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AVANT-PROPOS
In 2012, the state of Louisiana commemorates the Bicentennial
of Louisiana’s statehood: on April 30, 1812, Louisiana was
admitted as the 18th state in the Union. This event happens to
coincide with the Tercentennial of the enactment of French law as
the law applicable to La Louisiane, marking a starting point of the
law of Louisiana. 1 A Letter Patent signed on September 14, 1712
by King Louis XIV of France granted to Sieur Crozat, the king’s
Secretary, exclusive trade rights in all lands possessed by the king
“under the government of Louisiana,” whilst providing in article
VII that all laws applicable in Paris and its province, including
Edicts, Ordinances and Customs, were applicable to Louisiana.
This is the first document to make reference to the law to be
applied in Louisiana. Until the cession to Spain fifty years later,
French law officially applied in the immense territories that
stretched from the Gulf of Mexico to the Great Lakes and from the
Mississippi River to the Rocky Mountains and to the Isle of
Orleans east of the Mississippi River. The rediscovery of colonial
archives in New Orleans, and their future availability in digital
format, opens a new horizon to historical studies, though their
ambit might be limited to New Orleans and South Louisiana.
French law would cease to apply in Louisiana after its cession
to Spain in 1762. The complex and intricate Spanish laws, largely
derived from the Roman law of Justinian and that of the Visigoths,
remained in force after the retrocession of the Louisiana territories
to France in 1800 and the subsequent Louisiana Purchase by the
United States in 1803. The southern part of it was organized as the
Territory of Orleans, to become in 1812 the state of Louisiana.
French law would never apply again as such, but it would remain

1. One should not neglect the laws and customs of Native Americans. The
author feels ashamed to relegate them to a footnote. Whilst acknowledging their
existence, he pleads guilty and admits his ignorance.

2

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 5

influential after the territorial period, during two centuries of
statehood. 2
Two Notes published in this issue illustrate some of these
developments. Seán P. Donlan discusses the work of recent
historians of Louisiana law, showing that the study of the
development of a mixed legal system (such as the Louisianan),
whether based on a clash of legal cultures or continuity, requests a
combination of multiple skills, pertaining to a new discipline called
comparative legal history. 3 Alexandru-Daniel On authored a very
informative text on the Louisiana Translation Series, which makes
monuments of French legal literature accessible to English
speakers, and allows Aubry & Rau, Baudry-Lacantinerie, Gény,
and last but not least, Planiol, to remain leading doctrinal sources
in the state of Louisiana.
The present issue of the Journal of Civil Law Studies
contributes to the celebration of the past, showing how earlier
accomplishments can be reenergized to pave the way to the future,
moving the civil law of Louisiana from nearly dead, barely
resurrected status, to that of a beacon in a world where the civil
and common law traditions interfere and interact, mixed
jurisdictions becoming the norm.
This volume is an inaugural issue, with a new section Civil
Law in Louisiana to feature notes on significant cases decided in
the state, written by our Student Editors, all second and third year
law students at the LSU Paul M. Hébert Law Center, under the
supervision of their civil law or comparative law professors. From
Volume 5 onwards, Civil Law in Louisiana will appear in every
volume of the Journal. Also, for the first time, the Journal
publishes an LSU Law student Essay, showing how the civil law of

2. See Olivier Moréteau, Louisiana 1812-2012: 200 Years of Statehood
and 300 Years of French Law Influence, 59 LA. B.J. 325-326 (2012).
3. Comparative Legal History is the name of a new journal published by
Hart Publishing. Seán P. Donlan, an LSU Law Center graduate, is the Editor.
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Louisiana can help address a serious environmental problem of our
time.
This volume includes the presentation of a portion of the
translation work done at the Center of Civil Law Studies. Several
titles of the current Louisiana Civil Code are published in a
bilingual format in Civil Law Translations, with the original
English on the left and a French translation on the right. In
addition, short informative Book Reviews bring evidence of the
regained vitality of civil law scholarship in Louisiana.
Two Articles discuss and recombine two major themes of the
celebration: constitutional law and civil law. Professor Paul Baier,
a distinguished scholar and playwright, 4 stages the origins of
judicial review in Louisiana and trumpets words he rediscovered in
the Louisiana Constitution of 1812: “All laws contrary to this
Constitution shall be null and void.” This phrase was not to be
reenacted in more recent constitutions but Paul Baier makes an
opera out of it, promoting exegesis in a dialogue of two giants of
the judiciary, United Sates Chief Justice John Marshall and
Louisiana Judge François-Xavier Martin, showing how the latter,
known as the Father of Louisiana Jurisprudence, introduced
judicial review in the newly admitted state. The libretto was
carefully researched and drafted by coauthor Georgia Chadwick,
curator of most valuable original documents on Louisiana’s legal
history and the civil law in general, at the Law Library of
Louisiana, housed in the beautifully renovated building of the
Louisiana Supreme Court in New Orleans. De Revolutionibus,
reprinted with the kind permission of the Montreal based Éditions
Thémis and McGill University, redefines the place of the Civil
Code in Louisiana and in the legal universe. The author shows,
among other things, the growing influence of the Constitution on
4. His Play, “FATHER CHIEF JUSTICE”: E.D. WHITE AND THE
CONSTITUTION (1997) has been staged in several places in Louisiana, in
Washington, D.C. and soon in Boston. It features the life and work of Edward
Douglass White, the only Louisianan ever to become a Justice of the United
States Supreme Court (in 1894), and Chief Justice from 1910-1921.

4
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the Code in all civil law jurisdictions, and discusses how the Civil
Code, once at the center of the galaxy, has become a peripheral star
in Louisiana, much like in other civil law jurisdictions. In
Louisiana, like elsewhere, the Civil Code can be reenergized if recentered around the citizen.
Whether familiar or not with Louisiana law, readers will also
enjoy a Rediscovered Treasure of Louisiana Law, a late-19th
century essay by Thomas Semmes surveying the history of the
laws of Louisiana and offering a short and accurate overview of
the development of Roman law, proving if need be that the
Louisiana legal system, though technically 200- or 300-year old,
has roots ten times older. As expressed by the well-known
Southern author, William Faulkner, “The past is never dead. It’s
not even past.” 5
Olivier Moréteau

5. WILLIAM FAULKNER, REQUIEM FOR A NUN (1951).

JOHN MARSHALL

FRANÇOIS-XAVIER MARTIN
Photo by David Rigamer
Courtesy of Curator’s Office
Louisiana Supreme Court Museum

JUDICIAL REVIEW IN LOUISIANA: A BICENTENNIAL
EXEGESIS
By Paul R. Baier ∗ and Georgia Chadwick **
This court, and every court in this state, not only possesses
the right, but is duty bound, to declare void every act of the
legislature which is contrary to the constitution. The due
exercise of this power is of the utmost importance to the
people, and if it did not exist their rights would be shadows,
their laws delusions, and their liberty a dream.
—François-Xavier Martin
I. PRÉFACE: 1812-2012
No scholar of Louisiana’s public law that we can find has
trumpeted a “general provision” of Louisiana’s Constitution of
1812 that has since disappeared. This was a long time ago.
Louisiana joined the United States of America on April 30, 1812,
exactly nine years after the Louisiana Purchase of 1803—the year
of Marbury v. Madison. Jefferson doubted the constitutionality of
the purchase; John Marshall later sustained it. John Marshall was
Chief Justice of the United States in 1812. War with Britain raged.
General Andrew Jackson triumphed in the Battle of New Orleans.
But the Constitution triumphed over the General. This was the last
skirmish of the War of 1812, another Bicentenary to celebrate—or
to lament—depending on one’s view of the facts and the law. Here
is an early chapter, the earliest we can find, in the annals of judicial
review in Louisiana.
∗ George M. Armstrong, Jr., Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law
Center, Louisiana State University. Secretary, Supreme Court of Louisiana
Historical Society.
** Law Librarian of Louisiana. Executive Director, Supreme Court of
Louisiana Historical Society. Curator, Supreme Court of Louisiana Museum,
400 Royal Street, New Orleans, open to the public. The Museum’s exhibit cases
walk you through two hundred years of the Court’s history, in photographs,
portraiture, and memorabilia, from its earliest days in the Cabildo, built under
Spanish rule, ca. 1795, to the beaux arts magnificence of the Supreme Court’s
1910 building, now restored to its original glory in the heart of the Vieux Carré.
For a tour, call Georgia Chadwick, 504.310.2402.
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We mean judicial control by way of the Great Writ of
Habeas Corpus of the Executive Branch, of the Commander in
Chief—the judicial root, if you will, of Boumediene v. Bush, 553
U.S. 723 (2008), of late, the Supreme Court’s condemnation of
Section 7 of the Military Commission Act of 2006 as an
unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in
violation of Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 of the United States
Constitution: “The Clause protects the rights of the detained by a
means consistent with the essential design of the Constitution. It
ensures that, except during periods of formal suspension, the
Judiciary will have a time-tested device, the writ, to maintain the
‘delicate balance of governance’ that is itself the surest safeguard
of liberty.”—per Kennedy, J.—Chief Justice Roberts, joined by
Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito, dissenting.
Another 5-4, split decision. Binding on the President?
II. LE TEXTE
ARTICLE VI. SECT. 25. By way of a Bicentennial
exegesis we propose assaying the last general provision of Article
VI of Louisiana’s Constitution of 1812, the lost provision of
Louisiana’s fundamental law that caught our eye. It is the last of
twenty-five “Dispositions Générales,” to quote the French version.
It appears almost as an afterthought.
Here is the text of Section 25, precisely as it appears in the
English version of ARTICLE VI. General Provisions,
CONSTITUTION OR FORM OF GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE
OF LOUISIANA, adopted January 22, 1812, quoted in its elegant
simplicity, center-stage, so to speak, echoing down through
contemporary legislative, executive, and judicial chambers:
“All laws contrary to this Constitution shall be null and void.”
Or, to quote the French version:
“Les lois contraires à cette Constitution seront nulles.”
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III. THE LOST PROVISION
Section 25 disappeared from Louisiana’s public law with
the adoption of the Constitution of 1845. It has never appeared in
any Louisiana Constitution thereafter. Why? We suppose that after
a generation on the books, by the time of the Louisiana’s
Constitution of 1845, it was generally accepted that Louisiana’s
fundamental law, voiced by the Judiciary, controls the Legislative
and the Executive Magistracies. François-Xavier Martin in his
painstaking HISTORY OF LOUISIANA, FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD
(Vol. I, 1827; Vol. II, 1829) blithely passes over Section 25 in his
detailed description of the provisions of Louisiana’s first
Constitution. More recently, Tulane Law School Dean Emeritus
Cecil Morgan in his little jewel of a book, THE FIRST
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA (1975), for the
Historic New Orleans Collection, draws the reader’s attention to
“some interesting aspects” of Louisiana’s first Constitution that
“deserve special mention.” He says nothing at all, however, about
Section 25. To us, it jumps off the page. It reminds us of John
Marshall’s immortal principle, “supposed to be essential to all
written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is
void; and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by
that instrument.” The italics, nota bene, are John Marshall’s.
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 180 (1803).
After two hundred years we propose a Bicentennial Minute
entry essaying the origin of judicial review in Louisiana. We throw
Bicentenary light on what is a vital, yet completely overlooked,
now lost, provision of Louisiana’s first “CONSTITUTION OU
FORME DE GOUVERNEMENT DE L’ETAT DE LA
LOUISIANE.”
IV. FRANÇOIS-XAVIER MARTIN, GEORGE WYTHE
Doubtless there was talk of Montesquieu’s Espirit des Lois
in Vieux Carré coffee houses in the founding days of Louisiana’s

10
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public law. François Martin, a jurist of indefatigable scholarship,
undoubtedly nursed himself on Montesquieu and John Marshall.
He hardly slept for all the books he read. He spent his nights
preparing his astounding ORLEANS TERM REPORTS (1809-1812)
and his LOUISIANA TERM REPORTS (1813-1830), to say nothing of
his night watches reading law tirelessly, reading law endlessly. We
can easily imagine François Martin reading George Wythe’s
monumental opinion in Commonwealth v. Caton, 4 Call 5 (1782),
by candlelight in his Vieux Carré lodgings. We are sure he read it.
Here is Chancellor Wythe’s renowned passage announcing judicial
condemnation of a legislative act, 4 Call 8:
I shall not hesitate, sitting in this place, to say, to the
general court, Fiat justitia, ruat cœlum; and, to the usurping
branch of the legislature, you attempt worse than a vain
thing; for, although, you cannot succeed, you set an
example, which may convulse society to its centre. Nay
more, if the whole legislature, an event to be deprecated,
should attempt to overstep the bounds, prescribed to them
by the people, I, in administering the public justice of the
country, will meet the united powers at my seat in this
tribunal; and, pointing to the constitution, will say, to them,
here is the limit of your authority; and, hither, shall you go,
but no further.
Call in his report of the case advises: “N.B. It is said, that
this was the first case in the United States, where the question
relative to the nullity of an unconstitutional law was ever discussed
before a judicial tribunal; and the firmness of the judges
(particularly of Mr.Wythe,) was highly honourable to them; and
will always be applauded, as having fixed a precedent, whereon, a
general practice, which the people of this country think essential to
their rights and liberty, has been established.” 4 Call 21.
Wythe’s biography is entitled, GEORGE WYTHE: TEACHER
OF LIBERTY (Alonzo Dill, 1979) (“In observance of the 200th
anniversary of the beginning of the teaching of law at the College
of William and Mary, 1779-1979.”) Chancellor Wythe also taught
constitutional law at the College of William and Mary. For a brief
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period of time one of his students at William and Mary was none
other than—guess who?—John Marshall.
What was John Marshall doing in 1812?—the year of
Louisiana’s sovereignty? We will answer this question later in our
Bicentennial Minute Entry.
V. BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, ESPIRIT DES LOIS
Professor Jean Brissaud, late professor of legal history in
the University of Toulouse, in his heroic book, A HISTORY OF
FRENCH PUBLIC LAW (1904) (IX Continental Legal History Series;
translated by James W. Garner) (1915), tells us of Montesquieu’s
theory of separation of powers: “The spirit of independence of our
old Parliaments, their opposition to the crown, and the example
(which is questionable) of England counted for much in the
formation of this theory.” But French Public Law severed the
Judiciary’s head with La Révolution Française. “The judges could
not meddle in the exercise of legislative power, either by means of
orders taking jurisdiction, or by preventing or suspending the
execution of laws; nor could they pass upon the constitutionality of
laws.” Brissaud, § 502. The Principle of Separation of Powers.
Assuredly to the delight of Justice Antonin Scalia,
Montesquieu insists that the judiciary should restrict itself to
applying the laws to particular cases in a fixed and consistent
manner, so that “the judicial power, so terrible to mankind, . . .
becomes, as it were, invisible” ESPIRIT DES LOIS, 1748, 11.6; THE
SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, Thomas Nugent trans., New York, Hafner
Library of Classics, 1949, p.156.
Ironically, Justice Scalia is hardly invisible on this side of
the Atlantic. Judicial review in Louisiana, to be sure, is not one of
our French inheritances.

12
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VI. IL EMPEROR NAPOLEON, GENERAL ANDREW JACKSON
The Civil Law celebrates legislation, “c’est mon Code
civil,” says Napoleon. True enough. But whence judicial review in
Louisiana? What enables a Common Law judge to hold General
Andrew Jackson in contempt? Judge Dominick Hall so held. This
was the fiery judicial climax of the War of 1812. Hall was the
United States District Court judge sitting in New Orleans. Jackson
ordered Hall arrested for issuing a writ of habeas corpus
challenging the General’s declaration of martial law and his arrest
of one Louis Louallier, a native of France, a naturalized citizen of
the United States, and a member of Louisiana’s House of
Representatives. Louallier crossed Jackson’s sword by publishing a
letter to the editor of the Courier de la Louisiane. The letter
excoriated Jackson’s exile of Frenchmen from New Orleans. “MR.
EDITOR:—To remain silent on the last general orders, directing all
the Frenchmen, who now reside in New Orleans, to leave it within
three days, and to keep at a distance of 120 miles from it, would be
an act of cowardice, which ought not to be expected from a citizen
of a free country; and when everyone laments such an abuse of
authority, the press ought to denounce it to the people.”
Louallier extolls “the firmness of the magistrates, who are
the organs of the laws in this part of the union, and the guardians
of public order.”
He concludes by saying, “[I]t is high time the laws should
resume their empire.” “[I]t is time the citizens accused of any
crime should be rendered to their natural judges, and cease to be
dealt with before special or military tribunals, a kind of institution
held in abhorrence even in absolute governments . . . .” Alcée
Fortier, A HISTORY OF LOUISIANA (1904), Vol. III, p. 155.
VII. JUDGE F.-X. MARTIN
François-Xavier Martin, one of the “natural judges” to
whom Louallier addressed himself, says of General Jackson’s
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explosive reaction to Louallier’s letter: “Man bears nothing with
more impatience, than the exposure of his errors, and the contempt
of his authority.” You can find this universal truth reported in
Martin’s HISTORY OF LOUISIANA, Vol. II (1829), p. 392; Pelican
Publishing Co. Reprint 1975, p. 393.
General Jackson ordered Louallier tried as a spy by court
martial. It mattered not that Louallier was a naturalized citizen of
the United States and a civilian member of the Louisiana
Legislature. It made no difference that Louallier sided loyally with
Jackson against the British, who had fled New Orleans. Louallier’s
letter to the editor was seditious.
Death was the penalty under Jackson’s declaration of
martial law. Jackson considered New Orleans his military camp.
Inter arma silent leges, as Cicero says. The General was above the
law. He was beyond judicial control, according to the
Jurisprudence of the Camp.
VIII. JUDGE DOMINICK A. HALL
Not so at all. United States District Court Judge Dominick
Hall had the last word—for the moment at least—duly reported in
United States v. Major General Andrew Jackson, No. 791, United
States District Court, District of Louisiana (1815). Jackson’s arrest
of Hall was held a contempt of court, an unlawful military act
against “the firmness of the magistrates.” The General was fined a
thousand dollars. Later, after his two terms as President of the
United States, the United States Congress at the urging of
President John Tyler passed legislation reimbursing Jackson in full
for the thousand dollar fine he paid, plus interest amounting to
$2,700.
Here, then, is the earliest chapter in the life of judicial
review in Louisiana, recently revisited as a highlight of the
Bicentennial of the United States District Court, Eastern District of

14
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Louisiana, New Orleans, on line at http://www.laed.uscourts.gov
/200th/main.php.
IX. SOURCES OF SECTION 25
1. ALEXANDER HAMILTON. Alexander Hamilton’s
Federalist Paper No.78 is a pretty good place to start. We quote
the relevant passage:
The complete independence of the courts of justice is
peculiarly essential in a limited constitution. By a limited
constitution I understand one which contains certain
specified exceptions to the legislative authority; such for
instance is that it shall pass no bills of attainder, no ex post
facto laws, and the like. Limitations of this kind can be
preserved in practice no other way than through the
medium of the courts of justice; whose duty it must be to
declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the
constitution void. Without this, all the reservations of
particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing.
This from the original edition of THE FEDERALIST: A
COLLECTION OF ESSAYS, WRITTEN IN FAVOR OF THE NEW
CONSTITUTION, AS AGREED UPON BY THE FEDERAL CONVENTION,
SEPTEMBER 17, 1787, VOL. II. NEW-YORK: PRINTED AND SOLD BY
J. AND A. M‘LEAN, NO. 41, HANOVER-SQUARE, MDCCLXXXVIII, p.
292-293.
Hamilton’s No. 78 differs slightly, but significantly, from
Section 25. Only laws contrary to “the manifest tenor” of the
constitution are void.
This allows more flexibility in the joints of legislation and
keeps the judges at a deferring distance. James Bradley Thayer of
Harvard Law School dubbed this qualification on the scope of
judicial review, “The Rule of Clear Mistake.” James Bradley
Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129, 144 (1893). Today this
rule finds its voice most clearly in, say, Justice Breyer’s dissent in
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), or Chief
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Justice Roberts’s dissent in Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723
(2008).
2. KENTUCKY CONSTITUTION OF 1799. Next, it is
generally said that the Kentucky Constitution of 1799 is the origin
of Section 25. True enough, but our exegesis would emphasize a
difference in text that warrants notice. ARTICLE X of Kentucky’s
Constitution of 1799 is essentially a bill of rights that, through
some twenty-seven sections, recites the fundamental rights of
citizens, including the “natural and indefeasible right to worship
Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences”
and proclaims “[t]he free communication of thoughts and opinions
is one of the invaluable rights of man, and every citizen may freely
speak, write, and print on any subject, being responsible for the
abuse of that liberty.” Note the latter limitation of free speech:
“being responsible for the abuse of that liberty.” The Alien and
Sedition Acts of 1798 come to mind. Justice Samuel Chase’s stiff
enforcement of the Sedition Act against James Callender, a friend
of Thomas Jefferson in Republican Virginia, is well known.
Callender published a book entitled, THE PROSPECT BEFORE
US, in which he called President John Adams a “repulsive pedant,
a gross hypocrite and an unprincipled oppressor.” Chase presided
at Callender’s trial; the defense attempted to argue the
unconstitutionality of the law.
But Chase, a loyal federalist judge on the Supreme Court,
thought the law pristine, pure, and certainly constitutional. On the
other hand, Thomas Jefferson thought the Sedition Act pernicious,
impure, and patently unconstitutional. As President of the United
States Jefferson pardoned Callender on the ground that, in
President Jefferson’s view, the Sedition Act violated the First
Amendment. The President would follow his own legal judgment.
Never mind Justice Samuel Chase’s opinion. Here is an early
instance of inter-branch conflict over constitutional interpretation.
We shall recur to this matter in a moment.
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3. ARTICLE X. SEC. 28. ARTICLE X of the Kentucky
Constitution of 1799 concludes in its last section as follows:
Sec. 28. To guard against transgressions of the high powers
which we have delegated, we declare that everything in this
article is excepted out of the general powers of government,
and shall forever remain inviolate; and that all laws
contrary thereto, or contrary to this constitution, shall be
void.
This section’s text emphasizes the fundamental rights of the
citizen; all laws contrary thereto shall be void. Judicial review, just
as Hamilton justified it in No. 78, is aimed at protecting the
expressed fundamental rights of the citizen.
4. THOMAS JEFFERSON TO JAMES MADISON
(March 15, 1789). Thomas Jefferson is on record to the same
effect. Writing to James Madison about the proposed Bill of
Rights, he opined:
In the arguments in favor of a declaration of rights, you
omit one which has great weight with me; the legal check
which it puts in the hands of the judiciary. This is a body,
which, if rendered independent and kept strictly to their
own department, merits great confidence for their learning
and integrity.
James Madison’s support of the Judiciary as a guardian of
the proposed Bill of Rights is well known (1 Annals of Congress
457 (1789)):
If they are incorporated into the Constitution, independent
tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar
manner the guardians of those rights; they will be an
impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in
the Legislature or Executive; they will be naturally led to
resist every encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated
for in the Constitution by the declaration of rights.
5. MARBURY v. MADISON. Every first-year law student
can recite Chief Justice Marshall’s reasoning in Marbury v.
Madison in favor of the Judiciary adjudging the constitutionality of
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legislation. “Certainly all those who have framed written
constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and
paramount law of the nation, and consequently the theory of every
such government must be, that an act of the legislature, repugnant
to the constitution, is void.” Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137,
177 (1803). But who declares the repugnancy? Says the Great
Chief Justice: “It is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is.”
Of course, Jefferson insisted that the Judiciary keep strictly
to its own department. He thought John Marshall wandered too
loosely into Executive territory in Marbury v. Madison.
Jefferson always believed that each branch of government
should decide for itself the constitutionality of laws affecting it. In
other words, to him Judicial Supremacy was an anathema.
6. MONTESQUIEU. Ironically, judicial review in the
American Republic traces itself back ultimately to the Framers’
insistence on separation of powers, a morphed version of the Baron
de Montesquieu’s political theory. Recall Montesquieu considered
the judicial power “so terrible to mankind.” He had in mind the
French Parliaments of the Ancien Régime.
After the French Revolution the Parliaments were
dissolved. The judges were rendered eunuchs. “Of the three
powers above mentioned, the judiciary,” said Montesquieu, is
“next to nothing.” Not so here. George Wythe, John Marshall,
François Xavier-Martin—all gave voice to the Judiciary as
Guardian of the Ark of the Constitution. In other words, in
America the Judiciary is Montesquieu’s watchdog—over
Separation of Powers, as well as the Bill of Rights. Judicial
Review is born of both.
The doctrine of “division of powers,” as Montesquieu
formulated it, appears as the first Article of Kentucky’s
Constitution of 1799. Thomas Jefferson was its source, transmitted
by James Madison to John Brown to assist in the formation of the
Kentucky Constitution. THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, Julian
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P. Boyd ed., Princeton Univ. Press, 1952, Vol. 6, p. 283. In turn, it
appears as Article I of Louisiana’s Constitution of 1812; they are
duplicates. Here is Louisiana’s:
ARTICLE 1st.
Concerning the distribution of the Powers of Government.
SECT. 1st. The powers of the government of the State of
Louisiana shall be divided into three distinct departments,
and each of them be confided to a separate body of
Magistracy viz—those which are Legislative to one, those
which are executive to another, and those which are
judiciary to another.
SECT. 2d. No person or Collection of persons, being one of
those departments, shall exercise any power properly
belonging to either of the others; except in the instances
hereinafter expressly directed or permitted.
George Wythe justified judicial review in the name of
separation of powers. He held an act of the Virginia House of
Delegates, a pardon, unconstitutional where Virginia’s
Constitution required the concurrence of the Senate, which was not
forthcoming. Commonwealth v. Caton is the taproot of judicial
review in the American Republic, as we have unearthed it.
John Marshall himself while a member of Virginia’s
Executive Council was asked to remove a Justice of the Peace for
gross misdemeanors disgraceful to his office. In an opinion signed
by the future Chief Justice of the United States, dated February 20,
1783—twenty years before Marbury v. Madison—the Executive
declared that “the Law authorizing the Executive to enquire into
the Conduct of a Magistrate . . . is repugnant to the Act of
Government, contrary to the fundamental principles of our
constitution, and directly opposite to the general tenors of our
Laws.” PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, p. 280.
So too, judicial review in Louisiana finds root in the first
article of the Constitution of 1812, “Concerning the distribution of
the Powers of Government.”
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X. ON READING LAW
What would Justice Antonin Scalia say of ARTICLE VI,
SECT. 25? He would insist on reading its text according to its
original meaning. We had better repeat the text: “All laws contrary
to this Constitution shall be null and void.” What this means to us
is that all laws contrary to this Constitution are null and void. But
this is an exegesis of judicial review in Louisiana, not a review of
Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner’s new book, READING LAW, THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (Thompson/West 2012).
XI. SECTION 25’S TEXT
The text of Section 25 says nothing at all about which
organ of government, or perhaps all of them, has the constitutional
authority to decree a conflict between statute and Constitution. The
text says nothing at all about this. For the answer, we must look
elsewhere. Perhaps to history. Perhaps to THE FEDERALIST,
favorite reading of Justice Scalia. Perhaps “Es liegt in der Natur
der Sache,” as the Germans say. Or, to repeat Chief Justice John
Marshall’s exclamation in Marbury: “It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is.” 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803).
Justice Scalia subscribes to judicial review, to be sure, but
not the freewheeling nonsense of the Living Constitutionalist
Society. We commend READING LAW to our readers.
XII. THE NOTION OF A “LIVING CONSTITUTION”
Justice Scalia condemns the notion of a “Living
Constitution.” That is to say, a “living organism,” one that must
evolve with society or else “become brittle and snap.” Reading
Law, p. 410. So speak its advocates. Scalia’s response? “Sed truffa
est!” “But this is nonsense!” To the contrary (id., 407-408):
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[I]f the Living Constitution advocates are correct, if the
American Constitution should mean whatever each
successive generation of Americans thinks it ought to
mean, then Marbury v. Madison was wrongly decided. The
Members of Congress take the same oath to support the
Constitution that the Justices do. Marbury v. Madison’s
holding that the Supreme Court can disregard Congress’s
determination of what the Constitution requires is firmly
rooted in the reasoning that the Constitution is a law, whose
meaning, like that of other laws, can be discerned by lawtrained judges.
But what of law-trained Presidents? What of a Harvard
Law School President who thinks the Affordable Health Care Act
constitutional? The Constitution says nothing at all about why
Justice Antonin Scalia’s legal opinion should trump President
Barack Obama’s. The Defense of Marriage Act is unconstitutional
according to President Obama. He instructed his Attorney General
not to defend its constitutionality in court. The Congress of the
United States, however, passed the Act. Members of Congress, a
majority for sure, presumably judged DOMA constitutional
pursuant to their oath to support the Constitution. The Supreme
Court has yet to voice its opinion on the question.
XIII. A BLANK SPACE
Our point here is that the text of Section 25, however clear,
gets us nowhere. It is a blank space in our Bicentennial inquiry. To
be sure, we bow humbly to Justice Scalia’s “2. Supremacy-ofText Principle”:—“The words of a governing text are of
paramount concern, and what they convey, in their context, is
what the text means.” READING LAW, p. 56.
But ironically, the very power that makes Justice Scalia’s
opinion trump that of the President, assuming he has four votes for
his OPINION OF THE COURT, is nowhere to be found in what the text
of Section 25 means. Judicial supremacy comes to life only later,
after John Marshall, after Marbury v. Madison.
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It is clear to us at least, if not to Justice Scalia, that “The
judicial Power of the United States,” as Article III of the United
States Constitution declares it, has evolved over time—in fact and
in law.
Thomas Jefferson in response to Chief Justice Marshall’s
subpoena duces tecum in the Burr trial invoked the prerogatives of
the Presidency, an early claim of Executive Privilege. He withheld
certain documents in the interest of national security. Abraham
Lincoln defied Chief Justice Taney’s writ. Richard Nixon
disgraced the Presidency, but he stiffly yielded to Chief Justice
Burger’s judicial rejection of his claim of Executive Privilege, a
claim that “he and he alone” is the proper one to interpret the
Constitution regarding the scope of Executive Privilege. The
quotation is from Leon Jaworski’s oral argument.
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), if not Cooper
v. Aaron before it, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), surely settles the question of
which of Montesquieu’s three branches tops the tree.
XIV. CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN MARSHALL
For our Bicentennial salute to Section 25, we should rather
invoke the immortal words of The Great Chief Justice, John
Marshall: “In considering this question, then, we must never
forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding.” McCulloch v.
Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 407 (1819). (Justice Scalia quotes this
line in READING LAW, but he mistakenly fails to italicize the “a” in
John Marshall’s “it is a constitution we are expounding” (p. 405).
Pardonez nous, Mr. Justice.
XV. IL GIUDICE SAPIENTE
We consider Justice Scalia Il Giudice Sapiente—from the
Latin “sapere,” to have taste or flavor; wise; full of knowledge;
discerning; often ironical—surely a fit description of the first
Roman on the Court. Paul R. Baier, The Supreme Court, Justinian,
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and Antonin Scalia: Twenty Years in Retrospect, 67 La. L. Rev.
489, 502 (2007).
Justinian himself would admire Justice Scalia. Il Giudice
Justinianus, another of our terms of endearment for Scalia, J.,
quotes Justinian’s Digest in his book READING LAW (p. 56): A
verbis legis non est recedendum (“Do not depart from the words of
the law”).
Justice
Scalia
considers
the
evolutionists’—the
contemporary constitutional Darwinists’—reliance on Chief
Justice Marshall’s grand dictum, “it is a constitution we are
expounding” to be absolute nonsense, at worse an absurdity, at best
a canard. “But far from suggesting that the Constitution evolves, its
whole point was just the opposite.” READING LAW, p. 405.
XVI. EVOLUTION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Quite to the contrary, our researches convince us that
Section 25’s vital significance, its Bicentennial meaning after two
hundred years, is not to be found in its text—after all it has
disappeared—but in the evolution of judicial review in the
American Republic. Section 25 shows that Justice Scalia’s horse is
dead. It has been withdrawn from il Palio di Siena.
Mea culpa, Il Giudice Justinianus. But let us move on to
other Bicentennial data.
XVII. TREATY OF CESSION, ENABLING ACT
Article III of the Treaty of Cession between the United
States of America and the French Republic of April 30, 1803 (8
Stat. 200) contains a promise that the inhabitants of the ceded
territory shall be incorporated in the union of the United States,
and admitted as soon as possible, “according to the principles of
the federal constitution”; the Enabling Act of Congress of February
20, 1811 (2 Stat. 641), authorizes a constitutional convention for
the purpose of framing a government and incorporating the citizens
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of the Territory of Orleans into a sovereign state. It requires the
convention to declare, “in behalf of the people of the said territory,
that it adopts the constitution of the United States” and provides
further that the constitution to be formed:
shall be republican, and consistent with the constitution of
the United States; that it shall contain the fundamental
principles of civil and religious liberty; that it shall secure
to the citizens the trial by jury in all criminal cases, and the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, conformable to the
principles of the constitution of the United States . . .
We see in the Treaty of Cession and the Enabling Act the
inchoate right of judicial review, assuring to the people of
Louisiana as their birthright the fundamental principles of
separation of powers and of individual rights. Marbury v. Madison
announced these vital features of the public law of the United
States of America on February 24, 1803, a couple of months before
the Treaty of Cession and the Enabling Act. To our minds, Article
III and the Enabling Act adopt by reference John Marshall’s
reasoning in Marbury v. Madison: “[A]n act of the legislature,
repugnant to the constitution is void.”
Certainly our research and exegesis suggest that the
principle of judicial review implicit in Marbury, and perhaps John
Marshall’s opinion itself, may very well have been on the minds of
the Framers of Article VI, Section 25 of Louisiana’s Constitution
of 1812.
XVIII. LOUISIANA’S MARBURY V. MADISON
Mayor v. Morgan, 7 Martin (N.S) 1 (1828), is Louisiana’s
Marbury v. Madison. François-Xavier Martin—assuredly,
Louisiana’s John Marshall—delivered the opinion of the Court.
The case is this. The Mayor and City Council of New Orleans
refused obedience to a writ of mandamus issued by a court of first
instance commanding the Mayor et al. to seat a person on the
Council whose election was drawn in question. An act of the
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Legislature declared that the City Council “shall be the judge” of
the election of its members. Judge Martin reasoned that if the
Legislature had the power to grant to the municipal corporation of
New Orleans the right to determine the validity of the elections of
its members, the district court was without jurisdiction to issue the
writ of mandamus. Held: The Legislature had the power to render
the City Council the “judge of the validity of their elections, and
prohibit courts of justice from interfering with its decisions”; the
provision of the Acts of 1816 in question was constitutional. Thus
the writ of mandamus was void. Morgan, the Sheriff, who seized
the revenues of the City in execution of the judicial orders, was a
trespasser liable in damages.
We commend Judge Martin’s full opinion to the reader as
an exemplar of Martin’s judicial statesmanship and the power of
his judicial poetics.
There is plainly an echo of John Marshall in Judge Martin’s
opinion in Mayor v. Morgan, 7 Martin (N.S.), at 7:
This court, and every court in this state, not only possesses
the right, but is duty bound, to declare void every act of the
legislature which is contrary to the constitution. The due
exercise of this power is of the utmost importance to the
people, and if it did not exist their rights would be shadows,
their laws delusions, and their liberty a dream; but it should
be exercised with the utmost caution, and when great and
serious doubt exists, this tribunal should give to the people
the example of obedience to the will of the legislature.
XIX. CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN MARSHALL, 1812
What was Chief Justice Marshall doing in 1812? We
promised to answer to this question earlier on. The case we have in
mind is State of New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch 164 (1812). It is
not mentioned in any contemporary constitutional law casebook.
We dug it up ourselves by leafing through the pages of 7 Cranch,
February Term 1812. This is what legal historians call original
research.
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Our digging shows the Great Chief Justice adjudging a
constitutional claim arising under a Treaty of Cession between
certain Delaware Indians and what was then the Province of New
Jersey, under a conveyance of land from King Charles 2d, to the
Duke of York. These Delaware Indians had claims to a
considerable portion of lands in New Jersey. The Act of Cession,
August, 1758, relinquished the Indians’ claims on condition that
the government purchase a tract of land on which they might reside
in perpetuity. The Act stipulated that the land to be purchased for
the Indians “shall not hereafter be subject to any tax, any law usage
of custom to the contrary, in any wise notwithstanding.”
Later on, in 1801, the Delaware of New Jersey wanted to
migrate from the State to join their brethren in Stockbridge, New
York. The New Jersey Delaware obtained an act of the New Jersey
Legislature authorizing the sale of their land. “This act contains no
expression in any manner respecting the privilege of exemption of
taxation which was annexed to those lands by the act, under which
they were purchased and settled on by the Indians,” recites Chief
Justice Marshall in his opinion of the Court. Thereafter in 1803,
the year of Treaty of Cession between the United States and the
Republic of France, and, coincidently, the year of Marbury v.
Madison, the land in question was sold.
Next, as you might imagine, the New Jersey Legislature
repealed the act of 1758, which had exempted the land from
taxation. Held: The Repealing Act “is repugnant to the constitution
of the United States, in as much as it impairs the obligation of a
contract, and is, on that account, void.” And more—per Marshall,
C. J. (7 Cranch 167):
The privilege [of exemption from taxation] though for the
benefit of the Indians, is annexed, by the terms which
create it, to the land itself, not to their persons. It is for their
advantage that it should be annexed to the land, because, in
the event of a sale, on which alone the question could
become material, the value would be enhanced by it.
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In short, in 1812, the year of Louisiana’s sovereignty, Chief
Justice Marshall was enforcing the Constitution of the United
States, viz.: “The Constitution of the United States declares that no
state shall “pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law
impairing the obligation of contracts.” Article VI, Section 20 of the
Louisiana Constitution of 1812 says almost the same thing: “No ex
post facto law nor any law impairing the obligation of contracts
shall be passed.” And, then, we know, there is Article VI, Section
25. We quote its pristine text one last time: “All laws contrary to
this Constitution shall be null and void.”
Chief Justice Marshall, if we may say so, is an honored
guest at our Bicentennial table.
XX. A BICENTENNIAL MINUTE ENTRY
We come full circle, back to the future, back to CASES
ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF LOUISIANA, EASTERN DISTRICT. FEBRUARY
TERM, 1815, 3 Martin (1813-1815).
We mean the clash between the General and the Judge
previously rehearsed. This time, however, we draw the legal
historian’s attention to the Minute Book of the Louisiana Supreme
Court. It plainly shows that it was Louisiana’s Judge François
Martin, not United States District Court Judge Dominick Hall, who
first trumpeted the authority of judicial review in the annals of
Louisiana’s public law.
Here are the facts, a matter of reported chronology.
At the opening of the February Term, Eastern District,
1815, a commission was read by which François-Xavier Martin,
then Attorney General of the State, was appointed a Judge of the
Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana, together with a certificate
of his having taken the oaths required by the Constitution and law,
whereupon he took his seat. “The din of war prevented any
business being done, during this term.” 3 Martin V 3 [529].
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A month later, at the opening of the March Term 1815,
before the Honorable Pierre Derbigny and the Honorable F.-X.
Martin, the Minute Book shows:
On motion of Mr. Duncan of counsel for the appellees it is
ordered that the appellant—to show cause on Monday next
the 13th instant—why the parties should not proceed in this
case notwithstanding the act passed by the Legislature on
the 18th december last, entitled “An Act . . .
We quote the minute entry of March 7, 1815. The case is
James Johnson v. Duncan et al.’s Syndics, reported in 3 Martin
530.
On the same page of the Minute Book, appears the minute
entry of Monday 13th March 1815:
The parties aforesaid having appeared by their attorneys in
conformity with a rule taken in this case on the 7th instant
& the arguments thereon being closed the Court took time
to decide.
Next, our Bicentennial Minute entry appears on the same
leaf of the Minute Book, this for Monday, March 20th, 1815:
The Court now delivered their opinion in writing on the
motion made in this cause on the 7th instant and ordered
that the same be overruled.
What is this case about?
Martin, J., explains the case in his report, 3 Martin 530.
Remember, the din of war raged. Here is the terse opening of
Judge Martin’s opinion of the Court:
Martin, J. A motion that the Court might proceed in this
case, has been resisted on two grounds:
1. That the city and its environs were by general orders of
the officer, commanding the military district, put on the
15th of December last, under strict Martial Law.
2d. That by the 3d sec. of an act of assembly, approved on
the 18th of December last, all proceedings in any civil case
are suspended.

28

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 5

Judge Martin first addresses the argument of General
Jackson. Listen to the voice of Louisiana’s Judge François-Xavier
Martin—Bicentennial fireworks on the levee (3 Martin, 532-533):
We are told that the commander of the military district is
the person who is to suspend the writ, and is to do so,
whenever in his judgment the public safety appears to
require it: that, as he may thus paralyze the arm of the
justice of his country in the most important case, the
protection of personal liberty of the citizen, it follows that,
as he who can do the more can do the less, he can also
suspend all other functions of the civil magistrate, which he
does by his proclamation of Martial Law.
THIS mode of reasoning varies toto celo from the decision
of the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of
Swartout [sic] and Bollman, arrested in this city in 1806 by
general Wilkinson. The Court there declared, that the
Constitution had exclusively vested in Congress the right of
suspending the privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus, and
that body was the sole judge of the necessity that called for
the suspension. “If, at any time,” said the Chief Justice,
“the public safety shall require the suspension of the
powers vested in the Courts of the United States by this act,
(the Habeas Corpus act,) it is for the Legislature to say so.
This question depends on political considerations, on which
the Legislature is to decide. Till the Legislature will be
expressed, this Court can only see its duties, and must obey
the law.” 4 Cranch 101.
Swartwout and Bollman, you might surmise, is the voice of
John Marshall.
Thus, John Marshall is brought home to our Bicentennial
table as a surprise guest. The Great Chief Justice is here courtesy
of Louisiana’s Great Jurist François Martin. It is a nice touch to
our way of seeing things that John Marshall and F.-X. Martin’s
marble busts face each other, today, after two hundred years,
guarding the portal to the Louisiana Supreme Court Chamber,
fourth floor, 400 Royal Street, in the heart of the Vieux Carré—
open to the public.
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Of course Judge Martin sustained the act of the Louisiana
Legislature suspending all judicial proceedings during the War of
1812, against the claim that the act impairs the obligation of
contracts (3 Martin, 542, et seq.)
It does not, however, necessarily follow that an act called
for by other circumstances, than the apparent necessity of
relieving debtors, one of the consequences of which is
nevertheless to work some delay in the prosecution of suits,
and, consequently to retard the recovery and payment of
debts, must always be declared unconstitutional.
One thinks of our contemporary Louisiana Legislature
likewise suspending prescription after Hurricane Katrina. Nothing
unconstitutional about that.
Now notice, please, that Judge Martin first takes up Major
General Jackson’s claim that his declaration of Martial Law trumps
the Great Writ of Habeas Corpus. Why do that? The Legislature
has constitutionally suspended judicial proceedings. Why address
the General’s claim? The answer lies in what scholars call “judicial
statesmanship.” Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Marbury v.
Madison comes to mind. He addressed jurisdiction last. So too,
Martin.
Here is the closing part of Judge Martin’s rejection of
Major General Jackson’s claim (3 Martin 537): “How preposterous
then the idea that a military commander may, by his own authority,
destroy the tribunal established by law as the asylum of those
oppressed by military despotism!”

We reach the end of our Bicentennial sojourn, a final
minute entry.
The Minute Book of the Louisiana Supreme Court shows
that Judge Martin rendered on Monday, March 20, 1815.
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On the other hand—take note ye legal historians—the
contempt proceedings against Major General Andrew Jackson, No.
791, commenced the next day, March 21, 1815. John Dick, the
United States Attorney, was anxious to initiate contempt
proceedings against General Jackson; “but Hall insisted on a few
days being exclusively given to the manifestation of the joyous
feelings, which termination of the war excited. He did not yield to
Dick’s wishes till the 21st.” François Xavier Martin, HISTORY OF
LOUISIANA, Vol. II (1829), p. 416; Pelican Publishing Co. Reprint
1975, p. 405. Amazingly, our Bicentennial Minute Entry shows
that Judge Martin appears first in the Chronology of Judicial
Review in Louisiana.
Judge Martin himself, in his LOUISIANA TERM REPORTS,
appends a note (3 Martin 557) to his report of Johnson v. Duncan
et al.’s Syndics. We leave the last word to Reporter F.-X. Martin—
his enduring gift to the American Republic: “THE doctrine
established, in the first part of the opinion of the Court, in the
above case, is corroborated by the decision of the District Court of
the United States for the Louisiana District, in the case of United
States vs. Jackson, in which the defendant, having acted in
opposition to it, was fined $1000.” (Our Bicentennial emphasis—
corroborated.)
Requiescat in pace, F.-X. Martin.

DE REVOLUTIONIBUS: THE PLACE OF THE CIVIL CODE
†
IN LOUISIANA AND IN THE LEGAL UNIVERSE
Olivier Moréteau ∗
I. OF CENTER AND REVOLUTION: CIRCLING WITHIN AND AROUND
COPERNICUS’ SKULL
In May 2010, the Polish astronomer Nicolaus Copernicus
(1473-1543) was buried at the Frombork Cathedral, in Poland, 467
years after his death. His remains had rested in this cathedral,
along with those of many others, since 1543, the year of his death.
Modern technologies helped identify his remains (some hair found
in a book that he had used matched the DNA of a skull found
under the marble floor of the church) 1 and he was buried again on
May 22, at a ceremony in which the Catholic Church, represented
by the papal Nuncio and the Archbishop of Lublin, solemnly
acknowledged a prominent scientist who had been declared a
heretic because of his revolutionary ideas.
In 1543, just before his death, Copernicus had published De
Revolutionibus Orbium Celestium (On the Revolutions of the
†
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AMÉRIQUES 1-34 (Jimena Andino Dorato,
Jean-Frédérick Ménard & Lionel Smith eds., Thémis, Montreal, 2011). The
author thanks the editors and the publishers for authorizing this second
publication.
∗ Professor of Law, Russell B. Long Eminent Scholars Academic Chair,
Director of the Center of Civil Law Studies, Paul M. Hebert Law Center,
Louisiana State University; formerly Professor of Law, Université Jean Moulin
Lyon 3 and Director of the Édouard Lambert Institute of Comparative Law. The
author thanks Dragomir Cosanici, Dr. Agustín Parise, and Robert A. Pascal for
their help in the research and editing.
1. In the DIGITAL JOURNAL of May 24, 2010, Igor I. Solar wrote: “Göran
Henriksson, astronomer at the University of Uppsala in Sweden, searching in a
book, MAGNUM ROMANUM CALENDARIUM by Johannes Stoeffler, dated 1518,
found several hairs inside the book. This is a manual that Copernicus had used
during his life in Poland and which was taken by the Swedes during the PolishSwedish wars in the first quarter of the seventeenth century.” Polish astronomer
Nicolaus
Copernicus
buried,
again, online:
<http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/292435> (last visited on May 29, 2010).
CODES: PARCOURS À TRAVERS LES

32

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 5

Celestial Spheres), a book where he explained that the sun, and not
the earth, is the center of the universe. He is alleged to have first
expressed this view five hundred years ago, around 1510. 2 Little
did I know that Copernicus would be buried again between my oral
presentation, given in Montreal in November 2009, and my writing
this text for publication, in May 2010. But I knew that one year
before Copernicus’s first funeral Hernando de Soto, the Spanish
explorer and conquistador, had died on the banks of the
Mississippi River near the mouth of the Red River, 3 north of the
future Baton Rouge. He was the first documented European to
discover the region, yet he did not claim it for Spain. The vast
territory was later named Louisiana by Robert Cavelier de la Salle,
who solemnly took possession in the name of King Louis XIV of
France in 1682.
Did a geocentric or heliocentric vision of the universe mean
anything to the great explorers who mapped remote and unknown
areas of the Earth? Their concern was to find an alternative route to
India and discover new resources; at least they knew that their
planet was spherical. If a center existed, they were physically and
mentally far from it, charting the fringes of the known world. After
all, Copernicus himself had understood that our universe has no
center.
Many legal scholars, even the most sophisticated, believe that
their legal universe has a center. When comparatists describe
modern civil law systems, they place the civil code at its center.
True, this does not always reflect the way civil law jurisdictions
view themselves. Scotland and South Africa cannot view
themselves as civil code centric, since they do not have civil codes.
2. It appeared in his Commentariolus or “little commentary” circulated
between 1510 and 1514: Nicolai Copernici de hypothesibus motuum coelestium
a se constitutis commentariolus, known from later transcripts. 3 THE NEW
ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, MICROPAEDIA (15th ed., Encyclopaedia
Britannica, Chicago, 2007), s.v. “Copernicus, Nicolaus”.
3. FRANÇOIS-XAVIER MARTIN, THE HISTORY OF LOUISIANA 36 (Pelican 3d
ed., Gretna LA, 2000) (1827).
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France views itself as legicentric, 4 rather than civil code centric,
but perceives its Civil Code as a civil constitution. 5 Inside a given
legal system, the paradigm is rather pyramidal, reflecting the
hierarchy of norms, especially for those espousing a positivistic
vision of the law.
Turning to Louisiana and Quebec, the two North American
jurisdictions having kept the civil law tradition, there is a clear
perception, at least among lawyers trained in the civil law, that the
civil code occupies some central position. Together with the
French language, courageously maintained in Quebec and sadly
undermined in Louisiana, the civil code and civil law are markers
of identity. The civil code is a powerful symbol of the survival of
the civil law tradition on a continent dominated by the common
law.
Yet, to focus now on Louisiana, which will be at the core of the
following paragraphs, the civil code appears as a weakened
celestial body, with a rather low gravitational force. In addition,
the position of the code is less and less central to the legal order.
As will be seen in this paper, Louisiana scholars and lawyers are
very much aware of the phenomenon and may have a tendency to
see things as even worse than they are: civilians feel like a
minority and have developed an inferiority complex, preventing
them from being aware of the remarkable skills they have
developed, such as on the one hand exercising a highly valuable
ability to express the civil law in English, somehow resisting the
linguistic contamination of common law phraseology, and on the
other hand demonstrating a unique ability to revise the civil code,
making it more compatible with the common law system whilst
somehow keeping it in the realm of the civil law. These two skills
are greatly needed in the present global world and they should be
4. Stéphane Rials, Sieyès ou la délibération sans la prudence, Éléments
pour une interprétation de la philosophie de la Révolution et de l’esprit du
légicentrisme, 13 DROITS 123, at 137 (1991).
5. PAUL DUBOUCHET, LA PENSÉE JURIDIQUE AVANT ET APRÈS LE CODE
CIVIL 92 (L’Hermès, Lyon, 1991).
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marketed actively and exported, a mission that the author of this
paper has placed at the core of the agenda of the Louisiana State
University Center of Civil Law Studies, together with the
promotion of an active Louisiana civil law doctrine.
Louisiana is not the only civil law jurisdiction feeling that its
civil law tradition is threatened by a conquering common law. It is
true that in less mixed jurisdictions where the civil law does not
have a strong competitor – systems that some may be tempted to
describe as pure civil law – the civil code may have a much higher
gravitational force. However, other legal bodies exert a very strong
attractive force, such as constitutions, charters, conventions
protecting human rights, and international agreements. Even in the
countries that cradled the ancient and modern civil law tradition,
extrinsic pressure comes via many channels, including European
integration and global commercial practice. In addition, intrinsic
forces are also at work: decodification is endemic; codes are
hastily revised or are oftentimes weakened by a multiplication of
satellite codes or ancillary statutes that may be compared to errant
meteors. 6
Whatever the situation may be in mixed or less mixed civil law
jurisdictions, the civil code remains the port of entry for any
exploration of the legal universe, even if that point is less and less
central or more and more peripheral.
Does this mean that the center has been lost? Copernicus’
intuition may be revived in our legal context. This paper suggests
that the center may be retrieved, as everything is a matter of
perception or representation. It may be retrieved if one agrees to
place the citizen at the center of the legal order. A Copernician
revolution may be proposed: 7 legal bodies must gravitate around
the citizen rather than the other way around. Based on this idea or
6. See generally, Olivier Moréteau & Agustín Parise, Recodification in
Louisiana and Latin America, 83 TUL. L. REV. 1103 (2009).
7. For a prior use of the Copernician metaphor, see LÉONTIN-JEAN
CONSTANTINESCO, TRAITÉ DE DROIT COMPARÉ, t. 1 at 8 (Librairie générale de
droit et de jurisprudence, Paris, 1972).
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renewed perspective, 8 which echoes the work of those turning the
pyramid of norms upside down, 9 I propose to revisit what may be
the essence of the civil law tradition.
This journey in the form of a revolution will start in Louisiana,
with a brief survey of the Louisiana Civil Code experience and a
study of the perception of the code in judicial practice. We will
then look for the lost center, to watch phenomena such as the
decomposition and recomposition of codified law, and comment
on the constitutionalisation and internationalization of private law.
Finally, the revolution will take us back to the perspective of a
legal order recentered around the citizen, taking us to the core of
the civil law tradition. A revolution is a circular motion. We must
identify what we are turning around to understand the future of
civil codes in the Americas and in other parts of the world. But let
us start where we are, in Louisiana.
II. WHY WE LOST THE CENTER: QUO VADIS CODEX CIVILIS
LOUISIANENSIS?
Where is the Louisiana Civil Code heading to? Well, no
question as to the future may be answered without looking at the
past and the present. My first visit to Louisiana was from Boston
where I used to admire Gauguin’s masterpiece “D'où venons nous,
que sommes nous, où allons nous.” Let us explore the code and
check where it stands in classroom and court practice.

8. Robert A. Pascal, Of the Civil Code and Us, 59 LA. L. REV. 301 (1998);
Olivier Moréteau, A Summary Reflection on the Future of Civil Codes in
Europe, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR HELMUT KOZIOL 1449 (Peter Apathy, Raimund
Bollenberger et al. eds., Sramek, Vienna, 2010); and Olivier Moréteau, Libres
propos sur l’avenir des Codes civils en Europe, in MÉLANGES EN L’HONNEUR DE
SERGE GUINCHARD 1049 (Dalloz, Paris, 2010),.
9. Jacques Vanderlinden, Réseaux, pyramide et pluralisme ou Regards sur
la rencontre de deux aspirants-paradigmes de la science juridique, 49 REV.
INTERDISCIPL. ET. JUR. 11 (2002).
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A. The Louisiana Civil Code: between ius and lex
The Louisiana Civil Code is often described as a clone of the
French Civil Code. 10 This is not true, not even on the surface, a
study of the evidence and of historical literature 11 revealing a
complex and subtle reality.
1. The Digest of 1808
The ancestor to the current code is the Digest of the Civil Laws
now in force in the territory of Orleans enacted five years after the
United States purchased Louisiana from the French. 12 The Digest
of 1808 may have the format of a code, but strictly speaking it is a
digest and not a code for the very reason that it does not replace the
preexisting law. The laws of Spain in force in the Territory of
Orleans at the time of the Louisiana Purchase remained in force
after the enactment of the Digest. The French did not reestablish
French law during the few weeks in which they took control of the
territory retro-ceded to them by Spain in the Treaty of St.
Ildefonso. Spanish laws remained in force and they were abrogated
only to the extent that they were contradicted by the provisions of
the Digest. 13 The Digest of 1808 was meant to encapsulate the
basic civil laws in force in Louisiana at the time of the purchase,
namely Spanish laws.
10. BÉNEDICTE FAUVARQUE-COSSON & SARA PATRIS-GODECHOT, LE CODE
CIVIL FACE À SON DESTIN 31-32 (Documentation française, Paris, 2006); GÁBOR
HAMZA, LE DÉVELOPPEMENT DU DROIT PRIVÉ EUROPÉEN 176 (Faculty of Law,
Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, 2005); GILLES CUNIBERTI, GRANDS
SYSTÈMES DE DROIT CONTEMPORAINS 122 (L.G.D.J., Paris, 2007); ÉRIC
CARPANO & EMMANUELLE MAZUYER, LES GRANDS SYSTÈMES JURIDIQUES
ÉTRANGERS 141-142 (Gualino, Paris, 2009).
11. GEORGE DARGO, JEFFERSON'S LOUISIANA: POLITICS AND THE CLASH OF
LEGAL TRADITIONS (Revised ed., The Law Book Exchange, 2009); and
RICHARD HOLCOMBE KILBOURNE, A HISTORY OF THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE:
THE FORMATIVE YEARS, 1803-1839 (Reprint, Claitors Publishing Division,
Baton Rouge LA, 2008).
12. This part of the article borrows part of its exposition from Moréteau &
Parise, supra note 6, at 1112-1121, sometimes drawing from it verbatim, with
the coauthor’s kind permission.
13. Act of March 31, 1808, No. 120, 1808 La. Acts XXX, at 126.

2012]

DE REVOLUTIONIBUS

37

A Louisiana scholar once contended that the Digest was to a
large extent a replica of the Code Napoléon, with 85% of the
articles derived from or influenced by French sources. 14 The
resemblance to the French Civil Code, and even greater
resemblance to France’s more Roman Projet of 1800, is not
surprising. Spanish law and French law were alike on a large
number of issues, primarily wherever they derived from Roman
law or the Law Merchant. 15 It was therefore legitimate and
expedient for James Brown and Louis Moreau Lislet to borrow
from the French texts wherever they encapsulated the substance of
both French and Spanish laws. The substance of the Digest differs
wherever the two laws were different. 16 Examples may be found,
among others, in the law that pertains to marriage, community of
gains, successions, and alimony. 17
The fact that we are not dealing with a code in the French sense
is evidenced to by the response of judges to the Digest, which also
proves the Spanish ancestry of the Digest. Wherever they did not
find the precise solution to a problem by looking at the letter of the
Digest, judges looked back to the texts on which it was founded
and followed the solutions of antique Roman law and Spanish law,
since these were still in force. 18 Though resembling the French
Civil Code like a brother rather than a distant cousin, the Digest is
different in its essence. It is not a new law but a digest of ancient
laws. What makes the difference is the abrogation clause.
The Act of March 31st, 1808, by the Territorial Legislature,
approving and putting in effect the Digest of 1808 reads:

14. Rodolfo Batiza, The Louisiana Civil Code of 1808: Its Actual Sources
and Present Relevance, 46 TUL. L. REV. 4, 12 (1971). The author made a minute
check of the wording of the articles.
15. Robert A. Pascal, Sources of the Digest of 1808: A Reply to Professor
Batiza, 46 TUL. L. REV. 603, 606 (1972); and THOMAS J. SEMMES, HISTORY OF
THE LAWS OF LOUISIANA AND OF THE CIVIL LAW (Clark & Hofeline, New
Orleans LA, 1873; reprinted in the present volume of the J. CIV. L. STUD.).
16. Id.
17. Id. and Pascal, supra note 8.
18. E.g., Cottin v. Cottin, 5 Martin (O.S.) 93 (1817).

38

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 5

§2. And be it further enacted, That whatever in the ancient
civil laws of this territory, or in the territorial statute, is
contrary to the dispositions contained in the said digest, or
irreconcilable within them, is hereby abrogated. 19
The French law of March 21st, 1804, promulgating the Code
civil des français as a whole reads:
Art. 7: From the day when these laws [constituting the
Code] become effective, the Roman laws, the ordinances,
the general and local customs, the charters and the
regulations all cease to have the force either of general or
of special law concerning the subjects covered by the
present Code. 20
2. The Civil Code of 1825
In 1825, the legislature of the State of Louisiana (the territory
of Orleans had been granted statehood in 1812) enacted a Civil
Code. The need for a new enactment was felt because of the
confusion generated by the fact that judges kept citing sources that
were not easily accessible and written in a foreign language. The
19. Other relevant sections of the Act read:
Whereas, in the confused state in which the civil laws of this territory
were plunged by the effect of the changes which happened in its
government, it had become indispensable to make known the laws
which have been preserved after the abrogation of those which were
contrary to the constitution of the United States, or irreconcilable with
its principles, and to collect them in a single work, which might serve
as a guide for the decision of the courts and juries, without recurring to
a multiplicity of books, which, being for the most part written in
foreign languages, offer in their interpretation inexhaustible sources of
litigation.
§1. BE it enacted by the Legislative Council and House of
Representatives of the Territory of Orleans, in General Assembly
convened, That the work, entitled “Digest of the Civil Laws now in
force in the territory of Orleans, with alterations and amendments,
adapted to its present system of government,” which work is divided
into three books, entitled “Of persons, of things, and of the different
modifications of property, and of the different manners of acquiring the
property of things;” and containing, to wit; [follows the complete
structure of the Digest] Is hereby declared and proclaimed to be in
force in this territory, and shall therein have full execution.
Act of March 31, 1808, No. 120, 1808 La. Acts XXX.
20. RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW: CASES TEXT
MATERIALS 246 (Foundation Press 6th ed., New York, 1998).
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Digest was meant to clarify and simplify the laws, making them
more accessible, in the French language and also in English, since
the original French was translated into English, though rather
poorly. 21 The fact that judges felt bound to rely on the ancient
Spanish law and antique Roman law sources, available in Spanish
and Latin only, defeated the central purpose of the Digest: there
was no simplification.
One may note that the situation had been completely different
in France where, with an energetic abrogation clause, judges
understood that there was a break with the past and a fresh start.
This does not mean that judges never looked back to Roman law
and custom, but when they so did it was in an attempt to clarify the
solutions in the Code, not to have the ancient laws survive.
The text of the Code of 1825 very much resembles that of the
Digest. Some rewording was done here and there, and entire
chapters were added. As Rodolfo Batiza proved, many of these
additions are borrowed from the French Civil Code or from
Toullier, and therefore are of French origin. 22 It may be true to say
that the Code of 1825 is more French than the Digest, as Batiza
contended. 23
In sum, the texts of 1808 and 1825 are largely similar except
for a number of additions, deletions, and modifications. 24 The first
one is a digest and the second one a code, because it contains an
abrogation clause. Indeed, Article 3521 reads:
From and after the promulgation of this Code, the Spanish,
Roman and French laws, which were in force in this State,
when Louisiana was ceded to the United States, and the
21. See Edward B. Dubuisson, The Codes of Louisiana (Originals Written
in French; Errors of Translation), 25 LA. BAR ASSN. REP. 143 (1924); O.
Moréteau & Didier Lamèthe, L’interprétation des textes juridiques rédigés dans
plus d’une langue, 48-2 R.I.D.C. 327, 340 (2006); and John M. Shuey, Civil
Codes - Control of the French Text of the Code of 1825, 3 LA. L. REV. 452, 453
(1941).
22. See in general, Rudolfo Batiza, The Actual Sources of the Louisiana
Projet of 1823: A General Analytical Survey, 47 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1972).
23. See Batiza, id. at 24.
24. See the results of a study by Batiza, id. at 5.
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acts of the Legislative Council, of the legislature of the
Territory of Orleans, and of the Legislature of the State of
Louisiana, be and are hereby repealed in every case, for
which it has been especially provided in this Code, and that
they shall not be invoked as laws, even under the pretence
that their provisions are not contrary or repugnant to those
of this Code. 25
Otherwise, if one compares the text of the Digest to that of the
Code of 1825, there are no structural differences and the substance
of articles remains much the same. The text is partly rewritten and
augmented. However, purists will rightfully contend that this is not
a revision but a first codification, since the 1808 text was not a
code but a digest.
Nothing is simple and clear-cut in Louisiana, where trees are
mirrored in the swamps. What appears to be a tree may be the
reflection of a tree in water, and you are never sure where the roots
are.
What made a remarkable difference, however, was the judicial
resistance to positivism. Louisiana judges of the first half of the
19th century did not accept that legislation (lex) could do away with
or abrogate what Professor Pascal calls right order 26 and may
simply be called law in its broadest sense, meaning droit or ius.
François-Xavier Martin, who sat on the Louisiana Supreme Court
between 1812 and 1846, had been in favor of a clean abrogation
clause in the Digest, 27 and yet at the same time believed that such a
clause could only repeal the positive laws adopted by a legislature.
In Reynolds v. Swain, a case decided in 1839 when Martin was
25. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art 1112 (1825).
26. See generally ROBERT ANTHONY PASCAL: A PRIEST OF RIGHT ORDER
(Olivier Moréteau ed., Center of Civil Law Studies, Paul M. Hebert Law Center,
Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge LA, 2010), online:
<http://www.law.lsu.edu/index.cfm?geaux=ccls.publications> (last visited on
October 8, 2012).
27. Commenting on the work of Moreau Lislet and Brown, he wrote: “Their
labor would have been much more beneficial to the people, than it has proved, if
the legislature to whom it was submitted, had given it their sanction as a system,
intended to stand by itself, and be construed by its own context, by repealing all
former laws on matters acted upon in this digest.” MARTIN, supra note 2, at 344.
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Chief Justice (at that time called Chief Judge), 28 he said that the
legislature cannot abrogate unwritten law such as natural law or the
law of nations, 29 proving that Louisiana law was much more than
mere positive law. The Civil Code is lex, not ius, 30 and therefore
has a lower density than it may have in a positivistic system.
For approximately half a century, the Code of 1825 was able to
survive without significant alterations. The abolition of slavery
after the Civil War led to a major change. In 1868, the Louisiana
Legislature ordered the revision of the code. 31
3. The Civil Code of 1870
John Ray was appointed to draft the revision, and he submitted
his finished work on December 27th, 1869. In his report he
mentioned his thorough acquaintance with the Louisiana Civil
Code, statutes, and court decisions. 32
Scholars of the 19th century say that the revision of 1870 was a
work of clerical compilation 33 which had become necessary at that
moment for the growing state. The text of 1870 is in fact a revision
of the Code of 1825. Ray introduced several changes to the text.
Articles were renumbered and the quality of the English text was
improved: the Code of 1825 had been drafted in French and the
translation was not that good: the ability to develop a civil law in

28. Reynolds v. Swain, 13 La. 193 (1839).
29. “The repeal spoken of in the code, and the act of 1828, cannot extend
beyond the laws which the legislature itself had enacted…. It cannot be
extended to those unwritten laws which do not derive their authority from the
positive institution of any people, as the revealed law, the natural law, the law of
nations, the laws of peace and war, and those laws which are founded in those
relations of justice that existed in the nature of things, antecedent to any positive
precept.” Id.
30. For further discussion, see Pascal, supra note 8.
31. See Act of August 17, 1868, No. 31, 1868 La. Acts 39. See also the Joint
Resolution of October 21, 1868, No. 182, 1868 La. Acts 237.
32. JOHN RAY, THE CIVIL CODE OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA: REVISED,
ARRANGED AND AMENDED vii (Printed at the Office of the Louisiana
Intelligencer, Monroe, 1869).
33. E.g., CHARLES E. FENNER, THE GENESIS AND DESCENT OF THE SYSTEM
OF CIVIL LAW PREVAILING IN LOUISIANA 20 (Graham, New Orleans, 1886).
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English was still in the making. 34 New articles included the
legislative enactments since 1825. 35 The revised text was approved
by the Louisiana Legislature on March 14th, 1870. 36 The text was
written and published in English, without a French version, and it
had 3,556 articles divided into a Preliminary Title and three books,
following the structure of the original code, borrowed in turn from
the French Civil Code and the Institutes of Gaius. 37
4. The Revision of the Civil Code
With the dawn of a new century, the need for a new civil code
or for revision was reborn. Conditions had changed, and the
conceptual framework of the revision of 1870 had proved to be
analytically deficient in certain instances. 38 Therefore, in 1908 the
Louisiana Legislature created a commission in order to revise and
re-enact the civil code. 39 Very few changes were suggested by the
commission; finally, the draft code was never adopted by the
Louisiana Legislature. 40
In 1948, pressed by the need to update the existing civil law,
the Louisiana Legislature instructed the Louisiana State Law
Institute (LSLI) to prepare comprehensive drafts for the revision of
the Civil Code of Louisiana. 41 In order to fulfill its duty, the LSLI
–which was created in 1938– 42 faced a choice among three
34. See supra note 32, at vii-viii.
35. Id.
36. THE REVISED CIVIL CODE OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA 428 (Office of
the Republican, New Orleans, 1870).
37. Id., Preliminary Title “Of the general definitions of law and of the
promulgation of the laws”; Book I “Of persons”; Book II “Of things, and of
different modifications of ownership”; and Book III “Of the different modes of
acquiring the ownership of things”.
38. A. N. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM: LOUISIANA AND
COMPARATIVE LAW 76 (Claitor's Publishing Division 2d ed., Baton Rouge LA,
1999).
39. See Act of July 2, 1908, No. 160, 1908 La. Acts 216.
40. John H. Tucker, Source Books of Louisiana Law, 6 TUL. L. REV. 280,
298 (1931).
41. See Act of July 6, 1948, No. 335, 1948 La. Acts 810; and Fred Zengel,
Civil Code Revision in Louisiana, 54 TUL. L. REV. 942, 943 (1980).
42. See Act of July 2, 1938, No. 166, 1938 La. Acts 429.
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possible ways to carry-out the work: i) purify the linguistic aspects,
eliminate the obsolete provisions, and update the norms; ii)
undertake a structural revision that would start by a deep analysis
of the grounds for each institution, followed by a study of the
existing case law, and provide on this basis a new wording for the
articles; and iii) perform partial revisions of the text of 1870.43
The LSLI finally opted for the third possible way, that is to say,
partial revisions. 44 In the 1970s, the LSLI began the revision of the
Louisiana Civil Code on a title-by-title basis. 45 In the decades that
followed, dozens of reporters and hundreds of people participated
in the revisions, 46 and the different titles and chapters were
subjected to analysis. 47

For additional information regarding the LSLI, see William E. Crawford, The
Louisiana State Law Institute–History and Progress, 45 LA. L. REV. 1077
(1985); and William E. Crawford & Cordell H. Haymon, Louisiana State Law
Institute Recognizes 70-Year Milestone: Origin, History and Accomplishments,
56 LA. B.J. 85 (2008).
43. Saúl Litvinoff, Codificación en Louisiana, in 2 LA CODIFICACIÓN:
RAÍCES Y PROSPECTIVAS 135 (El Derecho, Buenos Aires,2004).
44. Id.
45. Crawford & Haymon, supra note 42, at 91.
46. Id.
47. Preliminary Title: Chapters 1 and 2 (1987), Chapter 3 (1987 and
1991); Book I: Title I-Natural and Juridical Personas (1987), Title III-Absent
Persons (1990), Title IV-Husband and Wife (1987), Title V-Divorce (1990, 1993,
and 1997), Title VI-Of Master and Servant (repealed in part in 1993), Title VIIParent and Child (1993), Chapters 1-3 (1976, 2005), Title IX-Persons Unable to
Care for Their Persons or Property (2000), Title X-Of Corporations (repealed in
part in 1993); Book II: Title I-Things, Title II-Ownership, Title III-Personal
Servitudes, Title IV-Predial Servitudes, Title V-Building Restrictions, Title VIBoundaries (all revised by a series of legislative acts from 1976 to 1979), Title
VII-Ownership in indivision (added in 1990); Book III: Preliminary Title
(1981), Title I-Of Successions, Chapters 1-3 (1981), Chapters 4-6 and 13 (1997),
Title II-Of Donations Inter Vivos and Mortis Causa, Chapter 2 (1991), Chapter 3
(1996), Chapter 4 (2001), Chapter 6 (1997 and 2001), Chapters 8 and 9 (2004),
Title III-Obligations in General (1984), Title IV-Conventional Obligations or
Contracts (1984); Title V-Obligations arising Without Agreement, Chapters 1
and 2 (1995), Title VI-Matrimonial Regimes (1979), Title VII-Sale (1993), Title
IX-Of Lease, Chapters 1-4 (2004), Title XI-Partnership (1980), Title XII-Of Loan
(2004), Title XIII-Deposit and Sequestration (2003), Title XV-Representation
and Mandate (1997), Title XVI-Suretyship (1987), Title XXII-Mortgages (1991
and 1992), Title XXII-A-Of Registry (2005), Title XXIII-Occupancy and
Possession (1982), Title XXIV-Prescription, Chapters 1-3 (1982), Chapter 4
(1983), Title XXV-Of the Signification of the Sundry Terms (1999); and Book
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It has been estimated that so far approximately 72% of the text
of 1870 has been fully revised. Hence only 28% remains still in
force, with many old provisions still coexisting and interacting
with the new wording. 48 The current text of the Louisiana Civil
Code is divided into a Preliminary Title and four books. 49
It has been argued that the revision did not repeal the old Code,
which survives wherever it is not contradicted: “these old Code
articles have been kept alive provided that they are not contrary to
or irreconcilable with the Revision.” 50 A new Digest then? To
those who fear that they do not see the boundaries between the
swamp, the bayous, and a wet sky, a firm and reassuring response
was given: “The modern Revision of the Civil Code of Louisiana
is a continuing process. […] it is a better instrument than before
[…]. The Civil Code is not an uncertain body of law. Those who
must use it have used it since 1976 without any problem other than
those common to any practice of the law.” 51
Louisiana’s Civil Code has had substantial revisions. May we
talk in terms of an ongoing recodification process? The structure of
the code is largely unchanged, but civilians may contend that the
introduction of a significant number of rules borrowed from
common law states or uniform laws, such as the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC), may have changed the spirit of the

IV (added in 1991). A. N. Yiannopoulos, The Civil Codes of Louisiana, in
LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE 2011, Vol. I, XVL(Thomson/West, 2011); and W. E.
Crawford & C. H. Haymon, supra note 42, at 91-92.
48. Vernon V. Palmer, The French Connection and The Spanish
Perception: Historical Debates and Contemporary Evaluation of French
Influence on Louisiana Civil Law, 63 LA. L. REV. 1067, 1112 (2003). Complete
references to the revisions to the civil code are available at Crawford &
Haymon, supra note 42, at 91-92.
49. Preliminary Title; Book I “Of persons”; Book II “Things and the
different modifications of ownership”; Book III “Of the different modes of
acquiring the ownership of things”; and Book IV “Conflict of Laws”.
50. V. V. Palmer, The Death of a Code–The Birth of a Digest, 63 TUL. L.
REV. 221, 224 (1988).
51. Julio C. Cueto-Rua, The Civil Code of Louisiana is Alive and Well, 64
TUL. L. REV. 147, 171-172 (1989).
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Code. This may be true, but only in part. Louisiana civilians should
remember that the UCC, and particularly Article 2 on sales, has
received a substantial civil law influence, cleverly instilled by Karl
Llewellyn: the good faith principle, the irrevocability of an offer,
are by no means common law doctrines! Civilians find themselves
at home in the Louisiana Civil Code. Even the addition of
detrimental reliance is not that much of a sign of common law
contamination. Its presence in the article on cause makes it seem of
mixed stamp. However, the term “promissory estoppel” is not used
in article 1967, and it has been demonstrated that detrimental
reliance is an underlying principle of the civil law of obligations as
much as it is of the common law. 52
The genius of the civil law is its ability to absorb doctrines
from foreign and sometimes distant origins. This is nothing new.
Legal ideas have circulated at all times. 53 Common law influence
in judicial practice should therefore be no surprise in an
environment where many lawyers and judges have received
common law training and are at best self-educated in the civil law.
B. Contemporary Classroom and Court Practice
For a civilian trained in France, the study of Louisiana cases,
even on matters governed by the Civil Code, can be something of a
challenge. The following paragraphs are largely based on my
experience teaching the Law of Obligations at the LSU Law
52. Olivier Moréteau, Revisiting the Grey Zone between Contract and Tort:
The Role of Estoppel and Reliance, in EUROPEAN TORT LAW 2004 at 60 (H.
Koziol & B.C. Steininger eds., Springer, Vienna & New York, 2005). See also
OLIVIER MORÉTEAU, L’ESTOPPEL ET LA PROTECTION DE LA CONFIANCE
LÉGITIME (Université Jean Moulin Lyon III, 1990).
53. See ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS, AN APPROACH TO
COMPARATIVE LAW (1st ed., University Press of Virginia Charlottesville, 1974
& 2d ed., University of Georgia Press, Athens, 1993); Rodolfo Sacco, La
circulation des modèles juridiques, Rapport général, in ACADÉMIE
INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARÉ, RAPPORTS GÉNÉRAUX : XIIIE CONGRÈS
INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT COMPARÉ, MONTREAL 1990 at 1 et seq, (Éditions Yvon
Blais, Cowansville, 1992); and W. Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (II): The
Logic of Legal Transplants, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 489 (1995).
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School over the past five years. Louisiana judgments are written
like judgments in other American States and reflect a common law
methodology. The majority opinion may be accompanied by a
dissent and judges give their own analysis and personal opinion,
citing a significant number of cases, doctrinal sources, and the
Civil Code. Codal citations are sometimes hidden amidst
jurisprudential and doctrinal citations. When reading cases,
students do not get a strong impression that the law is to be found
in the code. Few cases offer a clear and full analysis and
interpretation of code provisions. Lip service is paid to the code,
with the judgments sometimes checking that the code’s solution is
not contradicted by the cases. 54
In such a context, it is hard to develop in the students a strong
confidence that the code can respond to the needs of social and
business life. They trust the case rather than the enacted provision.
At the same time, they are fascinated by the logical organization of
the code and its ability to solve countless disputes, also reflecting
powerful principles that underlie the law of obligations, such as the
duty of good faith and the prevalence of a cooperation principle
over an approach promoting purely individualistic and selfish deals
and strategies. Yet they have a hard time to accept the idea that
they can win a case by an argument based on a code article or code
interpretation. They tend to trust the individual case more than the
use of the code and logic. Louisiana students are after all American
and grow up in a fundamentally pragmatic culture.
It comes as no surprise that, in the first half of the 20th century,
a scholar declared that Louisiana law was no longer civil law but
common law, Louisiana judges having adopted the system of stare
decisis. 55 This triggered a salutary reaction that generated a revival
54. Examples of well drafted and poorly drafted opinions may be found in
S. LITVINOFF & RONALD J. SCALISE JR., THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS IN THE
LOUISIANA JURISPRUDENCE (Paul M. Hebert Law Center 6th ed., Louisiana
State University, Baton Rouge LA, 2008), the coursebook I use in class.
55. Gordon Ireland, Louisiana’s Legal System Reappraised, 11 TUL. L.
REV. 585 (1937).
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of the civil law tradition. Dean Hebert and a few others pointed out
the misunderstanding experienced by Professor Ireland 56; they
explained that cases had at all times had a crucial importance in the
civil law tradition and explained that Louisiana judges tend to
follow jurisprudence constante much as those in other civil law
jurisdictions. 57
Here is a brief account of how I am teaching the civil law of
obligations to my first year law students, in the spring semester.
They have received, during the fall semester, a course on the
common law of contract, and another one called Western Legal
traditions in which they have been introduced to the history and the
method of the civil law, the common law, and the Louisiana
experience. Teaching at LSU is bi-jural rather than trans-systemic.
It tends to follow the old McGill approach rather than the new
trans-systemic model, though the latter is in a sense applied to the
study of torts, with a real mix of civil law and common law.
I start the class with an analysis of the problem of the day, for
instance acceptance of an offer, contractual damages, or solidarity.
I develop a typology of possible solutions, and try to have students
identify the possible responses. This is the trans-systemic part of
my teaching. I may show, in discussion of contract formation or
contract interpretation, that the focus may be on interpreting
unilateral communications by the parties or on the search for a
consensus. The former approach may lead to a battle of forms
when the parties exchange contradictory printed documents,
favoring the private interest of the one having the last shot, and the
56. Harriet Spiller Daggett, Joseph Dainow, Paul M. Hébert & Henry
George Mcmahon, A Reappraisal Appraised: A Brief for the Civil Law of
Louisiana, 12 TUL. L. REV. 12 (1937). For a full discussion, see David Gruning,
Bayou State Bijuralism: Common Law and Civil Law in Louisiana, 81 U. DET.
MERCY L. REV. 437, especially at 446-449.
57. See State of Louisiana v. Justin Malone, 25 So. 3d 113, at 126 (La.
2009) where, in her dissent, Justice Knoll notes that “one of the fundamental
rules of [the civil law tradition] is that a tribunal is never bound by the decisions
which it formerly rendered, it can always change its mind…,” citing PLANIOL’S
TREATISE ON THE CIVIL LAW § 123… and further noting that “prior holdings of
this court are persuasive, not authoritative, expressions of the law.”
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latter approach, by focusing on the consensus, may leave matters
of disagreement on one side and complement the contract with the
suppletive provisions provided by the code. I bring a fair amount
of comparative law into that part of the discussion, presenting
some foreign and transnational solutions. I make sure students
envision the full spectrum of possible solutions and identify the
various types of responses. Students can relate this to their
experience of having studied the common law of contract and
western legal traditions.
I then turn to the code. All students must at all times have in
front of them a paper edition of the Louisiana Civil Code and I
urge them to use the “pocket” edition compiled by my colleague
Alain Levasseur, 58 which contains nothing but the text of the code.
We read the code’s articles and it happens time and time again that
I read a given article or have it read aloud by a student several
times during one and the same class. From the code articles or their
combination, we derive the answer of Louisiana law to the
problem at hand.
Then and only then, we engage in the reading and discussion of
cases, covering two, sometimes three cases in one hour, adjusting
the length of the discussion accordingly. The facts of the case give
us a context to better understand the problem as it may appear in
real life, and I occasionally use the facts of the case at the
beginning of the class. The case serves as an illustration. It permits
noting the good or poor application of the code by the judge. The
case opens debate and discussion that may lead students to think of
what could be done to improve the law when the latter is not found
fully satisfactory. Of course the class is very interactive, but the
Civil Code serves as the Ariadne’s thread, that the students must
never lose if they are to find their way out of the labyrinth.
It is crucial, in my opinion, to make students aware of the
existence of different models and to make them understand which
58. LOUISIANA POCKET CIVIL CODE 2011 EDITION, (Alain Levasseur ed.,
LexisNexis, Charlottesville, 2011).
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ones fit or do not fit the higher purpose of the law, identified in the
general discussion. They can then understand and assess the
choices made by the Louisiana legislature, and develop a critical
approach. For instance, study of the cases may prove that
subjecting conventional subrogation by the creditor to the rules
governing the assignment of rights 59 may have detrimental effects,
for instance in cases of first-party insurance where the insured
grants subrogation to the insurer after having been paid partial
compensation. 60 Oftentimes it shows the wisdom of some solutions
that bridge apparently fundamental differences between the civil
law and the common law, like the elimination of the need to put
the deficient obligor in default when there is a contractual term or
there is prior evidence that there will be no performance once the
term is reached. 61 The relative abandonment of the distinction
between obligations to give, to do, or not to do in the context of
specific performance is another good example of a wise and highly
practicable solution, one that may be providing inspiration for
other jurisdictions, particularly France. 62
59. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1827: “An obligee who receives performance from a
third person may subrogate that person to the rights of the obligee, even without
the obligor's consent. That subrogation is subject to the rules governing the
assignment of rights.”
60. All rights are indeed transferred to the insurer and the insured is
deprived of the benefit of LA. CIV. CODE art. 1826B: “An original obligee who
has been paid only in part may exercise his right for the balance of the debt in
preference to the new obligee. This right shall not be waived or altered if the
original obligation arose from injuries sustained or loss occasioned by the
original obligee as a result of the negligence or intentional conduct of the
original obligor.”
61. This is the way Louisiana law has introduced something comparable to
anticipatory breach, while staying within the logic of the civil law, where failure
to perform does not per se terminate a contract that remains, in principle,
enforceable. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2016 provides: “When a delayed performance
would no longer be of value to the obligee or when it is evident that the obligor
will not perform, the obligee may regard the contract as dissolved without any
notice to the obligor.”
62. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1986: “Upon an obligor's failure to perform an
obligation to deliver a thing, or not to do an act, or to execute an instrument, the
court shall grant specific performance plus damages for delay if the obligee so
demands. If specific performance is impracticable, the court may allow damages
to the obligee.
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Students may be impressed at the time of a class, and the bright
ones may develop good civil law skills, but I know they will not
stay on firm ground for too long.
Legal practice places the case before the code. When appealing
to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, attorneys must submit a brief,
prepared and presented according to the Rules of the Supreme
Court of Louisiana. In the appellant’s brief, a list of cases must
appear prior to the statement of the facts of the case and a
specification of the alleged errors. 63 The brief of the respondent
must be arranged the same way. 64 This is a clear incentive to focus
on cases rather than on the code or legislation.
In addition, a number of norms external to the Civil Code must
be taken into account. The Federal and State Constitutions take
priority over any other norm. And it cannot be forgotten that the
big bulk of legislation in Louisiana is to be found in the Revised
Statutes. 65 Revised Statutes are arranged in Titles running in
alphabetic order, with General Provisions in a Title 1, and running
from Aeronautics (Title 2) to Wildlife and Fisheries (Title 56). The
General Provisions of Title 1 start with a Chapter 1, Interpretation
of Revised Statutes, which contains interpretative provisions that
differ from the traditional civilian rules to be found in the Civil
Code 66 and are of a common law stamp. For instance, R.S. 1:7 and

Upon a failure to perform an obligation that has another object, such as an
obligation to do, the granting of specific performance is at the discretion of the
court.”
63. Rules of the Supreme Court of Louisiana, Rule VII, Section 4: “The
brief of the appellant, applicant or relator, as the case may be, shall set forth (1)
an index of the authorities cited; (2) a concise statement of the case; (3) a
specification of the alleged errors complained of; and (4) an argument free from
unnecessary repetition and confined strictly to the issue or issues of the case.”
64. Rule VII, Section 5; “The brief of the appellee, or respondent, as the
case may be, shall contain an index of the authorities cited and such statement of
the case and such argument as may be deemed necessary.”
65. R.S. 1:1 reads: “This Act shall be known as the Louisiana Revised
Statutes of 1950 and shall be cited as R.S. followed by the number of the Title
and the number of the Section in the Title, separated by a colon. Example:
Section 1 of Title 20 shall be cited as R.S. 20:1.”
66. LA. CIV. CODE, arts. 9-13.
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8, providing that the singular may also denote the plural and one
gender may also denote the other, sound pretty much like Section 6
of the British Interpretation Act 1978 or similar provisions of other
states’ codes.
It is hard to claim that the law of Louisiana is Civil Code
centered. Apart from matters dealt with in the Civil Code – they
are many and of significant importance in people’s daily personal
and business life – almost everything else is dealt with in much
detail in legislation of common law stamp.
Even at LSU, the only one, out of the four law schools in the
State, to impose a bi-jural curriculum, civil law trained professors,
reduced to not even a fifth of the faculty these days, feel
disheartened and tend to react like a threatened minority, viewing
themselves as scarce specimens of an endangered species. It is
quite a job in that context, especially in times of recession and
severe budget cuts, to lead the Center of Civil Law Studies, and yet
it is a fascinating challenge. At the same time, traditionalist
civilians need to be reassured and Louisiana law needs to be
encouraged towards a future that does not after all appear to be that
frightening. Yes, there is a venerable civil law heritage, which is
part of the local culture and identity. No, the civil law is not the
reason why corruption exists and the economy lags behind that of
other States. What is perceived as a threatened local identity is
shared by many other peoples and may be changed into a powerful
asset.
Many legal systems belonging to the civil law tradition are in
search of a lost center.
III. IN SEARCH OF THE LOST CENTER
All civil law systems, mixed or less mixed, are losing sight of
what once was their center. Two types of forces largely contribute
to a weakening or dissolution of the core. The first set of forces is
endogenous and pertains to a sometimes awkward legislative

52

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 5

management of the code. To keep a somewhat optimistic
perspective, let us describe this in terms of decomposition and
recomposition of codes. The second set of forces is exogenous as it
stems from the constitutionalization and internationalization of the
civil law and its norms, more often than not with overall beneficial
consequences.
A. Endogenous Forces: Decomposition and Recomposition of
Codified Law
This phenomenon was described in recent papers, the most
recent of which will be simply plagiarized in the next paragraph. 67
Codes are sometimes decodified as a consequence of empirical
legislative reform, distorting the structure of the code, or reforming
significant matters by way of ancillary legislation that is no longer
to be found in the code. Efforts to rewrite the codes, either partly
or completely, and sometimes in a piecemeal fashion, are
confusingly described as revision or recodification. Doctrinal
efforts have been made to clarify the concepts of decodification,
revision, and recodification. 68
A redefinition of those terms was recently proposed, based on
architectural metaphors, comparing codes with churches or
temples. 69
Codification is the construction of a homogenous building
where the spirit can be felt in every single stone, window or
ornament. Where the building is expanded in such a way
that the connection between the different parts is lost, one
gets close to what is called decodification. This may be the
addition of new chapters in the code that do not connect
clearly to the original text – like the addition of the regime
of contracts with tour operators, full of consumer
protections, making exception to the general law of
67. Moréteau & Parise, supra note 6, at 1109-1112. This paragraph largely
reproduces Moréteau, A Summary Reflection, supra note 8.
68. Michael Mcauley, Proposal for a Theory and a Method of
Recodification, 49 LOY. L. REV. 261 (2003); and Moréteau & Parise, supra note
6, at 1103 et seq.
69. Moréteau & Parise, supra note 6, at 1105 et seq.
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obligations. Like unconnected wings of an enlarged
building, they exist next to it, and the material is sometimes
of a different fabric. Decodification also occurs when
extensions are totally unconnected, like separate statutes or
freestanding buildings. 70
Codes can be revised by the reform of one or several articles,
chapters, or titles. It sometimes happens that the entire code is
rewritten, sometimes as the consequence of a complete revision
process, as happened in the Netherlands and Quebec.
Partial revision may revitalize the code, but may also trigger a
decodification process where the revision causes the code to lose
its coherence. For instance, if the Louisiana revision of
obligations 71 undoubtedly contributed towards a revitalization of
the Civil Code, the revision of the Title on sale, 72 aiming at
introducing Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code into
Louisiana law, created discrepancies, especially in Chapter 9 on
redhibition.
Decodification also typically happens as a result of the
multiplication of ancillary statutes outside the code, dealing with
matters that were once regulated by the code itself. In Louisiana,
most provisions contained in Title 9 of the Revised Statutes 73 are
ancillary to the articles of the code, dealing for instance with
procedural details that pertain to a topic dealt with in the Civil
Code, as in the case of divorce. 74 They also contain matters not
dealt with in the Code and that could have found a place there, like
the law on human embryos, 75 in which case we may talk about
decodification. Title 9 of the Revised Statutes is nothing more than
an annex to the Civil Code.

70. Id. at 1106.
71. Act of July 2, 1984, effective January 1, 1985, No. 331, § 1, 1984 La.
Acts 718.
72. Act of June 23, 1993, effective January 1, 1995, No. 841, § 1, 1993 La.
Acts 2239.
73. On the Revised Statutes, see II. 2. above.
74. LA. REV. STAT. 9:301 to 376.
75. LA. REV. STAT. 9:121 to 133.
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Recodification is sometimes the answer. The entire civil code
may be rewritten, either on a new structure, or based on new
doctrines or ideas. The new civil code regains the density and
gravity the previous one had lost as a result of revision and
decodification. The new civil code appears like a revitalized star in
the legal system, and we may describe this as “solar
recodification.” 76
Recodification, however, often takes place in a far less
ambitious way. Decodified matters will not be returned to the civil
code. They will be amalgamated into specialized codes that may be
described as satellite codes, revolving around a less dense and
partly emptied civil code. These satellite codes are often little more
than clerical compilations, coming close to the common law idea
of consolidation. They do not have the density of the civil code.
Those satellite codes are generally created because the specific
areas of law started to develop in fragments outside of the civil
code, thus generating decodification. This process may be
described as “satellite recodification.” 77
Like solar recodification, satellite recodification is meant to
make legal provisions more accessible for jurists and laypersons
alike. However, it often appears to be more technical, and therefore
less accessible to ordinary citizens.
Recodification may generate new types of re-energized civil
codes, strengthening the solar system. Examples of solar
recodification are not many: they include the Netherlands and
Russia, in the Old World, and Brazil and Quebec, in the New
World.
Recodification more often results in the enactment of loose
satellite codes, which would probably not pass the test of being
called codes in the Napoleonic or Germanic sense. These satellites
revolve, sometimes in a distant orbit, around a weakened solar civil
code, which may undergo revisions and continued decodification.
76. Moréteau & Parise, supra note 6, at 1109 et seq.
77. Id.
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For instance, France allowed substantial matters to be moved
outside the Civil Code. Legislation on insurance and consumer
protection grew outside the code by way of separate statutes,
causing a decodification process. The enactment of an Insurance
Code and a Consumer Code were meant to consolidate dispersed
legislation, and this looks like recodification in the form of satellite
codes. To take the most recent of those codes (the Code de la
consommation), it was not meant to be more than a rearranged
collection of existing statutes and regulations protecting consumers
in various transactions, without any change in substance. The table
of contents appears more coherent, and like the Code des
assurances, this code contains a legislative part and another part
consisting of regulations. These codes are a rearranged collection
of existing legislation and regulations on a given topic, to make the
texts more accessible. They are a collection rather than a system,
and are satellites to the Civil Code. In Louisiana, one may cite the
Insurance Code, 78 the Mineral Code, 79 and the Trust Code, actually
enshrined in the “Civil Code” Title of the Revised Statutes. 80
To conclude on the place of the Civil Code in Louisiana, it
remains the center of a solar system but, within the image of
Louisiana’s legal galaxy, this solar system is now a peripheral
element. Comparative analysis reveals that the situation in
Louisiana is far from unique, endogenous forces pushing civil
codes to the edge of the galaxy even in so called pure civil law
jurisdictions.
Things are not any different regarding exogenous causes.

78. LA. REV. STAT. tit. 22.
79. LA. REV. STAT. tit. 31.
80. LA. REV. STAT. 9:1721 to 2252; LA. REV. STAT. 9:1721 reads: “This
Chapter shall be known and may be cited as the Louisiana Trust Code.”
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B. Exogenous Forces: Constitutionalization and Internationalization of Private Law
Two sets of forces, extraneous to domestic private law, are at
work, marginalizing the position of the civil code. The first one,
though domestic, is linked to the development of the jurisdiction of
Supreme or Constitutional Courts, extending the scope of judicial
review and constitutionalizing some areas of private law. The
second one is truly external, and linked to the development of
different kinds of international norms, interfering with traditional
fields of private law.
1. The Constitutionalization of Private Law
The constitutionalization of private law is a well-known
phenomenon. 81 The American model of judicial review, based on
the reading of the United States Constitution by the Supreme Court
in Marbury v. Madison, 82 allows the highest court in the nation to
declare any type of legislative provision unconstitutional and void,
therefore imposing the supremacy of law over the will of the
legislators. This model had a formidable influence all over the
Americas. Not only was it adopted in Canada, but also in Latin
American countries.
It impacts Louisiana as much as it does Quebec and Latin
American countries. For instance, in Loyacano v. Loyacano, 83 the
Louisiana Supreme Court was asked to annul an article of the Civil
Code that allowed a wife who had not been at fault to claim
alimony after a divorce. Art. 160, 84 as it then stood, 85 was

81. It was described twenty years ago by MARC FRANGI, L'APPORT DU
DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL AUX DROITS DES PERSONNES ET AUX DROITS
CONTRIBUTION
À
L'ÉTUDE
DE
LA
ÉCONOMIQUES
INDIVIDUELS:
CONSTITUTIONNALISATION DU DROIT PRIVÉ (Université Aix-Marseille III, 1990).
82. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
83. Loyacano v. Loyacano, 358 So. 2d 304 (La. 1978).
84. “When the wife has not been at fault, and she has not sufficient means
for her support, the court may allow her, out of the property and earnings of the
husband, alimony which shall not exceed one-third of his income.”
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allegedly a denial of equal protection of the laws, prohibited by
both the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States and Article I, § 3 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974.
Rather than taking the risk of depriving all divorced women of
alimony by declaring the provision null, the majority of the
Louisiana Supreme Court preferred to fix the problem by way of
interpretation, ruling that the ratio legis commanded it to be
extended so as to cover the case of men who might need alimony
from their ex-wife after a divorce. Justice Dennis also referred to
article 21 of the Civil Code, inviting the judge, where positive law
is silent, to proceed and decide according to equity, defined in the
article as meaning natural law, reason, and received usages. 86
Examples of interference by the constitution with the civil code
can be found in many jurisdictions. A number of countries of
continental Europe adopted judicial review following World War
II. Not surprisingly, judicial review flourished in those moving
from a totalitarian regime to democracy, such as Germany, Austria,
and Italy, and later Spain and Portugal. Having denied its wartime
Vichy Regime, France remained loyal to its revolutionary tradition
of putting the will of the people (demos) above judicial rulings
(rule of law), due to fear of government by judges. A
Constitutional Council was created in 1958 but could only
intervene by way of abstract review (without the context of a case),
upon the request of politicians, during the very short period
between the vote on the legislation and its promulgation by the
President of the Republic. The constitutionality of promulgated

85. It was later replaced by art. 112, which now reads: “A. When a spouse
has not been at fault and is in need of support, based on the needs of that party
and the ability of the other party to pay, that spouse may be awarded final
periodic support in accordance with Paragraph B of this Article.”
86. Act of June 18, 1987, effective January 1, 1988, No. 124, § 1, 1987 La.
Acts 404, at 407, later amended and renumbered art. 21, now article 4,
abandoning the reference to natural law, under the strange and false pretence
that “The term ‘natural law’ in Article 21 of the 1870 Code has no defined
meaning in Louisiana Jurisprudence.” (Revision Comments (b)).
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legislation could not be challenged. The Constitutional Council
worked tirelessly at enlarging the scope of review, recognizing a
constitutional value to all texts cited in the preamble to the
Constitution, including the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man
and the Citizen. A major step was taken with the constitutional
reform of 2008, allowing a party to a case to raise an exception of
unconstitutionality, to be determined by the Constitutional
Council, and opening the possibility of annulment of a legislative
provision in force. 87 The constitutionalization of private law, long
identified, 88 is thereby intensified.
Other courts, this time supranational, may also interfere with
domestic private law and therefore with civil codes.
2. The Internationalization of Private Law
European civil codes are subjected to the supremacy of
European Union law, enforced by the Court of Justice of the
European Union. Likewise, the European Court of Human Rights
sanctions violations of the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed and enacted by the
Members of the Council of Europe. For instance, Article 8
protecting the right to respect for private and family life and
Article 14 prohibiting discrimination are likely to interfere with
matters covered in civil codes, causing provisions of national codes
to be placed under the scrutiny of the European Court in
Strasbourg. Civil codes are double-checked or triple-checked, with
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union coming
into force on December 1, 2009. The situation becomes as complex
in Europe as in Quebec, where the Canadian Charter of Rights and
87. Loi constitutionnelle n° 2008-724 du 23 juillet 2008, adding art. 61-1 to
the Constitution: “Lorsque, à l'occasion d'une instance en cours devant une
juridiction, il est soutenu qu'une disposition législative porte atteinte aux droits
et libertés que la Constitution garantit, le Conseil constitutionnel peut être saisi
de cette question sur renvoi du Conseil d'État ou de la Cour de cassation qui se
prononce dans un délai déterminé.”
88. See FRANGI, supra note 81.
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Freedoms, forming the first part of the Constitution Act, 1982,
sometimes conflicts with the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and
Freedoms of 1975. Other international instruments also interfere,
and increase complexity; for instance when the courts are forced to
construe federal or provincial legislation in the light of the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. 89
In Quebec, Louisiana, and all other civil law jurisdictions,
centers are many and the civil code may be influenced by
constitutions, supranational or national charters of human rights,
and international treaties. They are like planets revolving around
several stars.
One may try to imagine a legal universe with multiple centers,
with satellites revolving around several stars or planets. For
instance, the French Code de la consommation may revolve around
the Code civil, the Constitution, European treaties and directives.
One may accept and bow to the complexity of the post-modern
world (whatever the meaning of this term may be) and modelize
legal reality shifting from the pyramid of norms to complex and
pluralistic networks. 90
Quebec has found a way to re-center private law on the Civil
Code, the Preliminary provision of which provides:
“The Civil Code of Quebec (S.Q. 1991, c. 64), in harmony
with the Charter of human rights and freedoms (R.S.Q., c.
C-12) and the general principles of law, governs persons,
relations between persons, and property.
The Civil Code comprises a body of rules which, in all
matters within the letter, spirit or object of its provisions,

89. Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada
(Attorney General), [2004] 1 S.C.R 76, 2004 SCC 4 (Can.); See Benjamin
Shmueli, The Influence of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child on Corporal Punishment – A Comparative Study, 10 OR. REV. INT’L L.
189, 219 (2008).
90. FRANÇOIS OST & MICHEL VAN DE KERCHOVE, DE LA PYRAMIDE AU
RÉSEAU? POUR UNE THÉORIE DIALECTIQUE DU DROIT, (Publications des Facultés
universitaires Saint-Louis, Bruxelles, 2002); and Vanderlinden, supra note 9.
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lays down the jus commune, 91 expressly or by implication.
In these matters, the Code is the foundation of all other
laws, although other laws may complement the Code or
make exceptions to it.”
A strong case should be made for the adoption of a similar
provision at the beginning of the Louisiana Civil Code. It would
also make sense to adopt it in France and in other civil law
countries, also adding a reference to the citizen. Re-centering
private law around the civil code must also mean re-centering it
around the cives, the citizen wherefrom the adjective civil derives.
For the raison-d’être of law is not the norm, but the citizen
regulated by the norm.
IV. BACK TO THE CENTER: A CITIZEN-CENTRIC LEGAL UNIVERSE
We reach the term of our revolution, the wheel going full
circle. After all, Nicolaus Copernicus did not create a new world,
but like all great scientists he taught us to see the world with a
different eye, taking us closer to the truth. The truth is often
simple. At all times, great developments in legal history have been
centered on the citizen. The word sounds passé, but sujet de droit
is too abstract and ambiguous, with somewhat negative overtones,
and the major inconvenience of being norm-centric. Should we use
“person,” or “human being?” Citizen has a different energy, and a
center must be strong, energetic, and meaningful.
A citizen is an individual, a human being of course, who is
ontologically a member of a community of mankind, for there is no
possible survival outside a community. The present writer believes
that this community is under God. He fully accepts that many a
fellow human being may not believe in God and yet be solidly
convinced that what makes our humanity is the full recognition of
the dignity of the other, which is the cement of human rights. For,
in his opinion, the recognition of the dignity of the other is the
91. This term offers the best possible translation of the French “droit
commun.”
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acknowledgment that we share a common condition and therefore
a common origin, which takes us back to the idea of God.
The citizen as member of a community has obligations and
rights. I am not just a person with multiple droits à or entitlements.
I am obliged in essence, by my very presence in this world.
Obligations precede rights and legitimize rights. Because I was fed
when I came into this world, I must feed those in need. This is
what natural law commands.
Sadly, the citizen has become the invisible part of the legal
universe, a sort of black hole. There is too much dust; there are too
many laws and regulations, darkening the center. Too much focus
is placed on the norm, leaving the citizen in the dark. Let us be
revolutionary and place the citizen at the center.
Let us avoid the many categories of consumer, administré,
elector, taxpayer, worker, and resident, as useful as they may be in
a given context. Let us take the person as a whole and in its social
essence, and we fall back to the dynamics of the civil law tradition.
The civil law placed the citizen at the center. By saying this, I
do not claim that this was regardless of social status. The Twelve
Tables did not change plebeians into patricians, but recognized the
plebeians have the right to know their limited rights and less
limited obligations. The capacity given to the plebeians to know
the law applicable to them was a significant progress. This was
after all the very purpose of the Louisiana Digest of 1808. 92
We must not be naive; the very idea of codification or
compilation is not free from ambiguity. The Corpus juris civilis
strengthened the power of Emperor Justinian. Glossators, Postglossators, and Commentators later confiscated the knowledge of
the law, with books written in Latin and not accessible in the
vernacular. Meantime, by reducing the local customs to writing,
the kings of France deprived the people of their ability to create
and develop the law in a spontaneous way, freezing the evolution
92. See supra note 19.
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of custom and placing its interpretation in the hands of judges or
jurisconsults. 93 The Prussian Code of 1792 (Allgemeines Landrecht
für die Preussischen Staaten) was by no means a tool of social
change or emancipation. However, the Enlightenment also
produced a Civil Code centered on the citizens, meant to safeguard
their rights against the arbitrary judicial abuse that was
commonplace in Ancient Regime France. 94
Law must be accessible to the citizen. In this respect, the civil
codes of France and Louisiana, Lower Canada or Quebec, and all
Latin American countries, are a great improvement, empowering
the citizen by making the law more easily accessible. Of course the
code does not say everything, and judges often have to make
meaning out of very general and sometimes – though not often –
confusing provisions. But at least the citizen can have access to the
reasoning of the judge 95 and check for manifest errors or
contradictions. By contrast, the common law is only accessible to
those who master the subtle technique of distinction and are patient
enough to read multiple cases that no single book may contain.
When statutes exist, and there are many, they tend to be lengthy,
over detailed, verbose, and confusing, and therefore not accessible
to ordinary citizens. 96

93. JACQUES VANDERLINDEN, COMPARER LES DROITS 342, (Kluwer
Éditions Juridiques Belgique & E. Story-Scientia, Bruxelles, 1995).
94. See Moréteau, Codes as Straight-Jackets, Safeguards and Alibis: The
Experience of the French Civil Code, 20 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 273, 276283 (1995).
95. Where this is expressed in an articulate manner, unlike in France where
the Cour de cassation, by not setting-out the arguments for its rulings,
confiscates the legislative power. Moréteau, The Future of Civil Codes in
France and Louisiana, 2 J. CIV. L. STUD. 39, 49 (2009).
96. See Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926), where
Sutherland J. said, at 391, “a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of
an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of
due process of law.” This dictum was cited by the Supreme Court of Canada, in
Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the CRIMINAL CODE (MANITOBA), [1990] 1
S.C.R. 1123.
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This deals with form, but much more can be said about
substance. 97 Civil law promotes cooperation over sheer
individualism, recognizing negotiorum gestio and the duty to help
those in urgent need. It promotes the matrimonial community of
gains, forced heirship, protecting family interest rather than
favoring fancy donations. It fights arrangements allowing the dead
to control the resources that should be available to the living. 98 It is
sometimes blamed for not being business friendly 99 but a number
of civil law countries have vibrant centers for business and rank
among the wealthiest in the world economy. The civil law should
not be blamed for making Louisiana and less developed Latin
American countries less prosperous than neighboring regions
having the common law. The blame should rather be on the lack of
responsibility: in neglecting the education of the young, in
accepting corruption as a fatality, and in neglecting sustainable
development. This has nothing to do with the nature of the legal
system. After all, a number of underdeveloped countries, some
very near the United States, are common law jurisdictions.
Traditional civil law is citizen-centered and its ideal form of
expression is in the civil code. Civil codes are more precise than
constitutions and bills of rights and leave less room to judicial
discretion. They read more easily than complex statutes, detailed
regulations, or multivolume compilations.

97. See Pascal, supra note 8.
98. Robert A. Pascal, Of Trusts, Human Dignity, Legal Science, and Taxes:
Suggested Principles for a Louisiana Trust Estates Law, 23 LA. L. REV. 639, see
especially p. 649 (1963).
99. See the report of the World Bank, Doing Business in 2004:
Understanding Regulation (The International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development / The World Bank, Washington, 2004) available at: http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2003/11/04/
000090341_20031104153559/Rendered/PDF/271470PAPER0Doing0business0
2004.pdf (last visited on October 9, 2012).
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V. THREE RECOMMENDATIONS AS A CONCLUSION
First recommendation: one must treasure or restore the civil
code’s original clarity both in style and substance, and reread
frequently the preliminary speech by Portalis, who was a great
legislator and philosopher. 100
Second recommendation: one must consult the people before
modifying the code. By this, I do not necessarily mean a popular
referendum. A referendum is appropriate when the question is of
primary public interest and can be phrased in a simple and
straightforward way, which is rarely the case with civil law reform.
I mean consultation before the drafting of a bill, to identify the
issues and the possible responses. In many respects, reforming a
civil code is like amending a constitution. One may imagine a
process comparable to a Constitutional Convention.
The French revision of the Code civil under the leadership of
the late Doyen Jean Carbonnier is exemplary in many respects. For
instance, the revision of matrimonial regimes in 1965 or divorce in
1975 was preceded by extensive sociological studies and
consultation. Louisiana can be proud of having a very efficient
State Institute preparing the revision of code titles. Regrettably,
Louisiana State Law Institute committees are composed of jurists
only (academics, attorneys, judges), and do not include educated
laypersons such as philosophers, theologians, or other scientists.
Beware of lobbyists, since they can be a threat to the common
good. Limit recourse to consultative panels or advisory
committees, they tend to slow down the legislative process and
lack transparency. Favor direct consultation of the people on the
Internet or through social groups, to promote direct expression,
spontaneous debate, and give the unheard citizen a voice.101

100. Alain Levasseur, Code Napoleon or Code Portalis?, 43 Tul. L. Rev.
762, 767-774 (1969).
101. Moréteau, A Summary Reflection, supra note 8, at 1456-1457;
Moréteau, Libres propos, supra note 8, at 1057; Pascal, supra note 8.
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Information technology favors a revival of direct democracy, an
aspect which is missing in highly sophisticated societies.
Third recommendation: one cannot do away with ancillary
legislation, but it makes sense to organize it in compilations or
specialized satellite codes. Elsewhere, I have made suggestions on
how to make them more accessible to the citizen: a simplified
version may be printed for the layperson and a more sophisticated
one for the jurist, a process that I compared to a double-decker
bus. 102
However, the gist of this third recommendation is to make sure
the civil code contains a Quebec style preliminary provision 103 that
may read as follows:
The Civil Code comprises a body of rules governing basic
obligations and rights of citizens regarding their person, things,
102. The main purpose and effect of complex legislative provisions should
be drafted in short two or three-line articles, couched in a simple and easily
understandable style, in bold and attractive print, so as to be accessible to the
layperson and attractive for reading. This constitutes the layperson-deck.
Necessary technical provisions would follow, using where need be more
technical language and giving the jurist the necessary details omitted from the
simplified text. This constitutes the jurist-deck. Of course the layperson-deck
may be printed or be available online separately. Any attempt to interpret
provisions in the jurist-deck contrary to the letter or the spirit of the laypersondeck would of course be ruled out, inasmuch as it is illegal to have a regulatory
text contravening the legislative provision. The upper layperson-deck will
always take precedence, as commanded by traditional civilian rules of
interpretation. Moréteau, A Summary Reflection, supra note 8, at 1458-1459.
103. Civil Code of Québec, Preliminary Provision:
The Civil Code of Québec, in harmony with the Charter of human
rights and freedoms (chapter C-12) and the general principles of law,
governs persons, relations between persons, and property.
The Civil Code comprises a body of rules which, in all matters within
the letter, spirit or object of its provisions, lays down the jus commune,
expressly or by implication. In these matters, the Code is the foundation
of all other laws, although other laws may complement the Code or
make exceptions to it.
On this provision, see Alain-François Brisson, La Disposition pré1iminaire du
Code civil du Québec, 44 MCGILL L. J. 539 (1998-1999); see also Jean-Maurice
Brisson, Le Code civil, droit commun?, in LE NOUVEAU CODE CIVIL
: INTERPRÉTATION ET APPLICATION. LES JOURNÉES MAXIMILIEN-CARON 1992,
(Faculté de droit, Université de Montréal eds., Éditions Thémis, Montréal,
1993); H. Patrick Glenn, La Disposition préliminaire du Code civil du Québec,
le droit commun et les principes généraux du droit, 46 LES CAHIERS DE DROIT
339 (2005).
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and relations between persons and things which, in all matters
within the letter, spirit or object of its provisions, lays down the jus
commune, expressly or by implication. In these matters, the Code
is the foundation of all other laws, although other laws may
complement the Code or make exceptions to it. It must be
interpreted in harmony with the general principles of law and
subject to norms having a constitutional nature.
This may be stating the obvious but may come as a salutary
reminder in a jurisdiction where the civil law tradition is unknown
to many and doubted by others.
The lack of response to this proposal, uttered two years ago, 104
indicates that it may be too late and that there may be too much
common law contamination to reasonably hope for a civil law
revival in Louisiana. 105 But as William of Orange, still a child
when Copernicus died and later to be known as William the Silent,
was fond of saying, “One need not hope in order to undertake, nor
succeed in order to persevere.” 106 History proves that he achieved
much in his lifetime.

104. O. Moréteau, An Introduction to Contamination, 3 J. CIV. L. STUD. 9, 15
(2010).
105. O. Moréteau, Mare Nostrum as the Cauldron of Western Legal
Traditions: Stirring the Broth, Making Sense of Legal Gumbo whilst
Understanding Contamination, 4 J. CIV. L. STUD. 516, 530 (2011).
106. As quoted by EDMUND WILSON, O CANADA: AN AMERICAN'S NOTES ON
CANADIAN CULTURE (1963).

CLASHES AND CONTINUITIES:
BRIEF REFLECTIONS ON THE “NEW LOUISIANA LEGAL
HISTORY”
Seán Patrick Donlan *
I. INTRODUCTION
I’m a Louisiana native, but I’ve been away from the state for
over a decade. In that time, I completed a Ph.D. (on Edmund
Burke’s Legal Thought) at Trinity College Dublin and remained to
teach law in Ireland. Most of my research has focused on
comparative law, history, and legal history. 1 Given my Louisiana
legal background and these interests, comparative legal history is
especially important to my work. Indeed, I’ve long wanted to
return to Louisiana history, in particular to the unusual legal and
social history of my own “Florida Parishes”. That research, on the
laws and norms of Spanish West Florida in the early nineteenth
century is underway, though it’s proceeding slowly. 2 It has,
however, drawn me back into the complex, sometimes convoluted,
debates on Louisiana legal history. The bicentennial of Louisiana
* Lecturer, University of Limerick, Ireland; President, Juris Diversitas;
General Secretary, World Society of Mixed Jurisdiction Jurists; Chief Editor,
COMPARATIVE LEGAL HISTORY; Executive Council, European Society for
Comparative Legal History. I want to thank those who read and commented on
different versions of this note. The opinions expressed and errors made are mine
alone.
1. Most recently, for example, I co-edited, with Michael Brown of the
University of Aberdeen, THE LAWS AND OTHER LEGALITIES OF IRELAND, 16891850 (Ashgate, London, 2011). My contribution to the collection was an article
on Arthur Browne, an eighteenth-century, American-born civilian (a specialist
in continental law) who taught civil law at Trinity College, practiced in both the
admiralty and ecclesiastical courts and the courts of common law, and served in
the Irish Parliament.
2. Seán P. Donlan, Entangled up in Red, White, and Blue: Spanish West
Florida and the American Territory of Orleans, c1803-1810 in
ENTANGLEMENTS IN LEGAL HISTORY: CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES TO GLOBAL
LEGAL HISTORY (Thomas Duve ed., forthcoming). The book grew out of a
workshop held at the Max Planck Institute for European Legal History
(Frankfurt, Germany) in August 2012.
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statehood provides an opportunity to briefly comment on the state
of our legal history and historiography. In particular, I want to
discuss the so-called “New Louisiana legal history” as articulated
over the last three decades by Professors Warren M. Billings and
Mark F. Fernandez. Their scholarship, with their allies, has made
important individual contributions to a more nuanced history of
our laws. But the revisionism of Billings and Fernandez is most
wanting precisely where they been most critical; that is, with
respect to comparative legal history. Indeed, I suggest that a
renewed engagement with the old legal historians and their heirs is
in order.
Warren Billings and Mark Fernandez are both excellent
historians with distinguished records in Louisiana history. A longtime resident of the state, Billings is Professor Emeritus in the
History Department of the University of New Orleans (UNO). 3 He
was the official historian of the Louisiana Supreme Court and was
responsible for making their records available in the UNO
archives. Fernandez, a native of Louisiana and once a student of
Billings, is Professor of History at Loyola University New Orleans.
Like Billings, he is also a past President of the Louisiana Historical
Association. 4 Both are elected fellows of the Louisiana Historical
Association. The published roots of the “New Louisiana Legal
3. Warren M. Billings’ relevant works include: Louisiana Legal History
and its Sources: Needs, Opportunities and Approaches in LOUISIANA’S LEGAL
HERITAGE (Edward F. Haas ed., 1983); Book Review, 30 LA. HIST. 324
(reviewing RICHARD H. KILBOURNE, HISTORY OF THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE:
THE FORMATIVE YEARS, 1803-1839 (1987)); Preface and Introduction, AN
UNCOMMON EXPERIENCE: LAW AND JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS IN LOUISIANA 18032003 (Judith K. Schafer & Warren M. Billings eds., Center for Louisiana
Studies, University of Southwest Louisiana, Lafayette, La., 1997; published as
VOL. 13, LOUISIANA PURCHASE BICENTENNIAL SERIES IN LOUISIANA STUDIES)
[hereinafter AN UNCOMMON EXPERIENCE]; Mixed Jurisdictions and
Convergence: The Louisiana Example, 29 INTL. J. LEG. INFO. 272 (2001).
4. Fernandez’s relevant works include: Louisiana Legal History: Past,
Present, and Future in A LAW UNTO ITSELF? ESSAYS IN THE NEW LOUISIANA
LEGAL HISTORY (Billings & Fernandez eds., LSU Press, Baton Rouge, La.,
2001) [hereinafter A LAW UNTO ITSELF?]; FROM CHAOS TO CONTINUITY: THE
EVOLUTION OF LOUISIANA’S JUDICIAL SYSTEM, 1712-1862 (LSU Press, Baton
Rouge, La., 2001) [hereinafter FROM CHAOS TO CONTINUITY].
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History” lay in Billings’ Louisiana Legal History and its Sources:
Needs, Opportunities and Approaches, published in Louisiana’s
Legal Heritage (1983). There Billings launched a critique of the
“lawyer-annalists” writing on Louisiana legal history and began to
suggest that American legal history, like that of Virginia (on which
he’d long specialized), was a better context than comparisons with
continental legal traditions. 5 The “New Louisiana Legal History”
tag was developed in Billings’ review of Richard Kilbourne’s
History of the Louisiana Civil Code (1989). There Billings both
criticised and claimed Kilbourne, who must have been surprised to
find that he’d been pressed into the ranks of the new historians. 6
Billings continued his critique and call-to-arms, now assisted by
Fernandez, across the 1990s. Their agenda became still clearer
over time: our legal history and historiography must, they argued,
generally be set in a wider social context and especially within the
broad contours of American legal history. The efforts of Billings
and Fernandez culminated in the jointly-edited A Law unto Itself?
Essays in the New Louisiana Legal History (2001) and, in the same
year, Fernandez’s From Chaos to Continuity: The Evolution of
Louisiana’s Judicial System, 1712-1862 (2001).
II. CODES AND CONTEXTS
The first plank of Billings’ and Fernandez’s critique is the
insistence that we set our legal history and historiography in its
broader social context. This call to place law in wider contexts—
without denying some level of autonomy for law—is to be
welcomed. As Fernandez wrote a decade ago, in his introduction to
A Law unto Itself?, it’s important not “to view law in a vacuum”
and to employ instead “interpretive schemes that mingle social,
5. Billings, Introduction in AN UNCOMMON EXPERIENCE, supra note 3, at
12.
6. Billings claimed that Kilbourne’s book was “among [the] first fruits” of
the movement. Warren M. Billings, Book Review, 30 LA. HIST. 324 (reviewing
RICHARD H. KILBOURNE, HISTORY OF THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE: THE
FORMATIVE YEARS, 1803-1839 (1987)).
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political, and intellectual history into modes of analysis that treat
things legal as one strand in a complex cultural matrix.”7
Professional historians rather than lawyers by training, Billings and
Fernandez are certainly right to insist that trained historians have
an important role to play in our legal history. It is a subject too
important to be left to legal historians alone. If the “old legal
historians” are never clearly identified, Louisiana legal historians
have traditionally focused—with their counterparts throughout the
West—on internal or doctrinal legal history. 8 Given the
dominance of external legal history in the United States over the
last half-century—which attempts, like the “New Louisiana Legal
History,” to place law in its wider economic, political, and social
contexts—it is peculiar that it has taken so long for what Billings
called a “sociocultural approach” to appear in the Bayou State. 9
The laudable aim of a more meaningful social history of
law has already produced some results. Billings and Fernandez are
responsible, at least in part, for encouraging or publishing work in
which scholars they include as fellow travelers in their “New
Louisiana Legal History”—e.g., Florence M. Jumonville and
Judith Kelleher Schafer—have taken their studies beyond codes
and courtrooms. Indeed, A Law unto Itself? included not only a
section on Judges and Courts, but essays on Books and the Law
and Law in Society as well. With these last two sections in mind,
Fernandez noted the importance of contributors who “mov[ed] past
mere analyses of digests and codes to identify the books on which
7. Fernandez, Louisiana Legal History in A LAW UNTO ITSELF?, supra
note 4, at 21.
8. Perhaps because of the acrimony of past debates, neither Billings nor
Fernandez is usually very specific about their targets. Henry Plauché Dart gets
the most attention, but he died in 1934. See Billings, Introduction in AN
UNCOMMON EXPERIENCE, supra note 3, at 14-15 and Mixed Jurisdictions and
Convergence: The Louisiana Example, 29 INTL. J. LEG. INFO. 272, 296-297
(2001). See also Billings, Louisiana Legal History and its Sources in
LOUISIANA’S LEGAL HERITAGE, supra note 3, at 194-5.
9. Billings, Preface in AN UNCOMMON EXPERIENCE, supra note 3, at 6.
For a recent comparison of British and American legal historians, see, e.g.,
Michael Lobban, The Varieties of Legal History, 5 CLIO@THÉMIS 1 (2012),
available at http://www.cliothemis.com/The-Varieties-of-Legal-History.
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lawyers and judges relied, to gauge their content, and to assess
their impression on Louisiana law and its practice.” 10 Even more
important perhaps are those contributors who moved between legal
and social history to investigate topics like slavery and the place of
women in the nineteenth century. 11 Ironically, however, the
collection contains little that is explicitly comparative even within
the American context that the new historians have championed. As
one reviewer put it, “its essays amplify the title’s ambivalence by
engaging only sporadically with the unifying theme of evaluating
Louisiana legal history in larger context.” 12
Indeed, the critique of Billings and Fernandez is not
without problems. First, it may be a little unfair to portray
inattention to social history as a failure of the lawyers. It’s hardly
surprising, after all, that “[l]aw professors claimed legal history for
their very own” or that histories written by lawyers would be, well,
lawyerly. 13 Instead, the absence of the social history of law that
Billings and Fernandez demand might suggest negligence on the
part of historians rather than jurists. More importantly, the legal
history produced by Billings and Fernandez is itself court-centered,
largely focused on judges and jurisprudence. It looks, in fact, little
different from traditional Anglophone legal scholarship, what we

10. Fernandez, Louisiana Legal History in A LAW UNTO ITSELF?, supra
note 4, at 17.
11. Others have gone further. See, e.g., DEREK N. KERR, PETTY FELONY,
SLAVE DEFIANCE, AND FRONTIER VILLAINY: CRIME AND JUSTICE IN SPANISH
LOUISIANA, 1770-1803 (Garland Publishing, New York, 1993); Sara Brooks
Sundberg, Women and the Law of Property Under Louisiana Civil Law, 17821835 (Ph.D. Dissertation, Louisiana State University, 2001); SHANNON L.
DAWDY, BUILDING THE DEVIL’S EMPIRE: FRENCH COLONIAL NEW ORLEANS
(University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2008); ANDREW MCMICHAEL,
ATLANTIC LOYALTIES: AMERICANS IN SPANISH WEST FLORIDA 1785-1810
(University of Georgia Press, Athens, Ga., 2008). Beyond Louisiana, see
BROWN & DONLAN, THE LAWS AND OTHER LEGALITIES OF IRELAND, 1689-1850,
supra note 1.
12. Christopher L. Doyle, Book Review, 1 J. EARLY REPUBL. 708 (review
of Billings & Fernandez, A LAW UNTO ITSELF? ESSAYS IN THE NEW LOUISIANA
LEGAL HISTORY (2001)).
13. Billings, Introduction in AN UNCOMMON EXPERIENCE, supra note 3, at
15.
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might call the “Old Anglo-American Legal History”. More
problematically, especially when arguing for a social history of
law, are the conclusions drawn from case law. For example, rather
than an exploration of “social, political, and intellectual history,”
Fernandez argued in From Chaos to Continuity that the
“[e]xamination of … state courts … allows for a sweeping analysis
of law, society, culture, politics, conflict, and consensus.” 14 But
surely this overstates the significance of the judiciary and case law.
These are obviously an important part of the overall picture of our
laws and of the “law in action”. But the study of case law is hardly
“sociocultural” analysis at its best. Both the old and new historians
would do well to take more seriously the call to “modes of analysis
that treat things legal as one strand in a complex cultural matrix.” 15
The general thrust of modern socio-legal scholarship is that
law, including but not limited to the courts, may reflect society, but
it also has meaningful autonomy as well. The relationship is
extraordinarily complex. But Billings wrote, in 1997, not only that
“[c]ulture, society, and law are inextricably intertwined,” but
that: 16
Ultimately law defines culture because it invests societies
with their collective identities, which sets each off from
another. Thus to examine even the most mundane facet of
any legal order is to illuminate changes in society and its
values through the passage of years. 17
Perhaps Billings misstated his view here or I’ve misunderstood,
but the idea that “law defines culture” seems simplistic, if not
naïve. Such an opinion has, of course, been held by older schools
of legal historians who placed their legal traditions at the center of
their cultures, not least long-standing views of Anglo-American
legal exceptionalism. A continental European variant, reflecting
14. FERNANDEZ, FROM CHAOS TO CONTINUITY, supra note 4, at xii.
15. Fernandez, Louisiana Legal History in A LAW UNTO ITSELF?, supra note
4, at 16.
16. Billings, Preface in AN UNCOMMON EXPERIENCE, supra note 3, at 7.
17. Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
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the nationalism of the nineteenth century, was the mystical
Volksgeist of the influential German “Historical School”. But such
views have little connection to an extensive, comparative
scholarship on the frequency of legal transplantation. 18 It
contradicts, too, the historical complexity and plurality of both
laws and cultures throughout Western legal history. 19
III. COMPARISONS AND CONTEXTS
The second aim of Billings and Fernandez is, as the latter put
it, to “explore new methods and areas of research with the aim of
tying the state’s legal history more closely to that of the South and
to the nation as a whole” is a perfectly reasonable endeavor. 20
Billings had earlier written that the new historians:
share a commitment to novel methods, a revisionist bent,
rigorous manuscript research, and an astute incorporation
of Louisiana’s legal history into the larger contexts of
national legal history, Southern history, and American
history in general. 21
This emphasis on the American context is rooted in the belief,
shared by Billings and Fernandez, that scholarship on Louisiana
legal history is not merely internal, but has tended to unnecessarily
and problematically accentuate its uniqueness or “exceptionalism”,
especially its relationship to continental legal sources. There is
some truth to this. Writing on our links to continental legal
18. The obvious touchstone is ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN
APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW (2d ed., University of Georgia Press, Athens,
Ga., 1993). The debate is, however, quite extensive and complex. For additional
titles, see Seán P. Donlan, The Mediterranean Hybridity Project: At the
Boundaries of Law and Culture, 4 J. CIV. L. STUD. 355, 370-373 (2011).
19. See Seán P. Donlan, Remembering: Legal Hybridity and Legal History,
2 COMP. L. REV. 1 (2011) and All This Together Make Up Our Common Law”:
Legal Hybridity in England and Ireland, 1704-1804 in MIXED LEGAL SYSTEMS
AT NEW FRONTIERS (Esin Örücü ed., Windy, Simmonds, and Hill Publishing,
London, 2010).
20. Fernandez, Louisiana Legal History in A LAW UNTO ITSELF?, supra note
4, at 1.
21. Billings, Introduction in AN UNCOMMON EXPERIENCE, supra note 3, at
17.
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traditions, our legal historians have too often failed to attend to
American parallels. 22 Indeed, in this respect, much of Fernandez’s
introduction to A Law unto Itself? is solid advice for the
development of a richer legal history. But similarities, like
differences, can be exaggerated. One partial perspective, or
partiality, may simply replace another. I want to suggest that
Billings and Fernandez appear confused about what the old legal
historians—whoever they are—were doing, oscillate in their own
appraisal of Louisiana law, and reveal important limitations in their
understanding of the comparative analysis they reject.
Billings is especially critical of “exceptionalism …”, the belief
in the sui generis nature of Louisiana’s laws, “as the organizing
principle of Louisiana legal history.” 23 Elsewhere, he refers to
“[t]he myth” that “French civil law [was] the marrow, the bone,
and the spirit of Louisiana jurisprudence.” 24 Perhaps there remain
some lawyers and laypeople who believe this, but to conclude that
it reflects the communis opinio of any generation of Louisiana’s
legal historians is mistaken. In fact, it seems to conflate an
argument largely about the uniqueness of Louisiana’s private law
for more sweeping conclusions about the tradition as a whole. The
“civilian renaissance” to which Billings refers was part of a wider

22. A number of recurring, admittedly important, questions still distract
from more productive analyses. Ongoing debates in Louisiana legal history
include, at least for the early nineteenth century: the status—mere digest or
modern code—of the 1808 redaction; the character—whether French or
Spanish—of the A DIGEST OF THE CIVIL LAWS NOW IN FORCE IN THE
TERRITORY OF ORLEANS (1808) [hereinafter DIGEST] and the role of the 1808
redactors; the significance of the “De La Vergne volume” of the 1808 DIGEST;
the character—whether continental or Anglo-American—of the jurisprudence;
the general character—whether naturalist or positivist—of Louisiana law. For a
similar list of debates, cf. Billings, Louisiana Legal History and its Sources in
LOUISIANA’S LEGAL HERITAGE, supra note 3, at 195.
23. Billings, Preface in AN UNCOMMON EXPERIENCE, supra note 3, at 6.
24. Billings, Mixed Jurisdictions and Convergence, supra note 3, at 299.
Indeed, Billings seems to want it both ways. He suggests that the Louisiana
claim to uniqueness “speaks more to myth than to reality” while acknowledging,
in the same paragraph, that Louisiana would become “a jurisdiction apart.” Id. at
272, 273. Note, too, Billings’ odd contrast between the FRENCH CIVIL CODE OF
1804 and the CODE NAPOLEON, id. at 280.
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debate against those who argued, anticipating in many respects the
new historians, that Louisiana was virtually indistinguishable from
its fellow American jurisdictions. 25 Indeed, the most heated debate
of the past four decades was precisely over whether the Digest of
1808 was best seen as redacting French or Spanish private law. 26
But neither camp denied Anglo-American transplants then or the
progressive influence of Anglo-American law since. Of course, in
Louisiana, as in other jurisdictions, legal history can be whiggish
and shallow among the public, practitioners, and professors alike. 27
But if Billings contrasts “exceptionalism” with the idea that
Louisiana is “an amalgamation of civil and common law precepts
that commenced in 1803 and continued into the present,” I know of
no scholar—certainly no living Louisiana legal historian—who
maintains the former view. 28
This suggests a fundamental misunderstanding of the old legal
historians—whoever they are—by at least some of the new
historians. Similar to Billings, Fernandez makes an odd contrast
between those who emphasized a “clash” of Anglo-American and
continental legal traditions in the early nineteenth century and
others who “walked a different route. [The latter] drew notice to a
blend between civil and common law that made Louisiana a
‘mixed jurisdiction.’” 29 The point of the clash thesis in its various
forms was, especially for the early nineteenth century, precisely to
explain the generation of Louisiana’s mixed legal system, of which

25. Fernandez called the revival an “intellectual cul-de-sac,” Louisiana
Legal History, supra note 4, at 9.
26. See especially Rodolfo Batiza, The Louisiana Civil Code of 1808: Its
Actual Sources and Present Relevance, 46 TUL. L. REV. 4 (1971) and Robert
Pascal, Sources of the Digest of the Civil Laws of 1808: A Reply to Professor
Batiza, 46 TUL. L. REV. 604 (1972). Forty years ago, this was described as a
“tournament of scholars” in Joseph M. Sweeney, Tournament of Scholars Over
the Sources of the Civil Code of 1808, 46 TUL. L. REV. 586 (1972).
27. The widespread belief that English common law was or is rooted in
actual social custom is a well-known example. Cf. FERNANDEZ, FROM CHAOS TO
CONTINUITY, supra note 4, at 112.
28. Billings, Preface in AN UNCOMMON EXPERIENCE, supra note 3, at 7.
29. Fernandez, Louisiana Legal History, supra note 4, at 12.
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no one is in doubt. 30 Again, writing about the attempt by some
Louisianans to protect their continental private law, Fernandez
states that “[t]he petitioners hoped to control efforts to admit
Louisiana into the Union, and to undermine Claiborne’s efforts to
create a mixed jurisdiction by securing civilian traditions.”31
Assuming that this was Claiborne’s aim, it fails to appreciate the
fact that whoever won (what certainly looks like a clash of some
sort), the result would have been a mixed system. It’s only by
securing the civilian traditions, in some manner at least, that a
mixed jurisdiction could be created. It’s the nature of our mixture,
not whether one was established, that has been the central question
for Louisiana’s legal historians.
The concept of a “clash of legal traditions” and cultures in the
Territory of Orleans, by being defined in different ways by
different writers with different perspectives and agendas, has
admittedly created enduring problems for Louisiana legal history. 32
In 1983, Billings himself maintained that “[t]he rivalry between
Louisiana law and American law after 1803 was no mere
intellectual exercise for the edification and material benefit of
lawyers; it is a conflict of culture in which Franco-Spanish
Louisianans sought to preserve their identity.” 33 He added that
accommodation was found and “the story of that accommodation
requires telling.” 34 Both of these statements are in the mainstream
of writing on Louisiana legal history. Since then, Billings and
30. This was quite explicitly the intention of GEORGE DARGO’S
JEFFERSON’S LOUISIANA: POLITICS AND THE CLASH OF LEGAL TRADITIONS (Rev.
ed., The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd., Clark, NJ, 2009), the most eloquent exponent
of the clash thesis. Cf., however, his more moderate presentation in Dargo, The
Digest of 1808: Historical Perspectives, 24 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L. FORUM 1
(2009).
31. FERNANDEZ, FROM CHAOS TO CONTINUITY, supra note 4, at 24.
32. Contrary to Billings’ claim that “Samuel B. Groner introduced the
‘clash of legal traditions’ thesis”, the idea extends back into the nineteenth
century. See Billings, Introduction in AN UNCOMMON EXPERIENCE, supra note
3, at 16. See also Groner, Louisiana Law: Its Development in the First QuarterCentury of American Rule, 8 LA. L. REV. 350 (1947-8).
33. Billings, Louisiana Legal History and its Sources, supra note 3, at 199.
34. Id.
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Fernandez have not so much presented a study of the confluence of
legal cultures, but to claim that Anglo-American law was
victorious early in the century, largely by virtue of the numbers of
Anglo-Americans in the Bar and on the Bench. 35 This is less
accommodation than annexation. 36 It can also rather easily be
presented as a clash. More importantly, however, conflict and
consensus, like clashes and continuities, aren’t mutually exclusive.
Louisiana legal historians have never denied that an
accommodation was made. The question was, to repeat myself,
about the character of that accommodation. The suggestion of
Billings and Fernandez seems to be that Louisianans developed not
a mixed system, but “a Louisiana version of [Anglo-American]
common law.” 37
Indeed, it appears that Billings and Fernandez don’t merely
want us to attend to American—or Anglo-American—contexts, but
dismiss other comparisons as irrelevant. 38 But their conclusion is,

35. See Billings, Preface and Introduction in AN UNCOMMON EXPERIENCE,
supra note 3, at 6, 16-17, and Fernandez, Louisiana Legal History, supra note 4,
at 9-12. Kilbourne’s rejection of the clash thesis, at least in its most crude form,
seems to have been an especially important influence on the new historians. His
primary point was to deny that President Thomas Jefferson or William CC
Clairborne, the Territorial Governor of Orleans, intended to suppress the local
laws and replace them with Anglo-American law. See chapter one of RICHARD
H. KILBOURNE, HISTORY OF THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE: THE FORMATIVE
YEARS, 1803-1839 (Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University, Baton
Rouge, La., 1987). There are, of course, more modest possibilities. I suggest that
if the true motivations of the advocates of the common laws of Orleans and
England cannot easily be divined, some amount of low-grade competition and
anxiety clearly existed, at least with regard to private law (regulating land,
matrimonial regimes, successions, etc.). This needn’t deny that Creoles and their
allies probably had mixed motives: the stability of property and politics, the
possibility of expediting statehood, as well as a genuine concern about the
substance of the law and the culture to which it was attached. In any event, we
must be cautious not to confuse rhetoric for reality.
36. Billings’ earlier article was more nuanced, noting both that Louisiana
laws “set [them] off from their antecedents and the rest of the nation as well”
and suggesting how “[t]he courts quickly became the forum in which the
competing legal systems were harmonized.” Billings, Louisiana Legal History
and its Sources, supra note 3, at 199.
37. FERNANDEZ, FROM CHAOS TO CONTINUITY, supra note 4, at 76.
38. Billings bemoaned the “preoccupation with comparative analysis” in
Billings, Louisiana Legal History and its Sources, supra note 3, at 195. He
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in part, rooted in inattention to and unfamiliarity with comparative
legal history. Fernandez’s From Chaos to Continuity is especially
problematic in this respect. The work contains careful, useful, and
important research on Louisiana’s courts. But the wider legal
context it presents, both Anglo-American and continental, relies on
stereotypes and anachronisms. 39 In discussing judicial practice in
the aftermath of the Digest of 1808, for example, Fernandez states
that Louisiana judges “deviated from traditional civilian practice in
which the jurist’s main occupation consisted of applying
appropriate code citations.” 40 This idea, with that of “[a]n
inflexible code”, is not merely unsubstantiated in modern
continental legal practice, it wasn’t even an aspiration for the ius
commune traditions of which French and Spanish Louisiana, the
subsequent Orleans Territory, was a part. 41 The Code Civil (1804)
was only four years old and the formalism of the French
“exegetical” approach, insofar as it actually applied even in France
at the time, was a deviation from the complex balancing of legal
texts, reason, and equity (i.e., équité) in continental adjudication.
The employment of such shibboleths results in attributing existing
commonalities between Anglo-American and continental law to
evidence of borrowing from the former, missing the more
significant fact that there were numerous parallel developments in

suggested that being an “outsider” gave him a critical distance Louisianans
didn’t have in understanding their laws. Id.
39. See Dargo, Book Review, H-LAW: H-NET REVIEWS, August 2002
(reviewing MARK F. FERNANDEZ, FROM CHAOS TO CONTINUITY: THE
EVOLUTION OF LOUISIANA’S JUDICIAL SYSTEM, 1712-1862), available at
www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=6645.
40. FERNANDEZ, FROM CHAOS TO CONTINUITY, supra note 4, at 33-34.
41. Id. at 61. Fernandez writes that such a code “embodying logic and
efficiency, simply could not provide for the plethora of challenging questions
that often arose before the bench.” Even assuming that the exegetical approach
of a later generation in France accurately expressed the practice of the French
courts, it’s odd to hear that such a codal regime, applied across France for over
two centuries, couldn’t provide for the legal challenges of Louisiana.
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both. 42 That is, rather than seeing Louisiana as part of a wider
American movement to codify, the American movement must
itself be, and has often been, set within wider codification
movements across the West.
IV. CONCLUSION
Billings, Fernandez, and their allies have made important
contributions to the study of Louisiana law and history.
Collectively, they’ve edged us in the direction of a more
meaningful social history of law. They’ve counseled us to pay
closer attention to the American context of Louisiana’s laws, legal
actors, and legal institutions. Following their suggestions will
result in a much more nuanced image of our laws and better define
the precise contours of our mixed tradition. But the revisionism of
Billings and Fernandez is most wanting precisely where they been
most critical, that is, with respect to comparative law and legal
history. For all our faults, comparatists and legal historians can
capture contexts that others—including talented historians—don’t.
Billings and Fernandez might accomplish still more than they have
with greater modesty, a closer reading of the scholarship of the old
historians and their heirs, and a wider appreciation of comparative
law, past and present. Perhaps in the wake of our bicentennial, we
can find more constructive ways in which the old and the new
historians can work together—in dialogue, collaborative projects,
joint publications, etc—to the benefit of the subject we all hold
dear.

42. See Fernandez’s comments on common law and custom, the ius
commune and exegetical jurisprudence, stare decisis and jurisprudence
constante in Civil Law and Common Law, an appendix to FROM CHAOS TO
CONTINUITY, supra note 4.

MAKING FRENCH DOCTRINE ACCESSIBLE TO THE
ENGLISH-SPEAKING WORLD: THE LOUISIANA
TRANSLATION SERIES
Alexandru-Daniel On ∗
I. INTRODUCTION
Translation theoreticians have asserted that all communication
is translation. 1 That means that language itself is a translation,
from the non-verbal world into the world of signs, and therefore
translation is in fact “translation for the second time”. 2 That refers
not only to language, but our gestures as well. We all had early
special training in translation during our childhood, while playing
charades. 3 Naturally, in a game of charades, the players that are
more likely to guess the right words are usually the actor's friends,
the ones that know him better. This childhood game is thus a first
lesson of culture-dependent translation - just like legal translation.
The better you know the object that you are mimicking and the
better you know the persons that have to guess it, the more
successful you will be in the game.
Legal translation possesses, however, a somewhat unique
feature. In law, language is both the object studied and the means
of analysis, which means that for a lawyer, language is not simply

∗ LL.M. candidate, Louisiana State University Law Center (2012),
Research Assistant for Professor Olivier Moréteau. The author would like to
thank Professor Olivier Moréteau and Professor Alain Levasseur for their
support and comments and Jennifer Lane for her help in editing the material.
1. Eduardo Rotman, The Inherent Problems of Legal Translation:
Theoretical Aspects, 6 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 187, 187 (1995-1996).
2. Id. at 187 n.1.
3. "Charades" is a word guessing game, where one player, who is given a
specific word, is acting without using sounds or words, and the others must
guess that word.
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a medium, but also the "raw material" to be worked on. 4 It’s still a
game of charades, only a bit more complicated.
All translations accomplish a double transfer: a strictly
functional transfer and a cultural transfer. For some legal
translations the functional element is preponderant, as it is, for
example, when translating a contract. Others, however, perform
primarily a cultural transfer.
When translating doctrine, the cultural transfer is preponderant.
It is only logical then that the birthplace of most translations of
major French doctrinal materials into English has been within the
state of Louisiana, a state that is very close to the French nomos. In
Louisiana, the French tradition was kept very much alive over the
centuries, and the core of Louisiana's legal system, its private law,
is of French and Spanish origin. 5 However, the process of
translating French materials in order to make them accessible
within the English-speaking world has never been solely
Louisianan. French doctrine has been and is still appreciated
worldwide for its intellectual strength, clarity and abstraction. That
is why the works of Pothier, 6 Domat 7 or Gény 8 were translated
into English prior to any Louisianan translation project.

4. Malcom Harvey, What's so Special about Legal Translation? (Jul. 12,
2012, 12:50 PM), http://id.erudit.org/iderudit/008007ar.
5. Though it is disputed if it is mainly of French origin, or Spanish [see
Rodolfo Batiza, The Louisiana Civil Code of 1808: Its Actual Sources and
Present Relevance, 46 TUL. L. REV. 4 (1971); Robert A. Pascal, Sources of the
Digest of 1808: A Reply to Professor Batiza, 46 TUL. L. REV. 603 (1972);
ALAIN LEVASSEUR, MOREAU LISLET: THE MAN BEHIND THE DIGEST OF 1808
170-206 (Claitor’s Publishing Division 2008).
6. ROBERT J. POTHIER, A TREATISE ON OBLIGATIONS, CONSIDERED IN A
MORAL AND LEGAL VIEW (N. C. Newbern trans., Martin and Ogden 1802, 2 v.);
ROBERT J. POTHIER, A TREATISE ON THE CONTRACT OF SALE (L. S. Cushing
trans., C.C. Little and 4. Brown 1839); ROBERT J. POTHIER, A TREATISE ON
MARITIME CONTRACTS OF LETTING TO HIRE (Caleb Cushing trans., Cummings
and Hilliard 1821); ROBERT J. POTHIER, A TREATISE ON THE CONTRACT OF
PARTNERSHIP, WITH THE CIVIL CODE AND THE CODE OF COMMERCE RELATING TO
THAT SUBJECT, IN THE SAME ORDER (Owen D. Tudor trans. with notes referring
to the decisions of the English courts, Butterworks 1854).
7. JEAN DOMAT, THE CIVIL LAW IN ITS NATURAL ORDER (Cuther S.
Cushing trans., Little, Brown & Co. 1853, 2 v.).
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That being said, no one can doubt the fact that Louisiana's
contribution to the process of making French doctrine accessible in
English is simply astonishing.
The complete volumes of translations form a long, well-crafted
and influential series, named the Louisiana Translation Series.
This series covers major French treatises and monographs, and a
few doctrinal excerpts, all bound in workable, well-organized and
easy-to-use volumes, the most important of which have been crossreferenced with the Louisiana civil code in an annotated series. 9
This translation work can be divided in two major categories:
translations made under the tutelage of the Louisiana State Law
Institute (Part II), and translations sponsored by the Center of Civil
Law Studies (Part III).
II. TRANSLATIONS MADE UNDER THE TUTELAGE OF THE
LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE
The first category includes translations realized by the
Louisiana State Law Institute 10 between 1959 and 1972, namely

8. FRANÇOIS GÉNY, MÉTHODE D’INTERPRÉTATION ET SOURCES EN DROIT
PRIVÉ POSITIF §155-159, 169-176, translated in ERNEST BRUNCKEN & LAYTON
B. REGISTER, SCIENCE OF LEGAL METHOD – SELECT ESSAYS 2-46 (Boston Book
Co. 1917); François Gény, La technique législative dans la Codification civile
moderne (à propos du Centenaire du Code civil), translated in BRUNCKEN &
REGISTER, id. at 498-557.
9. WEST’S LOUISIANA STATUTES ANNOTATED, CIVIL CODE SERIES (1952,
17 vols.). The translations of Planiol and Aubry & Rau are the ones that can be
cross-referenced with the annotated series.
10. The legislative charter of the Louisiana State Law Institute imposes
upon it the responsibility of making available translations of civil law materials
and commentaries in the interest of a better understanding of the civil law of
Louisiana and the philosophy upon which it is based [LA. REV. STAT. § 24:204
A(7) (1950)]. Generally, the Institute was chartered, created and organized as an
official advisory law revision commission, law reform agency and legal research
agency for the state of Louisiana [LA. REV. STAT. § 24:201 (1950)], with the
purpose of promoting and encouraging the clarification and simplification of the
law of Louisiana and its better adaptation to present social needs, securing the
better administration of justice, and carrying on scholarly legal research and
scientific legal work [LA. REV. STAT. § 24:204 A (1950)]. See also William E.
Crawford, The Louisiana State Law Institute–History and Progress, 45 LA. L.
REV. 1077 (1985).
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three magnificent projects covering: Planiol's Traité élémentaire de
droit civil, 11 Gény's Méthode d'interprétation et sources en droit
privé positif 12 and thereafter, in the Civil Law Translations series,
complete volumes or substantial excerpts of Aubry & Rau's Droit
civil français 13 and excerpts from the works of Carbonnier and
Baudry-Lacantinerie & Tissier. 14
Planiol and Ripert's Traité élémentaire de droit civil is the first
translation of the series and, without a shadow of a doubt, the
translation project that had the most substantial influence in the
state of Louisiana, 15 and perhaps even elsewhere. 16 Written by
11. MARCEL PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (La. St. L. Inst. trans., West,
1958, 3 v.).
12. FRANÇOIS GÉNY, METHOD OF INTERPRETATION AND SOURCES OF
PRIVATE POSITIVE LAW (La. St. L. Inst. trans., West, 1963).
13. CHARLES AUBRY & CHARLES RAU, 1 OBLIGATIONS (La. St. L. Inst.
trans., West, 1965); AUBRY & RAU, 2 PROPERTY (La. St. L. Inst. trans., West
1966); AUBRY & RAU, 3 TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSIONS & GRATUITOUS
DISPOSITIONS (La. St. L. Inst. trans., West 1969); AUBRY & RAU, 4 INTESTATE
SUCCESSIONS (La. St. L. Inst. trans., West 1971); AUBRY & RAU, 5
PRESCRIPTION (La. St. L. Inst. trans., West 1972).
14. GABRIEL BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE, ALBERT-ANATOLE TISSIER & JEAN
CARBONNIER, 5 PRESCRIPTION (La. St. L. Inst. trans., West 1972).
15. Planiol's treatise was used as authority in an unmatched number of
cases. Some of the most important private law cases dealing with property or
obligations were decided based on rules laid down and explained in this
translation of Marcel Planiol's TRAITÉ ÉLÉMENTAIRE. Cases like Bartlett v.
Calhoun, 412 So. 2d 597 (La. 1982), Gueno v. Medlenka, 238 La. 1081, 117 So.
2d 817 (1960) and Berlier v. A.P. Green Industries, 815 So. 2d 39 (La. 2002),
are landmark cases and also teaching material in Louisiana universities, and in
these cases excerpts from Planiol were absolutely decisive. See also Dainow,
The Planiol Treatise on the Civil Law: French and Louisiana Law for
Comparative Study, 10 AM. J. COMP. L. 175, 182 (1961). For the use of French
doctrine and French Law in general, by federal courts and state courts, see Alain
Levasseur, The Use of Comparative Law by Courts, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. SUPP.
41 (1994).
16. Proof of this vast influence is the decision to re-edit the series in 2005
by Hein (William S. Hein & Co., Inc., Buffalo) and the myriad of positive
reviews: “I feel certain that this Treatise which has attained the stature of a
classical work on law in France will be of immense benefit to American lawyers
and to all those interested in the vital problem of comparative law today.”
Edouard Morot-Sir, Director of the Cultural Services of the French Embassy
(1959), in PLANIOL, supra note 11, at 9; “Acquisition is recommended for all
types of law libraries.” Kate Wallach, Planiol, Marcel, Treatise on the Civil
Law, 53 LAW LIBR. J. 55, 67 (1960) (book review); A fervent supporter and
promoter of the Planiol translation was Joseph Dainow. See Joseph Dainow, The
Planiol Treatise on the Civil Law: French and Louisiana Law for Comparative
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Planiol in his own hand without any collaboration whatsoever, 17
this treatise was designed by the great French author as a textbook,
to be used by his students, 18 and was thereafter, for a long time,
used as such in law schools throughout France. 19 Consequently,
the structure of the treatise was influenced by the law curriculum
of that time, 20 and the style adapted to the purpose of teaching law:
it is concise and written with striking clarity. Based on the civil
code and some satellite statutes, the treatise covers almost all areas
of the civil law: a general introduction, the law of persons and
family, property, successions and donations, obligations and
special contracts (sale, lease, mandate, etc.), the security devices of
pledge and suretyship, privileges and mortgages, and aquisitive
and liberative prescription.
In the original version important passages are marked with
asterisks or double asterisks, and different types and sizes of font
are used 21 to emphasize what is of great value for a student
(principles, rules or law, elements of a particular doctrine), while
still conveying useful information and providing persuasive
explanations. The use of different fonts and asterisks was not
deemed advisable by the translators, and therefore the English
version does not keep these markings. The reason for this was the
fact that in Louisiana, Planiol's Traité Élémentaire was never

Study, 10 AM. J. COMP. LAW 175 (1961); Joseph Dainow, Civil Law
Translations and Treatises Sponsored in Louisiana, 23 AM. J. COMP. L. 521
(1975).
17. Georges Ripert, Preface to the 12th Edition of Planiol's Traité
élémentaire de droit civil, in 1 CIVIL LAW TREATISE, supra note 11, pt. 1, at 14.
18. PLANIOL, Intro to the 12th Edition of Planiol's Traité élémentaire de
droit civil, in 1 CIVIL LAW TREATISE, supra note 11, pt.1, at 21.
19. Denson Smith, Foreword to 1 CIVIL LAW TREATISE, supra note 11,
pt.1, at 4.
20. Joseph Dainow, Planiol, Civil Law Treatise. An English translation
prepared by the Louisiana State Law Institute from the original French Planiol,
Traité Élémentaire de Droit Civil (3 vol. 11 and 12 ed., 1938 and 1939), 20 LA.
L. REV. 191, 194 (1959-1960) (book review).
21. PLANIOL, Intro to the 12th Edition of Planiol's Traité élémentaire de
droit civil, supra note 11, pt.1, at 21.
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intended to be used as a manual for students. In Louisiana, the
treatise was designed primarily for use by courts, lawyers and law
scholars, and as a source for a better understanding of Louisiana's
(French) legal inheritance. 22
Planiol's work is no longer teaching material, not even in
France, but behind what he considered a modest manual for
students lays spectacularly complex doctrinal material, laden with
detailed historical accounts of how institutions evolved, statistics,
economic analysis, comparative analysis, bibliography and
"picturesque citations". 23
Planiol is still "persuasive authority" and no serious legal
scholar undertakes the study of a traditional civil law institution
without first consulting his treatises. However, much of the
underlying philosophy of his work is being forgotten and this is a
great opportunity for a reminder. Planiol was opposed to the
method of the exegetical school, mainly because he did not believe
that the civil law revolves around a code. In his view, the law was
a product of life as a whole. 24 Such a core belief is not easy to
follow, for it requires a different method of study, which takes into
account not just the intrinsic logic of the code, but also the
relevance of cases, history, economy, human behavior and other
areas of science. Planiol was a perfect apostle for his own
philosophy, his erudition allowing him to excel in his challenging
methodology.

22. "It is believed that the translation of this treatise will well serve the
courts, the lawyers and the law schools of Louisiana. Its publication will be
accompanied by the hope that it will be a significant contribution to a better
understanding of our rich legal inheritance and thereby materially improve the
administration of justice in Louisiana." Smith, supra note 19, at 5.
23. Ripert, supra note 17, at 15.
24. PLANIOL, Intro to the 12th Edition of Planiol's Traité élémentaire de
droit civil, supra note 11, at 19: "In this treatise I have constantly pointed out the
relationship of the civil law with the whole of life, not only that of the present,
but also that of the past from which it evolved". This one sentence must be
remembered, for it brings more light into the way we should approach the civil
law than the whole body of positivist legal literature.
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Last but not least, the translators of the three volumes should
be held in high esteem for what is undoubtedly a very professional
and well-crafted translation. The first volume was translated by
Pierre Crabites (a distinguished scholar who had formerly served
on the Mixed Tribunal of Egypt) and revised by Robert L. Henry
(jurist, author and scholar, who also served on the Mixed Tribunal
of Egypt), the second was translated by Robert L. Henry, and the
third by Jaro Mayda (graduate of Masaryk University, Professor of
law at the University of Puerto Rico). 25 Carlos E. Lazarus,
Continuous Statutory Revisor and Director of Legal Research for
the Institute, undertook the editorial preparation of the manuscript
for publication. 26
The second major project undertaken by the Louisiana State
Law Institute was the translation of Gény’s Méthode
d’interprétation et sources en droit privé positif.27 Gény’s Méthode
is a “wide-horizon general work”, 28 dealing with issues situated at
the core of legal thinking: legal hermeneutics, kinds of law, and
sources of law. He analyses different approaches on interpretation
and sets forward a new theory regarding legal interpretation,
named libre recherche scientifique, able to shed new light on the
law and open the door for its progressive development. With his
new theory, Gény moves away from most of the ideas of his
French legalist contemporaries and, without forsaking a degree of
deference to legislative authority, promotes a theory of
interpretation that recognized the authority of the interpreter
(judge), the scholar, and the citizen. 29 Gény influenced legal
25. Smith, supra note 19, at 4.
26. Id.
27. See GÉNY, supra note 12.
28. Dainow, Civil Law Translations and Treatises Sponsored in Louisiana,
supra note 16, at 523.
29. Nicolas Kasirer, François Gény’s libre recherche scientifique as a
Guide for Legal Translation, 61 LA. L. REV. 331, 334 (2001) ; see also O.
Moréteau, La traduction de l’œuvre de François Gény: Méthode de traduction et
sources doctrinales, in LA PENSÉE DE FRANÇOIS GÉNY, (François Lormant &
Olivier Cachard eds., Dalloz, forthcoming in 2012); François-Xavier Licari,
François Gény en Louisiane, in LA PENSÉE DE FRANÇOIS GÉNY, id.
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thinking not only in France and in other civil law jurisdictions, but
also in the common law. Great common law authors like Stone,30
Pound, 31 Llewellyn, 32 and Cardozo 33 have lengthy discussions
about Gény’s legal reasoning.
The translation for this project was entrusted to Jaro Mayda,
who also wrote a lengthy critical introduction in the same
volume. 34
The third and final translation project released by the Louisiana
State Law Institute was The Louisiana Civil Law Translation
Series. Starting with volume 3, this project also benefitted from the
expertise and resources of the Institute of Civil Law Studies. 35 The
series contains five translations, each dedicated to a major area of
civil law. The first four volumes are translations from Aubry &
Rau’s Cours de droit civil français. 36 The first deals with the Law
of Obligations, and it translates the fourth volume of the Cours de
droit civil français, as it was edited by Étienne Bartin in the sixth

30. JULIUS STONE, LEGAL SYSTEMS AND LAWYER'S REASONINGS 216, 220,
221, and 222 (Stanford University Press 1964).
31. ROSCOE POUND, 1 JURISPRUDENCE 183 (West 1959); Roscoe Pound,
Fifty Years of Jurisprudence, 51 HARV. L. REV. 444, 464-470 (1938).
32. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION, DECIDING
APPEALS 189, 260 and 261 n.46 (Little, Brown & Co. 1960).
33. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 16, 4647, 119-121, 138-139, and 143-145 (Yale University Press 1921).
34. Jaro Mayda, Gény’s Méthode After 60 years: A Critical Introduction, in
GÉNY, supra note 12, at V-LXXVI.
35. The Institute of Civil Law Studies was established in 1965 as a division
of the then LSU Law School for the purpose of preserving and enhancing the
civil law component of the Louisiana legal system. Since 1976, the institute
operates under a different name, The Center of Civil Law Studies, and its
mission is now expanded to promoting a better understanding and further
development of the private law of the State of Louisiana and other civil law
jurisdictions, particularly those of continental Europe and Latin America,
through theoretical and practical activities, such as publications, translations,
sponsorship of faculty and student exchanges, visiting scholars, seminars, and
lectures. The Center of Civil Law Studies promotes legal education by
sponsoring foreign students who wish to avail themselves of the opportunity of
studying a mixed legal system and American students who wish to expose
themselves to other legal systems. Such programs take advantage of Louisiana's
natural position as an education center for international and comparative legal
studies. (http://www.law.lsu.edu/index.cfm?geaux=ccls.home).
36. See AUBRY & RAU, supra note 13.
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edition (1942). The translation was made by A. N. Yiannopoulos, a
Greek scholar, holding advanced degrees from the University of
Chicago, the University of California, and the University of
Cologne, former Professor at Louisiana State University, currently
Professor Emeritus at Tulane University. The second volume,
regarding the Law of Property, is a translation of Volume II of the
seventh edition of Cours de droit civil, published in 1961 and
edited by Paul Esmein. The translation work was done by Jaro
Mayda. The third and fourth volume deal with Testamentary
Successions and Gratuitous Dispositions (vol. 3) and Intestate
Successions (vol. 4). The third volume corresponds to the last half
of Volume X (1954) and the whole of volume XI (1956) of Cours
de droit civil, while the forth volume corresponds to the last half of
volume IX and the first half of volume X, as they were edited by
Paul Esmein. Unlike the volumes that dealt with property and
obligations, where any addition to the original text was in brackets
and the contents was only brought up to date, these editions
contain Paul Esmein’s own critical views of texts of law or
jurisprudence. 37 The translation was prepared by Carlos E.
Lazarus, a native of Honduras, and at that time Professor at
Louisiana State University, holding degrees from the Municipal
College of Commerce in Manchester and Loyola University
School of Law. The fifth volume covers the subject of Prescription.
Three translations have been included in this volume in order to
achieve a comprehensive view of the subject: (1) BaudryLacantinerie & Tissier, Traité théorique et pratique de droit civil,
prescription; 38 (2) Aubry & Rau, Cours de droit civil français,
prescription; 39 and (3) Carbonnier, Notes on Liberative
37. Denson Smith, Foreword to 3 TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSIONS &
GRATUITOUS DISPOSITIONS, supra note 13, at III.
38. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, 28 TRAITÉ THÉORIQUE ET PRATIQUE
DE DROIT CIVIL, PRESCRIPTION (4th ed. 1924, nos. 1-815). The material was
updated with over 270 references to decisions, legislation and doctrine covering
the period 1924-1967.
39. AUBRY & RAU, 12 COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS, PRESCRIPTION
(Paul Esmein ed., 6th ed., 1958, nos. 770-776 bis).
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Prescription. 40 Once more, the translation project was entrusted to
Jaro Mayda.
Just like the Planiol volumes, The Civil Law Translation Series
proved to be very influential in Louisiana jurisprudence. 41 This
comes as no surprise, considering the fact that these volumes were
highly influential in France as well. Though French courts do not
have the habit of citing doctrine, a great number of decisions were
inspired by Aubry & Rau’s Cours de Droit Civil Français, and
some of them followed Aubry & Rau add litteram. 42 The authors
of the last volume enjoyed the same high esteem. In general,
Baudry-Lacantinerie’s work dominated French law schools as
teaching material for more than twenty years, 43 the reign of the
Précis élémentaire de droit civil having ended only when Planiol’s
Traité élémentaire was published. In particular, the volume on
prescription from the Traité théorique et pratique de droit civil is
considered "the most elaborate discussion regarding the subject of
prescription". 44 Also, Professor Carbonnier’s article is a splendid
addition to the fifth volume, covering mainly post-Baudry
jurisprudence (case law).

40. Jean Carbonnier, Notes sur la prescription extinctive, 50 REVUE
TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CIVIL 171-181 (1952).
41. Aubry & Rau are cited in at least 150 Supreme Court Decisions (using
Westlaw’s search engine). A few examples of important cases that cite the
translation are: Liner v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co., 319 So. 2d 766;
Bartlett v. Calhoun, 412 So. 2d 597; Howard v. Administrators of Tulane Educ.
Fund, 986 So. 2d 47; Lombardo v. Deshotel, 94 1172 La. 11/30/94, 647 So. 2d
1086.
42. André Tunc, Droit Civil Français by C. Aubry and C. Rau. Sixth
Edition, Edited by Étienne Bartin and Paul Esmein. Paris: Librairie Marchal et
Billard and Librairies Techniques. Twelve Volumes: Ten Volumes and
Permanent Supplement Published 1935-1955, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1157, 1158
(1956) (book review).
43. Ripert, supra note 17, at 13.
44. Denson Smith, Foreword to 5 PRESCRIPTION, supra notes 13 and 14, at
IV.
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III. TRANSLATIONS SPONSORED BY THE CENTER OF CIVIL LAW
STUDIES
The second group of translations was made under the tutelage
of The Center of Civil Law Studies (CCLS; formerly the Institute
of Civil Law studies). 45
The first translation sponsored by the CCLS was René David’s
Le droit français: Les données fondamentales du droit français,
published in English under the name French Law. Its Structure,
Sources, and Methodology. 46 The translation was entrusted to
Professor Michael Kindred. René David, having read and approved
the translation, also contributed with a preface to the English
edition.
The other six books from this group are relatively recent
additions, and they all share a common feature: they were either
personally translated by or the translation project was supervised
or directed by Alain Levasseur, Professor of Law at Louisiana
State University. Under his tutelage the following “nutshell” books
have been published: (1) Michael Alter, French Law of Business
Contracts: Principles; 47 (2) Bernard Chantebout, The French
Constitution; 48 (3) Christian Atias, The French Civil Law: An
Insider’s View; 49 (4) Jean-Louis Halpérin, The Civil Code; 50 (5)

45. Hereinafter CCLS.
46. RENÉ DAVID, FRENCH LAW. ITS STRUCTURE, SOURCES, AND
METHODOLOGY (Michael Kindred trans., Louisiana State University Press
1972).
47. MICHEL ALTER, FRENCH LAW OF BUSINESS CONTRACTS: PRINCIPLES
(Alain A. Levasseur trans., Louisiana State University Paul M. Herbert
Publications Institute 1986).
48. BERNARD CHANTEBOUT, THE FRENCH CONSTITUTION (David Gruning
trans., LSU Law Center 1998).
49. CHRISTIAN ATIAS, THE FRENCH CIVIL LAW: AN INSIDER'S VIEW (Alain
A. Levasseur & Bachir Mihoubi trans., Louisiana State University Paul M.
Herbert Publications Institute 1987).
50. JEAN-LOUIS HALPÉRIN, THE CIVIL CODE (David W. Gruning trans., Paul
M. Herbert Law Center Publications 2000).
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Louis Favoreau, Constitutional Courts; 51 and (6) Christian Atias,
French Civil Law. 52
The translations sponsored by the CCLS are ideal for scholars
and lawyers interested in comparative law, and especially so for
those who are new to this area of legal knowledge. René David’s
book on French law is a brilliant place to start any study on
comparative law. Even though the purpose of his book was to offer
an overview of the French legal system, in virtually every chapter
the author draws parallels between the common law and the civil
law, French law and German law, and all of this in a very succinct
and clear manner. Further insight into the fundamentals of French
law can be attained through the two translations of Christian Atias,
offering an overview of French law and French civil law, and JeanLouis Halpérin’s book regarding the French civil code, a great
contribution for all jurists, and not only for legal historians, laying
down the story of its birth, an account of previous attempts of
codification, the technique employed by its drafters, the
innovations it brought to the law, attitudes towards the code after
its enactment, different methods for interpretation, and, finally, the
influence of the French code in other countries. 53
In the realm of public law, the overview provided by the two
books regarding French Constitutional Law and European
Constitutional Courts 54 will open new horizons for those interested
in a comparative study of constitutional law. The study of French
constitutional law will definitely be intriguing for the American
51. LOUIS FAVOREU, CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS (Alain A. Levasseur &
Roger K. Ward trans., LSU Law Center 2001).
52. CHRISTIAN ATIAS, FRENCH CIVIL LAW (Alain A. Levasseur trans., LSU
Law Center 2002).
53. Not just in Europe, but also in other parts of the world. The author
makes reference to the influence of the Code Civil in the Americas, with an
emphasis on Louisiana and Quebec, the two North American jurisdictions
influenced by the French code and the French tradition (See HALPÉRIN, supra
note 50, at 94).
54. Although Louis Favoreau’s book deals mainly with Constitutional
Courts from different European countries, it is worthwhile to mention that it also
dedicates a few pages to Constitutional Courts outside the European continent
(see FAVOREU, supra note 51, at 122-125).
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reader, who will find within the French tradition a unique
idiosyncrasy regarding constitutional judicial review and will
discover that French jurists share quite a different view on the
principle of the separation of powers than their American
counterparts. Moreover, English-speaking readers will discover the
traditional French approach on judicial review, where the
Constitutional Council (Conseil Constitutionnel) – the institution
charged with constitutional review in France – prior to 2008 could,
in principle, declare a law unconstitutional only prior to its
enactment. Although French constitutional law underwent a
significant reform in 2008, 55 substantially enlarging ex-post
judicial review by the Conseil Constitutionnel and bringing the
system in line with the dominating European trend, it is still
worthwhile to get acquainted with this form of constitutional
review, for the purpose of understanding the mindset of French
lawyers and their reticence towards enlarging the scope of judicial
review.
The study of Constitutional Courts helps contrast this approach
with the tendency of other European countries to extend the scope
of constitutional review, while establishing special Courts, distinct
from the national Supreme Courts, dealing exclusively with
constitutional law issues.
IV. FINAL REMARKS
Having enumerated and said a few words about each
component of the Louisiana Translation Series, some final
remarks are in order. This series is not just a heterogeneous group
of doctrinal translations. It was a catalyst for the revival of the civil
law in Louisiana and its importance must be acknowledged. At the
end of the 1930’s Professor Gordon Ireland had characterized

55. Law No. 2008-724 of July 23, 2008, Journal Officiel de la République
Française [J.O.], July 24, 2008, No. 171.
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Louisiana as a common law state, 56 and his statement was by no
means an accident, or a mere provocation. Talking about
jurisprudence in the 1930’s, Professor Yiannopoulos observed that
“reading the decisions of the 1920’s and the 1930’s one has the
feeling that the civil law was dead.” 57 The Louisiana State Law
Institute and the Center of Civil Law Studies were created with the
express purpose of reviving the civil law tradition in Louisiana,
and a great role was played by the translation projects initiated by
the two institutions. The number of citations of French authority in
Louisiana jurisprudence grew significantly during the 50’s, 60’s
and 70’s. 58 Based on these translations, through the growing
respect and awareness of French civil law materials, Louisiana
started developing its own doctrine, and courts soon started
following solutions proposed by local scholars, in conjunction with
using the translations and foreign doctrine. 59 Thus the civil law in
Louisiana was not only saved, 60 but it is now growing and
developing its own original mechanisms and legal institutions.
The future holds great promise for the law of this land. Its
unique position in the legal universe, with a civil law core
permanently in tension with the neighboring common law, might
create a system that would benefit from both the theoretical finesse
of the civil law and the much-admired pragmatism of the common
law.
We must also keep in mind that the Louisiana Translation
Series is the product of an evolving and continuous process. The
56. Gordon Ireland, Louisiana's Legal System Reappraised, 11 TUL. L. REV.
585, 596 (1937).
57. A. N. Yiannopoulos, Louisiana Civil law: A Lost Cause?, 54 TUL. L.
REV. 830, 841 (1980).
58. J.-R. Trahan, The Continuing Influence of Le Droit Civil and El
Derecho Civil in the Private Law of Louisiana, 63 LA. L. REV. 1019, 1066 n.103
(2003).
59. Id. at 1065.
60. In 1972, Justice Mark Barham would write for the Louisiana Law
Review proclaiming a veritable “renaissance” of the civil law in Louisiana [See
Mack E. Barham, A Renaissance of the Civilian Tradition in Louisiana, 33 LA.
L. REV. 357 (1972)].
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first translations consisted of treatises, with the hope that the legal
reasoning and the solutions from those treatises will be followed
by courts throughout the state. But with the birth of a strong local
civilian doctrine and the creation of a 23-volume Louisiana Civil
Law Treatise, 61 the need to translate thick volumes of doctrine is
fading. 62 For that reason, the most recent translations serve a
different purpose, that of encouraging the study of comparative
law. 63 Only through comparative research can Louisiana law take
advantage of its unique position in the legal universe and live up to
its full potential.

61. LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE (West, 23 vols.).
62. The Civil Code Précis Series is an example of this movement. This
series is a modern and concise analysis of different areas of Louisiana civil law.
See ALAIN LEVASSEUR, LOUISIANA LAW OF OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL. A
PRÉCIS (3d ed., LexisNexis 2009); ALAIN LEVASSEUR, LOUISIANA LAW OF
CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS. A PRÉCIS (LexisNexis 2010); ALAIN LEVASSEUR
& DAVID GRUNING, LOUISIANA LAW OF SALE AND LEASE. A PRÉCIS (2d ed.,
LexisNexis 2011); FRANK MARAIST, LOUISIANA LAW OF TORTS. A PRÉCIS
(LexisNexis 2010); MICHAEL H. RUBIN, LOUISIANA LAW OF SECURITY DEVICES.
A PRÉCIS (LexisNexis 2011); JOHN RANDALL TRAHAN, LOUISIANA LAW OF
PROPERTY. A PRÉCIS (LexisNexis 2012). See also SUSAN GUALTIER, Louisiana
Civil Code Précis Series (book review), in the present volume of the J. CIV. L.
STUD.
63. There is also a stringent need to develop a solid legal vocabulary of the
civil law in English. To this purpose, the Association Capitant France and the
Louisiana Chapter of the Association Capitant are in the process of translating
approximately 2000 words (concepts) related to the civil code, selected from the
famous VOCABULAIRE JURIDIQUE CORNU, the best French legal dictionary to
date.

THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE TRANSLATION PROJECT:
AN INTRODUCTION
Shortly after the Bicentennial of the Louisiana Civil Code, in
2008, 1 the Center of Civil Law Studies at the Louisiana State
University Paul M. Hébert Law Center started the vast project of
translating the entire Louisiana Civil Code from English into
French, and later on into Spanish.
I. WHY TRANSLATE THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE?
The current Louisiana Civil Code is one of few civil codes in
the world exclusively drafted in the English language. One may
also cite the Civil Code of Seychelles and add the civil codes of
some of Louisiana’s sister states such as California, Montana,
North Dakota and South Dakota, based on the draft civil code
proposed just after the Civil War by David Dudley Field for the
state of New York, voted by the legislature but vetoed by the
governor. 2 However, Louisiana is the only state in the United
States keeping the civil law tradition, in coexistence with the
common law that governs other areas of the law. 3 Civil codes of
other states are seen as mere restatements of the common law and
are interpreted in relation to earlier case law. 4
Though earlier versions of the Louisiana Civil Code were
drafted in French and then translated into English, the present code
is in English only. The project is a major linguistic experiment of
re-translation, exploring the vocabulary of the civil law in English
and testing its validity and vitality. Like the Digest of 1808 (A
Digest of the Civil Laws now in force in the Territory of Orleans),
the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825 was drafted in French and
1. Olivier Moréteau & Agustín Parise, The Bicentennial of the Louisiana
Civil Code (1808-2008), 2 J. CIV. L. STUD. 195 (2009).
2. See David Gruning, Vive la différence ? Why No Codification of Private
Law in the United States?, 39 REVUE JURIDIQUE THÉMIS 153 (2005).
3. One must also add the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, closely
associated to the United States.
4. Id. at 188-189.
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translated into English, to be published and enacted in both
languages. In 1870, the Civil Code was entirely revised and, this
time and from then on, drafted and published solely in English.
Since then, the Louisiana Civil Code has been subject to many
revisions by the Louisiana legislature mainly since the 1970s,
carefully prepared by the Louisiana State Law Institute. This
leaves few provisions in the original language of 1808 and 1825.
This means that since 1870, the Louisiana Civil Code has not
been available in French for the French speaking population of the
state. The concept of linguistic rights was then inexistent and it
seems that the legislature drew conclusions from the “fading of the
French language and legal culture.” 5 The Louisiana legislature
may have forgotten that civil codes are drafted for citizens, hence
the need to make the code available in the language they speak, 6
and not exclusively in the language of the educated. 7 Or they may
have regarded the Civil Code as a statute, projecting a common
law vision whereby no particular effort should be made to make
the law accessible to the layman except with the help of a paid,
trained lawyer. Whether French speakers make 5 or 10% of the
population of the state, whether the practice of French is or is not
on the decline, the translation project will make the Civil Code
available to francophone Louisianans. In Cajun country, French is
still spoken in many households. Alongside with the promotion of
French in school education (see among others the efforts of the
Council for the Development of French in Louisiana, CODOFIL),
the translation project meets some of the objectives of the
Francophone Section of the Louisiana Bar Association. Some
5. A.N. Yiannopoulos, The Civil Codes of Louisiana in LOUISIANA CIVIL
CODE LIX, at LXIX (West 2011).
6. Olivier Moréteau, De Revolutionibus, The Place of the Civil Code in
Louisiana and in the Legal Universe, in LE DROIT CIVIL ET SES CODES:
PARCOURS À TRAVERS LES AMÉRIQUES 1-34 (Jimena Ando Dorato, JeanFrédérick Ménard & Lionel Smith eds., 2011), reprinted in the present issue of
the Journal of Civil Law Studies.
7. Older citizens, especially in Cajun country, have not forgotten that
children were beaten for speaking French on the school ground.
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cases are argued in French in some courts in Louisiana. French
speaking judges and attorneys cannot but welcome the present
initiative. From a legal point of view, the history of linguistic
rights in Louisiana is still to be written. As modest as it may be,
this translation project might be a significant step.
Outside Louisiana, the translation into French of a substantially
modernized civil code may facilitate law reform in francophone
countries, offering an additional model. A number of multilingual
and, in some cases, mixed jurisdictions in Africa and nearby (e.g.
Cameroon, Seychelles), in Asia (e.g. Cambodia, Vietnam), or in
the South Pacific (e.g. Vanuatu) should also be interested. The
project may contribute to making Louisiana law and legal culture
more accessible to lawyers and business people over the world and
will facilitate business relations with Louisiana.
Overall, the translated civil code should serve as a guide for
law reform, in civil law countries trying to bridge the divide with
common law systems. This is the case of most Member States of
the European Union, developing countries, countries in political
and legal transition, and mixed jurisdictions all over the world. It
not only favors the convergence of civil law and common law
whilst keeping solutions in a codified format, but also points out
linguistics solutions as to the way to express civilian concepts in
the English language. In addition, it is hoped that the project will
inspire other cooperative projects that may involve the Center of
Civil Law Studies, the Louisiana State Law Institute, as well as
other partners.
The text of the Louisiana Civil Code was never drafted nor
fully translated into Spanish, though its provisions originate in
Spanish law. 8 Despite the lack of a complete Spanish version, a
large part of the 1825 Code appears in the Spanish version of
Saint-Joseph’s Concordance (1843), also included in the
Concordancias of García Goyena, explaining the early influence of
8. See in the present volume, Thomas J. Semmes, History of the Laws of
Louisiana and of the Civil Law.
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the Louisiana Civil Code on codification throughout Latin America
and Spain. 9
The forthcoming translation into Spanish of the current
Louisiana Civil Code would revive the influence of Louisiana on
code and law reform in Spain and Latin America. 10
II. THE TRANSLATION PROCESS
In 2009, the undersigned project director translated the
Preliminary chapter, revised by Professor David Gruning of the
University of Loyola New Orleans College of Law, and at a much
later stage (pending publication), by Professor Emeritus JeanClaude Gémar of the Université de Montréal. He also started the
translation of Book One. During a six-month visit in the summer
2009, Dr. Michel Séjean, now Associate Professor at the
Université Panthéon-Assas (Paris 2) started the translation of Book
Three, Title 4, on Conventional Obligations. He also translated the
Principles of European Tort Law from English into French, a
major project that was concluded in the year 2010 and published in
2011. 11 In the spring of 2011, a first group of three interns from
Université de Nantes, all students in a Master of Trilingual Studies
program, 12 visited for three months. They worked on Book One
and Titles 3, 4, 7 and 11 of Book Three. Dr. Ivan Tchotourian,
Associate Professor at Université de Nantes visited in the fall of
9. Agustín Parise, The Place of the Louisiana Civil Code in the Hispanic
Civil Codifications: Inclusion in the Comments to the Spanish Civil Code
Project of 1851, 68 LA L. REV. 823-929 (2008); Las Concordancias Legislativas
Decimonónicas: Instrumentos de Difusión del Derecho Continental Europeo en
América, 17 CUADERNOS DE HISTORIA DEL DERECHO 171-206 (Spain, 2010);
and Influence of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825 in Latin-American
Codification Movements: The References to Louisiana Provisions in the
Argentine Civil Code of 1871 in LOUISIANA: THE LEGAL HISTORY OF EUROPE IN
A SINGLE US STATE 1-43 (forthcoming 2012).
10. Olivier Moréteau & Agustín Parise, Recodification in Louisiana and
Latin America, 83 TUL. L. REV. 1103 (2009).
11. PRINCIPES DU DROIT EUROPÉEN DE LA RESPONSABILITÉ CIVILE : TEXTES
ET COMMENTAIRES (trans. Michel Séjean & O. Moréteau eds., 2011).
12. Anne-Marguerite Barbier du Doré, Laurie Chalaux, and Charlotte
Henry, Master Juriste Trilingue, Université de Nantes.
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that same year, translating the titles on Mandate and Suretyship
(Book Three, Titles 15 and 16). Between April and June 2012, a
second team of interns visited from Nantes, working on Book One
and Book Three, Titles 4, 5, and 7. 13 Alexandru-Daniel On, LL.M.
candidate at LSU, and Dr. Anne Tercinet, Professor at the EM
Lyon Business School, visiting at LSU Law in June, joined in the
effort.
The 2012 team also worked on the translation of several entries
of the Vocabulaire juridique Cornu, 14 a leading French legal
dictionary, joining efforts in an ambitious international venture
conducted by Association Henri Capitant des amis de la culture
juridiquefrançaise and Juriscope (Poitiers). LSU Law Professor
Alain Levasseur, President of the Association Capitant Louisiana
Chapter, coordinates the translation of the Civil Code vocabulary,
with the Louisiana team working to create a new database
containing vocabulary of the civil law in English. The code
translation and the Vocabulaire juridique Cornu translation largely
complement each other, and the English version of the Vocabulaire
juridique Cornu will make ample reference to the Louisiana Civil
Code.
All these projects are the product of team work. For example,
intern A translates one chapter whilst intern B translates another.
Each of them cross-checks the work of the other, using the Word
software track-change and comment functions. At weekly or biweekly revision meetings, which always include the project
director (and occasionally include other visiting scholars), the
translation is projected on screen, with all additions and comments.
Team members agree on final versions, after discussing possible
options, and doing further research in dictionaries and historical

13. Anne Perocheau and Anne-Sophie Roinsard, Master Juriste Trilingue,
Université de Nantes.
14. GÉRARD CORNU, VOCABULAIRE JURIDIQUE (Presses Universitaires de
France , 9th ed. 2011).
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precedents. 15 Additional research may be necessary, in which case
the final text is vetted at a later meeting. Occasionally, other
specialists are consulted, for instance to clarify bureaucratic or
procedural requirements referred to in code articles. All
intermediate versions are saved and recorded (with track change),
so that the working process can be fully traced and remain
available for further studies.
Regarding terminological choices, the translation aims to
revive the original French of the Digest of 1808 and Civil Code of
1825. Whenever an article remains unchanged or when parts of its
wording can be traced to the original versions of the Louisiana
Civil Code, the choice is made to revert to the original language,
except where there is an obvious reason to do otherwise because
terminological changes have occurred in the meantime. This gives
the translation a Louisiana flavor, much like the English translation
of the Code civil of Québec has been said to have a Montreal
sound, in the opinion of a strong supporter of the project. 16
Support and Dissemination
A dedicated webpage was created on the Center of Civil Law
Studies website, on the model of the Digest Online project which
presents the Digest of 1808 in French or in English, or in both
languages simultaneously, with the French appearing below the
English on a divided screen. 17The Louisiana Civil Code Online
page was inaugurated in March 2012, with the parts of the
translation work completed by then. It was updated in July the
same year, with the addition of several titles, and periodical
15. 3 LOUISIANA LEGAL ARCHIVES, COMPILED EDITION OF THE CIVIL
CODES OF LOUISIANA, 2 vol. (1940). This publication of the Louisiana State
Law Institute, prepared by Robert A. Pascal under the supervision of Joseph
Dainow, gives for each article of the 1870 Code, the corresponding or parent
provision in the Code of 1825, Digest of 1808, and French Code of 1804, in
French and in English.
16. Judge Nicholas Kasirer, of the Court of Appeal of Quebec, oral
comments at the International Colloquium Celebrating the Bi-Centennial of the
Louisiana Civil Code, Tulane Law School, New Orleans, November 19-22,
2008.
17. http://www.law.lsu.edu/index.cfm?geaux=clo.maindigest
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updates are expected in the years to come. 18 Updates will continue
once the project is concluded, to keep the database abreast of
subsequent legislative change.
The translation of the Louisiana Civil Code is a joint project of
the Center of Civil Law Studies, Information Technology Support
and the Law Library of the Paul M. Hebert Law Center. The
Center for French and Francophone Studies at Louisiana State
University supported the project from its inception in 2009, also
joined by the Louisiana State Law Institute and the Consulate
General of France in New Orleans. The Université de Nantes
(France) is the primary international institutional partner. In 2012,
the translation project received very significant financial support
from the Partner University Foundation (PUF), with a grant
funding a Training Multilingual Jurists project, combining the
cooperative efforts of the LSU Law Center and the Université de
Nantes, over a period of three years. The PUF grant will help fund
an international conference to be held at Baton Rouge and to be
scheduled during the first half of 2014, where the translation work
will be discussed in more detail.
In the meantime, the present bilingual publication aims to
showcase the ongoing translation work, with the hope of attracting
the attention of the comparative law community at large,
francophone jurists, and jurilinguists alike. It has to be accepted as
a work in progress, and though much care has been taken, this is
not the work of professional translators. These titles, already
online, have been revised and modified prior to the present
publication. Subsequent revisions will take place as the work
moves on and is debated.
This publication includes the Preliminary Title and the general
law of obligations, namely three titles of Book Three: Obligations
in General (Title 3), Conventional Obligations or Contracts (Title
4), and Obligations Arising Without Agreement (Title 5). The
18. http://www.law.lsu.edu/index.cfm?geaux=clo.lcco
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English and the French appear side by side, rather than one above
the other, as on the webpage. This will facilitate research and the
work of scholars who will contribute papers at the forthcoming
Baton Rouge international conference, likely to focus on the law of
obligations.
Olivier Moréteau

LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE
CODE CIVIL DE LOUISIANE
PRELIMINARY TITLE

TITRE PRÉLIMINAIRE

CHAPTER 1. GENERAL
PRINCIPLES
[Acts 1987, No. 124, §1, eff. Jan.
1, 1988]

CHAPITRE 1. PRINCIPES
GÉNÉRAUX
[Loi de 1987, n° 124, §1, en
vigueur le 1er janvier 1988.]

Art. 1. The sources of law are
legislation and custom.

Art. 1. Les sources du droit
sont la loi et la coutume.

Art. 2. Legislation is a
solemn expression of legislative
will.

Art. 2. La loi est l’expression
solennelle de la volonté du
législateur.

Art. 3. Custom results from
practice repeated for a long time
and generally accepted as having
acquired the force of law.
Custom may not abrogate
legislation.

Art. 3. La coutume résulte de
l’usage répété pendant une
longue période et généralement
accepté comme ayant acquis
force de loi. La coutume ne peut
abroger la loi.

Art. 4. When no rule for a
particular situation can be
derived from legislation or
custom, the court is bound to
proceed according to equity. To
decide equitably, resort is made
to justice, reason, and prevailing
usages.

Art. 4. Lorsqu’aucune règle
ne peut être dégagée de la loi ou
de la coutume pour une situation
particulière, le juge doit
procéder conformément à
l’équité. Pour décider suivant
l’équité, il faut recourir à la
justice, à la raison et aux usages
reçus.

Art. 5. No one may avail
himself of ignorance of the law.

Art. 5. Nul ne peut se
prévaloir de l’ignorance de la
loi.

Art. 6. In the absence of
contrary legislative expression,
substantive laws apply

Art. 6. En l’absence de
volonté législative contraire, les
lois qui régissent le fond ne
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prospectively only. Procedural
and interpretative laws apply
both prospectively and
retroactively, unless there is a
legislative expression to the
contrary.

s’appliquent que pour l’avenir.
Les lois procédurales et
interprétatives s’appliquent aussi
bien pour l’avenir que
rétroactivement, à moins d’une
expression législative contraire.

Art. 7. Persons may not by
their juridical acts derogate from
laws enacted for the protection of
the public interest. Any act in
derogation of such laws is an
absolute nullity.

Art. 7. Les personnes ne
peuvent par leurs actes
juridiques déroger aux lois
relatives à la sauvegarde de
l’ordre public. Tout acte
dérogeant à de telles lois est
frappé de nullité absolue.

Art. 8. Laws are repealed,
either entirely or partially, by
other laws.
A repeal may be express or
implied. It is express when it is
literally declared by a subsequent
law. It is implied when the new
law contains provisions that are
contrary to, or irreconcilable
with, those of the former law.
The repeal of a repealing law
does not revive the first law.

Art. 8. Les lois peuvent être
abrogées en tout ou en partie,
par d’autres lois.
L’abrogation peut être
expresse ou tacite. Elle est
expresse, lorsqu'elle est
littéralement prononcée par la
loi nouvelle. Elle est tacite, si la
nouvelle loi renferme des
dispositions contraires à celles
des lois antérieures, ou qui ne
puissent se concilier avec elles.
L’abrogation d’une loi
d’abrogation ne fait pas revivre
la première loi.

CHAPTER 2.
INTERPRETATION OF LAWS
[Acts 1987, No. 124, §1, eff. Jan.
1, 1988]
Art. 9. When a law is clear
and unambiguous and its
application does not lead to
absurd consequences, the law
shall be applied as written and no
further interpretation may be
made in search of the intent of

CHAPITRE 2. DE
L’INTERPRÉTATION DES LOIS
[Loi de 1987, n° 124, §1, en
vigueur le 1er janvier 1988.]
Art. 9. Lorsque la loi est
claire et sans ambigüité et que
son application ne conduit pas à
des conséquences absurdes, la
loi doit être appliquée à la lettre
et aucune autre interprétation ne
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the legislature.
Art. 10. When the language
of the law is susceptible of
different meanings, it must be
interpreted as having the
meaning that best conforms to
the purpose of the law.
Art. 11. The words of a law
must be given their generally
prevailing meaning.
Words of art and technical
terms must be given their
technical meaning when the law
involves a technical matter.
Art. 12. When the words of a
law are ambiguous, their
meaning must be sought by
examining the context in which
they occur and the text of the law
as a whole.
Art. 13. Laws on the same
subject matter must be
interpreted in reference to each
other.
CHAPTER 3. CONFLICT OF
LAWS
[Acts 1991, No. 923, §1, eff. Jan.
1, 1992]
Art. 14. Unless otherwise
expressly provided by the law of
this state, cases having contacts
with other states are governed by
the law selected in accordance
with the provisions of Book IV
of this Code.
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peut être faite afin de rechercher
l’intention du législateur.
Art. 10. Lorsque les termes
de la loi sont susceptibles de
significations différentes, ils
doivent être interprétés dans le
sens le plus conforme à l’objet de
la loi.
Art. 11. Les termes de la loi
doivent être entendus dans leur
signification la plus usitée.
Les termes de l’art et les
expressions techniques doivent
être entendus dans leur sens
technique lorsque la loi
comprend une matière technique.
Art. 12. Lorsque les termes
de la loi sont ambigus, leur sens
doit être recherché en examinant
le contexte dans lequel ils se
trouvent et le texte de la loi dans
son ensemble.
Art. 13. Les lois sur un même
sujet doivent être interprétées
selon le rapport qu’elles ont
l’une avec l’autre.
CHAPITRE 3. CONFLITS DE
LOIS
[Loi de 1991, n° 923, §1, en
vigueur le 1er janvier 1992.]
Art. 14. Sauf disposition
expressément contraire de la loi
de cet état, les affaires
présentant un lien avec d’autres
états sont régies par la loi
applicable en vertu des
dispositions du Livre IV du
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présent Code.
Arts. 15-23. [Blank]

BOOK III. OF THE DIFFERENT
MODES OF ACQUIRING THE
OWNERSHIP OF THINGS
(…)

Art. 15 à 23. [Blanc]

LIVRE III. DES DIFFÉRENTS
MOYENS DONT ON ACQUIERT
LA PROPRIÉTÉ DES BIENS
(…)

TITLE III. OBLIGATIONS IN
GENERAL
[Acts 1984, No. 331, §1, eff. Jan.
1, 1985]

TITRE III. DES OBLIGATIONS EN
GÉNÉRAL
[Loi de 1984, n° 331, §1, en
vigueur le 1er janv. 1985]

CHAPTER 1. GENERAL
PRINCIPLES

CHAPITRE 1. PRINCIPES
GÉNÉRAUX

Art. 1756. An obligation is a
legal relationship whereby a
person, called the obligor, is bound
to render a performance in favor of
another, called the obligee.
Performance may consist of
giving, doing, or not doing
something.

Art. 1756. L’obligation est un
lien de droit par lequel une
personne, le débiteur, est tenue
d’exécuter une prestation en faveur
d’une autre, le créancier. La
prestation peut consister à donner,
à faire, ou à ne pas faire quelque
chose.

Art. 1757. Obligations arise
from contracts and other
declarations of will. They also
arise directly from the law,
regardless of a declaration of will,
in instances such as wrongful acts,
the management of the affairs of
another, unjust enrichment and
other acts or facts.

Art 1757. Les obligations
naissent des contrats et d’autres
manifestations de volonté. Elles
naissent également de la loi ellemême, indépendamment de toute
manifestation de volonté, en cas de
délit ou quasi-délit, de la gestion
de l’affaire d’autrui, de
l’enrichissement sans cause ou
d’autres actes ou faits.

Art. 1758. A. An obligation
may give the obligee the right to:

Art. 1758. A. L’obligation
peut donner le droit au créancier:
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(1) Enforce the performance
that the obligor is bound to render;
(2) Enforce performance by
causing it to be rendered by
another at the obligor's expense;
(3) Recover damages for the
obligor's failure to perform, or his
defective or delayed performance.

B. An obligation may give the
obligor the right to:
(1) Obtain the proper discharge
when he has performed in full;
(2) Contest the obligee's
actions when the obligation has
been extinguished or modified by a
legal cause.
Art. 1759. Good faith shall
govern the conduct of the obligor
and the obligee in whatever
pertains to the obligation.

CHAPTER 2. NATURAL
OBLIGATIONS
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(1) de faire exécuter en nature
la prestation à laquelle le débiteur
est tenu ;
(2) de la faire exécuter en
nature par un tiers aux frais du
débiteur ;
(3) de recouvrer des dommages
et intérêts pour l’inexécution de la
prestation par le débiteur, ou pour
son exécution défectueuse ou
tardive.
B. L’obligation peut donner le
droit au débiteur :
(1) d’être libéré de son
obligation lorsqu’il s’est
pleinement exécuté;
(2) de s’opposer aux actions du
créancier lorsque l’obligation a été
éteinte ou modifiée par une cause
légale.
Art. 1759. La bonne foi doit
régir le comportement du débiteur
et du créancier dans tout ce qui a
trait à l’obligation.
CHAPITRE 2. DES
OBLIGATIONS NATURELLES

Art. 1760. A natural obligation
arises from circumstances in which
the law implies a particular moral
duty to render a performance.

Art. 1760. L’obligation
naturelle naît de circonstances
dans lesquelles la loi suppose un
devoir moral particulier d’exécuter
une prestation.

Art. 1761. A natural obligation
is not enforceable by judicial
action. Nevertheless, whatever has
been freely performed in
compliance with a natural
obligation may not be reclaimed.
A contract made for the

Art. 1761. L’obligation
naturelle n’est pas susceptible
d’exécution par l’effet d’une action
en justice. Néanmoins, ce qui a été
exécuté volontairement en vertu
d’une obligation naturelle ne peut
donner lieu à restitution.
Le contrat portant sur
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performance of a natural obligation
is onerous.

l’exécution d’une obligation
naturelle est à titre onéreux.

Art. 1762. Examples of
circumstances giving rise to a
natural obligation are:
(1) When a civil obligation has
been extinguished by prescription
or discharged in bankruptcy.
(2) When an obligation has
been incurred by a person who,
although endowed with
discernment, lacks legal capacity.
(3) When the universal
successors are not bound by a civil
obligation to execute the donations
and other dispositions made by a
deceased person that are null for
want of form.

Art. 1762. Les exemples
suivants sont des circonstances
pouvant donner naissance à une
obligation naturelle:
(1) lorsqu’une obligation civile
est éteinte par prescription ou
faillite du débiteur ;
(2) lorsqu’une obligation est à
la charge d’une personne qui, bien
que douée de discernement, ne
jouit pas de la capacité légale ;
(3) lorsque les ayants cause
universels ne sont pas tenus d’une
obligation civile d’exécuter les
donations et autres dispositions
faites par le défunt et qui sont
nulles pour vice de forme.

CHAPTER 3. KINDS OF
OBLIGATIONS

CHAPITRE 3. DES DIVERSES
ESPÈCES D’OBLIGATIONS

SECTION 1. REAL
OBLIGATIONS

SECTION 1. DES OBLIGATIONS
RÉELLES

Art. 1763. A real obligation is
a duty correlative and incidental to
a real right.

Art. 1763. L’obligation réelle
est un devoir correspondant à un
droit réel dont elle est l’accessoire.

Art. 1764. A real obligation is
transferred to the universal or
particular successor who acquires
the movable or immovable thing to
which the obligation is attached,
without a special provision to that
effect.
But a particular successor is
not personally bound, unless he
assumes the personal obligations of
his transferor with respect to the
thing, and he may liberate himself

Art. 1764. L’obligation réelle
est transmise de plein droit à
l’ayant cause universel ou à titre
particulier qui acquiert le meuble
ou l’immeuble auquel l’obligation
est attachée.
Toutefois, un ayant cause à
titre particulier n’est pas
personnellement tenu, à moins
qu’il n’assume les obligations
personnelles de son auteur à
l’égard de la chose ; il peut se
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of the real obligation by
abandoning the thing.

111

décharger de l’obligation réelle en
abandonnant la chose.

SECTION 2. STRICTLY
PERSONAL AND HERITABLE
OBLIGATIONS

SECTION 2. DES OBLIGATIONS
STRICTEMENT PERSONNELLES
ET DES OBLIGATIONS
TRANSMISSIBLES

Art. 1765. An obligation is
heritable when its performance
may be enforced by a successor of
the obligee or against a successor
of the obligor.
Every obligation is deemed
heritable as to all parties, except
when the contrary results from the
terms or from the nature of the
contract.
A heritable obligation is also
transferable between living
persons.

Art. 1765. L’obligation est
transmissible lorsque l’exécution
peut en être poursuivie par un
ayant cause du créancier ou à
l’encontre d’un ayant cause du
débiteur.
Toute obligation est réputée
transmissible à l’égard de toutes
les parties, sauf lorsque le
contraire résulte des termes ou de
la nature du contrat.
L’obligation transmissible peut
aussi être cédée entre personnes
vivantes.

Art. 1766. An obligation is
strictly personal when its
performance can be enforced only
by the obligee, or only against the
obligor.
When the performance
requires the special skill or
qualification of the obligor, the
obligation is presumed to be
strictly personal on the part of the
obligor. All obligations to perform
personal services are presumed to
be strictly personal on the part of
the obligor.
When the performance is
intended for the benefit of the
obligee exclusively, the obligation
is strictly personal on the part of
that obligee.

Art. 1766. L’obligation est
strictement personnelle lorsque
seul le créancier peut en
poursuivre l’exécution ou que
celle-ci ne peut être poursuivie
qu’à l’encontre du débiteur.
Lorsque la prestation requiert
une aptitude ou une qualification
spéciale de la part du débiteur,
l’obligation est présumée être
strictement personnelle au
débiteur. Toutes les obligations
d’exécuter des services personnels
sont présumées être strictement
personnelles au débiteur.
Lorsque la prestation est
stipulée exclusivement au bénéfice
du créancier, l’obligation est
strictement personnelle à celui-ci.
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SECTION 3. CONDITIONAL
OBLIGATIONS

SECTION 3. DES OBLIGATIONS
CONDITIONNELLES

Art. 1767. A conditional
obligation is one dependent on an
uncertain event.
If the obligation may not be
enforced until the uncertain event
occurs, the condition is suspensive.
If the obligation may be
immediately enforced but will
come to an end when the uncertain
event occurs, the condition is
resolutory.

Art. 1767. L’obligation est
conditionnelle lorsqu'elle dépend
d'un événement incertain.
Lorsque l’exécution de
l’obligation ne peut être poursuivie
jusqu’à l’événement incertain, la
condition est suspensive.
Lorsque l’exécution de
l’obligation peut être poursuivie
immédiatement mais prend fin lors
de l’événement incertain, la
condition est résolutoire.

Art. 1768. Conditions may be
either expressed in a stipulation or
implied by the law, the nature of
the contract, or the intent of the
parties.

Art. 1768. Les conditions sont
expresses lorsqu’elles sont
stipulées, ou implicites lorsqu’elles
découlent de la loi, de la nature du
contrat ou de l’intention des
parties.

Art. 1769. A suspensive
condition that is unlawful or
impossible makes the obligation
null.

Art. 1769. La condition
suspensive illicite ou impossible
rend nulle l’obligation.

Art. 1770. A suspensive
condition that depends solely on
the whim of the obligor makes the
obligation null.
A resolutory condition that
depends solely on the will of the
obligor must be fulfilled in good
faith.

Art. 1770. La condition
suspensive qui dépend du seul
caprice du débiteur rend nulle
l’obligation.
La condition résolutoire qui
dépend de la seule volonté du
débiteur doit être accomplie de
bonne foi.

Art. 1771. The obligee of a
conditional obligation, pending
fulfillment of the condition, may
take all lawful measures to
preserve his right.

Art. 1771. Tant que la
condition n’est pas réalisée, le
créancier de l’obligation
conditionnelle peut exercer tous les
actes licites conservatoires de son
droit.

Art. 1772. A condition is

Art. 1772. La condition est
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regarded as fulfilled when it is not
fulfilled because of the fault of a
party with an interest contrary to
the fulfillment.

censée accomplie lorsqu’elle n’est
pas réalisée par la faute d’une
partie ayant un intérêt contraire à
son accomplissement.

Art. 1773. If the condition is
that an event shall occur within a
fixed time and that time elapses
without the occurrence of the
event, the condition is considered
to have failed.
If no time has been fixed for
the occurrence of the event, the
condition may be fulfilled within a
reasonable time.
Whether or not a time has been
fixed, the condition is considered
to have failed once it is certain that
the event will not occur.

Art. 1773. Lorsque l’obligation
est contractée sous la condition
qu'un événement arrivera dans un
temps fixe, cette condition est
censée défaillie, lorsque le temps
est expiré, sans que l'événement
soit arrivé.
Lorsqu’aucun temps fixe n’a
été prévu pour l’occurrence de
l’événement, la condition peut être
accomplie dans un délai
raisonnable.
Qu’un temps fixe ait été prévu
ou non, la condition est censée
défaillie lorsqu’il est certain que
l’événement n’arrivera pas.

Art. 1774. If the condition is
that an event shall not occur within
a fixed time, it is considered as
fulfilled once that time has elapsed
without the event having occurred.
The condition is regarded as
fulfilled whenever it is certain that
the event will not occur, whether
or not a time has been fixed.

Art. 1774. Lorsque la condition
est qu’un événement n’arrivera pas
dans un temps fixe, elle est
accomplie, lorsque ce temps est
expiré sans que l'événement soit
arrivé.
La condition est censée
accomplie dès lors qu’il est certain
que l’événement n’arrivera pas,
qu’un temps fixe ait été prévu ou
non.

Art. 1775. Fulfillment of a
condition has effects that are
retroactive to the inception of the
obligation. Nevertheless, that
fulfillment does not impair the
validity of acts of administration
duly performed by a party, nor
affect the ownership of fruits
produced while the condition was
pending. Likewise, fulfillment of

Art. 1775. La condition
accomplie a un effet rétroactif au
jour de la création de l’obligation.
Néanmoins, cet accomplissement
n’affecte ni la validité des actes
d’administration dûment exécutés
par une partie pendant que la
condition n’était pas accomplie, ni
la propriété des fruits produits
dans cette même période. De
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the condition does not impair the
right acquired by third persons
while the condition was pending.

même, l’accomplissement de la
condition n’affecte pas les droits
acquis par les tiers alors que la
condition n’était pas réalisée.

Art. 1776. In a contract for
continuous or periodic
performance, fulfillment of a
resolutory condition does not affect
the validity of acts of performance
rendered before fulfillment of the
condition.

Art. 1776. Dans un contrat à
exécution continue ou périodique,
l’accomplissement d’une condition
résolutoire n’affecte pas la validité
des prestations exécutées avant la
réalisation de la condition.

SECTION 4. OBLIGATIONS
WITH A TERM

SECTION 4. DES OBLIGATIONS
À TERME

Art. 1777. A term for the
performance of an obligation may
be express or it may be implied by
the nature of the contract.
Performance of an obligation
not subject to a term is due
immediately.

Art. 1777. Le terme pour
l’exécution d’une obligation peut
être explicite ou il peut être
implicite par la nature du contrat.
L’exécution d’une obligation
sans terme est due immédiatement.

Art. 1778. A term for the
performance of an obligation is a
period of time either certain or
uncertain. It is certain when it is
fixed. It is uncertain when it is not
fixed but is determinable either by
the intent of the parties or by the
occurrence of a future and certain
event. It is also uncertain when it is
not determinable, in which case the
obligation must be performed
within a reasonable time.
Art. 1779. A term is presumed
to benefit the obligor unless the
agreement or the circumstances
show that it was intended to benefit
the obligee or both parties.

Art. 1778. Le terme pour
l’exécution d’une obligation est
une période de temps certaine ou
incertaine. Le terme est certain
lorsque son échéance est fixe. Il est
incertain lorsque son échéance
n’est pas fixe, mais déterminable
ou bien par l’intention des parties,
ou bien par un événement futur et
certain. Il est également incertain
lorsque son échéance n’est pas
déterminable, auquel cas
l’obligation doit être exécutée dans
un délai raisonnable.
Art. 1779. Le terme est
présumé stipulé en faveur du
débiteur, à moins qu’il ne résulte
de la stipulation ou des
circonstances, qu’il a été convenu
en faveur du créancier ou des deux
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parties.
Art. 1780. The party for whose
exclusive benefit a term has been
established may renounce it.
Art. 1781. Although
performance cannot be demanded
before the term ends, an obligor
who has performed voluntarily
before the term ends may not
recover the performance.
Art. 1782. When the obligation
is such that its performance
requires the solvency of the
obligor, the term is regarded as
nonexistent if the obligor is found
to be insolvent.
Art. 1783. When the obligation
is subject to a term and the obligor
fails to furnish the promised
security, or the security furnished
becomes insufficient, the obligee
may require that the obligor, at his
option, either perform the
obligation immediately or furnish
sufficient security. The obligee
may take all lawful measures to
preserve his right.
Art. 1784. When the term for
performance of an obligation is not
marked by a specific date but is
rather a period of time, the term
begins to run on the day after the
contract is made, or on the day
after the occurrence of the event
that marks the beginning of the
term, and it includes the last day of
the period.
Art. 1785. Performance on

Art. 1780. La partie qui
bénéficie exclusivement du terme
peut y renoncer.
Art. 1781. Bien que la
prestation ne puisse être exigée
avant l’échéance du terme, le
débiteur qui s’est volontairement
exécuté avant l’échéance du terme
ne peut solliciter la restitution.
Art. 1782. Lorsque l’obligation
est telle que son exécution
nécessite que le débiteur soit
solvable, le terme est réputé
inexistant si le débiteur s’avère
insolvable.
Art. 1783. Lorsque l’obligation
est affectée d’un terme et que le
débiteur ne fournit pas les sûretés
promises, ou que les sûretés
fournies sont insuffisantes, le
créancier peut demander au
débiteur, selon son choix, ou bien
d’exécuter immédiatement
l’obligation, ou bien de fournir des
sûretés suffisantes. Le créancier
peut prendre toute mesure licite
conservatoire de son droit.
Art. 1784. Lorsque le terme de
l’exécution d’une obligation
n’échoit pas à une date précise
mais est plutôt une période de
temps, le terme commence à courir
le jour suivant la conclusion du
contrat, ou le jour suivant
l’événement qui marque le début
du terme, et il inclut le dernier jour
de la période.
Art. 1785. L’exécution à terme
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doit se faire en conformité avec
l’intention des parties, ou selon
l’usage établi lorsque l’intention
ne peut pas être déterminée.

SECTION 5. OBLIGATIONS
WITH MULTIPLE PERSONS

SECTION 5. DES OBLIGATIONS
AVEC MULTIPLICITÉ DE
PARTIES

Art. 1786. When an obligation
binds more than one obligor to one
obligee, or binds one obligor to
more than one obligee, or binds
more than one obligor to more than
one obligee, the obligation may be
several, joint, or solidary.

Art. 1786. Lorsqu’elle lie
plusieurs débiteurs à un créancier,
un débiteur à plusieurs créanciers,
ou plusieurs débiteurs à plusieurs
créanciers, l’obligation est
séparée, conjointe ou solidaire.

Art. 1787. When each of
different obligors owes a separate
performance to one obligee, the
obligation is several for the
obligors.
When one obligor owes a
separate performance to each of
different obligees, the obligation is
several for the obligees.
A several obligation produces
the same effects as a separate
obligation owed to each obligee by
an obligor or by each obligor to an
obligee.

Art. 1787. Lorsque chacun des
différents débiteurs doit une
prestation distincte à un seul
créancier, l’obligation est séparée
pour les débiteurs.
Lorsqu’un seul débiteur doit
une prestation distincte à chacun
des différents créanciers,
l’obligation est séparée pour les
créanciers.
Une obligation séparée produit
les mêmes effets qu’une obligation
distincte due à chacun des
créanciers par un seul débiteur ou
à un seul créancier par chacun des
débiteurs.

Art. 1788. When different
obligors owe together just one
performance to one obligee, but
neither is bound for the whole, the
obligation is joint for the obligors.
When one obligor owes just
one performance intended for the
common benefit of different
obligees, neither of whom is

Art. 1788. Lorsque plusieurs
débiteurs doivent ensemble une
seule prestation à un seul
créancier, mais qu’aucun n’est
obligé pour l’ensemble de celle-ci,
l’obligation est conjointe pour les
débiteurs.
Lorsqu’un seul débiteur doit
une seule prestation voulue dans
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entitled to the whole performance,
the obligation is joint for the
obligees.

l’intérêt commun de plusieurs
créanciers et qu’aucun d’eux n’a
droit à l’entière prestation,
l’obligation est conjointe pour les
créanciers.

Art. 1789. When a joint
obligation is divisible, each joint
obligor is bound to perform, and
each joint obligee is entitled to
receive, only his portion.
When a joint obligation is
indivisible, joint obligors or
obligees are subject to the rules
governing solidary obligors or
solidary obligees.

Art. 1789. Lorsque l’obligation
conjointe est divisible, chaque
débiteur conjoint est tenu
d’exécuter sa part de l’obligation,
et chaque créancier conjoint n’a le
droit de recevoir que sa part.
Lorsque l’obligation conjointe
est indivisible, les débiteurs ou
créanciers conjoints sont soumis
aux règles gouvernant les relations
entre les débiteurs ou créanciers
solidaires.

Art. 1790. An obligation is
solidary for the obligees when it
gives each obligee the right to
demand the whole performance
from the common obligor.

Art. 1790. L’obligation est
solidaire pour les créanciers
lorsqu’elle donne à chacun d’entre
eux le droit d’exiger l’entière
prestation de la part du débiteur
commun.

Art. 1791. Before a solidary
obligee brings action for
performance, the obligor may
extinguish the obligation by
rendering performance to any of
the solidary obligees.

Art. 1791. Avant que l’un des
créanciers solidaires n’intente une
action en exécution, le débiteur
peut éteindre l’obligation en
exécutant la prestation au profit de
l’un quelconque des créanciers
solidaires.

Art. 1792. Remission of debt
by one solidary obligee releases
the obligor but only for the portion
of that obligee.

Art. 1792. La remise de la
dette par l’un des créanciers
solidaires libère le débiteur
uniquement pour la part due à ce
créancier.

Art. 1793. Any act that
interrupts prescription for one of
the solidary obligees benefits all
the others.

Art. 1793. Tout acte
interrompant la prescription pour
l’un des créanciers solidaires
profite à tous les autres.
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Art. 1794. An obligation is
solidary for the obligors when each
obligor is liable for the whole
performance. A performance
rendered by one of the solidary
obligors relieves the others of
liability toward the obligee.

Art. 1794. L’obligation est
solidaire pour les débiteurs
lorsque chaque débiteur est tenu
d’exécuter l’entière prestation.
L’exécution de la prestation par
l’un des débiteurs solidaires libère
les autres de leur responsabilité
envers le créancier.

Art. 1795. An obligee, at his
choice, may demand the whole
performance from any of his
solidary obligors. A solidary
obligor may not request division of
the debt.
Unless the obligation is
extinguished, an obligee may
institute action against any of his
solidary obligors even after
institution of action against another
solidary obligor.

Art. 1795. Un créancier peut, à
sa convenance, demander
l’exécution de l’entière prestation
à l’un quelconque de ses débiteurs
solidaires. Un débiteur solidaire
ne peut pas demander la division
de la dette.
À moins que l’obligation ne
soit éteinte, un créancier peut
intenter une action contre l’un
quelconque de ses débiteurs
solidaires même après avoir
intenté une action contre un autre
débiteur solidaire.

Art. 1796. Solidarity of
obligation shall not be presumed.
A solidary obligation arises from a
clear expression of the parties'
intent or from the law.

Art. 1796. La solidarité de
l’obligation ne se présume pas.
L’obligation solidaire nait de la
claire expression de la volonté des
parties ou de la loi.

Art. 1797. An obligation may
be solidary though it derives from
a different source for each obligor.

Art. 1797. L’obligation peut
être solidaire même si elle provient
de différentes sources pour chaque
débiteur.

Art. 1798. An obligation may
be solidary though for one of the
obligors it is subject to a condition
or term.
Art. 1799. The interruption of
prescription against one solidary
obligor is effective against all
solidary obligors and their heirs.

Art. 1798. L’obligation peut
être solidaire même si elle est
conditionnelle ou à terme pour
l’un des débiteurs.
Art. 1799. L’interruption de la
prescription à l’égard d’un
débiteur solidaire vaut à l’égard
de tous les débiteurs solidaires et
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de leurs héritiers.
Art. 1800. A failure to perform
a solidary obligation through the
fault of one obligor renders all the
obligors solidarily liable for the
resulting damages. In that case, the
obligors not at fault have their
remedy against the obligor at fault.
Art. 1801. A solidary obligor
may raise against the obligee
defenses that arise from the nature
of the obligation, or that are
personal to him, or that are
common to all the solidary
obligors. He may not raise a
defense that is personal to another
solidary obligor.
Art. 1802. Renunciation of
solidarity by the obligee in favor of
one or more of his obligors must
be express. An obligee who
receives a partial performance
from an obligor separately
preserves the solidary obligation
against all his obligors after
deduction of that partial
performance.
Art. 1803. Remission of debt
by the obligee in favor of one
obligor, or a transaction or
compromise between the obligee
and one obligor, benefits the other
solidary obligors in the amount of
the portion of that obligor.
Surrender to one solidary
obligor of the instrument
evidencing the obligation gives rise
to a presumption that the remission

Art. 1800. Le défaut
d’exécution d’une obligation
solidaire due à la faute de l’un des
débiteurs rend tous les débiteurs
responsables solidairement des
dommages qui en résultent. Dans
ce cas, les débiteurs non fautifs
disposent d’un recours contre le
débiteur fautif.
Art. 1801. Un débiteur
solidaire peut opposer au
créancier des moyens de défense,
qu’ils découlent de la nature de
l’obligation, qu’ils lui soient
personnels, ou qu’ils soient
communs à tous les débiteurs
solidaires. Il ne peut soulever de
moyen de défense qui serait propre
à un autre débiteur solidaire.
Art. 1802. La renonciation à la
solidarité par le créancier en
faveur d’un ou de plusieurs de ses
débiteurs doit être expresse. Un
créancier qui reçoit séparément
l’exécution partielle d’un débiteur
conserve l’obligation solidaire à
l’égard de tous ses débiteurs après
déduction de cette exécution
partielle.
Art. 1803. La remise de la dette
par le créancier en faveur d’un
débiteur, ou la transaction ou le
compromis entre le créancier et un
seul débiteur, libère les autres
débiteurs solidaires à hauteur de
la part du débiteur libéré.
La remise à l’un des débiteurs
solidaires de l’acte constatant
l’obligation fait présumer que la
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of debt was intended for the benefit remise de la dette a été consentie à
of all the solidary obligors.
tous les débiteurs solidaires.
Art. 1804. Among solidary
obligors, each is liable for his virile
portion. If the obligation arises
from a contract or quasi-contract,
virile portions are equal in the
absence of agreement or judgment
to the contrary. If the obligation
arises from an offense or quasioffense, a virile portion is
proportionate to the fault of each
obligor.
A solidary obligor who has
rendered the whole performance,
though subrogated to the right of
the obligee, may claim from the
other obligors no more than the
virile portion of each.
If the circumstances giving rise
to the solidary obligation concern
only one of the obligors, that
obligor is liable for the whole to
the other obligors who are then
considered only as his sureties.

Art. 1804. Entre les débiteurs
solidaires, chacun est responsable
pour sa part virile. Lorsque
l’obligation résulte d’un contrat ou
d’un quasi-contrat et en l’absence
de stipulation ou de jugement
contraire, les parts viriles sont
égales. Lorsque l’obligation
résulte d’un délit ou d’un quasidélit, la part virile est
proportionnelle à la faute de
chacun des débiteurs.
Le débiteur solidaire qui a
exécuté la totalité de la prestation,
encore qu’il soit subrogé aux
droits du créancier, ne peut
demander aux autres débiteurs
plus que la part virile de chacun.
Lorsque les circonstances qui
font naître l’obligation solidaire ne
concernent que l’un des débiteurs,
celui-ci est responsable de la
totalité envers les autres débiteurs
qui sont alors considérés
seulement comme ses cautions.

Art. 1805. A party sued on an
obligation that would be solidary if
it exists may seek to enforce
contribution against any solidary
co-obligor by making him a third
party defendant according to the
rules of procedure, whether or not
that third party has been initially
sued, and whether the party
seeking to enforce contribution
admits or denies liability on the
obligation alleged by plaintiff.

Art. 1805. Une partie
poursuivie pour une obligation qui
serait solidaire si elle existait peut
faire valoir la contribution de tout
autre codébiteur solidaire, en le
faisant intervenir comme tiers
défendeur conformément aux
règles de procédure, qu’il ait ou
non été poursuivi initialement, et
que la partie cherchant à faire
valoir la contribution admette ou
nie toute responsabilité fondée sur
l’obligation alléguée par le
demandeur.

2012]

BILINGUAL LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE

121

Art. 1806. A loss arising from
the insolvency of a solidary obligor
must be borne by the other solidary
obligors in proportion to their
portion.
Any obligor in whose favor
solidarity has been renounced must
nevertheless contribute to make up
for the loss.

Art. 1806. La perte résultant de
l’insolvabilité d’un débiteur
solidaire doit être supportée par
les autres débiteurs solidaires,
proportionnellement à leur part.
Tout débiteur qui a bénéficié
d’une renonciation à la solidarité
doit néanmoins contribuer à
combler la perte.

SECTION 6. CONJUNCTIVE
AND ALTERNATIVE
OBLIGATIONS

SECTION 6. OBLIGATIONS
CONJONCTIVES ET
ALTERNATIVES

Art. 1807. An obligation is
conjunctive when it binds the
obligor to multiple items of
performance that may be
separately rendered or enforced. In
that case, each item is regarded as
the object of a separate obligation.
The parties may provide that
the failure of the obligor to
perform one or more items shall
allow the obligee to demand the
immediate performance of all the
remaining items.

Art. 1807. L’obligation est
conjonctive lorsqu’elle oblige le
débiteur à plusieurs prestations qui
peuvent être exécutées ou exigées
séparément. Dans ce cas, chaque
prestation fait l’objet d’une
obligation distincte.
Les parties peuvent prévoir
que la défaillance du débiteur
relative à l’exécution d’une ou de
plusieurs prestations permet au
créancier d’exiger l’exécution
immédiate de toutes les prestations
restantes.

Art. 1808. An obligation is
alternative when an obligor is
bound to render only one of two or
more items of performance.

Art. 1808. L’obligation est
alternative lorsque le débiteur
n’est tenu d’exécuter qu’une
prestation lorsqu’il y en a deux ou
davantage.

Art. 1809. When an obligation
is alternative, the choice of the
item of performance belongs to the
obligor unless it has been expressly
or impliedly granted to the obligee.

Art. 1809. Lorsque l’obligation
est alternative, le choix de la
prestation appartient au débiteur,
sauf s’il est expressément ou
implicitement attribué au
créancier.

Art. 1810. When the party who

Art. 1810. Lorsque la partie
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has the choice does not exercise it
after a demand to do so, the other
party may choose the item of
performance.

qui a le choix ne l’exerce pas alors
qu’il lui a été demandé de le faire,
l’autre partie peut choisir la
prestation.

Art. 1811. An obligor may not
perform an alternative obligation
by rendering as performance a part
of one item and a part of another.

Art. 1811. Un débiteur ne
saurait exécuter une obligation
alternative en exécutant une partie
de l’une des prestations et une
partie d’une autre.

Art. 1812. When the choice
belongs to the obligor and one of
the items of performance
contemplated in the alternative
obligation becomes impossible or
unlawful, regardless of the fault of
the obligor, he must render one of
those that remain.
When the choice belongs to the
obligee and one of the items of
performance becomes impossible
or unlawful without the fault of the
obligor, the obligee must choose
one of the items that remain. If the
impossibility or unlawfulness is
due to the fault of the obligor, the
obligee may choose either one of
those that remain, or damages for
the item of performance that
became impossible or unlawful.

Art. 1812. Lorsque le choix
appartient au débiteur et que l’une
des prestations visées par
l’obligation alternative devient
impossible ou illégale,
indépendamment de toute faute du
débiteur, il doit exécuter une des
prestations restantes.
Lorsque le choix appartient au
créancier et que l’une des
prestations devient impossible ou
illégale sans qu’il y ait eu faute du
débiteur, le créancier doit choisir
l’une des prestations restantes. Si
l’impossibilité ou l’illégalité est
due à une faute du débiteur, le
créancier peut choisir ou bien une
des prestations restantes, ou bien
des dommages et intérêts pour la
prestation devenue impossible ou
illégale.

Art. 1813. If all of the items of
performance contemplated in the
alternative obligation become
impossible or unlawful without the
obligor's fault, the obligation is
extinguished.

Art. 1813. Lorsque toutes les
prestations visées par l’obligation
alternative deviennent impossibles
ou illégales sans qu’il y ait eu
faute du débiteur, l’obligation est
éteinte.

Art. 1814. When the choice
belongs to the obligor, if all the
items of performance contemplated
in the alternative obligation have

Art. 1814. Lorsque le choix
appartient au débiteur, si toutes les
prestations visées par l’obligation
alternative sont devenues
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become impossible and the
impossibility of one or more is due
to the fault of the obligor, he is
liable for the damages resulting
from his failure to render the last
item that became impossible.
If the impossibility of one or
more items is due to the fault of the
obligee, the obligor is not bound to
deliver any of the items that
remain.

impossibles ou illégales et que
l’impossibilité de l’une ou de
plusieurs des prestations est due à
la faute du débiteur, il est
responsable du dommage résultant
de son incapacité à exécuter la
dernière prestation devenue
impossible.
Si l’impossibilité de l’une ou
de plusieurs des prestations est due
à la faute du créancier, le débiteur
n’est tenu d’exécuter aucune des
prestations restantes.

SECTION 7. DIVISIBLE AND
INDIVISIBLE OBLIGATIONS

SECTION 7. OBLIGATIONS
DIVISIBLES ET INDIVISIBLES

Art. 1815. An obligation is
divisible when the object of the
performance is susceptible of
division.
An obligation is indivisible
when the object of the
performance, because of its nature
or because of the intent of the
parties, is not susceptible of
division.

Art. 1815. L’obligation est
divisible lorsque l’objet de la
prestation est susceptible de
division.
L’obligation est indivisible
lorsque l’objet de la prestation, de
par sa nature, ou de par l’intention
des parties, n’est pas susceptible
de division.

Art. 1816. When there is only
one obligor and only one obligee, a
divisible obligation must be
performed as if it were indivisible.

Art. 1816. Lorsqu’il y a
seulement un débiteur et seulement
un créancier, l’obligation divisible
doit être exécutée comme si elle
était indivisible.

Art. 1817. A divisible
obligation must be divided among
successors of the obligor or of the
obligee.
Each successor of the obligor
is liable only for his share of a
divisible obligation.
Each successor of the obligee
is entitled only to his share of a

Art. 1817. L’obligation
divisible doit être divisée entre les
successeurs du débiteur ou du
créancier.
Chaque successeur du débiteur
est responsable uniquement pour
sa part d’une obligation divisible.
Chaque successeur du
créancier n’a droit qu’à sa part
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divisible obligation.

d’une obligation divisible.

Art. 1818. An indivisible
obligation with more than one
obligor or obligee is subject to the
rules governing solidary
obligations.

Art. 1818. L’obligation
indivisible ayant plusieurs
débiteurs ou créanciers est régie
par les règles gouvernant les
obligations solidaires.

Art. 1819. An indivisible
obligation may not be divided
among the successors of the
obligor or of the obligee, who are
thus subject to the rules governing
solidary obligors or solidary
obligees.

Art. 1819. L’obligation
indivisible ne peut être divisée
entre les successeurs du débiteur
ou du créancier, auxquels les
règles de la solidarité restent donc
applicables.

Art. 1820. A stipulation of
solidarity does not make an
obligation indivisible.

Art. 1820. Une clause de
solidarité ne rend pas l’obligation
indivisible.

CHAPTER 4. TRANSFER OF
OBLIGATIONS

CHAPITRE 4. DU TRANSFERT
DES OBLIGATIONS

SECTION 1. ASSUMPTION OF
OBLIGATIONS

SECTION 1. DE LA PRISE EN
CHARGE DES OBLIGATIONS

Art. 1821. An obligor and a
third person may agree to an
assumption by the latter of an
obligation of the former. To be
enforceable by the obligee against
the third person, the agreement
must be made in writing.
The obligee's consent to the
agreement does not effect a release
of the obligor.
The unreleased obligor remains

Art. 1821. Le débiteur et un
tiers peuvent convenir de la prise
en charge 1 par à ce dernier de
l’obligation du premier. Afin que le
créancier puisse l’opposer à ce
tiers, l’accord doit être passé par
écrit.
Le consentement du créancier
ne libère pas le débiteur.
Le débiteur non libéré reste
obligé solidairement avec le tiers.

1

NdT : Bien que la notion d’assumption of obligations renvoie à celle de
« délégation », le mot assumption a été traduit par « prise en charge ». Outre la
prise en charge à l’initiative du débiteur qui est une vraie délégation (voir art.
1886), le Code civil louisianais connait en effet la prise en charge suite à un
accord entre le créancier et un tiers acceptant de prendre en charge l’obligation
du débiteur initial. Peut-on parler de délégation en pareil cas ?
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solidarily bound with the third
person.
Art. 1822. A person who, by
agreement with the obligor,
assumes the obligation of the latter
is bound only to the extent of his
assumption.
The assuming obligor may
raise any defense based on the
contract by which the assumption
was made.
Art. 1823. An obligee and a
third person may agree on an
assumption by the latter of an
obligation owed by another to the
former. That agreement must be
made in writing. That agreement
does not effect a release of the
original obligor.
Art. 1824. A person who, by
agreement with the obligee, has
assumed another's obligation may
not raise against the obligee any
defense based on the relationship
between the assuming obligor and
the original obligor.
The assuming obligor may
raise any defense based on the
relationship between the original
obligor and obligee. He may not
invoke compensation based on an
obligation owed by the obligee to
the original obligor.

SECTION 2. SUBROGATION
Art. 1825. Subrogation is the
substitution of one person to the
rights of another. It may be
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Art. 1822. La personne qui,
avec l’accord du débiteur, prend
en charge l’obligation de ce
dernier n’est tenue qu’à hauteur de
sa prise en charge.
Le débiteur prenant en charge
l’obligation pourra soulever toute
défense fondée sur le contrat par
lequel la prise en charge de
l’obligation par le tiers a été faite.
Art. 1823. Le créancier et un
tiers peuvent convenir de la prise
en charge par ce dernier d’une
obligation due par un autre au
premier. Cet accord doit être passé
par écrit. Cet accord ne libère pas
le débiteur initial.
Art. 1824. La personne qui, par
accord avec le créancier, a pris en
charge l’obligation d’une autre, ne
peut soulever à l’encontre du
créancier aucune défense fondée
sur la relation entre le débiteur
ayant pris en charge et le débiteur
initial.
Le débiteur ayant pris en
charge l’obligation peut soulever
toutes les défenses relevant de la
relation entre le débiteur initial et
le créancier. Il ne peut invoquer la
compensation sur le fondement
d’une obligation due par le
créancier au débiteur initial.
SECTION 2. DE LA
SUBROGATION
Art. 1825. La subrogation est
la substitution d’une personne
dans les droits d’une autre. Elle est
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conventional or legal.

conventionnelle ou légale.

Art. 1826. A. When
subrogation results from a person's
performance of the obligation of
another, that obligation subsists in
favor of the person who performed
it who may avail himself of the
action and security of the original
obligee against the obligor, but is
extinguished for the original
obligee.
B. An original obligee who has
been paid only in part may exercise
his right for the balance of the debt
in preference to the new obligee.
This right shall not be waived or
altered if the original obligation
arose from injuries sustained or
loss occasioned by the original
obligee as a result of the
negligence or intentional conduct
of the original obligor.

Art. 1826. A.
Lorsque la
subrogation résulte de l’exécution
par une personne de l’obligation
d’une autre, cette obligation
subsiste au profit de la personne
qui l’a exécutée. Celle-ci peut se
prévaloir de l’action en justice et
des sûretés du créancier initial
envers le débiteur. Toutefois,
l’obligation est éteinte pour le
créancier initial.
B. Le créancier initial qui n’a
été payé qu’en partie peut exercer
son droit pour le solde de la dette,
par préférence au nouveau
créancier. Ce droit ne peut faire
l’objet d’une renonciation ni être
altéré si l’obligation initiale
résulte de dommages ou de pertes
subis par le créancier initial suite
à une négligence ou à une conduite
intentionnelle de la part du
débiteur initial.

Art. 1827. An obligee who
receives performance from a third
person may subrogate that person
to the rights of the obligee, even
without the obligor's consent. That
subrogation is subject to the rules
governing the assignment of rights.

Art. 1827. Le créancier qui
reçoit la prestation de la part d’un
tiers peut subroger cette personne
aux droits du créancier, même sans
le consentement du débiteur. Cette
subrogation est soumise aux règles
régissant la cession de créance.

Art. 1828. An obligor who
pays a debt with money or other
fungible things borrowed for that
purpose may subrogate the lender
to the rights of the obligee, even
without the obligee's consent.
The agreement for subrogation
must be made in writing
expressing that the purpose of the

Art. 1828. Un débiteur qui paie
une dette avec de l’argent ou toute
autre chose fongible empruntée à
cette fin peut subroger le prêteur
dans les droits du créancier, même
sans le consentement de ce dernier.
L’accord aux fins de
subrogation doit être passé par
écrit précisant que l’emprunt a été
réalisé dans le but d’acquitter la
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loan is to pay the debt.

dette.

Art. 1829. Subrogation takes
place by operation of law:
(1) In favor of an obligee who
pays another obligee whose right is
preferred to his because of a
privilege, pledge, mortgage, or
security interest;
(2) In favor of a purchaser of
movable or immovable property
who uses the purchase money to
pay creditors holding any
privilege, pledge, mortgage, or
security interest on the property;
(3) In favor of an obligor who
pays a debt he owes with others or
for others and who has recourse
against those others as a result of
the payment;
(4) In favor of a successor who
pays estate debts with his own
funds; and
(5) In the other cases provided
by law. [Acts 1989, No. 137, §16,
eff. Sept. 1, 1989; Acts 2001, No.
572, 1]

Art. 1829. La subrogation
opère de plein droit:
(1) en faveur du créancier qui
paie un autre créancier dont le
droit est préféré au sien en raison
d’un privilège, d’un gage, d’une
hypothèque ou d’une sûreté;
(2) en faveur de l’acquéreur de
biens meubles ou immeubles qui
emploie l’argent de l’acquisition
pour payer les créanciers
détenteurs d’un privilège, d’un
gage, d’une hypothèque ou d’une
sûreté sur le bien;
(3) en faveur du débiteur qui
paie une dette à laquelle il est tenu
avec d’autres ou pour d’autres et
qui bénéficie d’un recours à
l’encontre de ceux-ci suite au
paiement;
(4) en faveur du successeur qui
paie, de ses propres deniers, les
dettes de la succession; et
(5) dans les autres cas prévus
par la loi. [Loi de 1989, n° 137,
§16, en vigueur le 1er septembre
1989 ; loi de 2001, n° 572, 1]

Art. 1830. When subrogation
takes place by operation of law, the
new obligee may recover from the
obligor only to the extent of the
performance rendered to the
original obligee. The new obligee
may not recover more by invoking
conventional subrogation.

Art. 1830. Lorsque la
subrogation opère de plein droit, le
nouveau créancier ne peut
recouvrer du débiteur que la
prestation exécutée au bénéfice du
créancier initial. Le nouveau
créancier ne peut recouvrer
davantage en invoquant une
subrogation conventionnelle.
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CHAPITRE 5. DE LA PREUVE
DES OBLIGATIONS

Art. 1831. A party who
demands performance of an
obligation must prove the existence
of the obligation.
A party who asserts that an
obligation is null, or that it has
been modified or extinguished,
must prove the facts or acts giving
rise to the nullity, modification, or
extinction.

Art. 1831. La partie qui
demande l’exécution d’une
obligation doit en prouver
l’existence.
La partie qui affirme qu’une
obligation est nulle, ou qu’elle a
été modifiée ou éteinte, doit
prouver les faits ou actes à
l’origine de la nullité, de la
modification ou de l’extinction.

Art. 1832. When the law
requires a contract to be in written
form, the contract may not be
proved by testimony or by
presumption, unless the written
instrument has been destroyed,
lost, or stolen.

Art. 1832. Lorsque la loi
requiert qu’un contrat soit passé
par écrit, le contrat ne peut pas
être prouvé par témoignage ou par
présomption, à moins que l’acte
écrit n’ait été détruit, perdu ou
volé.

Art. 1833. A. An authentic act
is a writing executed before a
notary public or other officer
authorized to perform that
function, in the presence of two
witnesses, and signed by each
party who executed it, by each
witness, and by each notary public
before whom it was executed. The
typed or hand-printed name of
each person shall be placed in a
legible form immediately beneath
the signature of each person
signing the act.

Art. 1833. A.
L’acte
authentique est un écrit passé par
devant un notaire public 2, ou par
tout autre officier public autorisé à
exercer cette fonction, en présence
de deux témoins, et signé par
chacune des parties qui l’a passé,
par chacun des témoins, et par
chacun des notaires publics devant
lequel il a été passé. Le nom,
manuscrit ou dactylographié, de
chacun doit être écrit lisiblement
immédiatement en dessous de la
signature de chacun des
signataires de l’acte.
B. Pour que l’acte soit
authentique, l’écrit n’a pas à être

B. To be an authentic act, the
writing need not be executed at one
2

NdT : Comme dans les autres états et dans les pays de common law, le notary
public n’est pas un officier ministériel investi du sceau de l’État. Le plus
souvent, il n’a pas de formation juridique et sa fonction se limite à la
certification des actes qui lui sont présentés par les parties.
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time or place, or before the same
notary public or in the presence of
the same witnesses, provided that
each party who executes it does so
before a notary public or other
officer authorized to perform that
function, and in the presence of
two witnesses and each party, each
witness, and each notary public
signs it. The failure to include the
typed or hand-printed name of
each person signing the act shall
not affect the validity or
authenticity of the act.
C. If a party is unable or does
not know how to sign his name, the
notary public must cause him to
affix his mark to the writing. [Acts
2003, No. 965, §1, eff. Jan. 1,
2005]

Art. 1834. An act that fails to
be authentic because of the lack of
competence or capacity of the
notary public, or because of a
defect of form, may still be valid as
an act under private signature.
Art. 1835. An authentic act
constitutes full proof of the
agreement it contains, as against
the parties, their heirs, and
successors by universal or
particular title.
Art. 1836. An act under private
signature is regarded prima facie as
the true and genuine act of a party
executing it when his signature has
been acknowledged, and the act

129

passé en un lieu ou en un moment
unique, ou devant le même notaire
public, ou en présence des mêmes
témoins, du moment que chacune
des parties le passe devant le
notaire public ou l’officier public
autorisé à exercer cette fonction,
en présence de deux témoins, et
que chaque partie, chaque témoin
et chaque notaire public signe
l’acte. L’absence de la mention
manuscrite ou dactylographiée du
nom de chacun des signataires
n’affecte en rien la validité ni
l’authenticité de l’acte.
C. Lorsque l’une des parties
n’est pas capable de signer son
nom ou ne sait pas comment le
faire, le notaire doit l’amener à
apposer sa marque sur l’écrit. [Loi
de 2003, no 965, §1, en vigueur le
1er janv. 2005]
Art. 1834. L’acte qui ne peut
être considéré comme authentique
en raison de l’incompétence ou de
l’incapacité du notaire public, ou
en raison d’un vice de forme, peut
néanmoins être valide en tant
qu’acte sous seing privé.
Art. 1835. L’acte authentique
fait pleinement foi de la convention
qu’il renferme, entre les parties,
leurs héritiers, et leurs ayants
cause à titre universel ou
particulier.
Art. 1836. L’acte sous seing
privé est présumé être l’acte
véritable et sincère de la partie qui
le passe lorsque sa signature a fait
l’objet d’une reconnaissance. Dans
ce cas, la valeur probatoire de
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shall be admitted in evidence
without further proof.
An act under private signature
may be acknowledged by a party to
that act by recognizing the
signature as his own before a court,
or before a notary public, or other
officer authorized to perform that
function, in the presence of two
witnesses. An act under private
signature may be acknowledged
also in any other manner
authorized by law.
Nevertheless, an act under
private signature, though
acknowledged, cannot substitute
for an authentic act when the law
prescribes such an act.

l’acte doit être admise sans qu’il
soit nécessaire d’apporter d’autre
preuve.
L’acte sous seing privé peut
faire l’objet d’une reconnaissance
par une partie à cet acte en
reconnaissant la signature comme
étant la sienne devant un tribunal
ou devant un notaire public, ou
devant tout officier public autorisé
à exercer cette fonction, en
présence de deux témoins. Un acte
sous seing privé peut aussi faire
l’objet d’une reconnaissance de
toute autre manière autorisée par
la loi.
Cependant, l’acte sous seing
privé, bien que reconnu, ne peut
être substitué à un acte
authentique lorsque la loi prescrit
un tel acte.

Art. 1837. An act under private
signature need not be written by
the parties, but must be signed by
them.

Art. 1837. L’acte sous seing
privé peut ne pas être rédigé par
les parties, mais elles doivent le
signer.

Art. 1838. A party against
whom an act under private
signature is asserted must
acknowledge his signature or deny
that it is his.
In case of denial, any means of
proof may be used to establish that
the signature belongs to that party.

Art. 1838. La partie à qui l’on
oppose un acte sous seing privé
doit ou bien reconnaître sa
signature ou bien nier qu’il s’agit
de sa signature.
En cas de dénégation, tout
moyen de preuve peut être utilisé
pour établir que la signature est
celle de cette partie.

Art. 1839. A transfer of
immovable property must be made
by authentic act or by act under
private signature. Nevertheless, an
oral transfer is valid between the
parties when the property has been
actually delivered and the

Art. 1839. Le transfert de
propriété d’un bien immobilier doit
être établi par acte authentique ou
par acte sous seing privé.
Cependant, le transfert oral est
valable entre les parties lorsque le
bien a été effectivement délivré et
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transferor recognizes the transfer
when interrogated on oath.
An instrument involving
immovable property shall have
effect against third persons only
from the time it is filed for registry
in the parish where the property is
located.

que le cédant reconnait le transfert
lorsqu’il est interrogé sous
serment.
Un acte relatif à la propriété
immobilière n’est opposable aux
tiers qu’à compter du moment de
son enregistrement dans la
paroisse 3 où l’immeuble se situe.

Art. 1840. When certified by
the notary public or other officer
before whom the act was passed, a
copy of an authentic act constitutes
proof of the contents of the
original, unless the copy is proved
to be incorrect.

Art. 1840. Lorsqu’elle est
certifiée par le notaire public ou
l’officier public devant lequel
l’acte a été passé, la copie d’un
acte authentique constitue une
preuve du contenu de l’original,
sauf preuve de non-conformité de
la copie.

Art. 1841. When an authentic
act or an acknowledged act under
private signature has been filed for
registry with a public officer, a
copy of the act thus filed, when
certified by that officer, constitutes
proof of the contents of the
original.

Art. 1841. Lorsqu’un acte
authentique ou un acte sous seing
privé reconnu a été enregistré au
registre par un officier public, une
copie de l’acte enregistré,
lorsqu’elle est certifiée par ce
dernier, vaut preuve du contenu de
l’original.

Art. 1842. Confirmation is a
declaration whereby a person cures
the relative nullity of an obligation.
An express act of confirmation
must contain or identify the
substance of the obligation and
evidence the intention to cure its
relative nullity.
Tacit confirmation may result
from voluntary performance of the
obligation.

Art. 1842. La confirmation est
la déclaration par laquelle une
personne remédie à la nullité
relative d’une obligation.
Un acte exprès de confirmation
doit contenir ou identifier la
substance de l’obligation et
apporter la preuve de l’intention
de remédier à sa nullité relative.
Une confirmation tacite peut
résulter de l’exécution volontaire
de l’obligation.

Art. 1843. Ratification is a
declaration whereby a person gives

Art. 1843. La ratification est
une déclaration par laquelle une

3

NdT : La Louisiane a conservé la paroisse comme division territoriale. Celle-ci
est l’équivalent du comté dans les autres états.
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his consent to an obligation
incurred on his behalf by another
without authority.
An express act of ratification
must evidence the intention to be
bound by the ratified obligation.
Tacit ratification results when
a person, with knowledge of an
obligation incurred on his behalf
by another, accepts the benefit of
that obligation.
Art. 1844. The effects of
confirmation and ratification are
retroactive to the date of the
confirmed or ratified obligation.
Neither confirmation nor
ratification may impair the rights
of third persons.
Art. 1845. A donation inter
vivos that is null for lack of proper
form may be confirmed by the
donor but the confirmation must be
made in the form required for a
donation.
The universal successor of the
donor may, after his death,
expressly or tacitly confirm such a
donation.
Art. 1846. When a writing is
not required by law, a contract not
reduced to writing, for a price or,
in the absence of a price, for a
value not in excess of five hundred
dollars may be proved by
competent evidence.
If the price or value is in
excess of five hundred dollars, the
contract must be proved by at least
one witness and other

[Vol. 5

personne donne son consentement
à une obligation contractée par
une autre personne en son nom,
sans avoir reçu pouvoir de le faire.
L’acte exprès de ratification
doit manifester l’intention d’être
lié par l’obligation ratifiée.
Il y a ratification tacite
lorsqu’une personne ayant
connaissance d’une obligation
contractée en son nom, accepte le
bénéfice de cette obligation.
Art. 1844. Les effets de la
confirmation et de la ratification
rétroagissent à la date de
l’obligation confirmée ou ratifiée.
Ni la confirmation, ni la
ratification ne peuvent porter
atteinte aux droits des tiers.
Art. 1845. Une donation entre
vifs nulle pour vice de forme peut
être confirmée par le donateur,
mais la confirmation doit être
effectuée dans la forme requise
pour une donation.
L’ayant droit universel du
donateur peut, après le décès de
celui-ci, confirmer expressément
ou tacitement une telle donation.
Art. 1846. Lorsque la forme
écrite n’est pas requise par la loi,
un contrat non passé par écrit dont
le prix ou, en l’absence de prix, la
valeur n’excède pas cinq cents
dollars, peut être prouvé par tout
moyen.
Si le prix ou la valeur excède
cinq cents dollars, le contrat doit
être prouvé par au moins un
témoin et d’autres circonstances
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corroborating circumstances.

concordantes.

Art. 1847. Parol evidence is
inadmissible to establish either a
promise to pay the debt of a third
person or a promise to pay a debt
extinguished by prescription.

Art. 1847. La preuve orale ne
peut être admise pour établir une
promesse de paiement de la dette
d’un tiers, ou une promesse de
paiement d’une dette éteinte par
prescription.

Art. 1848. Testimonial or other
evidence may not be admitted to
negate or vary the contents of an
authentic act or an act under
private signature. Nevertheless, in
the interest of justice, that evidence
may be admitted to prove such
circumstances as a vice of consent,
or to prove that the written act was
modified by a subsequent and valid
oral agreement. [Acts 2012, No.
277, §1, eff. Aug. 1, 2012]

Art. 1848. La preuve par
témoin ou par autre moyen ne peut
être admise pour nier ou pour
modifier le contenu d’un acte
authentique ou d’un acte sous
seing privé. Toutefois, dans
l’intérêt de la justice, cette preuve
peut être admise pour établir des
circonstances telles que le vice du
consentement ou afin de prouver
que l’acte écrit a été modifié par
un accord oral valide et ultérieur.
[Loi de 2012, n° 277, §1, en
vigueur le 1er août 2012]

Art. 1849. In all cases,
testimonial or other evidence may
be admitted to prove the existence
or a presumption of a simulation or
to rebut such a presumption.
Nevertheless, between the parties,
a counterletter is required to prove
that an act purporting to transfer
immovable property is an absolute
simulation, except when a
simulation is presumed or as
necessary to protect the rights of
forced heirs. [Added by Acts 2012,
No. 277, §1, eff. Aug. 1, 2012]

Art. 1849. Dans tous les cas, la
preuve par témoin ou par autre
moyen peut être admise pour
prouver l’existence d’une
simulation, en établir la
présomption ou renverser une telle
présomption. Toutefois, entre les
parties, une contre-lettre est
requise afin de prouver qu’un acte
translatif de propriété immobilière
est une simulation absolue, sauf
lorsque la simulation est présumée
ou lorsqu’il est nécessaire de
protéger les droits des héritiers
réservataires. [Ajouté par la loi de
2012, n° 277, §1, en vigueur le 1er
août 2012]

Arts. 1850-1852. [Repealed.
Acts 1997, No. 577, §3]

Art. 1850 à 1852. [Abrogés
par la loi de 1997, n° 577, §3]
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Art. 1853. A judicial
confession is a declaration made
by a party in a judicial proceeding.
That confession constitutes full
proof against the party who made
it.
A judicial confession is
indivisible and it may be revoked
only on the ground of error of fact.

Art. 1853. L’aveu judiciaire est
la déclaration faite par une partie
lors d’une instance judiciaire. Cet
aveu fait pleinement preuve à
l’encontre de son auteur.
Un aveu judiciaire est
indivisible, et ne peut être révoqué
que pour cause d’erreur de fait.

CHAPTER 6. EXTINCTION OF
OBLIGATIONS

CHAPITRE 6. DE L’EXTINCTION
DES OBLIGATIONS

SECTION 1. PERFORMANCE

SECTION 1. DE L’EXÉCUTION

Art. 1854. Performance by the
obligor extinguishes the obligation.

Art. 1854. L’exécution par le
débiteur éteint l’obligation.

Art. 1855. Performance may
be rendered by a third person, even
against the will of the obligee,
unless the obligor or the obligee
has an interest in performance only
by the obligor.
Performance rendered by a
third person effects subrogation
only when so provided by law or
by agreement.

Art. 1855. La prestation peut
être exécutée par un tiers, même
contre la volonté du créancier, à
moins que le débiteur ou le
créancier n’ait intérêt à ce que la
prestation soit exécutée par le seul
débiteur.
La prestation exécutée par un
tiers n’entraîne subrogation que
dans les cas prévus par la loi ou
par l’accord des parties.

Art. 1856. An obligation that
may be extinguished by the
transfer of a thing is not
extinguished unless the thing has
been validly transferred to the
obligee of performance.

Art. 1856. Une obligation qui
peut s’éteindre par le transfert
d’une chose n’est éteinte que
lorsque cette chose a été
valablement transférée au
créancier de la prestation.

Art. 1857. Performance must
be rendered to the obligee or to a
person authorized by him.
However, a performance
rendered to an unauthorized person
is valid if the obligee ratifies it.

Art. 1857. La prestation doit
être exécutée au profit du
créancier ou de la personne que ce
dernier a autorisée.
Cependant, la prestation
exécutée au profit d’une personne
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In the absence of ratification, a
performance rendered to an
unauthorized person is valid if the
obligee has derived a benefit from
it, but only for the amount of the
benefit.

non autorisée est valable si le
créancier la ratifie.
En l’absence de ratification, la
prestation exécutée au profit d’une
personne non autorisée est valable
si le créancier en a tiré un
avantage, mais seulement à
hauteur de cet avantage.

Art. 1858. Performance
rendered to an obligee without
capacity to receive it is valid to the
extent of the benefit he derived
from it.

Art. 1858. La prestation
exécutée au profit d’un créancier
qui n’a pas la capacité de la
recevoir ne vaut que dans la
mesure de l’avantage qu’il en a
tiré.

Art. 1859. A performance
rendered to an obligee in violation
of a seizure is not valid against the
seizing creditor who, according to
his right, may force the obligor to
perform again.
In that case, the obligor may
recover the first performance from
the obligee.

Art. 1859. La prestation
exécutée au profit d’un créancier
en violation d’une saisie n’est pas
opposable au créancier saisissant
qui, selon ses droits, peut de
nouveau contraindre le débiteur à
l’exécution.
Dans un tel cas, le débiteur
peut recouvrer la première
prestation du créancier qui l’a
perçue.

Art. 1860. When the
performance consists of giving a
thing that is determined as to its
kind only, the obligor need not
give one of the best quality but he
may not tender one of the worst.

Art. 1860. Lorsque la
prestation consiste à donner une
chose déterminée en fonction de
son espèce uniquement, le débiteur
n’est pas tenu d’en donner une de
la meilleure qualité mais il ne peut
pas en proposer de la plus
mauvaise.

Art. 1861. An obligee may
refuse to accept a partial
performance.
Nevertheless, if the amount of
an obligation to pay money is
disputed in part and the obligor is
willing to pay the undisputed part,

Art. 1861. Le créancier peut
refuser d’accepter une exécution
partielle.
Néanmoins, si le montant
d’une obligation de payer une
somme d’argent est en partie
contesté et que le débiteur est
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the obligee may not refuse to
accept that part. If the obligee is
willing to accept the undisputed
part, the obligor must pay it. In
either case, the obligee preserves
his right to claim the disputed part.

disposé à payer la partie non
contestée, le créancier ne peut pas
refuser d’accepter cette partie. Si
le créancier est disposé à accepter
la partie non contestée, le débiteur
doit la payer. Dans chacun de ces
cas, le créancier conserve son
droit de réclamer la partie
contestée.

Art. 1862. Performance shall
be rendered in the place either
stipulated in the agreement or
intended by the parties according
to usage, the nature of the
performance, or other
circumstances.
In the absence of agreement or
other indication of the parties'
intent, performance of an
obligation to give an individually
determined thing shall be rendered
at the place the thing was when the
obligation arose. If the obligation
is of any other kind, the
performance shall be rendered at
the domicile of the obligor.

Art. 1862. La prestation doit
être exécutée soit à l’endroit
stipulé dans la convention, soit à
l’endroit voulu par les parties
conformément à l’usage, à la
nature de la prestation, ou à
d’autres circonstances.
En l’absence d’accord ou
d’autre indication de l’intention
des parties, l’exécution d’une
obligation de donner un corps
certain doit être exécutée à
l’endroit où il se trouvait au
moment de la naissance de
l’obligation. Si l’obligation est de
toute autre nature, la prestation
doit être exécutée au domicile du
débiteur.

Art. 1863. Expenses that may
be required to render performance
shall be borne by the obligor.

Art. 1863. Les dépenses qui
peuvent être nécessaires à
l’exécution de la prestation sont à
la charge du débiteur.

SUBSECTION A. IMPUTATION
OF PAYMENT

SOUS-SECTION A. DE
L’IMPUTATION DE PAIEMENT

Art. 1864. An obligor who
owes several debts to an obligee
has the right to impute payment to
the debt he intends to pay.
The obligor's intent to pay a
certain debt may be expressed at

Art. 1864. Le débiteur de
plusieurs dettes envers un
créancier a le droit d’imputer le
paiement sur la dette qu’il entend
payer.
L’intention du débiteur de
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the time of payment or may be
inferred from circumstances
known to the obligee.

payer une certaine dette peut être
exprimée au moment du paiement
ou peut être déduite de
circonstances connues du
créancier.

Art. 1865. An obligor may not,
without the obligee's consent,
impute payment to a debt not yet
due.

Art. 1865. Le débiteur ne peut,
sans le consentement du créancier,
imputer le paiement sur une dette
non encore échue.

Art. 1866. An obligor of a debt
that bears interest may not, without
the obligee's consent, impute a
payment to principal when interest
is due.
A payment made on principal
and interest must be imputed first
to interest.

Art. 1866. Le débiteur d’une
dette qui porte intérêts ne peut,
sans le consentement du créancier,
imputer le paiement sur le capital
lorsque l’intérêt est dû.
Le paiement fait sur le capital
et intérêts s’impute d’abord sur les
intérêts.

Art. 1867. An obligor who has
accepted a receipt that imputes
payment to one of his debts may
no longer demand imputation to
another debt, unless the obligee has
acted in bad faith.

Art. 1867. Le débiteur qui a
accepté une quittance imputant le
paiement sur l’une de ses dettes ne
peut plus demander l’imputation
sur une autre dette, à moins que le
créancier n’ait agit de mauvaise
foi.

Art. 1868. When the parties
have made no imputation, payment
must be imputed to the debt that is
already due.
If several debts are due,
payment must be imputed to the
debt that bears interest.
If all, or none, of the debts that
are due bear interest, payment must
be imputed to the debt that is
secured.
If several unsecured debts bear
interest, payment must be imputed
to the debt that, because of the rate
of interest, is most burdensome to
the obligor.

Art. 1868. Lorsque les parties
n’ont pas réalisé d’imputation, le
paiement doit être imputé sur la
dette déjà échue.
Si plusieurs dettes sont échues,
le paiement doit être imputé sur la
dette qui porte intérêts.
Si toutes, ou aucune, des dettes
encore dues portent intérêt, le
paiement doit être imputé sur la
dette qui est garantie.
Si plusieurs dettes non
garanties portent intérêt, le
paiement doit être imputé sur la
dette qui, en raison de son taux
d’intérêt, est la plus lourde pour le
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If several secured debts bear
no interest, payment must be
imputed to the debt that, because
of the nature of the security, is
most burdensome to the obligor.
If the obligor had the same
interest in paying all debts,
payment must be imputed to the
debt that became due first.
If all debts are of the same
nature and became due at the same
time, payment must be
proportionally imputed to all.

débiteur.
Si plusieurs dettes garanties ne
portent pas d’intérêt, le paiement
doit être imputé, en raison de la
nature de la sûreté, sur la plus
lourde pour le débiteur.
Si le débiteur a le même intérêt
à payer toutes les dettes, le
paiement doit être imputé sur celle
qui est échue en premier.
Si toutes les dettes sont de
même nature et deviennent
exigibles au même moment, le
paiement doit être imputé de façon
proportionnelle sur toutes les
dettes.

SUBSECTION B. TENDER AND
DEPOSIT

SOUS-SECTION B. DE L’OFFRE
DE PAIEMENT ET DE LA
CONSIGNATION

Art. 1869. When the object of
the performance is the delivery of a
thing or a sum of money and the
obligee, without justification, fails
to accept the performance tendered
by the obligor, the tender, followed
by deposit to the order of the court,
produces all the effects of a
performance from the time the
tender was made if declared valid
by the court.
A valid tender is an offer to
perform according to the nature of
the obligation.
Art. 1870. If the obligor knows
or has reason to know that the
obligee will refuse the
performance, or when the object of
the performance is the delivery of a
thing or a sum of money at a place

Art. 1869. Lorsque l’objet de la
prestation est la délivrance d’une
chose ou d’une somme d’argent et
que le créancier, sans motif
légitime, refuse d’accepter
l’exécution offerte par le débiteur,
l’offre de paiement, suivie de la
consignation au tribunal, produit
tous les effets de l’exécution à
partir du moment où l’offre a été
déclarée valable par le tribunal.
Une offre valable est une offre
d’exécution conforme à la nature
de l’obligation.
Art. 1870. Lorsque le débiteur
sait, ou a des raisons de savoir que
le créancier refusera la prestation,
ou lorsque la prestation a pour
objet la délivrance d’une chose ou
d’une somme d’argent à un autre
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other than the obligee's domicile, a
notice given to the obligee that the
obligor is ready to perform has the
same effect as a tender.

endroit que le domicile du
créancier, une notification donnée
au créancier que le débiteur est
prêt à exécuter a le même effet que
l’offre.

Art. 1871. After the tender has
been refused, the obligor may
deposit the thing or the sum of
money to the order of the court in a
place designated by the court for
that purpose, and may demand
judgment declaring the
performance valid.
If the deposit is accepted by
the obligee, or if the court declares
the performance valid, all expenses
of the deposit must be borne by the
obligee.

Art. 1871. Suite au refus de
l’offre le débiteur peut déposer la
chose ou la somme d’argent à
l’endroit désigné à cet effet par le
juge, et peut exiger un jugement
déclarant l’exécution valable.
Lorsque le dépôt est accepté
par le créancier, ou lorsque le juge
déclare l’exécution valable, les
frais de consignation sont
entièrement à la charge du
créancier.

Art. 1872. If performance
consists of the delivery of a
perishable thing, or of a thing
whose deposit and custody are
excessively costly in proportion to
its value, the court may order the
sale of the thing under the
conditions that it may direct, and
the deposit of the proceeds.
SECTION 2. IMPOSSIBILITY OF
PERFORMANCE

Art. 1873. An obligor is not
liable for his failure to perform
when it is caused by a fortuitous
event that makes performance
impossible.
An obligor is, however, liable
for his failure to perform when he
has assumed the risk of such a
fortuitous event.

Art. 1872. Lorsque la
prestation consiste en la livraison
d’une chose périssable, ou d’une
chose dont la consignation ou la
garde sont excessivement
onéreuses par rapport à sa valeur,
le juge peut ordonner la vente de
la chose dans les conditions qu’il
ordonne, ainsi que la consignation
du prix.
SECTION 2. DE
L’IMPOSSIBILITÉ
D’EXÉCUTION
Art. 1873. Le débiteur n’est
pas responsable de son défaut
d’exécution lorsqu’il est causé par
un cas fortuit rendant l’exécution
impossible.
Le débiteur est, cependant,
responsable de son défaut
d’exécution lorsqu’il a accepté le
risque de ce cas fortuit.

140

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 5

An obligor is liable also when
the fortuitous event occurred after
he has been put in default.
An obligor is likewise liable
when the fortuitous event that
caused his failure to perform has
been preceded by his fault, without
which the failure would not have
occurred.

Le débiteur est également
responsable lorsque le cas fortuit
survient après sa mise en demeure.
Le débiteur est de même
responsable lorsque le cas fortuit
causant son défaut d’exécution a
été précédé d’une faute de sa part,
sans laquelle le défaut d’exécution
n’aurait pas eu lieu

Art. 1874. An obligor who had
been put in default when a
fortuitous event made his
performance impossible is not
liable for his failure to perform if
the fortuitous event would have
likewise destroyed the object of the
performance in the hands of the
obligee had performance been
timely rendered.
That obligor is, however, liable
for the damage caused by his
delay.

Art. 1874. Le débiteur qui avait
été mis en demeure avant qu’un
cas fortuit ne rende l’exécution
impossible n’est pas responsable
de son défaut d’exécution lorsque
le cas fortuit aurait également
détruit l’objet de la prestation
entre les mains du créancier si la
prestation avait été exécutée à
temps.
Ce débiteur est cependant
responsable du dommage causé
par son retard.

Art. 1875. A fortuitous event is
one that, at the time the contract
was made, could not have been
reasonably foreseen.

Art. 1875. Le cas fortuit est
celui qui ne pouvait être
raisonnablement prévu au moment
de la conclusion du contrat.

Art. 1876. When the entire
performance owed by one party
has become impossible because of
a fortuitous event, the contract is
dissolved.
The other party may then
recover any performance he has
already rendered.

Art. 1876. Lorsque la totalité
de l’exécution due par une partie
est devenue impossible en raison
d’un cas fortuit, le contrat est
dissout.
L’autre partie peut alors
recouvrer toute prestation qu’elle
a déjà exécutée.

Art. 1877. When a fortuitous
event has made a party's
performance impossible in part, the
court may reduce the other party's
counterperformance
proportionally, or, according to the

Art. 1877. Lorsqu’un cas
fortuit a rendu la prestation de
l’une des parties partiellement
impossible, le juge peut réduire
proportionnellement la
contreprestation de l’autre partie,
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circumstances, may declare the
contract dissolved.

ou, selon les circonstances, peut
déclarer la dissolution du contrat.

Art. 1878. If a contract is
dissolved because of a fortuitous
event that occurred after an obligor
has performed in part, the obligee
is bound but only to the extent that
he was enriched by the obligor's
partial performance.

Art. 1878. Lorsque le contrat
est dissout en raison d’un cas
fortuit qui s’est produit après que
le débiteur ait en partie exécuté sa
prestation, le créancier est tenu
d’exécuter la sienne mais
seulement à hauteur de son
enrichissement.

SECTION 3. NOVATION

SECTION 3. DE LA NOVATION

Art. 1879. Novation is the
extinguishment of an existing
obligation by the substitution of a
new one.

Art. 1879. La novation est
l’extinction d’une obligation
existante par la substitution d’une
nouvelle obligation.

Art. 1880. The intention to
extinguish the original obligation
must be clear and unequivocal.
Novation may not be presumed.

Art. 1880. L’intention
d’éteindre l’obligation initiale doit
être claire et non-équivoque. La
novation ne se présume pas.

Art. 1881. Novation takes
place when, by agreement of the
parties, a new performance is
substituted for that previously
owed, or a new cause is substituted
for that of the original obligation.
If any substantial part of the
original performance is still owed,
there is no novation.
Novation takes place also
when the parties expressly declare
their intention to novate an
obligation.
Mere modification of an
obligation, made without intention
to extinguish it, does not effect a
novation. The execution of a new
writing, the issuance or renewal of
a negotiable instrument, or the

Art. 1881. Il y a novation
lorsque, par l’accord des parties,
une nouvelle prestation est
substituée à celle due auparavant,
ou une nouvelle cause est
substituée à celle de l’obligation
initiale. Lorsqu’une partie
substantielle de la prestation
initiale est encore due, il n’y a pas
novation.
Il y a novation lorsque les
parties déclarent expressément
leur intention de nover une
obligation.
La simple modification de
l’obligation, faite sans intention de
l’éteindre, ne vaut pas novation.
La rédaction d’un nouvel écrit, la
création ou le renouvellement d’un
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giving of new securities for the
performance of an existing
obligation are examples of such a
modification.

effet de commerce, ou la remise de
nouvelles sûretés en vue de
l’exécution d’une obligation
existante sont des exemples de telle
modification.

Art. 1882. Novation takes
place when a new obligor is
substituted for a prior obligor who
is discharged by the obligee. In
that case, the novation is
accomplished even without the
consent of the prior obligor, unless
he had an interest in performing
the obligation himself.

Art. 1882. Il y a novation
lorsqu’un nouveau débiteur se
substitue à un débiteur antérieur
qui est libéré par le créancier.
Dans ce cas, la novation est
accomplie même en l’absence du
consentement du débiteur
antérieur, à moins que celui-ci
n’ait un intérêt à exécuter
l’obligation lui-même.

Art. 1883. Novation has no
effect when the obligation it
purports to extinguish does not
exist or is absolutely null.
If the obligation is only
relatively null, the novation is
valid, provided the obligor of the
new one knew of the defect of the
extinguished obligation.

Art. 1883. La novation n’a
aucun effet lorsque l’obligation
qu’elle prétend éteindre est
inexistante ou est entachée de
nullité absolue.
Si l’obligation n’est entachée
que de nullité relative, la novation
est valable, à condition que le
débiteur de la nouvelle obligation
ait eu connaissance du vice de
l’obligation éteinte.

Art. 1884. Security given for
the performance of the
extinguished obligation may not be
transferred to the new obligation
without agreement of the parties
who gave the security.

Art. 1884. La sûreté donnée en
vue de l’exécution de l’obligation
éteinte ne peut être transférée à la
nouvelle obligation sans l’accord
des parties qui l’ont fournie.

Art. 1885. A novation made by
the obligee and one of the obligors
of a solidary obligation releases the
other solidary obligors.
In that case, the security given
for the performance of the
extinguished obligation may be
retained by the obligee only on

Art. 1885. La novation
effectuée par le créancier et le
codébiteur d’une obligation
solidaire libère les autres débiteurs
solidaires.
Dans un tel cas, la sûreté
donnée en vue de l’exécution de
l’obligation éteinte ne peut être
réservée par le créancier que sur
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property of that obligor with whom
the novation has been made.
If the obligee requires that the
other co-obligors remain solidarily
bound, there is no novation unless
the co-obligors consent to the new
obligation.

les biens de celui qui contracte la
nouvelle dette.
Lorsque le créancier exige que
les autres codébiteurs restent
solidairement tenus, il n’y a pas
novation à moins que les
codébiteurs ne consentent à la
nouvelle obligation.

Art. 1886. A delegation of
performance by an obligor to a
third person is effective when that
person binds himself to perform.
A delegation effects a novation
only when the obligee expressly
discharges the original obligor.

Art. 1886. La délégation de la
prestation par le débiteur à un
tiers ne prend effet que lorsque
cette personne s’oblige à
l’exécuter.
La délégation n’opère
novation que lorsque le créancier
libère expressément le débiteur
initial.

Art. 1887. If the new obligor
has assumed the obligation and
acquired the thing given as
security, the discharge of any prior
obligor by the obligee does not
affect the security or its rank

Art. 1887. Lorsque le nouveau
débiteur a pris en charge
l’obligation et acquis la chose
donnée en tant que sûreté, la
libération de tout débiteur
antérieur par le créancier n’affecte
ni la sûreté ni son rang.

SECTION 4. REMISSION OF
DEBT

SECTION 4. DE LA REMISE DE
LA DETTE

Art. 1888. A remission of debt
by an obligee extinguishes the
obligation. That remission may be
express or tacit.

Art. 1888. La remise de dette
par un créancier éteint
l’obligation. Elle peut être
expresse ou tacite.

Art. 1889. An obligee's
voluntary surrender to the obligor
of the instrument evidencing the
obligation gives rise to a
presumption that the obligee
intended to remit the debt.

Art. 1889. L’abandon
volontaire par le créancier au
débiteur du titre constatant
l’obligation fait présumer
l’intention du créancier de
remettre la dette.

Art. 1890. A remission of debt
is effective when the obligor

Art. 1890. La remise de dette
prend effet lorsque le débiteur en

144

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

receives the communication from
the obligee. Acceptance of a
remission is always presumed
unless the obligor rejects the
remission within a reasonable time.

[Vol. 5

reçoit la communication de la part
du créancier. L’acceptation de la
remise de dette est toujours
présumée à moins que le débiteur
ne la rejette dans un délai
raisonnable.

Art. 1891. Release of a real
Art. 1891. La renonciation à
security given for performance of
une sûreté réelle donnée en vue de
the obligation does not give rise to l’exécution de l’obligation ne fait
a presumption of remission of debt. pas présumer la remise de dette.
Art. 1892. Remission of debt
granted to the principal obligor
releases the sureties.
Remission of debt granted to
the sureties does not release the
principal obligor.
Remission of debt granted to
one surety releases the other
sureties only to the extent of the
contribution the other sureties
might have recovered from the
surety to whom the remission was
granted.
If the obligee grants a
remission of debt to a surety in
return for an advantage, that
advantage will be imputed to the
debt, unless the surety and the
obligee agree otherwise.

Art. 1892. La remise de dette
accordée au débiteur principal
libère les cautions.
La remise de dette accordée
aux cautions ne libère pas le
débiteur principal.
La remise de dette accordée à
une caution ne libère les autres
cautions que pour la part que les
autres cautions auraient recouvrée
de la caution à qui la remise de
dette a été consentie.
Lorsque le créancier accorde
une remise de dette à une caution
en échange d’un avantage, cet
avantage doit être imputé sur la
dette, à moins que la caution et le
créancier n’en décident autrement.

SECTION 5. COMPENSATION

SECTION 5. DE LA
COMPENSATION

Art. 1893. Compensation takes
place by operation of law when
two persons owe to each other
sums of money or quantities of
fungible things identical in kind,
and these sums or quantities are
liquidated and presently due.
In such a case, compensation
extinguishes both obligations to the

Art. 1893. Il y a compensation
de plein droit lorsque deux
personnes se doivent mutuellement
une somme d’argent ou une
certaine quantité de choses
fongibles de la même espèce et que
ces sommes ou quantités sont
liquides et exigibles.
Dans un tel cas, la
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extent of the lesser amount.
Delays of grace do not prevent
compensation.

compensation éteint les deux
obligations jusqu’à hauteur de la
valeur moindre.
Un délai de grâce ne fait pas
obstacle à la compensation.

Art. 1894. Compensation takes
place regardless of the sources of
the obligations.
Compensation does not take
place, however, if one of the
obligations is to return a thing of
which the owner has been unjustly
dispossessed, or is to return a thing
given in deposit or loan for use, or
if the object of one of the
obligations is exempt from seizure.

Art. 1894. La compensation a
lieu quelle que soit la source des
obligations.
Cependant, la compensation
ne peut avoir lieu, si l’une des
obligations consiste à rendre une
chose dont le propriétaire a été
injustement dépossédé, ou bien à
rendre une chose donnée en dépôt
ou prêt à usage, ou encore si
l’objet de l’une des obligations est
insaisissable.

Art. 1895. Compensation takes
place even though the obligations
are not to be performed at the same
place, but allowance must be made
in that case for the expenses of
remittance.

Art. 1895. Il y a compensation
même lorsque les obligations ne
sont pas exécutables au même
endroit, mais il faut dans ce cas
tenir compte des frais de
versement.

Art. 1896. If an obligor owes
more than one obligation subject to
compensation, the rules of
imputation of payment must be
applied.

Art. 1896. Si le débiteur est
tenu à plus d’une obligation sujette
à compensation, les règles
relatives à l’imputation de
paiement doivent être appliquées.

Art. 1897. Compensation
between obligee and principal
obligor extinguishes the obligation
of a surety.
Compensation between obligee
and surety does not extinguish the
obligation of the principal obligor.

Art. 1897. La compensation
entre le créancier et le débiteur
principal éteint l’obligation de la
caution.
La compensation entre le
créancier et la caution n’éteint pas
l’obligation du débiteur principal.

Art. 1898. Compensation
between the obligee and one
solidary obligor extinguishes the
obligation of the other solidary
obligors only for the portion of that

Art. 1898. La compensation
entre le créancier et l’un des
débiteurs solidaires n’éteint
l’obligation des codébiteurs
solidaires que pour la part de ce
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obligor.
Compensation between one
solidary obligee and the obligor
extinguishes the obligation only for
the portion of that obligee.
The compensation provided in
this Article does not operate in
favor of a liability insurer.

débiteur.
La compensation entre l’un des
créanciers solidaires et le débiteur
n’éteint l’obligation que pour la
part due à ce créancier.
La compensation prévue à cet
article n’opère pas en faveur d’un
assureur en responsabilité civile.

Art. 1899. Compensation can
neither take place nor may it be
renounced to the prejudice of
rights previously acquired by third
parties.

Art. 1899. La compensation ne
peut avoir lieu et l’on ne peut y
renoncer au préjudice des droits
antérieurement acquis par des
tiers.

Art. 1900. An obligor who has
consented to an assignment of the
credit by the obligee to a third
party may not claim against the
latter any compensation that
otherwise he could have claimed
against the former.
An obligor who has been given
notice of an assignment to which
he did not consent may not claim
compensation against the assignee
for an obligation of the assignor
arising after that notice.

Art. 1900. Le débiteur qui a
consenti à la cession du crédit par
le créancier à un tiers ne peut se
prévaloir à l’encontre de ce
dernier d’une compensation à
laquelle il aurait autrement pu
prétendre à l’égard du premier.
Le débiteur qui a reçu
notification d’une cession à
laquelle il n’a pas consenti ne peut
se prévaloir de la compensation à
l’encontre du cessionnaire pour
une obligation du cédant née après
cette notification.

Art. 1901. Compensation of
obligations may take place also by
agreement of the parties even
though the requirements for
compensation by operation of law
are not met.

Art. 1901. La compensation
des obligations peut avoir
également lieu par accord entre les
parties même si les conditions de
la compensation de plein droit ne
sont pas remplies.

Art. 1902. Although the
obligation claimed in
compensation is unliquidated, the
court can declare compensation as
to that part of the obligation that is
susceptible of prompt and easy
liquidation

Art. 1902. Même lorsque
l’obligation dont il est demandé
compensation n’est pas liquide, le
juge peut déclarer la compensation
pour la part de l’obligation qui est
susceptible de liquidation simple et
rapide.
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SECTION 6. CONFUSION

SECTION 6. DE LA CONFUSION

Art. 1903. When the qualities
of obligee and obligor are united in
the same person, the obligation is
extinguished by confusion.

Art. 1903. Lorsque les qualités
de débiteur et de créancier sont
réunies en la même personne,
l’obligation est éteinte par
confusion.

Art. 1904. Confusion of the
qualities of obligee and obligor in
the person of the principal obligor
extinguishes the obligation of the
surety.
Confusion of the qualities of
obligee and obligor in the person
of the surety does not extinguish
the obligation of the principal
obligor.

Art. 1904. La confusion des
qualités de créancier et de débiteur
en la personne du débiteur
principal éteint l’obligation de la
caution.
La confusion des qualités de
créancier et de débiteur en la
personne de la caution n’éteint pas
l’obligation du débiteur principal.

Art. 1905. If a solidary obligor
becomes an obligee, confusion
extinguishes the obligation only for
the portion of that obligor.
If a solidary obligee becomes
an obligor, confusion extinguishes
the obligation only for the portion
of that obligee.

Art. 1905. Lorsque le débiteur
solidaire devient créancier, la
confusion n’éteint l’obligation
qu’à hauteur de la part de ce
débiteur.
Si le créancier devient
débiteur, la confusion n’éteint
l’obligation qu’à hauteur de la
part de ce créancier.

TITLE IV. CONVENTIONAL
OBLIGATIONS OR
CONTRACTS
[Acts 1984, No. 331, §1, eff. Jan.
1, 1985]

TITRE IV. DES OBLIGATIONS
CONVENTIONNELLES OU DES
CONTRATS
[Loi de 1984, no 331, §1, en
vigueur le 1er janvier 1985.]

CHAPTER 1. GENERAL
PRINCIPLES

CHAPITRE 1. PRINCIPES
GÉNÉRAUX

Art. 1906. A contract is an
agreement by two or more parties
whereby obligations are created,
modified, or extinguished.

Art. 1906. Le contrat est un
accord entre deux ou plusieurs
parties qui crée, modifie, ou met
fin à des obligations.
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Art. 1907. A contract is
unilateral when the party who
accepts the obligation of the other
does not assume a reciprocal
obligation.

Art. 1907. Le contrat est
unilatéral lorsque la partie qui
accepte l’obligation de l’autre
n’assume pas d’obligation
réciproque.

Art. 1908. A contract is
bilateral, or synallagmatic, when
the parties obligate themselves
reciprocally, so that the obligation
of each party is correlative to the
obligation of the other.

Art. 1908. Le contrat est
bilatéral ou synallagmatique
lorsque les parties s’obligent
réciproquement les unes envers les
autres, de sorte que l’obligation de
chacune des parties soit
corrélative à l’obligation de
l’autre.

Art. 1909. A contract is
onerous when each of the parties
obtains an advantage in exchange
for his obligation.

Art. 1909. Le contrat est à titre
onéreux lorsque chaque partie
obtient un avantage en échange de
son obligation.

Art. 1910. A contract is
gratuitous when one party
obligates himself towards another
for the benefit of the latter, without
obtaining any advantage in return.

Art. 1910. Le contrat est à titre
gratuit lorsque l’une des parties
s’oblige elle-même envers l’autre
pour le bénéfice de cette dernière,
sans obtenir d’avantage en retour.

Art. 1911. A contract is
commutative when the
performance of the obligation of
each party is correlative to the
performance of the other.

Art. 1911. Le contrat est
commutatif lorsque l’exécution de
l’obligation de chaque partie est
corrélative à l’exécution de
l’obligation de l’autre.

Art. 1912. A contract is
aleatory when, because of its
nature or according to the parties'
intent, the performance of either
party's obligation, or the extent of
the performance, depends on an
uncertain event.

Art. 1912. Le contrat est
aléatoire lorsque, de par sa nature
ou selon la volonté des parties,
l’exécution de l’obligation de l’une
des parties ou l’étendue de cette
exécution, dépend d’un événement
incertain.

Art. 1913. A contract is
accessory when it is made to
provide security for the
performance of an obligation.

Art. 1913. Le contrat est
accessoire lorsqu’il est passé en
vue de fournir une sûreté pour
l’exécution d’une obligation. Le
cautionnement, l’hypothèque, le
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Suretyship, mortgage, pledge, and
other types of security agreements
are examples of such a contract.
When the secured obligation
arises from a contract, either
between the same or other parties,
that contract is the principal
contract. [Acts 1989, No. 137, §16,
eff. Sept. 1, 1989]

nantissement et les autres types de
sûretés en sont des exemples.
Lorsque l’obligation assortie
d’une sûreté résulte d’un contrat,
ou entre les mêmes parties, ou
avec d’autres, ce contrat est le
contrat principal. [Modifiée par la
loi de 1989, no 137, §16, en
vigueur le 1er septembre 1989.]

Art. 1914. Nominate contracts
are those given a special
designation such as sale, lease,
loan, or insurance.
Innominate contracts are those
with no special designation.

Art. 1914. Les contrats
nommés sont ceux auxquels une
dénomination spécifique est
donnée, telle que vente, louage,
prêt ou assurance.
Les contrats innomés sont ceux
qui n’ont aucune dénomination
spécifique.

Art. 1915. All contracts,
nominate and innominate, are
subject to the rules of this title.

Art. 1915. Tous les contrats,
nommés et innomés, sont soumis
aux règles du présent titre.

Art. 1916. Nominate contracts
are subject to the special rules of
the respective titles when those
rules modify, complement, or
depart from the rules of this title.

Art. 1916. Les contrats
nommés sont soumis aux règles
particulières des titres relatifs à
chacun d’eux lorsque ces règles
modifient, complètent, ou diffèrent
des règles du présent titre.

Art. 1917. The rules of this
title are applicable also to
obligations that arise from sources
other than contract to the extent
that those rules are compatible
with the nature of those
obligations.

Art. 1917. Les règles du
présent titre sont également
applicables aux obligations
résultant d’une source autre que le
contrat dans la mesure où ces
règles sont compatibles avec la
nature de ces obligations.

CHAPTER 2. CONTRACTUAL
CAPACITY AND EXCEPTIONS

CHAPITRE 2. DE LA CAPACITÉ
À CONTRACTER ET DES
EXCEPTIONS

Art. 1918. All persons have
capacity to contract, except

Art. 1918. Toute personne a la
capacité de contracter, à
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unemancipated minors, interdicts,
and persons deprived of reason at
the time of contracting.

l’exception des mineurs non
émancipés, des interdits 4, et des
personnes privées de raison au
moment de la conclusion du
contrat.

Art. 1919. A contract made by
a person without legal capacity is
relatively null and may be
rescinded only at the request of
that person or his legal
representative.

Art. 1919. Un contrat passé
par une personne dépourvue de
capacité juridique est frappé de
nullité relative et ne peut être
annulé qu’à la requête de cette
personne ou de son représentant
légal.

Art. 1920. Immediately after
discovering the incapacity, a party,
who at the time of contracting was
ignorant of the incapacity of the
other party, may require from that
party, if the incapacity has ceased,
or from the legal representative if it
has not, that the contract be
confirmed or rescinded.

Art. 1920. Dès la découverte
de l’incapacité, une partie qui au
moment de la conclusion du
contrat ignorait l’incapacité de
l’autre, peut exiger de cette partie,
si l’incapacité a cessé, ou de son
représentant légal si tel n’est pas
le cas, que le contrat soit confirmé
ou annulé.

Art. 1921. Upon rescission of a
contract on the ground of
incapacity, each party or his legal
representative shall restore to the
other what he has received
thereunder. When restoration is
impossible or impracticable, the
court may award compensation to
the party to whom restoration
cannot be made.

Art. 1921. Lors de
l’annulation 5 d’un contrat pour
cause d’incapacité, chaque partie
ou son représentant légal doit
restituer à l’autre ce qu’elle a reçu
en exécution de celui-ci. Lorsque
la restitution est impossible ou
irréalisable, le juge peut accorder
une compensation à la partie
envers laquelle la restitution ne
peut avoir lieu.

Art. 1922. A fully emancipated
minor has full contractual capacity.
4

Art. 1922. Le mineur
pleinement émancipé a la pleine
capacité contractuelle.

NdT : Le substantif interdict, traduit par « interdit », désigne les majeurs privés
de la capacité d’exercice et placés sous un régime de protection.
5
NdT : Le mot rescission est traduit par annulation, le français tendant à limiter
l’usage du terme « rescision », synonyme de nullité relative, à l’hypothèse de la
lésion.
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Art. 1923. A contract by an
unemancipated minor may be
rescinded on grounds of incapacity
except when made for the purpose
of providing the minor with
something necessary for his
support or education, or for a
purpose related to his business.

Art. 1923. Le contrat passé par
un mineur non émancipé peut être
annulé pour cause d’incapacité
sauf s’il a été conclu dans le but de
fournir au mineur une chose
nécessaire à son entretien ou à son
éducation, ou dans un but lié à son
activité professionnelle.

Art. 1924. The mere
representation of majority by an
unemancipated minor does not
preclude an action for rescission of
the contract. When the other party
reasonably relies on the minor's
representation of majority, the
contract may not be rescinded.

Art. 1924. La simple
déclaration de majorité par un
mineur non-émancipé n’interdit
pas une action en annulation du
contrat. Lorsque l’autre partie se
fie raisonnablement à la
déclaration de majorité faite par le
mineur, le contrat ne peut être
annulé.

Art. 1925. A noninterdicted
person, who was deprived of
reason at the time of contracting,
may obtain rescission of an
onerous contract upon the ground
of incapacity only upon showing
that the other party knew or should
have known that person's
incapacity.

Art. 1925. Une personne noninterdite, qui était privée de raison
au moment de la conclusion du
contrat, ne peut obtenir
l’annulation d’un contrat à titre
onéreux pour incapacité qu’en
démontrant que l’autre partie
connaissait ou aurait dû connaitre
cette incapacité.

Art. 1926. A contract made by
a noninterdicted person deprived of
reason at the time of contracting
may be attacked after his death, on
the ground of incapacity, only
when the contract is gratuitous, or
it evidences lack of understanding,
or was made within thirty days of
his death, or when application for
interdiction was filed before his
death.

Art. 1926. Un contrat passé
par une personne non-interdite
privée de raison au moment de la
conclusion peut, après son décès,
être attaqué pour cause
d’incapacité, seulement si le
contrat est à titre gratuit, ou s’il
manifeste un manque de
compréhension, ou s’il a été conclu
dans les trente jours précédant le
décès, ou si la demande
d’interdiction avait été déposée
avant le décès.
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CHAPTER 3. CONSENT

CHAPITRE 3. DU
CONSENTEMENT

Art. 1927. A contract is formed
by the consent of the parties
established through offer and
acceptance.
Unless the law prescribes a
certain formality for the intended
contract, offer and acceptance may
be made orally, in writing, or by
action or inaction that under the
circumstances is clearly indicative
of consent.
Unless otherwise specified in
the offer, there need not be
conformity between the manner in
which the offer is made and the
manner in which the acceptance is
made.

Art. 1927. Le contrat est formé
par le consentement des parties
manifesté par l’offre et
l’acceptation.
À moins que la loi ne prévoie
une forme particulière pour le
contrat envisagé, l’offre et
l’acceptation peuvent être
formulées oralement, par écrit, ou
par action ou inaction qui, selon
les circonstances, indique
clairement le consentement.
Sauf indication contraire dans
l’offre, il n’est pas nécessaire que
l’offre et l’acceptation soient
formulées de façon identique.

Art. 1928. An offer that
specifies a period of time for
acceptance is irrevocable during
that time.
When the offeror manifests an
intent to give the offeree a delay
within which to accept, without
specifying a time, the offer is
irrevocable for a reasonable time.
Art. 1929. An irrevocable offer
expires if not accepted within the
time prescribed in the preceding
Article.
Art. 1930. An offer not
irrevocable under Civil Code
Article 1928 may be revoked
before it is accepted.
Art. 1931. A revocable offer
expires if not accepted within a
reasonable time.

Art. 1928. L’offre assortie d’un
délai d’acceptation est irrévocable
durant ledit délai.
Lorsque l’offrant manifeste
l’intention de donner au
destinataire un délai
d’acceptation, sans en préciser la
durée, l’offre est irrévocable
durant un délai raisonnable.
Art. 1929. L’offre irrévocable
devient caduque lorsqu’elle n’est
pas acceptée dans le délai prescrit
à l’article précédent.
Art. 1930. L’offre non
irrévocable aux termes de l’article
1928 du présent Code peut être
révoquée avant son acceptation.
Art. 1931. Une offre révocable
devient caduque lorsqu’elle n’est
pas acceptée dans un délai
raisonnable.
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Art. 1932. An offer expires by
the death or incapacity of the
offeror or the offeree before it has
been accepted.

Art. 1932. Le décès ou
l’incapacité de l’offrant ou du
destinataire de l’offre avant que
celle-ci n’ait été acceptée entraîne
la caducité de l’offre.

Art. 1933. An option is a
contract whereby the parties agree
that the offeror is bound by his
offer for a specified period of time
and that the offeree may accept
within that time.

Art. 1933. L’option est le
contrat par lequel les parties
conviennent que l’offrant est tenu
par son offre pendant le délai
convenu et que le destinataire peut
l’accepter durant ce délai.

Art. 1934. An acceptance of an
irrevocable offer is effective when
received by the offeror.

Art. 1934. L’acceptation d’une
offre irrévocable prend effet
lorsqu’elle est reçue par l’offrant.

Art. 1935. Unless otherwise
specified by the offer or the law, an
acceptance of a revocable offer,
made in a manner and by a
medium suggested by the offer or
in a reasonable manner and by a
reasonable medium, is effective
when transmitted by the offeree.

Art. 1935. Sauf indication
contraire spécifiée dans l’offre ou
par la loi, l’acceptation d’une offre
révocable, formulée d’une manière
et selon un moyen suggérés dans
l’offre ou d’une manière et selon
un moyen raisonnables, prend effet
lorsqu’elle est transmise par le
destinataire.

Art. 1936. A medium or a
manner of acceptance is reasonable
if it is the one used in making the
offer or one customary in similar
transactions at the time and place
the offer is received, unless
circumstances known to the offeree
indicate otherwise.

Art. 1936. Un moyen ou une
manière d’accepter l’offre est
raisonnable si l’offre a été faite de
la même façon ou si les
transactions similaires sont
habituellement effectuées ainsi au
moment et au lieu où l’offre est
reçue, à moins que des
circonstances connues du
destinataire n’indiquent le
contraire.

Art. 1937. A revocation of a
revocable offer is effective when
received by the offeree prior to
acceptance.

Art. 1937. La révocation d’une
offre révocable ne prend effet que
lorsqu’elle est reçue par le
destinataire avant l’acceptation.
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Art. 1938. A written
revocation, rejection, or acceptance
is received when it comes into the
possession of the addressee or of a
person authorized by him to
receive it, or when it is deposited
in a place the addressee has
indicated as the place for this or
similar communications to be
deposited for him.

Art. 1938. La communication
écrite de la révocation, du rejet, ou
de l’acceptation est reçue
lorsqu’elle vient en possession du
destinataire ou d’une personne
autorisée par lui à la recevoir, ou
lorsqu’elle est déposée à l’endroit
indiqué par le destinataire comme
celui où cet écrit ou toute
communication similaire doit lui
être remis.

Art. 1939. When an offeror
invites an offeree to accept by
performance and, according to
usage or the nature or the terms of
the contract, it is contemplated that
the performance will be completed
if commenced, a contract is formed
when the offeree begins the
requested performance.

Art. 1939. Lorsque l’offrant
invite le destinataire de l’offre à
l’accepter par l’exécution et que,
selon l’usage ou la nature ou les
termes du contrat, il est considéré
que l’exécution sera achevée du
moment qu’elle est commencée, le
contrat est formé lorsque le
destinataire commence l’exécution
requise.

Art. 1940. When, according to
usage or the nature of the contract,
or its own terms, an offer made to
a particular offeree can be accepted
only by rendering a completed
performance, the offeror cannot
revoke the offer, once the offeree
has begun to perform, for the
reasonable time necessary to
complete the performance. The
offeree, however, is not bound to
complete the performance he has
begun.
The offeror's duty of
performance is conditional on
completion or tender of the
requested performance.

Art. 1940. Lorsque, selon
l’usage ou la nature du contrat, ou
selon les termes de celui-ci, l’offre
faite à un destinataire déterminé
ne peut être acceptée que par une
exécution complète, l’offrant ne
peut révoquer l’offre durant la
période raisonnable nécessaire à
l’exécution complète une fois que
le destinataire a commencé
l’exécution. Toutefois, le
destinataire de l’offre n’est pas
tenu d’achever l’exécution
commencée.
Le devoir d'exécution de
l'offrant est conditionnel à
l'exécution complète ou à l'offre
réelle d'exécution de la prestation
requise.
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Art. 1941. When
commencement of the performance
either constitutes acceptance or
makes the offer irrevocable, the
offeree must give prompt notice of
that commencement unless the
offeror knows or should know that
the offeree has begun to perform.
An offeree who fails to give the
notice is liable for damages.
Art. 1942. When, because of
special circumstances, the offeree's
silence leads the offeror reasonably
to believe that a contract has been
formed, the offer is deemed
accepted.
Art. 1943. An acceptance not
in accordance with the terms of the
offer is deemed to be a
counteroffer.
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Art. 1941. Lorsque le
commencement de l’exécution ou
bien constitue une acceptation ou
bien rend l’offre irrévocable, le
destinataire doit informer sans
délai de ce commencement à moins
que l’offrant ne sache ou ne doive
savoir que le destinataire a
commencé l’exécution. Le
destinataire qui omet d’informer
est tenu à des dommages et
intérêts.
Art. 1942. Lorsque, en raison
de circonstances particulières, le
silence du destinataire porte
raisonnablement l’offrant à croire
que le contrat a été formé, l’offre
est réputée acceptée.
Art. 1943. L’acceptation non
conforme aux termes de l’offre est
réputée être une contre-offre.

Art. 1944. An offer of a reward
made to the public is binding upon
the offeror even if the one who
performs the requested act does not
know of the offer.

Art. 1944. L’offre de
récompense faite au public lie
l’offrant même si celui qui exécute
l’acte demandé n’a pas
connaissance de l’offre.

Art. 1945. An offer of reward
made to the public may be revoked
before completion of the requested
act, provided the revocation is
made by the same or an equally
effective means as the offer.

Art. 1945. L’offre de
récompense faite au public peut
être révoquée avant l’achèvement
de l’acte demandé, à condition que
la révocation soit faite de manière
identique à l’offre ou par un moyen
tout aussi efficace.

Art. 1946. Unless otherwise
stipulated in the offer made to the
public, or otherwise implied from
the nature of the act, when several
persons have performed the
requested act, the reward belongs
to the first one giving notice of his
completion of performance to the

Art. 1946. À moins que l’offre
faite au public ne stipule
autrement, ou qu’il n’en résulte
autrement de la nature même de
l’acte, lorsque plusieurs personnes
ont exécuté l’acte demandé, la
récompense appartient au premier
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offeror.
Art. 1947. When, in the
absence of a legal requirement, the
parties have contemplated a certain
form, it is presumed that they do
not intend to be bound until the
contract is executed in that form.

CHAPTER 4. VICES OF
CONSENT

[Vol. 5

qui informe l’offrant de son
achèvement de l’exécution.
Art. 1947. Lorsque, en
l’absence d’exigence légale, les
parties ont envisagé une certaine
forme, il est présumé qu’elles n’ont
pas l’intention d’être liées tant que
le contrat n’est pas conclu selon
cette forme.
CHAPTIRE 4. DES VICES DU
CONSENTEMENT

SECTION 1. ERROR
SECTION 1. DE L’ERREUR
Art. 1948. Consent may be
vitiated by error, fraud, or duress.
Art. 1949. Error vitiates
consent only when it concerns a
cause without which the obligation
would not have been incurred and
that cause was known or should
have been known to the other
party.
Art. 1950. Error may concern a
cause when it bears on the nature
of the contract, or the thing that is
the contractual object or a
substantial quality of that thing, or
the person or the qualities of the
other party, or the law, or any other
circumstance that the parties
regarded, or should in good faith
have regarded, as a cause of the
obligation.
Art. 1951. A party may not
avail himself of his error if the
other party is willing to perform
the contract as intended by the

Art. 1948. Le consentement
peut être vicié par l’erreur, le dol
ou la violence.
Art. 1949. L’erreur vicie le
consentement seulement
lorsqu’elle porte sur une cause
sans laquelle l’obligation n’aurait
pas été contractée et que cette
cause était connue ou aurait dû
être connue de l’autre partie.
Art. 1950. Il y a erreur sur la
cause lorsqu’elle porte sur la
nature du contrat, ou sur la chose
objet du contrat ou sur une qualité
substantielle de cette chose, ou la
personne ou les qualités de l’autre
partie, ou le droit, ou toute autre
circonstance prise en compte par
les parties, ou qui aurait dû être
prise en compte de bonne foi,
comme cause de l’obligation.
Art. 1951. Une partie ne peut
se prévaloir de son erreur lorsque
l’autre partie est disposée à
exécuter le contrat tel qu’il a été
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party in error.

prévu par la partie dans l’erreur.

Art. 1952. A party who obtains
rescission on grounds of his own
error is liable for the loss thereby
sustained by the other party unless
the latter knew or should have
known of the error.
The court may refuse
rescission when the effective
protection of the other party's
interest requires that the contract
be upheld. In that case, a
reasonable compensation for the
loss he has sustained may be
granted to the party to whom
rescission is refused.

Art. 1952. La partie qui obtient
l’annulation sur le fondement de sa
propre erreur est de ce fait
responsable de la perte subie par
l’autre partie, sauf lorsque cette
dernière avait connaissance ou
aurait dû avoir connaissance de
cette erreur.
Le juge peut refuser
l’annulation lorsque la protection
effective des intérêts de l’autre
partie requiert le maintien du
contrat. Dans ce cas, une
indemnisation raisonnable pour la
perte subie peut être attribuée à la
partie à laquelle l’annulation est
refusée.

SECTION 2. FRAUD

SECTION 2. DU DOL

Art. 1953. Fraud is a
misrepresentation or a suppression
of the truth made with the intention
either to obtain an unjust
advantage for one party or to cause
a loss or inconvenience to the
other. Fraud may also result from
silence or inaction.

Art. 1953. Le dol est une
fausse déclaration ou une
dissimulation de la vérité faite
dans l’intention ou bien de
procurer un avantage injuste à
l’une des parties ou bien de causer
une perte ou un inconvénient à
l’autre. Le dol peut également
résulter du silence ou de l’inaction.

Art. 1954. Fraud does not
vitiate consent when the party
against whom the fraud was
directed could have ascertained the
truth without difficulty,
inconvenience, or special skill.
This exception does not apply
when a relation of confidence has
reasonably induced a party to rely
on the other's assertions or

Art. 1954. Le dol ne vicie pas
le consentement lorsque la partie à
l’encontre de laquelle le dol était
dirigé aurait pu établir la vérité
sans difficulté, inconvénient, ou
compétence particulière.
Cette exception ne s’applique
pas lorsqu’une relation de
confiance a raisonnablement
conduit une partie à se fier aux
affirmations ou déclarations de
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l’autre.

Art. 1955. Error induced by
fraud need not concern the cause of
the obligation to vitiate consent,
but it must concern a circumstance
that has substantially influenced
that consent.

Art. 1955. L’erreur induite par
un dol ne doit pas nécessairement
porter sur la cause de l’obligation
pour vicier le consentement, mais
doit porter sur une circonstance
qui a considérablement influencé
ce consentement.

Art. 1956. Fraud committed by
a third person vitiates the consent
of a contracting party if the other
party knew or should have known
of the fraud.

Art. 1956. Le dol commis par
un tiers vicie le consentement
d’une partie au contrat lorsque
l’autre partie avait connaissance
ou aurait dû avoir connaissance de
ce dol.

Art. 1957. Fraud need only be
proved by a preponderance of the
evidence and may be established
by circumstantial evidence.

Art. 1957. Le dol peut être
prouvé par la seule prépondérance
de la preuve et peut être établi par
des preuves circonstancielles.

Art. 1958. The party against
whom rescission is granted
because of fraud is liable for
damages and attorney fees.

Art. 1958. La partie à
l’encontre de laquelle l’annulation
est prononcée pour cause de dol
est redevable de dommages et
intérêts et des frais d’avocat.

SECTION 3. DURESS

SECTION 3. DE LA VIOLENCE

Art. 1959. Consent is vitiated
when it has been obtained by
duress of such a nature as to cause
a reasonable fear of unjust and
considerable injury to a party's
person, property, or reputation.
Age, health, disposition, and
other personal circumstances of a
party must be taken into account in
determining reasonableness of the
fear.

Art. 1959. Le consentement est
vicié lorsqu’il a été obtenu par
l’effet d’une violence d’une nature
telle qu’elle ait pu causer la
crainte raisonnable d’un mal
injuste et considérable envers la
personne, les biens ou la
réputation d’une partie.
L’âge, la santé, le
tempérament et toute autre
circonstance personnelle d’une
partie doivent être pris en compte
dans la détermination du caractère
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raisonnable de la crainte.
Art. 1960. Duress vitiates
consent also when the threatened
injury is directed against the
spouse, an ascendant, or
descendant of the contracting
party.
If the threatened injury is
directed against other persons, the
granting of relief is left to the
discretion of the court.
Art. 1961. Consent is vitiated
even when duress has been exerted
by a third person.
Art. 1962. A threat of doing a
lawful act or a threat of exercising
a right does not constitute duress.
A threat of doing an act that is
lawful in appearance only may
constitute duress.

Art. 1960. La violence vicie
également le consentement lorsque
le mal dont il est fait menace est
dirigé à l’encontre du conjoint, de
l’ascendant ou du descendant du
cocontractant.
Si le mal dont il est fait menace
est dirigé à l’encontre d’autres
personnes, l’octroi d’une
réparation est laissé à
l’appréciation du juge.
Art. 1961. Le consentement est
également vicié lorsque la violence
a été exercée par un tiers.
Art. 1962. La menace
d’accomplir un acte licite ou
d’exercer un droit n’est pas
constitutive de violence.
La menace d’accomplir un
acte qui n’est licite qu’en
apparence peut être constitutive de
violence.

Art. 1963. A contract made
with a third person to secure the
means of preventing threatened
injury may not be rescinded for
duress if that person is in good
faith and not in collusion with the
party exerting duress.

Art. 1963. Le contrat conclu
avec un tiers afin d’assurer les
moyens de prévenir le mal dont il
est fait menace ne peut être annulé
pour violence lorsque ce tiers est
de bonne foi et n’est pas de
connivence avec la partie exerçant
la violence.

Art. 1964. When rescission is
granted because of duress exerted
or known by a party to the
contract, the other party may
recover damages and attorney fees.
When rescission is granted
because of duress exerted by a
third person, the parties to the

Art. 1964. Lorsque
l’annulation est accordée pour
cause de violence exercée par
l’une des parties au contrat ou
connue de l’une des parties, l’autre
partie peut recouvrer des
dommages et intérêts ainsi que les
frais d’avocats.
Lorsque l’annulation est
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contract who are innocent of the
duress may recover damages and
attorney fees from the third person.

accordée pour cause de violence
exercée par un tiers, les parties au
contrat qui ne sont pas coupables
de violence peuvent recouvrer de
ce tiers des dommages et intérêts
ainsi que les frais d’avocats.

SECTION 4. LESION

SECTION 4. DE LA LÉSION

Art. 1965. A contract may be
annulled on grounds of lesion only
in those cases provided by law.

Art. 1965. Un contrat peut être
annulé pour cause de lésion dans
les seuls cas prévus par la loi.

CHAPTER 5. CAUSE

CHAPITRE 5. DE LA CAUSE

Art. 1966. An obligation
cannot exist without a lawful
cause.

Art. 1966. Une obligation ne
peut exister sans une cause licite.

Art. 1967. Cause is the reason
why a party obligates himself.
A party may be obligated by a
promise when he knew or should
have known that the promise
would induce the other party to
rely on it to his detriment and the
other party was reasonable in so
relying. Recovery may be limited
to the expenses incurred or the
damages suffered as a result of the
promisee's reliance on the promise.
Reliance on a gratuitous promise
made without required formalities
is not reasonable.

Art. 1968. The cause of an
obligation is unlawful when the
enforcement of the obligation
would produce a result prohibited
by law or against public policy.

Art. 1967. La cause est la
raison pour laquelle une partie
s’oblige.
Une partie peut s’obliger par
une promesse lorsqu’elle savait ou
aurait dû savoir que la promesse
conduirait l’autre partie à se fier à
celle-ci à ses dépens et que cette
autre partie s’y est fiée
raisonnablement. Le recouvrement
peut être limité aux dépenses
engagées ou aux dommages subis
du fait de la confiance que le
bénéficiaire de la promesse avait
placée en celle-ci. La confiance en
une promesse gratuite faite sans
les formalités requises n’est pas
raisonnable.
Art. 1968. La cause de
l’obligation est illicite lorsque la
mise en œuvre de l’obligation
produirait un résultat prohibé par
la loi ou contraire à l’ordre public.
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Art. 1969. An obligation may
be valid even though its cause is
not expressed.

Art. 1969. L’obligation n’est
pas moins valable quoi que la
cause n’en soit pas exprimée.

Art. 1970. When the
expression of a cause in a
contractual obligation is untrue, the
obligation is still effective if a
valid cause can be shown.

Art. 1970. Lorsque la cause
d’une obligation contractuelle est
exprimée de manière erronée,
l’obligation reste effective si une
cause valable peut être démontrée.

CHAPTER 6. OBJECT AND
MATTER OF CONTRACTS

CHAPITRE 6. DE L’OBJET ET
DE LA MATIÈRE DES
CONTRATS

Art. 1971. Parties are free to
contract for any object that is
lawful, possible, and determined or
determinable.

Art. 1971. Les parties sont
libres de contracter sur tout objet
licite, possible et déterminé ou
déterminable.

Art. 1972. A contractual object
is possible or impossible according
to its own nature and not according
to the parties' ability to perform.

Art. 1972. L’objet du contrat
est possible ou impossible en
fonction de sa propre nature et non
en fonction de la capacité des
parties à l’exécuter.

Art. 1973. The object of a
contract must be determined at
least as to its kind.
The quantity of a contractual
object may be undetermined,
provided it is determinable.

Art. 1973. L’objet du contrat
doit être déterminé au moins quant
à son espèce.
La quantité de l’objet du
contrat peut être indéterminée,
pourvu qu’elle soit déterminable.

Art. 1974. If the determination
of the quantity of the object has
been left to the discretion of a third
person, the quantity of an object is
determinable.
If the parties fail to name a
person, or if the person named is
unable or unwilling to make the
determination, the quantity may be
determined by the court.

Art. 1974. Lorsque la
détermination de la quantité de
l’objet a été laissée à la discrétion
d’un tiers, la quantité de l’objet est
déterminable.
Lorsque les parties n’ont pas
nommé de tiers, ou si le tiers
nommé est dans l’incapacité ou ne
veut pas effectuer la détermination,
la quantité peut être déterminée
par le juge.
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Art. 1975. The quantity of a
contractual object may be
determined by the output of one
party or the requirements of the
other.
In such a case, output or
requirements must be measured in
good faith.

Art. 1975. La quantité de
l’objet du contrat peut être
déterminée par la production
d’une partie ou par les exigences
de l’autre.
Dans un tel cas, la production
ou les exigences doivent être
évaluées de bonne foi.

Art. 1976. Future things may
be the object of a contract.
The succession of a living
person may not be the object of a
contract other than an antenuptial
agreement. Such a succession may
not be renounced.

Art. 1976. Les choses futures
peuvent être l’objet d’un contrat.
La succession d’une personne
vivante ne peut faire l’objet d’un
contrat autre qu’une convention
prénuptiale. On ne peut renoncer à
une telle succession.

Art. 1977. The object of a
contract may be that a third person
will incur an obligation or render a
performance.
The party who promised that
obligation or performance is liable
for damages if the third person
does not bind himself or does not
perform.

Art. 1977. L’objet du contrat
peut être la prise d’un engagement
ou l’exécution d’une prestation par
un tiers.
La partie qui promet une telle
obligation ou prestation est tenue à
des dommages et intérêts si le tiers
ne s’engage pas ou n’exécute pas.

CHAPTER 7. THIRD PARTY
BENEFICIARY

CHAPITRE 7. DE LA
STIPULATION POUR AUTRUI

Art. 1978. A contracting party
may stipulate a benefit for a third
person called a third party
beneficiary.
Once the third party has
manifested his intention to avail
himself of the benefit, the parties
may not dissolve the contract by
mutual consent without the
beneficiary's agreement.

Art. 1978. Une partie
contractante peut stipuler un
bénéfice pour un tiers appelé tiers
bénéficiaire.
Une fois que le tiers a
manifesté son intention de se
prévaloir de ce bénéfice, les
parties ne peuvent dissoudre le
contrat par consentement mutuel
sans l’accord du tiers bénéficiaire.

Art. 1979. The stipulation may
be revoked only by the stipulator

Art. 1979. La stipulation ne
peut être révoquée que par le
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and only before the third party has
manifested his intention of availing
himself of the benefit.
If the promisor has an interest
in performing, however, the
stipulation may not be revoked
without his consent.
Art. 1980. In case of
revocation or refusal of the
stipulation, the promisor shall
render performance to the
stipulator.
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stipulant et seulement avant que le
tiers n’ait manifesté son intention
de se prévaloir du bénéfice.
Cependant, lorsque le
promettant a un intérêt dans
l’exécution de la stipulation, celleci ne peut être révoquée sans son
consentement.
Art. 1980. En cas de
révocation ou de refus de la
stipulation, le promettant en doit
l’exécution au profit du stipulant.

Art. 1981. The stipulation
gives the third party beneficiary
the right to demand performance
from the promisor.
Also the stipulator, for the
benefit of the third party, may
demand performance from the
promisor.

Art. 1981. La stipulation donne
au tiers bénéficiaire le droit d’en
demander l’exécution par le
promettant.
De même, au bénéfice du tiers,
le stipulant peut en demander
l’exécution par le promettant.

Art. 1982. The promisor may
raise against the beneficiary such
defenses based on the contract as
he may have raised against the
stipulator.

Art. 1982. Le promettant peut
soulever à l’encontre du
bénéficiaire les moyens de défense
basés sur le contrat qu’il aurait pu
soulever à l’encontre du stipulant.

CHAPTER 8. EFFECTS OF
CONVENTIONAL
OBLIGATION

CHAPITRE 8. DES EFFETS DES
OBLIGATIONS
CONVENTIONNELLES

SECTION 1. GENERAL
EFFECTS OF CONTRACTS

SECTION 1. DES EFFETS
GÉNÉRAUX DES CONTRATS

Art. 1983. Contracts have the
effect of law for the parties and
may be dissolved only through the
consent of the parties or on
grounds provided by law.
Contracts must be performed in
good faith.

Art. 1983. Les contrats
tiennent lieu de loi entre les parties
et ne peuvent être dissous que par
le consentement des parties ou
pour des motifs prévus par la loi.
Les contrats doivent être exécutés
de bonne foi.
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Art. 1984. Rights and
obligations arising from a contract
are heritable and assignable unless
the law, the terms of the contract or
its nature preclude such effects.

Art. 1984. Les droits et
obligations nés d’un contrat sont
transmissibles et cessibles à moins
que la loi, les termes ou la nature
du contrat n’excluent de tels effets.

Art. 1985. Contracts may
produce effects for third parties
only when provided by law.

Art. 1985. Les contrats ne
peuvent produire d’effets à l’égard
des tiers que dans les cas prévus
par la loi.

SECTION 2. SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE

SECTION 2. DE L’EXÉCUTION
EN NATURE

Art. 1986. Upon an obligor's
failure to perform an obligation to
deliver a thing, or not to do an act,
or to execute an instrument, the
court shall grant specific
performance plus damages for
delay if the obligee so demands. If
specific performance is
impracticable, the court may allow
damages to the obligee.
Upon a failure to perform an
obligation that has another object,
such as an obligation to do, the
granting of specific performance is
at the discretion of the court.

Art. 1986. Lorsque le débiteur
manque à l’exécution d’une
obligation de délivrer une chose,
de ne pas faire ou de signer un
acte, le juge doit accorder au
créancier qui en fait la demande
l’exécution en nature ainsi que des
dommages et intérêts moratoires.
Lorsque l’exécution en nature est
irréalisable, le juge peut attribuer
des dommages et intérêts au
créancier.
En cas de manquement à
l’exécution d’une obligation ayant
un autre objet, telle qu’une
obligation de faire, l’octroi de
l’exécution en nature est laissé à
l’appréciation du juge.

Art. 1987. The obligor may be
restrained from doing anything in
violation of an obligation not to do.

Art. 1987. Le débiteur peut se
voir interdire tout agissement qui
violerait une obligation de ne pas
faire.

Art. 1988. A failure to perform
an obligation to execute an
instrument gives the obligee the
right to a judgment that shall stand
for the act.

Art. 1988. Le défaut
d’exécution d’une obligation de
signer un acte donne au créancier
le droit à un jugement qui tiendra
lieu de titre.

2012]

BILINGUAL LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE

SECTION 3. PUTTING IN
DEFAULT

165

SECTION 3. DE LA MISE EN
DEMEURE

Art. 1989. Damages for delay
in the performance of an obligation
are owed from the time the obligor
is put in default.
Other damages are owed from
the time the obligor has failed to
perform.

Art. 1989. Les dommages et
intérêts pour retard dans
l’exécution d’une obligation sont
dus à compter du moment où le
débiteur est mis en demeure.
Les autres dommages et
intérêts sont dus à compter
du moment où le débiteur a
manqué à l’exécution.

Art. 1990. When a term for the
performance of an obligation is
either fixed, or is clearly
determinable by the circumstances,
the obligor is put in default by the
mere arrival of that term. In other
cases, the obligor must be put in
default by the obligee, but not
before performance is due.

Art. 1990. Lorsqu’un terme
pour l’exécution de l’obligation est
ou bien fixé ou bien clairement
déterminable en raison des
circonstances, le débiteur est mis
en demeure par la simple échéance
de ce terme. Dans les autres cas, le
débiteur doit être mis en demeure
par le créancier, mais pas avant
que l’exécution soit exigible.

Art. 1991. An obligee may put
the obligor in default by a written
request of performance, or by an
oral request of performance made
before two witnesses, or by filing
suit for performance, or by a
specific provision of the contract.

Art. 1991. Le créancier peut
mettre le débiteur en demeure par
une demande écrite d’exécution,
par une demande orale d’exécution
faite devant deux témoins, par le
dépôt d’une demande judiciaire
d’exécution ou par une clause
particulière du contrat.

Art. 1992. If an obligee bears
the risk of the thing that is the
object of the performance, the risk
devolves upon the obligor who has
been put in default for failure to
deliver that thing.

Art. 1992. Lorsque le
créancier supporte le risque de la
chose objet de l’exécution, le
risque est transféré au débiteur qui
a été mis en demeure pour défaut
de délivrance de cette chose.

Art. 1993. In case of reciprocal
obligations, the obligor of one may
not be put in default unless the

Art. 1993. En cas
d’obligations réciproques, le
débiteur de l’une ne peut être mis
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en demeure à moins que le
débiteur de l’autre ait exécuté ou
soit prêt à exécuter sa propre
obligation.

SECTION 4. DAMAGES

SECTION 4. DES DOMMAGES
ET INTÉRÊTS

Art. 1994. An obligor is liable
for the damages caused by his
failure to perform a conventional
obligation.
A failure to perform results
from nonperformance, defective
performance, or delay in
performance.

Art. 1994. Le débiteur est
responsable des dommages causés
par son défaut d’exécution d’une
obligation conventionnelle.
Le défaut d’exécution s’entend
de l’inexécution, de la mauvaise
exécution ou du retard dans
l’exécution.

Art. 1995. Damages are
measured by the loss sustained by
the obligee and the profit of which
he has been deprived.

Art. 1995. Les dommages et
intérêts sont calculés à hauteur de
la perte subie par le créancier et
du gain dont il a été privé.

Art. 1996. An obligor in good
faith is liable only for the damages
that were foreseeable at the time
the contract was made.

Art. 1996. Le débiteur de
bonne foi n’est responsable que
des dommages qui étaient
prévisibles au moment où le
contrat a été conclu.

Art. 1997. An obligor in bad
faith is liable for all the damages,
foreseeable or not, that are a direct
consequence of his failure to
perform.

Art. 1997. Le débiteur de
mauvaise foi est responsable de
tous les dommages, prévisibles ou
non, qui sont la conséquence
directe de son défaut d’exécution.

Art. 1998. Damages for
nonpecuniary loss may be
recovered when the contract,
because of its nature, is intended to
gratify a nonpecuniary interest and,
because of the circumstances
surrounding the formation or the
nonperformance of the contract,
the obligor knew, or should have
known, that his failure to perform

Art. 1998. Les dommages et
intérêts pour une perte non
pécuniaire peuvent être recouvrés
lorsque le contrat, de par sa
nature, a été conclu pour satisfaire
un intérêt non pécuniaire et que, à
cause des circonstances qui ont
encadré la formation ou
l’inexécution du contrat, le
débiteur savait, ou aurait dû
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would cause that kind of loss.
Regardless of the nature of the
contract, these damages may be
recovered also when the obligor
intended, through his failure, to
aggrieve the feelings of the
obligee.

savoir, que son défaut d’exécution
causerait ce type de perte.
Quelle que soit la nature du
contrat, ces dommages et intérêts
peuvent aussi être recouvrés
lorsque le débiteur avait
l’intention, par son défaut
d’exécution, de heurter les
sentiments du créancier.

Art. 1999. When damages are
insusceptible of precise
measurement, much discretion
shall be left to the court for the
reasonable assessment of these
damages.

Art. 1999. Lorsque les
dommages et intérêts ne peuvent
faire l’objet d’un calcul précis, un
large pouvoir d’appréciation est
laissé au juge pour l’évaluation
raisonnable de ces dommages et
intérêts.

Art. 2000. When the object of
the performance is a sum of
money, damages for delay in
performance are measured by the
interest on that sum from the time
it is due, at the rate agreed by the
parties or, in the absence of
agreement, at the rate of legal
interest as fixed by R.S. 9:3500.
The obligee may recover these
damages without having to prove
any loss, and whatever loss he may
have suffered he can recover no
more. If the parties, by written
contract, have expressly agreed
that the obligor shall also be liable
for the obligee's attorney fees in a
fixed or determinable amount, the
obligee is entitled to that amount as
well. Acts 1984, No. 331, §1, eff.
Jan. 1, 1985; Acts 1985, No. 137,
§1, eff. July 3, 1985; Acts 1987,

Art. 2000. Lorsque l’objet du
contrat est une somme d’argent,
les dommages et intérêts pour
retard dans l’exécution sont
calculés à hauteur des intérêts
produits par cette somme à
compter de la date à laquelle elle
est due, au taux consenti par les
parties ou, en l’absence d’accord,
au taux d’intérêt légal fixé par
l’article 9:3500 des Revised
Statutes 6.
Le créancier peut recouvrer
ces dommages et intérêts sans
avoir à prouver aucune perte, et
quelle que soit la perte subie il ne
peut recouvrer davantage. Lorsque
les parties, par un contrat écrit,
ont expressément consenti à ce que
le débiteur soit également
redevable des frais d’avocat du
créancier pour un montant fixé ou

6

NdT : Les Revised Statutes (R.S.), littéralement « lois révisées », sont la
compilation des lois de l’état de Louisiane, classées thématiquement dans
l’ordre alphabétique.
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No. 883, §1; Acts 2004, No. 743,
§3, eff. Jan. 1, 2005]
Note: See Acts 1985, no. 137,
§2.

déterminable, le créancier a aussi
droit à ce montant. [Loi de 1985,
no 137, §1, en vigueur le 3 juillet
1985 ; loi de 1987, no 883, §1 ; loi
de 2004, no 743, §3, en vigueur le
1er janvier 2005.]
NB : Voir la loi de 1985, no
137, §2.

Art. 2001. Interest on accrued
interest may be recovered as
damages only when it is added to
the principal by a new agreement
of the parties made after the
interest has accrued.

Art. 2001. L’intérêt sur les
intérêts courus peut être recouvré
au titre de dommages et intérêts
seulement lorsqu’il s’ajoute au
principal par un nouvel accord des
parties, conclu après que l’intérêt
a commencé à courir.

Art. 2002. An obligee must
make reasonable efforts to mitigate
the damage caused by the obligor's
failure to perform. When an
obligee fails to make these efforts,
the obligor may demand that the
damages be accordingly reduced.

Art. 2002. Le créancier doit
faire des efforts raisonnables pour
atténuer le dommage causé par le
défaut d’exécution du débiteur.
Lorsque le créancier manque à
faire ces efforts, le débiteur peut
demander que les dommages et
intérêts soient réduits en
conséquence.

Art. 2003. An obligee may not
recover damages when his own
bad faith has caused the obligor's
failure to perform or when, at the
time of the contract, he has
concealed from the obligor facts
that he knew or should have known
would cause a failure.
If the obligee's negligence
contributes to the obligor's failure
to perform, the damages are
reduced in proportion to that
negligence.

Art. 2003. Le créancier ne peut
recouvrer de dommages et intérêts
lorsque sa propre mauvaise foi a
causé le défaut d’exécution du
débiteur ou lorsque, au moment de
la conclusion du contrat, il a
dissimulé au débiteur des faits dont
il savait ou aurait dû savoir qu’ils
causeraient un défaut d’exécution.
Lorsque la négligence du
créancier contribue au défaut
d’exécution du débiteur, les
dommages et intérêts sont réduits
en proportion de cette négligence.

Art. 2004. Any clause is null
that, in advance, excludes or limits

Art. 2004. Toute clause qui
exclut ou limite par avance la
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the liability of one party for
intentional or gross fault that
causes damage to the other party.
Any clause is null that, in
advance, excludes or limits the
liability of one party for causing
physical injury to the other party.

169

responsabilité de l’une des parties,
en cas de faute intentionnelle ou de
faute lourde causant un dommage
à l’autre partie, est nulle.
Toute clause qui exclut ou
limite par avance la responsabilité
de l’une des parties, pour cause de
dommage corporel à l’autre partie,
est nulle.

SECTION 5. STIPULATED
DAMAGES

SECTION 5. DES DOMMAGES
ET INTÉRÊTS
CONVENTIONNELS

Art. 2005. Parties may
stipulate the damages to be
recovered in case of
nonperformance, defective
performance, or delay in
performance of an obligation.
That stipulation gives rise to a
secondary obligation for the
purpose of enforcing the principal
one.

Art. 2005. Les parties peuvent
stipuler les dommages et intérêts
qui seront recouvrés en cas de
non-exécution, de mauvaise
exécution ou d’exécution tardive
d’une obligation.
Cette clause donne naissance à
une obligation accessoire afin
d’assurer l’exécution de
l’obligation principale.

Art. 2006. Nullity of the
principal obligation renders the
stipulated damages clause null.
Nullity of the stipulated
damages clause does not render the
principal obligation null.

Art. 2006. La nullité de
l’obligation principale entraîne la
nullité de la clause stipulant les
dommages et intérêts.
La nullité de la clause
stipulant les dommages et intérêts
n’entraîne pas la nullité de
l’obligation principale.

Art. 2007. An obligee may
demand either the stipulated
damages or performance of the
principal obligation, but he may
not demand both unless the
damages have been stipulated for
mere delay.

Art. 2007. Le créancier peut
demander ou bien l’application de
la clause stipulant les dommages et
intérêts ou bien l’exécution de
l’obligation principale, mais il ne
peut demander les deux, à moins
que les dommages et intérêts
n’aient été stipulés pour simple
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retard.
Art. 2008. An obligor whose
failure to perform the principal
obligation is justified by a valid
excuse is also relieved of liability
for stipulated damages.

Art. 2008. Le débiteur dont le
défaut d’exécution de l’obligation
principale est justifié par une
excuse valable est également libéré
de sa responsabilité pour les
dommages et intérêts
conventionnels.

Art. 2009. An obligee who
avails himself of a stipulated
damages clause need not prove the
actual damage caused by the
obligor's nonperformance,
defective performance, or delay in
performance.

Art. 2009. Le créancier qui se
prévaut de la clause stipulant les
dommages et intérêts n’a pas à
prouver l’existence du dommage
causé par la non-exécution, la
mauvaise exécution ou l’exécution
tardive par le débiteur.

Art. 2010. An obligee may not
avail himself of a clause stipulating
damages for delay unless the
obligor has been put in default.

Art. 2010. Le créancier ne peut
se prévaloir de la clause stipulant
les dommages et intérêts pour
cause de retard à moins que le
débiteur n’ait été mis en demeure.

Art. 2011. Stipulated damages
for nonperformance may be
reduced in proportion to the benefit
derived by the obligee from any
partial performance rendered by
the obligor.

Art. 2011. Les dommages et
intérêts conventionnels pour nonexécution peuvent être réduits
proportionnellement au bénéfice
tiré par le créancier de toute
exécution partielle par le débiteur.

Art. 2012. Stipulated damages
may not be modified by the court
unless they are so manifestly
unreasonable as to be contrary to
public policy.

Art. 2012. Les dommages et
intérêts conventionnels ne peuvent
être modifiés par le juge à moins
qu’ils soient si manifestement
déraisonnables qu’ils en sont
contraires à l’ordre public.

CHAPTER 9. DISSOLUTION

CHAPITRE 9. DE LA
DISSOLUTION

Art. 2013. When the obligor
fails to perform, the obligee has a
right to the judicial dissolution of

Art. 2013. Lorsque le débiteur
n’exécute pas, le créancier peut
prétendre à la dissolution
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the contract or, according to the
circumstances, to regard the
contract as dissolved. In either
case, the obligee may recover
damages.
In an action involving judicial
dissolution, the obligor who failed
to perform may be granted,
according to the circumstances, an
additional time to perform.

judiciaire du contrat ou, selon les
circonstances, considérer le
contrat dissous. Dans un cas
comme dans l’autre, le créancier
peut recouvrer des dommages et
intérêts.
Lors d’une action en
dissolution judiciaire, le débiteur
qui n’a pas exécuté peut se voir
accorder, selon les circonstances,
un délai supplémentaire
d’exécution.

Art. 2014. A contract may not
be dissolved when the obligor has
rendered a substantial part of the
performance and the part not
rendered does not substantially
impair the interest of the obligee.

Art. 2014. Le contrat ne peut
être dissous lorsque le débiteur en
a exécuté une partie substantielle
et que la partie non exécutée
n’affecte pas substantiellement
l’intérêt du créancier.

Art. 2015. Upon a party's
failure to perform, the other may
serve him a notice to perform
within a certain time, with a
warning that, unless performance
is rendered within that time, the
contract shall be deemed dissolved.
The time allowed for that purpose
must be reasonable according to
the circumstances.
The notice to perform is
subject to the requirements
governing a putting of the obligor
in default and, for the recovery of
damages for delay, shall have the
same effect as a putting of the
obligor in default

Art. 2015. En cas d’inexécution
par l’une des parties, l’autre peut
lui notifier un avis d’exécuter dans
un certain délai, avec un
avertissement précisant que le
contrat sera réputé dissous, à
moins que l’exécution ne soit
rendue dans ce délai. Le délai
accordé à cette fin doit être
raisonnable compte tenu des
circonstances.
L’avis d’exécution est soumis
aux conditions gouvernant la mise
en demeure du débiteur défaillant
et a le même effet s’agissant du
recouvrement de dommages et
intérêts pour retard.

Art. 2016. When a delayed
performance would no longer be of
value to the obligee or when it is
evident that the obligor will not
perform, the obligee may regard
the contract as dissolved without

Art. 2016. Lorsque l’exécution
tardive n’a plus de valeur pour le
créancier ou lorsqu’il est évident
que le débiteur n’exécutera pas, le
créancier peut considérer le
contrat dissous, sans notification
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any notice to the obligor.

au débiteur.

Art. 2017. The parties may
expressly agree that the contract
shall be dissolved for the failure to
perform a particular obligation. In
that case, the contract is deemed
dissolved at the time it provides for
or, in the absence of such a
provision, at the time the obligee
gives notice to the obligor that he
avails himself of the dissolution
clause.

Art. 2017. Les parties peuvent
convenir expressément que le
contrat sera dissous en cas
d’inexécution d’une obligation
particulière. Dans ce cas, le
contrat est réputé dissous au
moment convenu ou, à défaut, au
moment où le créancier fait savoir
au débiteur qu’il invoque la clause
de dissolution.

Art. 2018. Upon dissolution of
a contract, the parties shall be
restored to the situation that
existed before the contract was
made. If restoration in kind is
impossible or impracticable, the
court may award damages.
If partial performance has been
rendered and that performance is
of value to the party seeking to
dissolve the contract, the
dissolution does not preclude
recovery for that performance,
whether in contract or quasicontract.
Art. 2019. In contracts
providing for continuous or
periodic performance, the effect of
the dissolution shall not be
extended to any performance
already rendered.
Art. 2020. When a contract has
been made by more than two
parties, one party's failure to
perform may not cause dissolution
of the contract for the other parties,
unless the performance that failed
was essential to the contract.

Art. 2018. Lors de la
dissolution du contrat, les parties
sont remises dans la situation qui
existait avant sa conclusion.
Lorsque la restitution en nature est
impossible ou irréalisable, le juge
peut octroyer des dommages et
intérêts.
En cas d’exécution partielle et
si celle-ci a de la valeur pour la
partie qui cherche à dissoudre le
contrat, la dissolution n’interdit
pas un recours contractuel ou
quasi-contractuel relatif à cette
exécution.
Art. 2019. Dans les contrats à
exécution continue ou périodique,
l’effet de la dissolution ne s’étend
pas à ce qui a déjà été exécuté.
Art. 2020. Lorsqu’un contrat a
été conclu entre plus de deux
parties, le défaut d’exécution de
l’une ne peut causer la dissolution
du contrat à l’égard des autres
parties, à moins que l’exécution
qui n’a pas eu lieu soit essentielle
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Art. 2021. Dissolution of a
contract does not impair the rights
acquired through an onerous
contract by a third party in good
faith.
If the contract involves
immovable property, the principles
of recordation apply to a third
person acquiring an interest in the
property whether by onerous or
gratuitous title. [Acts 2005, No.
169, §2, eff. Jan. 1, 2006; Acts
2005, 1st Ex. Sess., No. 13, §1, eff.
Nov. 29, 2005]
Art. 2022. Either party to a
commutative contract may refuse
to perform his obligation if the
other has failed to perform or does
not offer to perform his own at the
same time, if the performances are
due simultaneously.
Art. 2023. If the situation of a
party, financial or otherwise, has
become such as to clearly endanger
his ability to perform an obligation,
the other party may demand in
writing that adequate security be
given and, upon failure to give that
security, that party may withhold
or discontinue his own
performance.
Art. 2024. A contract of
unspecified duration may be
terminated at the will of either
party by giving notice, reasonable
in time and form, to the other
party.
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au contrat.
Art. 2021. La dissolution du
contrat n’affecte pas les droits
acquis par un tiers de bonne foi en
vertu d’un contrat à titre onéreux.
Lorsque le contrat est relatif à
un bien immobilier, les principes
de la publicité foncière
s’appliquent au tiers acquéreur
d’un droit sur ce bien, que ce soit à
titre onéreux ou gratuit. [Loi de
2005, n° 169, §2, en vigueur le 1er
janvier 2006 ; loi de 2005, 1re
session extraordinaire, n° 13, §1,
en vigueur le 29 novembre 2005.]
Art. 2022. Chaque partie à un
contrat commutatif peut refuser
d’exécuter son obligation si l’autre
n’a pas exécuté la sienne ou
n’offre pas de l’exécuter au même
moment, lorsque les prestations
sont dues simultanément.
Art. 2023. Lorsque la situation
d’une partie, notamment
financière, est devenue telle qu’elle
compromet clairement sa capacité
à exécuter une obligation, l’autre
partie peut demander par écrit
qu’une sûreté adéquate soit
apportée et, à défaut, cette partie
peut suspendre ou interrompre son
exécution.
Art. 2024. Le contrat à durée
indéterminée peut être rompu
unilatéralement par l’une des
parties, sur préavis donné à
l’autre, dès lors que celui-ci est
raisonnable tant par sa forme que
par sa durée.

174

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

CHAPTER 10. SIMULATION

[Vol. 5

CHAPITRE 10. DE LA
SIMULATION

Art. 2025. A contract is a
simulation when, by mutual
agreement, it does not express the
true intent of the parties.
If the true intent of the parties
is expressed in a separate writing,
that writing is a counterletter.

Art. 2025. Le contrat est une
simulation lorsque, par accord
mutuel, il n’exprime pas l’intention
véritable des parties.
Lorsque l’intention véritable
des parties est exprimée dans un
écrit séparé, celui-ci est une
contre-lettre.

Art. 2026. A simulation is
absolute when the parties intend
that their contract shall produce no
effects between them. That
simulation, therefore, can have no
effects between the parties.

Art. 2026. La simulation est
absolue lorsque l’intention des
parties est que leur contrat ne
produise aucun effet entre elles.
Cette simulation ne peut dès lors
produire aucun effet entre les
parties.

Art. 2027. A simulation is
relative when the parties intend
that their contract shall produce
effects between them though
different from those recited in their
contract. A relative simulation
produces between the parties the
effects they intended if all
requirements for those effects have
been met.

Art. 2027. La simulation est
relative lorsque l’intention des
parties est que leur contrat
produise entre elles des effets
différents de ceux énumérés au
contrat. La simulation relative
produit à l’égard des parties les
effets qu’elles ont entendu donner
au contrat dès lors que toutes les
conditions nécessaires sont
réunies.

Art. 2028. A. Any simulation,
either absolute or relative, may
have effects as to third persons.
B. Counterletters can have no
effects against third persons in
good faith. Nevertheless, if the
counterletter involves immovable
property, the principles of
recordation apply with respect to
third persons. [Acts 2012, No. 277,
§1, eff. Aug. 1, 2012]

Art. 2028. A. Toute simulation,
absolue ou relative, peut avoir des
effets à l’égard des tiers.
B. Les contre-lettres ne
peuvent avoir aucun effet à
l’encontre des tiers de bonne foi.
Toutefois, lorsque la contre-lettre
est relative à un bien immobilier,
les principes de la publicité
foncière s’appliquent à l’égard des
tiers. [Loi de 2012, n° 277, §1, en
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vigueur le 1er août 2012.]

CHAPTER 11. NULLITY
Art. 2029. A contract is null
when the requirements for its
formation have not been met.
Art. 2030. A contract is
absolutely null when it violates a
rule of public order, as when the
object of a contract is illicit or
immoral. A contract that is
absolutely null may not be
confirmed.
Absolute nullity may be
invoked by any person or may be
declared by the court on its own
initiative.

CHAPITRE 11. DE LA NULLITÉ
Art. 2029. Le contrat est nul
lorsque les conditions nécessaires
à sa formation ne sont pas réunies.
Art. 2030. Le contrat est frappé
de nullité absolue lorsqu’il viole
une règle d’ordre public ; il en est
ainsi lorsque l’objet du contrat est
illicite ou immoral. Le contrat
frappé de nullité absolue n’est pas
susceptible de confirmation.
La nullité absolue peut être
invoquée par toute personne ou
peut être soulevée d’office par le
juge.

Art. 2031. A contract is
relatively null when it violates a
rule intended for the protection of
private parties, as when a party
lacked capacity or did not give free
consent at the time the contract
was made. A contract that is only
relatively null may be confirmed.
Relative nullity may be
invoked only by those persons for
whose interest the ground for
nullity was established, and may
not be declared by the court on its
own initiative.

Art. 2031. Le contrat est frappé
de nullité relative lorsqu’il viole
une règle protectrice des intérêts
particuliers des parties ; il en est
ainsi lorsqu’une partie était privée
de capacité ou n’a pas donné de
consentement libre au moment de
la conclusion du contrat. Le
contrat frappé de nullité relative
est susceptible de confirmation.
La nullité relative ne peut être
invoquée que par les personnes en
faveur desquelles la cause de
nullité est établie et ne peut être
soulevée d’office par le juge.

Art. 2032. Action for
annulment of an absolutely null
contract does not prescribe.
Action of annulment of a
relatively null contract must be
brought within five years from the
time the ground for nullity either
ceased, as in the case of incapacity

Art. 2032. L’action en nullité
visant un contrat frappé de nullité
absolue est imprescriptible.
L’action en nullité visant un
contrat frappé de nullité relative
doit être exercée dans un délai de
cinq ans à compter du moment où
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or duress, or was discovered, as in
the case of error or fraud.
Nullity may be raised at any
time as a defense against an action
on the contract, even after the
action for annulment has
prescribed.

la cause de nullité ou bien a cessé,
comme dans le cas de l’incapacité
ou de la violence, ou bien a été
découverte, comme dans le cas de
l’erreur ou du dol.
La nullité peut être soulevée à
tout moment comme moyen de
défense lors d’une action ayant
trait au contrat, même lorsque
l’action en nullité est prescrite.

Art. 2033. An absolutely null
contract, or a relatively null
contract that has been declared null
by the court, is deemed never to
have existed. The parties must be
restored to the situation that
existed before the contract was
made. If it is impossible or
impracticable to make restoration
in kind, it may be made through an
award of damages.
Nevertheless, a performance
rendered under a contract that is
absolutely null because its object
or its cause is illicit or immoral
may not be recovered by a party
who knew or should have known
of the defect that makes the
contract null. The performance
may be recovered, however, when
that party invokes the nullity to
withdraw from the contract before
its purpose is achieved and also in
exceptional situations when, in the
discretion of the court, that
recovery would further the interest
of justice.
Absolute nullity may be raised
as a defense even by a party who,
at the time the contract was made,
knew or should have known of the

Art. 2033. Le contrat frappé de
nullité absolue, ou le contrat
frappé de nullité relative déclaré
nul par le juge, est réputé n’avoir
jamais existé. Les parties doivent
être remises en l’état dans lequel
elles se trouvaient avant la
conclusion du contrat. Si une telle
remise en l’état est impossible ou
irréalisable en nature, elle peut se
faire par le versement de
dommages et intérêts.
Toutefois, l’exécution faite au
titre d’un contrat frappé de nullité
absolue pour illicéité ou
immoralité de l’objet ou de la
cause ne peut donner lieu à
restitution à la partie qui
connaissait ou aurait dû connaître
la cause de nullité du contrat.
Cependant, l’exécution peut
donner lieu à restitution lorsque
cette partie invoque la nullité pour
se retirer du contrat avant qu’il ait
atteint son but, et aussi en cas de
circonstances exceptionnelles
lorsque le juge estime que cette
restitution sert l’intérêt de la
justice.
La nullité absolue peut être
soulevée comme moyen de défense
même par la partie qui, au moment
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defect that makes the contract null.

de la conclusion du contrat,
connaissait ou aurait dû connaître
la cause de nullité du contrat.

Art. 2034. Nullity of a
provision does not render the
whole contract null unless, from
the nature of the provision or the
intention of the parties, it can be
presumed that the contract would
not have been made without the
null provision.

Art. 2034. La nullité d’une
clause ne rend pas le contrat nul
dans son intégralité à moins qu’il
puisse être présumé, de par la
nature de la clause ou l’intention
des parties, que le contrat n’aurait
pas été conclu en l’absence de
celle-ci.

Art. 2035. Nullity of a contract
does not impair the rights acquired
through an onerous contract by a
third party in good faith.
If the contract involves
immovable property, the principles
of recordation apply to a third
person acquiring an interest in the
property whether by onerous or
gratuitous title. [Acts 2005, No.
169, §2, eff. July 1, 2006; Acts
2005, 1st Ex. Sess., No. 13, §1, eff.
Nov. 29, 2005]

Art. 2035. La nullité du contrat
n’affecte pas les droits acquis par
un tiers de bonne foi en vertu d’un
contrat à titre onéreux.
Lorsque le contrat est relatif à
un bien immobilier, les principes
de la publicité foncière
s’appliquent au tiers acquéreur
d’un droit sur ce bien, que ce soit à
titre onéreux ou gratuit. [Loi de
2005, no 169, §2, en vigueur le 1er
janvier 2006 ; loi de 2005, 1re
session extraordinaire, no 13, §1,
en vigueur le 29 novembre 2005.]

CHAPTER 12. REVOCATORY
ACTION AND OBLIQUE
ACTION

CHAPITRE 12. DE L’ACTION
PAULIENNE ET DE L’ACTION
OBLIQUE

SECTION 1. REVOCATORY
ACTION

SECTION 1. DE L’ACTION
PAULIENNE

Art. 2036. An obligee has a
right to annul an act of the obligor,
or the result of a failure to act of
the obligor, made or effected after
the right of the obligee arose, that
causes or increases the obligor's
insolvency. [Acts 2003, No. 552,

Art. 2036. Le créancier a le
droit d’annuler un acte du
débiteur, ou le résultat d’un
manquement du débiteur, commis
ou réalisé après l’apparition du
droit du créancier, qui cause ou
aggrave l’insolvabilité du débiteur.
[Loi de 2003, no 552, §1; loi de
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§1; Acts 2004, No. 447, §1]
Art. 2037. An obligor is
insolvent when the total of his
liabilities exceeds the total of his
fairly appraised assets. [Acts 2003,
No. 552, §1; Acts 2004, No. 447,
§1]
Art. 2038. An obligee may
annul an onerous contract made by
the obligor with a person who
knew or should have known that
the contract would cause or
increase the obligor's insolvency.
In that case, the person is entitled
to recover what he gave in return
only to the extent that it has inured
to the benefit of the obligor's
creditors.
An obligee may annul an
onerous contract made by the
obligor with a person who did not
know that the contract would cause
or increase the obligor's
insolvency, but in that case that
person is entitled to recover as
much as he gave to the obligor.
That lack of knowledge is
presumed when that person has
given at least four-fifths of the
value of the thing obtained in
return from the obligor.
Art. 2039. An obligee may
attack a gratuitous contract made
by the obligor whether or not the
other party knew that the contract
would cause or increase the
obligor's insolvency.

[Vol. 5

2004, no 447, §1.]
Art. 2037. Le débiteur est
insolvable lorsque le total de ses
dettes est supérieur au total de ses
actifs estimés à leur juste valeur.
[Loi de 2003, no 552, §1; loi de
2004, no 447, §1.]
Art. 2038. Le créancier peut
annuler un contrat à titre onéreux
conclu par le débiteur avec une
personne qui savait ou aurait dû
savoir que le contrat causerait ou
aggraverait l’insolvabilité du
débiteur. Dans ce cas, cette
personne a le droit de recouvrer ce
qu’elle a donné en retour
uniquement à hauteur de ce qui
aura tourné au profit des
créanciers du débiteur.
Le créancier peut annuler un
contrat à titre onéreux conclu par
le débiteur avec une personne qui
ne savait pas que le contrat
causerait ou aggraverait
l’insolvabilité du débiteur, mais
dans ce cas cette personne a le
droit de recouvrer autant que ce
qu’elle a donné au débiteur. Ce
défaut de connaissance est
présumé dès lors que cette
personne a donné au moins les
quatre cinquièmes de la valeur de
la chose obtenue en retour de la
part du débiteur.
Art. 2039. Le créancier peut
attaquer un contrat à titre gratuit
conclu par le débiteur, que l’autre
partie sache ou non que ce contrat
pourrait causer ou aggraver
l’insolvabilité du débiteur.
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Art. 2040. An obligee may not
annul a contract made by the
obligor in the regular course of his
business.

Art. 2040. Le créancier ne peut
pas annuler un contrat conclu par
le débiteur dans le cadre habituel
de son activité professionnelle.

Art. 2041. The action of the
obligee must be brought within one
year from the time he learned or
should have learned of the act, or
the result of the failure to act, of
the obligor that the obligee seeks to
annul, but never after three years
from the date of that act or result.

Art. 2041. L’action du
créancier cherchant à annuler le
contrat doit être intentée dans un
délai d’un an à compter du
moment où il a eu connaissance ou
aurait dû avoir connaissance de
l’acte ou du résultat du
manquement du débiteur, sans que
cela ne puisse excéder trois ans à
compter de la date de cet acte ou
de ce résultat.

Art. 2042. In an action to annul
either his obligor's act, or the result
of his obligor's failure to act, the
obligee must join the obligor and
the third persons involved in that
act or failure to act.
A third person joined in the
action may plead discussion of the
obligor's assets.

Art. 2042. Lors d’une action en
annulation de l’acte de son
débiteur ou du résultat du
manquement de son débiteur, le
créancier doit joindre à l’action le
débiteur et les tiers impliqués dans
cet acte ou ce manquement.
Le tiers intervenant à cette
action peut demander le bénéfice
de discussion des actifs du
débiteur.

Art. 2043. If an obligee
establishes his right to annul his
obligor's act, or the result of his
obligor's failure to act, that act or
result shall be annulled only to the
extent that it affects the obligee's
right.

Art. 2043. Lorsque le
créancier fait valoir son droit
d’annuler l’acte du débiteur ou le
résultat du manquement du
débiteur, cet acte ou ce résultat
sera annulé seulement dans la
mesure où cela affecte le droit du
créancier.

SECTION 2. OBLIQUE ACTION

SECTION 2. DE L’ACTION
OBLIQUE

Art. 2044. If an obligor causes
or increases his insolvency by
failing to exercise a right, the

Art. 2044. Lorsque le débiteur
cause ou aggrave son insolvabilité
en n’exerçant pas un droit, le
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obligee may exercise it himself,
unless the right is strictly personal
to the obligor.
For that purpose, the obligee
must join in the suit his obligor and
the third person against whom that
right is asserted.

créancier peut l’exercer lui-même,
à moins que ce droit ne soit
strictement personnel au débiteur.
À cet effet, le créancier doit
joindre à l’action son débiteur et le
tiers à l’encontre duquel il fait
valoir ce droit.

CHAPTER 13.
INTERPRETATION OF
CONTRACTS

CHAPITRE 13. DE
L’INTERPRÉTATION DES
CONTRATS

Art. 2045. Interpretation of a
contract is the determination of the
common intent of the parties.

Art. 2045. L’interprétation du
contrat est la détermination de
l’intention commune des parties.

Art. 2046. When the words of
a contract are clear and explicit and
lead to no absurd consequences, no
further interpretation may be made
in search of the parties' intent.

Art. 2046. Lorsque les termes
du contrat sont clairs et explicites
et ne conduisent pas à des
conséquences absurdes, aucune
autre interprétation ne peut être
faite afin de rechercher l’intention
des parties.

Art. 2047. The words of a
contract must be given their
generally prevailing meaning.
Words of art and technical
terms must be given their technical
meaning when the contract
involves a technical matter.

Art. 2047. Les termes du
contrat doivent être entendus dans
leur signification la plus usitée.
Les termes de l’art et les
expressions techniques doivent être
entendus dans leur sens technique
lorsque le contrat comprend une
matière technique.

Art. 2048. Words susceptible
of different meanings must be
interpreted as having the meaning
that best conforms to the object of
the contract.

Art. 2048. Les termes
susceptibles de significations
différentes doivent être interprétés
dans le sens le plus conforme à
l’objet du contrat.

Art. 2049. A provision
susceptible of different meanings
must be interpreted with a meaning
that renders it effective and not

Art. 2049. Une stipulation
susceptible de significations
différentes doit être interprétée
dans le sens qui lui donne quelque
effet et non dans un sens qui l’en
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with one that renders it ineffective.

prive.

Art. 2050. Each provision in a
contract must be interpreted in
light of the other provisions so that
each is given the meaning
suggested by the contract as a
whole.

Art. 2050. Chaque stipulation
du contrat doit être interprétée à la
lumière des autres stipulations de
façon à donner à chacune le sens
suggéré par le contrat dans son
ensemble.

Art. 2051. Although a contract
is worded in general terms, it must
be interpreted to cover only those
things it appears the parties
intended to include.

Art. 2051. Même si le contrat
est rédigé en des termes généraux,
il doit être interprété de façon à
couvrir seulement ce qu’il paraît
que les parties entendaient inclure.

Art. 2052. When the parties
intend a contract of general scope
but, to eliminate doubt, include a
provision that describes a specific
situation, interpretation must not
restrict the scope of the contract to
that situation alone.

Art. 2052. Lorsque les parties
entendent donner au contrat une
portée générale mais, pour
éliminer le doute, incluent une
stipulation décrivant une situation
particulière, l’interprétation ne
saurait restreindre la portée du
contrat à cette seule situation.

Art. 2053. A doubtful
provision must be interpreted in
light of the nature of the contract,
equity, usages, the conduct of the
parties before and after the
formation of the contract, and of
other contracts of a like nature
between the same parties.

Art. 2053. Une stipulation
douteuse doit être interprétée à la
lumière de la nature du contrat, de
l’équité, des usages, de la conduite
des parties avant et après la
conclusion du contrat, et des
autres contrats de même nature
entre les mêmes parties.

Art. 2054. When the parties
made no provision for a particular
situation, it must be assumed that
they intended to bind themselves
not only to the express provisions
of the contract, but also to
whatever the law, equity, or usage
regards as implied in a contract of
that kind or necessary for the
contract to achieve its purpose.

Art. 2054. Lorsque les parties
n’ont prévu aucune stipulation
pour une situation particulière, il
doit être présumé qu’elles
entendaient s’obliger non
seulement aux stipulations
expresses du contrat, mais aussi à
tout ce que la loi, l’équité, ou les
usages considèrent comme
implicite dans un contrat de ce
type ou nécessaire pour que le
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contrat atteigne son objectif.
Art. 2055. Equity, as intended
in the preceding articles, is based
on the principles that no one is
allowed to take unfair advantage of
another and that no one is allowed
to enrich himself unjustly at the
expense of another.
Usage, as intended in the
preceding articles, is a practice
regularly observed in affairs of a
nature identical or similar to the
object of a contract subject to
interpretation.

Art. 2056. In case of doubt that
cannot be otherwise resolved, a
provision in a contract must be
interpreted against the party who
furnished its text.
A contract executed in a
standard form of one party must be
interpreted, in case of doubt, in
favor of the other party.
Art. 2057. In case of doubt that
cannot be otherwise resolved, a
contract must be interpreted
against the obligee and in favor of
the obligor of a particular
obligation.
Yet, if the doubt arises from
lack of a necessary explanation
that one party should have given,
or from negligence or fault of one
party, the contract must be
interpreted in a manner favorable
to the other party whether obligee
or obligor.

Art. 2055. L’équité, telle
qu’elle est entendue dans les
précédents articles, est fondée sur
les principes selon lesquels nul n’a
le droit d’obtenir un avantage
injuste au détriment d’autrui et nul
n’a le droit de s’enrichir
injustement aux dépens d’autrui.
L’usage, tel qu’il est entendu
dans les précédents articles,
consiste en la pratique
régulièrement observée dans les
affaires de nature identique ou
similaire à l’objet du contrat à
interpréter.
Art. 2056. Lorsque le doute ne
peut être résolu autrement, une
stipulation contractuelle doit être
interprétée contre la partie qui a
fourni son texte.
En cas de doute, un contrat
rédigé selon un formulaire type de
l’une des parties doit être
interprété en faveur de l’autre
partie.
Art. 2057. Lorsque le doute ne
peut être résolu autrement, le
contrat doit être interprété contre
le créancier et en faveur du
débiteur d’une obligation
particulière.
Cependant, si le doute naît de
l’absence d’une explication
nécessaire que l’une des parties
aurait dû donner, ou de la
négligence ou de la faute de l’une
des parties, le contrat doit être
interprété de manière favorable à
l’autre partie, qu’il s’agisse du
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créancier ou du débiteur.
Arts. 2058-2291. [Repealed.
Acts 1984, No. 331, §1, eff. Jan. 1,
1985]

TITLE V. OBLIGATIONS
ARISING WITHOUT
AGREEMENT
CHAPTER 1. MANAGEMENT
OF AFFAIRS (NEGOTIORUM
GESTIO)
[Acts 1995, No. 1041, §1, eff. Jan.
1, 1996]
Art. 2292. There is a
management of affairs when a
person, the manager, acts without
authority to protect the interests of
another, the owner, in the
reasonable belief that the owner
would approve of the action if
made aware of the circumstances.
Art. 2293. A management of
affairs is subject to the rules of
mandate to the extent those rules
are compatible with management
of affairs.
Art. 2294. The manager is
bound, when the circumstances so
warrant, to give notice to the
owner that he has undertaken the
management and to wait for the
directions of the owner, unless
there is immediate danger.
Art. 2295. The manager must
exercise the care of a prudent
administrator and is answerable for
any loss that results from his

Art. 2058 à 2291. [Abrogés
par la loi de 1984, no 331, §1, en
vigueur le 1er janvier 1985.]

TITRE V. DES ENGAGEMENTS
QUI SE FORMENT SANS
CONVENTION
CHAPITRE 1. DE LA GESTION
D’AFFAIRES
[Loi de 1995, n˚ 1041, §1, en
vigueur le 1er janvier 1996.]
Art. 2292. Il y a gestion
d’affaires lorsqu’une personne, le
gérant, agit en l’absence de
pouvoir pour protéger les intérêts
d’une autre, le propriétaire, en
croyant raisonnablement que
celui-ci approuverait cette action
s’il connaissait les circonstances.
Art. 2293. La gestion
d’affaires est soumise aux règles
du mandat dans la mesure où
celles-ci sont compatibles avec la
gestion d’affaires.
Art. 2294. Le gérant est tenu,
lorsque les circonstances le
justifient, d’informer le
propriétaire qu’il a entrepris la
gestion et d’attendre les
instructions de celui-ci, à moins
d’un danger imminent.
Art. 2295. Le gérant doit
apporter tous les soins d’un
administrateur prudent et est
responsable de toute perte
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failure to do so. The court,
considering the circumstances,
may reduce the amount due the
owner on account of the manager's
failure to act as a prudent
administrator.

résultant de sa défaillance. Le
juge, en considération des
circonstances, peut réduire le
montant dû par le propriétaire en
raison de la défaillance du gérant
à agir en administrateur prudent.

Art. 2296. An incompetent
person or a person of limited legal
capacity may be the owner of an
affair, but he may not be a
manager. When such a person
manages the affairs of another, the
rights and duties of the parties are
governed by the law of enrichment
without cause or the law of
delictual obligations.

Art. 2296. Une personne dont
l’incapacité juridique est totale ou
limitée peut être maître de
l’affaire, mais ne peut en être le
gérant. Lorsqu’elle vient à gérer
les affaires d’une autre, les droits
et obligations des parties sont
régis par le droit de
l’enrichissement sans cause ou le
droit des obligations délictuelles.

Art. 2297. The owner whose
affair has been managed is bound
to fulfill the obligations that the
manager has undertaken as a
prudent administrator and to
reimburse the manager for all
necessary and useful expenses.

Art. 2297. Le propriétaire dont
l’affaire a été gérée est tenu de
remplir les engagements que le
gérant a pris en administrateur
prudent et de rembourser le gérant
de toutes les dépenses nécessaires
et utiles.

CHAPTER 2. ENRICHMENT
WITHOUT CAUSE
[Acts 1995, No. 1041, §1, eff. Jan.
1, 1996]

CHAPITRE 2. DE
L’ENRICHISSEMENT SANS
CAUSE
[Loi de 1995, n˚ 1041, §1, en
vigueur le 1er janvier 1996.]

SECTION 1. GENERAL
PRINCIPLES

SECTION 1. PRINCIPES
GÉNÉRAUX

Art. 2298. A person who has
been enriched without cause at the
expense of another person is bound
to compensate that person. The
term "without cause" is used in this
context to exclude cases in which
the enrichment results from a valid
juridical act or the law. The

Art. 2298. Une personne qui a
été enrichie sans cause au
détriment d’une autre est tenue de
compenser cette dernière.
L’expression « sans cause » est
utilisée dans ce contexte pour
exclure les cas dans lesquels
l’enrichissement résulte d’un acte
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remedy declared here is subsidiary
and shall not be available if the law
provides another remedy for the
impoverishment or declares a
contrary rule.
The amount of compensation
due is measured by the extent to
which one has been enriched or the
other has been impoverished,
whichever is less.
The extent of the enrichment
or impoverishment is measured as
of the time the suit is brought or,
according to the circumstances, as
of the time the judgment is
rendered.

juridique valable ou de la loi. Le
recours envisagé ici est subsidiaire
et n’est pas ouvert lorsque la loi
prévoit un autre recours pour
l’appauvrissement ou une
disposition contraire.
Le montant de la compensation
est calculé compte tenu de
l’enrichissement de l’un ou de
l’appauvrissement de l’autre, le
plus petit des deux étant retenu.
L’étendue de l’enrichissement
ou de l’appauvrissement est
calculée au moment où le procès
est intenté ou, selon les
circonstances, au moment où le
jugement est rendu.

SECTION 2. PAYMENT OF A
THING NOT OWED

SECTION 2. DU PAIEMENT DE
L’INDU

Art. 2299. A person who has
received a payment or a thing not
owed to him is bound to restore it
to the person from whom he
received it.
Art. 2300. A thing is not owed
when it is paid or delivered for the
discharge of an obligation that
does not exist.

Art. 2299. Celui qui reçoit un
paiement ou une chose qui ne lui
est pas dû est tenu d’en faire
restitution à celui de qui il l’a reçu.
Art. 2300. Une chose n’est pas
due lorsqu’elle est payée ou remise
en vue de l’extinction d’une
obligation qui n’existe pas.

Art. 2301. A thing is not owed
when it is paid or delivered for
discharge of an obligation that is
subject to a suspensive condition.

Art. 2301. Une chose n’est pas
due lorsqu’elle est payée ou remise
en vue de l’extinction d’une
obligation soumise à une condition
suspensive.

Art. 2302. A person who paid
the debt of another person in the
erroneous belief that he was
himself the obligor may reclaim
the payment from the obligee. The
payment may not be reclaimed to
the extent that the obligee, because
of the payment, disposed of the

Art. 2302. La personne qui a
payé la dette d’une autre en se
croyant par erreur débitrice peut
réclamer répétition auprès du
créancier. La répétition ne peut
être demandée dans la mesure où
le créancier, en raison du
paiement, a disposé du titre ou a
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instrument or released the
securities relating to the claim. In
such a case, the person who made
the payment has a recourse against
the true obligor.

libéré les sûretés accessoires à la
créance. Dans ce cas, la personne
qui a payé dispose d’un recours à
l’encontre du véritable débiteur.

Art. 2303. A person who in
bad faith received a payment or a
thing not owed to him is bound to
restore it with its fruits and
products.

Art. 2303. Celui qui a reçu de
mauvaise foi un paiement ou une
chose qui ne lui était pas dû est
tenu d’en faire restitution avec ses
fruits et ses produits.

Art. 2304. When the thing not
owed is an immovable or a
corporeal movable, the person who
received it is bound to restore the
thing itself, if it exists.
If the thing has been destroyed,
damaged, or cannot be returned, a
person who received the thing in
good faith is bound to restore its
value if the loss was caused by his
fault. A person who received the
thing in bad faith is bound to
restore its value even if the loss
was not caused by his fault.

Art. 2304. Si la chose indument
reçue est un immeuble ou un
meuble corporel, celui qui l’a
reçue s’oblige à la restituer en
nature, si elle existe.
Lorsque la chose a été
détruite, endommagée ou ne peut
être restituée, la personne qui l’a
reçue de bonne foi doit en restituer
la valeur si la perte a été causée
par sa faute. La personne qui l’a
reçue de mauvaise foi doit en
restituer la valeur même si la perte
n’a pas été causée par sa faute.

Art. 2305. A person who in
good faith alienated a thing not
owed to him is only bound to
restore whatever he obtained from
the alienation. If he received the
thing in bad faith, he owes, in
addition, damages to the person to
whom restoration is due.

Art. 2305. La personne qui, de
bonne foi, a aliéné une chose qui
ne lui était pas due n’est tenue de
restituer que ce qu’elle a obtenu de
cette aliénation. Lorsqu’elle a reçu
la chose de mauvaise foi, elle est
en outre redevable de dommages et
intérêts envers la personne à qui
elle doit restitution.

Arts. 2306-2313. [Repealed.
Acts 1995, No. 1041, eff. Jan. 1,
1996]

Arts. 2306 à 2313. [Abrogés
par la loi de 1995, n˚ 1041, §1, en
vigueur le 1er janvier 1996.]

Art. 2314. [Repealed. Acts
1979, No. 180, §3]

Art. 2314. [Abrogé par la loi
de 1979, n˚ 180, §3.]
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CHAPTER 3. OF OFFENSES
AND QUASI OFFENSES

CHAPITRE 3. DES DÉLITS ET
QUASI-DÉLITS

Art. 2315. A. Every act
whatever of man that causes
damage to another obliges him by
whose fault it happened to repair it.
B. Damages may include loss
of consortium, service, and society,
and shall be recoverable by the
same respective categories of
persons who would have had a
cause of action for wrongful death
of an injured person. Damages do
not include costs for future medical
treatment, services, surveillance, or
procedures of any kind unless such
treatment, services, surveillance, or
procedures are directly related to a
manifest physical or mental injury
or disease. Damages shall include
any sales taxes paid by the owner
on the repair or replacement of the
property damaged. [Amended by
Acts 1884, No. 71; Acts 1908, No.
120, §1; Acts 1918, No. 159, §1;
Acts 1932, No. 159, §1; Acts 1948,
No. 333, §1; Acts 1960, No. 30,
§1; Acts 1982, No. 202, §1; Acts
1984, No. 397, §1; Acts 1986, No.
211, §1; Acts 1999, No. 989, §1,
eff. July 9, 1999; Acts 2001, No.
478, §1]

Art. 2315. A. Tout fait
quelconque de l’homme qui cause
à autrui un dommage oblige celui
par la faute duquel il est arrivé à le
réparer.
B. Les dommages et intérêts
peuvent inclure la perte de la
compagnie, de l’affection et des
services conjugaux ou familiaux et
peuvent être recouvrés par les
mêmes catégories de personnes qui
auraient le droit d’agir du fait d’un
acte délictuel ayant entraîné la
mort de la victime d’un dommage.
Les dommages et intérêts
n’incluent pas le coût des
traitements, des services, du suivi,
ou des actes médicaux à venir,
quelle que soit leur nature, sauf
lorsqu’ils sont directement et
manifestement liés à une atteinte à
l’intégrité physique ou mentale, ou
à une maladie physique ou
mentale. Les dommages et intérêts
doivent inclure toutes les taxes
payées par le propriétaire pour la
réparation ou le remplacement du
bien endommagé. [Amendé par la
Loi de 1884, n˚ 71 ; Loi de 1908,
n˚ 120, §1 ; Loi de 1918, n˚ 159,
§1 ; Loi de 1932, n˚ 159, §1 ; Loi
de 1948, n˚ 333, §1 ; Loi de 1960,
n˚ 30, §1 ; Loi de 1982, n˚ 202, § ;
Loi de 1984, n˚ 397, §1 ; Loi de
1986, n˚ 211, §1 ; Loi de 1999, n˚
989, §1, en vigueur le 9 juillet
1999 ; Loi de 2001, n˚ 478, §1.]

Art. 2315.1. A. If a person who
has been injured by an offense or
quasi offense dies, the right to

Art. 2315.1. A. Lorsqu’une
personne qui a été victime d’un
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recover all damages for injury to
that person, his property or
otherwise, caused by the offense or
quasi offense, shall survive for a
period of one year from the death
of the deceased in favor of:
(1) The surviving spouse and
child or children of the deceased,
or either the spouse or the child or
children.
(2) The surviving father and
mother of the deceased, or either of
them if he left no spouse or child
surviving.
(3) The surviving brothers and
sisters of the deceased, or any of
them, if he left no spouse, child, or
parent surviving.
(4) The surviving grandfathers
and grandmothers of the deceased,
or any of them, if he left no spouse,
child, parent, or sibling surviving.

B. In addition, the right to
recover all damages for injury to
the deceased, his property or
otherwise, caused by the offense or
quasi offense, may be urged by the
deceased's succession
representative in the absence of
any class of beneficiary set out in
Paragraph A.

C. The right of action granted
under this Article is heritable, but
the inheritance of it neither
interrupts nor prolongs the
prescriptive period defined in this

[Vol. 5

délit ou quasi-délit décède, le droit
d’obtenir les dommages et intérêts
en réparation du préjudice
corporel, matériel ou autre subi
par le défunt du fait du délit ou
quasi-délit, peut être exercé
pendant un an à compter du décès
par:
(1) Le conjoint survivant et
l’enfant ou les enfants du défunt,
ou soit le conjoint, soit l’enfant ou
les enfants.
(2) Le père et la mère
survivants du défunt, ou l’un des
deux, s’il n’a pas laissé de conjoint
ou d’enfant survivant.
(3) Les frères et sœurs
survivants du défunt, ou l’un
quelconque d’entre eux, s’il n’a
laissé ni conjoint, ni enfant, ni
parent survivant.
(4) Les grands-pères et grandsmères survivants du défunt, ou l’un
quelconque d’entre eux, s’il n’a
laissé ni conjoint, ni enfant, ni
parent, ni frère, ni sœur survivant.
B. En outre, le droit d’obtenir
des dommages et intérêts en
réparation du préjudice corporel,
matériel ou autre subi par le
défunt, causé par le délit ou quasidélit, peut être exercé par le
représentant de la succession du
défunt, en l’absence de tout
bénéficiaire appartenant à l’une
des catégories exposées dans le
paragraphe A.
C. Le droit d’action accordé en
vertu de cet article est
transmissible, mais sa transmission
n’interrompt ni ne prolonge le
délai de prescription prévu par le
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Article.
D. As used in this Article, the
words "child", "brother", "sister",
"father", "mother", "grandfather",
and "grandmother" include a child,
brother, sister, father, mother,
grandfather, and grandmother by
adoption, respectively.

E. For purposes of this Article,
a father or mother who has
abandoned the deceased during his
minority is deemed not to have
survived him. [Acts 1986, No. 211,
§2; Acts 1987, No. 675, §1; Acts
1997, No. 1317, §1, eff. July 15,
1997]
Art. 2315.2. A. If a person dies
due to the fault of another, suit
may be brought by the following
persons to recover damages which
they sustained as a result of the
death:
(1) The surviving spouse and
child or children of the deceased,
or either the spouse or the child or
children.
(2) The surviving father and
mother of the deceased, or either of
them if he left no spouse or child
surviving.
(3) The surviving brothers and
sisters of the deceased, or any of
them, if he left no spouse, child, or
parent surviving.
(4) The surviving grandfathers
and grandmothers of the deceased,
or any of them, if he left no spouse,
child, parent, or sibling surviving.
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présent article.
D. Tels qu’utilisés dans cet
article, les mots « enfant »,
« frère », « sœur », « père »,
« mère », « grand-père » et
« grand-mère » incluent
respectivement l’enfant, le frère, la
sœur, le père, la mère, le grandpère et la grand-mère par
adoption.
E. Aux fins du présent article,
le père ou la mère qui a
abandonné le défunt pendant sa
minorité est réputé ne pas lui avoir
survécu. [Loi de 1986, n˚ 211, §2 ;
Loi de 1987, n˚ 675, §1 ; Loi de
1997, n˚ 1317, §1, en vigueur le 15
juillet 1997.]
Art. 2315.2. A. Lorsqu’une
personne meurt par la faute d’une
autre, une action peut être menée
par les personnes suivantes pour
obtenir les dommage-intérêts
auxquels elles peuvent prétendre
en raison du décès :
(1) Le conjoint survivant et
l’enfant ou les enfants du défunt,
ou soit le conjoint, soit l’enfant ou
les enfants.
(2) Le père et la mère
survivants du défunt, ou l’un des
deux, s’il n’a pas laissé de conjoint
ou d’enfant survivant.
(3) Les frères et sœurs
survivants du défunt, ou l’un
quelconque d’entre eux, s’il n’a
laissé ni conjoint, ni enfant, ni
parent survivant.
(4) Les grands-pères et grandsmères survivants du défunt, ou l’un
quelconque d’entre eux, s’il n’a
laissé ni conjoint, ni enfant, ni
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E. For purposes of this Article,
a father or mother who has
abandoned the deceased during his
minority is deemed not to have
survived him. [Acts 1986, No. 211,
§2; Acts 1997, No. 1317, §1, eff.
July 15, 1997]

parent, ni frère, ni sœur survivant.
B. Le droit d’action accordé
par cet article se prescrit par un
délai d’un an à compter de la date
du décès du défunt.
C. Le droit d’action accordé en
vertu de cet article est
transmissible, mais sa transmission
n’interrompt ni ne prolonge le
délai de prescription prévu par le
présent article.
D. Tels qu’utilisés dans cet
article, les mots « enfant »,
« frère », « sœur », « père »,
« mère », « grand-père » et
« grand-mère » incluent
respectivement l’enfant, le frère, la
sœur, le père, la mère, le grandpère et la grand-mère par
adoption.
E. Aux fins du présent article,
le père ou la mère qui a
abandonné le défunt pendant sa
minorité est réputé ne pas lui avoir
survécu. [Loi de 1986, n˚ 211, §2 ;
Loi de 1997, n˚ 1317, §1, en
vigueur le 15 juillet 1997.]

Art. 2315.3. In addition to
general and special damages,
exemplary damages may be
awarded upon proof that the
injuries on which the action is
based were caused by a wanton
and reckless disregard for the
rights and safety of the person
through an act of pornography
involving juveniles, as defined by
R.S. 14:81.1, regardless of whether
the defendant was prosecuted for

Art. 2315.3. Des dommages et
intérêts exemplaires peuvent être
alloués en plus des dommages et
intérêts généraux et spéciaux s’il
est prouvé que les préjudices sur
lesquels l’action est fondée ont été
causés par une ignorance
délibérée et imprudente des droits
et de la sécurité de la personne du
fait d’un acte de pornographie
impliquant des jeunes, tel que
défini par les Revised Statutes 7,

B. The right of action granted
by this Article prescribes one year
from the death of the deceased.
C. The right of action granted
under this Article is heritable, but
the inheritance of it neither
interrupts nor prolongs the
prescriptive period defined in this
Article.
D. As used in this Article, the
words "child", "brother", "sister",
"father", "mother", "grandfather",
and "grandmother" include a child,
brother, sister, father, mother,
grandfather, and grandmother by
adoption, respectively.

7

NdT : supra note 6.
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his acts. [Acts 2009, No. 382, §1]

Art. 2315.4. In addition to
general and special damages,
exemplary damages may be
awarded upon proof that the
injuries on which the action is
based were caused by a wanton or
reckless disregard for the rights
and safety of others by a defendant
whose intoxication while operating
a motor vehicle was a cause in fact
of the resulting injuries. [Acts
1984, No. 511, §1]

Art. 2315.5. Notwithstanding
any other provision of law to the
contrary, the surviving spouse,
parent, or child of a deceased, who
has been convicted of a crime
involving the intentional killing or
attempted killing of the deceased,
or, if not convicted, who has been
judicially determined to have
participated in the intentional,
unjustified killing or attempted
killing of the deceased, shall not be
entitled to any damages or
proceeds in a survival action or an
action for wrongful death of the
deceased, or to any proceeds
distributed in settlement of any
such cause of action. In such case,
the other child or children of the
deceased, or if the deceased left no
8
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article 14:81.1 8, sans tenir compte
de toute action pénale menée à
l’encontre du défendeur pour ses
actes. [Loi de 2009, n° 382, §1.]
Art. 2315.4. Des dommages et
intérêts exemplaires peuvent être
alloués en plus des dommages et
intérêts généraux et spéciaux s’il
est prouvé que les préjudices sur
lesquels l’action est fondée ont été
causés par une ignorance
délibérée et imprudente des droits
et de la sécurité d’autrui, par un
défendeur conduisant un véhicule à
moteur sous l’empire d’alcool ou
de drogue et causant de ce fait les
préjudices qui en résultent. [Loi de
1984, n° 511, §1.]
Art. 2315.5. Nonobstant toute
autre disposition légale contraire,
le conjoint, le parent ou l’enfant
survivant du défunt, qui a été
déclaré coupable du crime
d’homicide volontaire ou de
tentative d’homicide du défunt, ou,
s’il n’a pas été déclaré coupable,
dont il a été judiciairement
déterminé qu’il a participé à
l’homicide volontaire injustifié, ou
à la tentative d’homicide du défunt,
sera privé de tous dommages et
intérêts ou bénéfices retirés d’une
action intentée en tant qu’ayantdroit survivant ou fondée sur l’acte
délictuel ayant entraîné la mort du
défunt, et de tous bénéfices
distribués après qu’une telle action
ait fait l’objet d’une transaction.
Dans ce cas, l’autre enfant ou les

NdT : Le texte cité est applicable aux mineurs de moins de dix-sept ans.

192

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 5

other child surviving, the other
survivors enumerated in the
applicable provisions of Articles
2315.1(A) and 2315.2(A), in order
of preference stated, may bring a
survival action against such
surviving spouse, parent, or child,
or an action against such surviving
spouse, parent, or child for the
wrongful death of the deceased.
An executive pardon shall not
restore the surviving spouse's,
parent's, or child's right to any
damages or proceeds in a survival
action or an action for wrongful
death of the deceased. [Acts 1987,
No. 690, §1; Acts 1991, No. 180,
§1]

autres enfants du défunt, ou
lorsque le défunt ne laisse aucun
autre enfant survivant, les autres
survivants énumérés dans les
dispositions applicables des
articles 2315.1(A) et 2315.2(A),
selon l’ordre de préférence établi,
peuvent intenter une action en tant
qu’ayant-droit survivant contre le
conjoint, le parent ou l’enfant
survivant, ou une action contre
ledit conjoint, parent ou enfant
survivant fondée sur l’acte
délictuel ayant entraîné la mort du
défunt.
La grâce n’a pas pour effet de
rétablir le droit du conjoint, du
parent ou de l’enfant survivant, de
prétendre à des dommages et
intérêts ou à des bénéfices au
moyen d’une action intentée en
tant qu’ayant-droit survivant ou
fondée sur l’acte délictuel ayant
entraîné la mort du défunt. [Loi de
1987, n° 690, §1 ; Loi de 1991, n°
180, §1.]

Art. 2315.6. A. The following
persons who view an event causing
injury to another person, or who
come upon the scene of the event
soon thereafter, may recover
damages for mental anguish or
emotional distress that they suffer
as a result of the other person's
injury:
(1) The spouse, child or
children, and grandchild or
grandchildren of the injured
person, or either the spouse, the
child or children, or the grandchild
or grandchildren of the injured
person.

Art. 2315.6. A. Les personnes
suivantes, lorsqu’elles sont témoins
d’un événement causant un
dommage à une autre personne, ou
qu’elles se trouvent sur le lieu de
l’événement peu de temps après,
peuvent obtenir des dommages et
intérêts pour le traumatisme
mental ou la détresse émotionnelle
dont elles souffrent du fait du
préjudice subi par cette autre
personne :
(1) Le conjoint, l’enfant ou les
enfants, et les petits-enfants de la
victime, ou soit le conjoint, l’enfant
ou les enfants, soit les petits-
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(2) The father and mother of
the injured person, or either of
them.
(3) The brothers and sisters of
the injured person or any of them.
(4) The grandfather and
grandmother of the injured person,
or either of them.
B. To recover for mental
anguish or emotional distress under
this Article, the injured person
must suffer such harm that one can
reasonably expect a person in the
claimant's position to suffer serious
mental anguish or emotional
distress from the experience, and
the claimant's mental anguish or
emotional distress must be severe,
debilitating, and foreseeable.
Damages suffered as a result of
mental anguish or emotional
distress for injury to another shall
be recovered only in accordance
with this Article. [Acts 1991, No.
782, §1]

enfants de la victime.
(2) Le père et la mère de la
victime ou l’un des deux.
(3) Les frères et sœurs de la
victime ou l’un d’entre eux.
(4) Les grand-père et grandmère de la victime ou l’un des
deux.
B. Afin d’obtenir réparation du
traumatisme mental ou de la
détresse émotionnelle aux termes
du présent article, la victime du
dommage doit souffrir d’un
préjudice tel qu’on puisse
raisonnablement s’attendre à ce
qu’une personne dans la position
du demandeur subisse un
traumatisme mental ou une
détresse émotionnelle suite à cette
expérience. De plus, le
traumatisme mental ou la détresse
émotionnelle du demandeur doit
être sévère, invalidante et
prévisible.
Le préjudice résultant du
traumatisme mental ou de la
détresse émotionnelle pour
dommage subi par autrui ne peut
être réparé que sur la base du
présent article. [Loi de 1991, n°
782, §1.]

Art. 2315.7. In addition to
general and special damages,
exemplary damages may be
awarded upon proof that the
injuries on which the action is
based were caused by a wanton
and reckless disregard for the
rights and safety of the person
through criminal sexual activity
which occurred when the victim
was seventeen years old or

Art. 2315.7. Des dommages et
intérêts exemplaires peuvent être
alloués en plus des dommages et
intérêts généraux et spéciaux s’il
est prouvé que les préjudices sur
lesquels l’action est fondée ont été
causés par une ignorance
délibérée et imprudente des droits
et de la sécurité de la personne du
fait d’une infraction de nature
sexuelle qui a eu lieu alors que la
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younger, regardless of whether the
defendant was prosecuted for his
or her acts. The provisions of this
Article shall be applicable only to
the perpetrator of the criminal
sexual activity. [Acts 1993, No.
831, §1, eff. June 22, 1993]

victime avait dix-sept ans ou
moins, sans tenir compte de toute
action pénale menée à l’encontre
du défendeur pour ses actes. Les
dispositions du présent article
s’appliquent seulement à l’auteur
de l’infraction de nature sexuelle.
[Loi de 1993, n° 831, §1, en
vigueur le 22 juin 1993.]

Art. 2316. Every person is
responsible for the damage he
occasions not merely by his act,
but by his negligence, his
imprudence, or his want of skill.

Art. 2316. Chacun est
responsable du dommage qu’il a
causé non seulement par son fait,
mais encore par sa négligence, son
imprudence, ou son impéritie.

Art. 2317. We are responsible,
not only for the damage
occasioned by our own act, but for
that which is caused by the act of
persons for whom we are
answerable, or of the things which
we have in our custody. This,
however, is to be understood with
the following modifications.

Art. 2317. On est responsable,
non seulement du dommage que
l’on cause par son propre fait,
mais encore de celui qui est causé
par le fait des personnes dont on
doit répondre, ou des choses que
l’on a sous sa garde ; ce qui doit
s’entendre avec les modifications
suivantes.

Art. 2317.1. The owner or
custodian of a thing is answerable
for damage occasioned by its ruin,
vice, or defect, only upon a
showing that he knew or, in the
exercise of reasonable care, should
have known of the ruin, vice, or
defect which caused the damage,
that the damage could have been
prevented by the exercise of
reasonable care, and that he failed
to exercise such reasonable care.
Nothing in this Article shall
preclude the court from the
application of the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur in an appropriate
case. [Acts 1996, 1st Ex. Sess., No.

Art. 2317.1. Le propriétaire ou
le gardien d’une chose n’est
responsable du dommage causé
par sa ruine, son vice ou son
défaut, que s’il est démontré : qu’il
connaissait ou aurait dû connaître
en agissant avec une diligence
raisonnable, la ruine, le vice ou le
défaut qui a causé le dommage ;
que le dommage aurait pu être
évité en agissant avec une
diligence raisonnable ; et qu’il n’a
pas agi avec la diligence
raisonnable requise. Le cas
échéant, rien dans le présent
article n’interdit au juge
d’appliquer la règle res ipsa
loquitur. [Loi de 1996, 1re session
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1, §1, eff. April 16, 1996]

Art. 2318. The father and the
mother are responsible for the
damage occasioned by their minor
child, who resides with them or
who has been placed by them
under the care of other persons,
reserving to them recourse against
those persons. However, the father
and mother are not responsible for
the damage occasioned by their
minor child who has been
emancipated by marriage, by
judgment of full emancipation, or
by judgment of limited
emancipation that expressly
relieves the parents of liability for
damages occasioned by their minor
child.
The same responsibility
attaches to the tutors of minors.
[Acts 1984, No. 578, §1; Acts
2008, No. 786, §1, eff. Jan. 1,
2009]
Art. 2319. Neither a curator
nor an undercurator is personally
responsible to a third person for a
delictual obligation of the interdict
in his charge solely by reason of
his office. [Acts 2000, 1st Ex.
Sess., No. 25, §2, eff. July 1, 2001
Art. 2320. Masters and
employers are answerable for the
damage occasioned by their
servants and overseers, in the
exercise of the functions in which
they are employed.
Teachers and artisans are
answerable for the damage caused
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extraordinaire, n° 1, §1, en vigueur
le 16 avril 1996.]
Art. 2318. Le père et la mère
sont responsables du dommage
causé par leur enfant mineur, qui
réside avec eux ou qui a été placé
par eux sous la garde d’autres
personnes, sauf leur recours contre
ces personnes. Cependant, le père
et la mère ne sont pas responsables
du dommage causé par leur enfant
mineur qui a été émancipé par
mariage, par jugement de pleine
émancipation ou par jugement
d’émancipation limitée, relevant
expressément les parents de leur
responsabilité pour les dommages
causés par leur enfant mineur.
La même responsabilité a lieu
à l’égard des tuteurs des mineurs.
[Loi de 1984, n° 578, §1 ; Loi de
2008, n° 786, §1, en vigueur le 1er
janvier 2009.]
Art. 2319. Ni un curateur ni un
subrogé curateur ne peut être
personnellement responsable
auprès d’un tiers du fait délictuel
de l’incapable dont il a la charge,
au seul motif de sa fonction. [Loi
de 2000, 1re session extraordinaire,
n° 25, §2, en vigueur le 1er juillet
2001.]
Art. 2320. Les maîtres et les
commettants sont responsables du
dommage causé par leurs
domestiques et préposés, dans
l’exercice actuel des fonctions
auxquelles ils les emploient.
Les enseignants et les artisans
sont responsables du dommage
causé par leurs élèves et apprentis,
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by their scholars or apprentices,
while under their superintendence.
In the above cases,
responsibility only attaches, when
the masters or employers, teachers
and artisans, might have prevented
the act which caused the damage,
and have not done it.
The master is answerable for
the offenses and quasi-offenses
committed by his servants,
according to the rules which are
explained under the title: Of quasicontracts, and of offenses and
quasi-offenses.
Art. 2321. The owner of an
animal is answerable for the
damage caused by the animal.
However, he is answerable for the
damage only upon a showing that
he knew or, in the exercise of
reasonable care, should have
known that his animal's behavior
would cause damage, that the
damage could have been prevented
by the exercise of reasonable care,
and that he failed to exercise such
reasonable care. Nonetheless, the
owner of a dog is strictly liable for
damages for injuries to persons or
property caused by the dog and
which the owner could have
prevented and which did not result
from the injured person's
provocation of the dog. Nothing in
this Article shall preclude the court
from the application of the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur in an
9

[Vol. 5

pendant le temps qu’ils sont sous
leur surveillance.
La responsabilité ci-dessus n’a
lieu que quand les maîtres ou
commettants, enseignants ou
artisans, ont pu empêcher le fait
qui a causé le dommage, et ne l’ont
point empêché.
Le maître est responsable des
délits et quasi-délits commis par
ses domestiques, en vertu des
règles exposées sous le titre : des
quasi-contrats, et des délits et
quasi-délits 9.
Art. 2321. Le propriétaire d’un
animal est responsable du
dommage que l’animal a causé.
Cependant, il n’est responsable du
dommage que s’il est démontré :
qu’il savait ou aurait dû savoir en
agissant avec une diligence
raisonnable que le comportement
de son animal causerait un
dommage ; que le dommage aurait
pu être évité avec une diligence
raisonnable ; et qu’il n’a pas agi
avec la diligence raisonnable
requise. Néanmoins, le
propriétaire d’un chien est
présumé responsable du préjudice
matériel et corporel causé par le
chien dès lors que le propriétaire
aurait pu l’éviter et qu’il ne
résultait pas de la provocation du
chien par la victime. Le cas
échéant, rien dans le présent
article n’interdit au juge
d’appliquer la règle res ipsa

NdT : Le Titre V « Des quasi-contrats, des délits et des quasi-délits » a été
renommé « Des engagements qui se forment sans convention » lors de la
révision de 1995 (loi de 1995, n° 1041, §3).

2012]

BILINGUAL LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE

197

appropriate case. [Acts 1996, 1st
Ex. Sess., No. 1, §1, eff. April 16,
1996]

loquitur. [Loi de 1996, 1ère
session extraordinaire, n° 1, §1, en
vigueur le 16 avril 1996.]

Art. 2322. The owner of a
building is answerable for the
damage occasioned by its ruin,
when this is caused by neglect to
repair it, or when it is the result of
a vice or defect in its original
construction. However, he is
answerable for damages only upon
a showing that he knew or, in the
exercise of reasonable care, should
have known of the vice or defect
which caused the damage, that the
damage could have been prevented
by the exercise of reasonable care,
and that he failed to exercise such
reasonable care. Nothing in this
Article shall preclude the court
from the application of the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur in an
appropriate case. [Acts 1996, 1st
Ex. Sess., No. 1, §1, eff. April 16,
1996]

Art. 2322. Le propriétaire d’un
bâtiment est responsable du
dommage causé par sa ruine,
lorsqu’elle est arrivée par une
suite du défaut d’entretien, ou par
le vice de sa construction10.
Cependant, il n’est responsable du
dommage que s’il est démontré :
qu’il connaissait ou aurait dû
connaître en agissant avec une
diligence raisonnable, le vice ou le
défaut qui a causé le dommage ;
que le dommage aurait pu être
évité en agissant avec une
diligence raisonnable ; et qu’il n’a
pas agi avec la diligence
raisonnable requise. Le cas
échéant, rien dans le présent
article n’interdit au juge
d’appliquer la règle res ipsa
loquitur. [Loi de 1996, 1re session
extraordinaire, n° 1, §1, en vigueur
le 16 avril 1996.]

Art. 2322.1. A. The screening,
procurement, processing,
distribution, transfusion, or
medical use of human blood and
blood components of any kind and
the transplantation or medical use
of any human organ, human tissue,
or approved animal tissue by
physicians, dentists, hospitals,
hospital blood banks, and nonprofit

Art. 2322.1. A. Le dépistage,
l’approvisionnement, le
conditionnement, la distribution, la
transfusion, ou l’utilisation
médicale de sang humain ou de
composants sanguins de toute sorte
ainsi que la transplantation ou
l’utilisation médicale de tout
organe ou tissu humain, ou de tissu
animal approuvé, par des
médecins, dentistes, hôpitaux,

10

NdT : Le mot original n’est pas traduit. Absent de la version française
d’origine, ce mot fut ajouté dans la version anglaise par le traducteur du Code
civil de 1825, « construction » ayant un sens plus large en anglais, recouvrant
construction et rénovation. Il a été maintenu par la suite.
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community blood banks is declared
to be, for all purposes whatsoever,
the rendition of a medical service
by each and every physician,
dentist, hospital, hospital blood
bank, and nonprofit community
blood bank participating therein,
and shall not be construed to be
and is declared not to be a sale.
Strict liability and warranties of
any kind without negligence shall
not be applicable to the
aforementioned who provide these
medical services.

B. In any action based in
whole or in part on the use of
blood or tissue by a healthcare
provider, to which the provisions
of Paragraph A do not apply, the
plaintiff shall have the burden of
proving all elements of his claim,
including a defect in the thing sold
and causation of his injuries by the
defect, by a preponderance of the
evidence, unaided by any
presumption.
C. The provisions of
Paragraphs A and B are procedural
and shall apply to all alleged
causes of action or other act,
omission, or neglect without regard
to the date when the alleged cause
of action or other act, omission, or
neglect occurred.

[Vol. 5

centres de transfusion hospitaliers
et centres de transfusion locaux à
but non-lucratif, est réputé, à
quelque fin que ce soit, être la
prestation d’un service médical
par chacun des médecins,
dentistes, hôpitaux, centres de
transfusion hospitaliers et centres
de transfusion locaux à but nonlucratif y participant, et ne doit pas
être interprété comme étant une
vente ou être déclaré comme telle.
Lorsqu’elles fournissent ces
services médicaux, les personnes
susmentionnées ne se voient
appliquer aucune présomption de
responsabilité ou garantie
d’aucune sorte.
B. Dans toute action fondée en
tout ou en partie sur l’usage de
sang ou de tissu par un
professionnel de santé, à laquelle
les dispositions du paragraphe A
ne sont pas applicables, il incombe
au demandeur de prouver, par la
prépondérance de la preuve, sans
bénéficier d’aucune présomption,
tous les éléments de sa demande, y
compris le défaut de la chose
vendue et le fait que le préjudice
ait été causé par ce défaut.
C. Les dispositions des
paragraphes A et B sont
procédurales et doivent
s’appliquer à toute cause d’action
ou autre fait, omission ou
manquement allégué, sans tenir
compte de la date à laquelle la
cause d’action ou autre fait,
omission ou manquement allégué
s’est produit.
D. Tels qu’utilisés au présent
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D. As used in this Article:
(1) "Healthcare provider"
includes all individuals and entities
listed in R.S. 9:2797, this Article,
R.S. 40:1299.39 and R.S.
40:1299.41 whether or not enrolled
with the Patient's Compensation
Fund.

(2) "The use of blood or tissue"
means the screening, procurement,
processing, distribution,
transfusion, or any medical use of
human blood, blood products, and
blood components of any kind and
the transplantation or medical use
of any human organ, human or
approved animal tissue, and tissue
products or tissue components by
any healthcare provider. [Added by
Acts 1981, No. 611, §1; Acts 1990,
No. 1091, §1; Acts 1999, No. 539,
§2, eff. June 30, 1999]

Art. 2323. A. In any action for
damages where a person suffers
injury, death, or loss, the degree or
percentage of fault of all persons
causing or contributing to the
injury, death, or loss shall be
determined, regardless of whether
the person is a party to the action
or a nonparty, and regardless of the
person's insolvency, ability to pay,
immunity by statute, including but
not limited to the provisions of

11

NdT : supra note 6.
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article :
(1) « Professionnel de santé »
inclut tous les individus et entités
énumérés au présent article et aux
articles 9:2797, 40:1299.39 et
40:1299.41 des Revised Statutes 11,
qu’ils soient ou non inscrits auprès
du Fonds de compensation des
patients.
(2) « L’utilisation de sang ou
tissu » s’entend comme le
dépistage, l’approvisionnement, le
conditionnement, la distribution, la
transfusion, ou toute utilisation
médicale de sang humain ou de
composants sanguins de toute sorte
ainsi que la transplantation ou
l’utilisation médicale de tout
organe ou tissu humain, ou tissu
animal approuvé, et produits à
base de tissu ou composants de
tissu par tout professionnel de
santé. [Ajouté par la Loi de 1981,
n° 611, §1 ; Loi de 1990, n° 1091,
§1 ; Loi de 1999, n° 539, §2, en
vigueur le 30 juin 1999.
Art. 2323. A. Dans toute action
en réparation suite à un dommage,
un décès ou une perte, le degré ou
le pourcentage de faute de toute
personne ayant causé le dommage,
le décès ou la perte, ou y ayant
contribué, doit être déterminé, que
la personne soit partie à l’action
ou non, et sans tenir compte de son
insolvabilité, de sa capacité à
payer, d’une immunité prévue par
la loi, qu’elle relève ou non des
dispositions de l’article 23:1032
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R.S. 23:1032, or that the other
person's identity is not known or
reasonably ascertainable. If a
person suffers injury, death, or loss
as the result partly of his own
negligence and partly as a result of
the fault of another person or
persons, the amount of damages
recoverable shall be reduced in
proportion to the degree or
percentage of negligence
attributable to the person suffering
the injury, death, or loss.

B. The provisions of Paragraph
A shall apply to any claim for
recovery of damages for injury,
death, or loss asserted under any
law or legal doctrine or theory of
liability, regardless of the basis of
liability.
C. Notwithstanding the
provisions of Paragraphs A and B,
if a person suffers injury, death, or
loss as a result partly of his own
negligence and partly as a result of
the fault of an intentional
tortfeasor, his claim for recovery of
damages shall not be reduced.
[Amended by Acts 1979, No. 431,
§1; Acts 1996, 1st Ex. Sess., No. 3,
§1, eff. April 16, 1996]

Art. 2324. A. He who
conspires with another person to
commit an intentional or willful act
12

NdT : supra note 6.
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des Revised Statutes 12, ni du fait
que l’identité de cette autre
personne soit inconnue ou ne soit
pas raisonnablement vérifiable.
Lorsqu’une personne est victime
d’un dommage, d’un décès ou
d’une perte, résultant en partie de
sa propre négligence, et en partie
de la faute d’une ou plusieurs
autres personnes, le montant des
dommages et intérêts recouvrables
est diminué en fonction du degré
ou du pourcentage de négligence
attribuable à la victime du
dommage, du décès ou de la perte.
B. Les dispositions du
paragraphe A s’appliquent à toute
demande en réparation suite à un
dommage, un décès ou une perte,
fondée sur toute loi ou théorie
juridique de responsabilité, quel
que soit le fondement de la
responsabilité.
C. En dépit des dispositions
des paragraphes A et B, si une
personne est victime d’un
dommage, d’un décès ou d’une
perte résultant en partie de sa
propre négligence, et en partie de
la faute d’un auteur du dommage
ayant agi de manière
intentionnelle, sa demande en
réparation ne doit pas être réduite.
[Amendé par la Loi de 1979, n˚
431, §1 ; Loi de 1996, 1re session
extraordinaire, n˚ 3, §1, en vigueur
le 16 avril 1996.
Art. 2324. A. Celui qui
conspire avec une autre personne
pour commettre un acte
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is answerable, in solido, with that
person, for the damage caused by
such act.
B. If liability is not solidary
pursuant to Paragraph A, then
liability for damages caused by
two or more persons shall be a
joint and divisible obligation. A
joint tortfeasor shall not be liable
for more than his degree of fault
and shall not be solidarily liable
with any other person for damages
attributable to the fault of such
other person, including the person
suffering injury, death, or loss,
regardless of such other person's
insolvency, ability to pay, degree
of fault, immunity by statute or
otherwise, including but not
limited to immunity as provided in
R.S. 23:1032, or that the other
person's identity is not known or
reasonably ascertainable.

C. Interruption of prescription
against one joint tortfeasor is
effective against all joint
tortfeasors. [Amended by Acts
1979, No. 431, §1; Acts 1987, No.
373, §1; Acts 1988, No. 430, §1;
Acts 1996, 1st Ex. Sess., No. 3, §1,
eff. April 16, 1996]

13

NdT : supra note 6.
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intentionnel ou volontaire est
responsable, solidairement, avec
cette personne, du préjudice causé
par cet acte.
B. Lorsque la responsabilité
n’est pas solidaire en vertu du
paragraphe A, la responsabilité
pour les dommages causés par
deux personnes ou plus est alors
une obligation conjointe et
divisible. L’auteur qui participe
conjointement à l’acte
dommageable n’est pas
responsable au-delà du degré de
sa faute et n’est pas solidairement
responsable avec toute autre
personne des dommages
attribuables à la faute de cette
autre personne, y compris lorsqu’il
s’agit de la victime du dommage,
du décès ou de la perte, sans tenir
compte, s’agissant de cette autre
personne, de son insolvabilité, de
sa capacité à payer, du degré de sa
faute, de son immunité légale ou
autre, qu’elle relève ou non des
dispositions de l’article 23:1032
des Revised Statutes 13, ni du fait
que son identité soit inconnue ou
ne soit pas raisonnablement
vérifiable.
C. L’interruption de la
prescription à l’encontre de l’un
des auteurs participant
conjointement à l’acte
dommageable s’applique à tous les
autres. [Amendé par la Loi de
1979, n˚ 431, §1 ; Loi de 1987, n˚
373, §1 ; Loi de 1988, n˚ 430, §1 ;
Loi de 1996, 1re session
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extraordinaire, n˚ 3, §1, en vigueur
le 16 avril 1996.]
Art. 2324.1. In the assessment
of damages in cases of offenses,
quasi offenses, and quasi contracts,
much discretion must be left to the
judge or jury. [Acts 1984, No. 331,
§3, eff. Jan. 1, 1985]
Art. 2324.2. A. When the
recovery of damages by a person
suffering injury, death, or loss is
reduced in some proportion by
application of Article 2323 or 2324
and there is a legal or conventional
subrogation, then the subrogee's
recovery shall be reduced in the
same proportion as the subrogor's
recovery.

B. Nothing herein precludes
such persons and legal or
conventional subrogees from
agreeing to a settlement which
would incorporate a different
method or proportion of subrogee
recovery for amounts paid by the
legal or conventional subrogee
under the Louisiana Worker's
Compensation Act, R.S. 23:1021,
et seq. [Acts 1989, No. 771, §1,
eff. July 9, 1989]

14

Art. 2324.1. Un large pouvoir
d’appréciation est laissé au juge
ou au jury lors de l’évaluation des
dommages et intérêts en cas de
délit, quasi-délit et quasi-contrat.
[Loi de 1984, n˚ 331, §3, en
vigueur le 1er janvier 1985.]
Art. 2324.2. A. Lorsque
l’obtention de dommages et
intérêts par la victime d’un
dommage, d’un décès ou d’une
perte est réduite dans la
proportion prévue aux articles
2323 ou 2324 et qu’il y a
subrogation légale ou
conventionnelle, l’indemnisation
du subrogé est alors réduite dans
la même proportion que celle du
subrogeant.
B. Rien dans le présent article
n’interdit auxdites personnes ni
aux subrogés légaux ou
conventionnels de convenir d’une
transaction reposant sur une
autre méthode ou une autre
proportion d’indemnisation
subrogatoire pour les montants
payés par les subrogés légaux ou
conventionnels en application du
Louisiana Worker’s Compensation
Act (articles 23:1021 et suivants
des Revised Statutes) 14. [Loi de
1989, n˚ 771, §1, en vigueur le 9
juillet 1989.]

NdT : Loi louisianaise sur l’indemnisation des accidentés du travail, figurant
aux Revised Statutes (R.S.), supra note 6.

THE CASE FOR AN ACTION IN TORT TO RESTRICT THE
EXCESSIVE PUMPING OF GROUNDWATER IN LOUISIANA
John B. Tarlton *
Water is the oil of the 21st century. 1 It is a vital resource in the
global economy with a multitude of uses, and the demand for water
continues to increase worldwide. 2 Almost all of the planet’s
freshwater readily available for human use is groundwater. 3
Louisiana, along with the rest of the United States, is heavily
dependent on groundwater as a natural resource. 4 Louisiana’s
public policy regarding its natural resources is that they should be
“protected, conserved, and replenished insofar as possible and
consistent with the health, safety, and welfare of the people.” 5

* Candidate, J.D. and Graduate Diploma in Comparative Law, LSU Law Center
(2013); B.S., Texas A&M University (2008). I send my deepest thanks and
gratitude to the following people for their support and helpful comments:
Professor Olivier Moréteau, Professor John Randall Trahan, Daniel On, Jennifer
Lane, and Joseph Manning.
1. Andrew Liveris, CEO Dow Chemical, quoted in Running Dry, THE
ECONOMIST,
Aug.
21
2008,
available
at:
http://www.economist.com/node/11966993.
2. Running Dry, THE ECONOMIST, id.
3. After discounting salt water located in the oceans and frozen water
located in glaciers, permafrost, and ice caps, groundwater constitutes about
98.6% of the world’s remaining water. World Water Assessment Program,
United Nations, The United Nations World Water Development Report 3: Water
in a Changing World 173, Table 10.4 (2008), http://unesdoc.unesco.org/
images/0018/001819/181993e.pdf
4. Louisiana uses approximately 1.6 billion gallons of groundwater every
day for various uses. Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal and the Louisiana
Department of Natural Resources have recently taken steps to emphasize the
importance of groundwater as a natural resource in the state and to encourage
groundwater conservation. Louisiana Department of Natural Resources, DNR
Secretary Angelle Commemorates 2011 Ground Water Awareness Week (Mar.
7, 2011), http://dnr.louisiana.gov/index.cfm?md=newsroom&tmp=detail&aid
=841; “In the United States [groundwater] is the source of drinking water for
about half the total population and nearly all of the rural population, and it
provides over 50 billion gallons per day for agricultural needs.” United States
Geological Survey, USGS Fact Sheet-103-03: Ground-Water Depletion Across
the Nation at 1 (November 2003), http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/fs-10303/JBartolinoFS%282.13.04%29.pdf
5. LA. CONST. art. IX, §1.
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Achieving the goals of protection, conservation, and replenishment
of natural resources such as groundwater requires a balancing of
interests. These interests include the private interests involved in
using groundwater for productive industrial, agricultural, and
domestic purposes, as well as the public interests in using
groundwater for municipal purposes and in maintaining
groundwater as a renewable resource for future generations. 6 As
groundwater consumption increases, these interests will be
increasingly brought into conflict with each other as they compete
for the same resource.
Groundwater depletion has been a serious problem in
Louisiana for years. 7 The current legal regime in Louisiana does
not adequately protect against this problem. It is necessary for the
legal system in Louisiana to develop a more effective means of
resolving disputes regarding shared groundwater resources in order
to protect the long-term sustainability of the state’s aquifers. Part
of the solution may be to recognize a cause of action that enables
private individuals and businesses negatively affected by a
neighbor’s excessive groundwater withdrawal to enjoin and/or
impose liability for the excessive use. This cause of action is
6. As of the year 2000, the USGS estimated that Louisiana used
groundwater in the following ways: Municipal use - 349 million gal./day,
Domestic use - 41.2 million gal./day, Irrigation - 791 million gal./day, Livestock
- 4.03 million gal./day, Aquaculture - 128 million gal./day, Industrial - 285
million gal./day, Thermo-electric power - 28.4 million gal./day. Susan S.
Hutson, Nancy L. Barber et al., USGS, Estimated Use of Water in the United
States in 2000 Table 4 at 9 (2004), http://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/2004/circ1268/
pdf/circular1268.pdf,
7. “Groundwater pumping by Baton Rouge, Louisiana, increased more
than tenfold between the 1930s and 1970, resulting in groundwater-level
declines of approximately 200 feet.” United States Geological Survey, USGS
Fact Sheet-103-03: Ground-Water Depletion Across the Nation at 2 (November
2003),
http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/fs-103-03/JBartolinoFS%282.13.04%29.pdf;
Between 1990 and 2000, three of the major aquifer systems in Louisiana
experienced declines in groundwater levels of 1ft/yr or greater. This widespread
decline in groundwater levels indicates that groundwater is being withdrawn
faster than it is being naturally replenished. Dan J. Tomaszewski, John K.
Lovelace, & Paul A. Ensminger, USGS, Water Resources Technical Report No.
68: Water Withdrawls and Trends in Ground-Water Levels and Stream
Discharge in Louisiana at 6 (2002), http://la.water.usgs.gov/publications/pdfs
/TR68.pdf.
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grounded in Louisiana Civil Code articles 667-669, which place
limitations on certain uses of property which cause injury to one’s
neighbors.
Part I of this Essay explores the problem of groundwater
depletion in Louisiana and explains why current regulatory law is
insufficient to deal with this problem. Part II begins by
highlighting two different concerns: who owns the groundwater,
and who has the right to explore and pump for groundwater. Part II
concludes by demonstrating that the right to explore and pump
groundwater from underneath one’s land is clearly established by
the Louisiana Mineral Code and that this right is being jeopardized
by the current unsustainable rate of groundwater decline. With a
view towards curtailing unsustainable use of groundwater, Part III
outlines the various ways in which uses of property can be legally
restricted in order to protect the rights of others. Part III pays
special attention to Louisiana Civil Code articles 667-669, which
provide some basic guidelines for when uses of property can be
restricted in Louisiana. Part IV explains how these Code articles
can be interpreted so as to establish a tort claim for excessive
pumping of groundwater, and describes what remedies might be
available to a plaintiff who is successful in bringing such a claim.
This Essay concludes by arguing that a tort action for excessive
pumping of groundwater is both well-founded in Louisiana law
and much needed to slow down the alarming rate of groundwater
decline in the state.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE GROUNDWATER PROBLEM
Although Louisiana is typically considered a water-rich state,
there has been growing concern in recent years that increased
water consumption will threaten the quality and sustainability of
the state’s water resources. 8 Scientific studies have confirmed that

8. Tomazewski et al., Water Resources Technical Report No. 68, id. at 2.
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water use in Louisiana has grown significantly in recent decades. 9
This growth in water use has had substantial effects on
groundwater. 10 Most groundwater used by humans is stored in
aquifers, which are underground layers of porous rock, sand, or
gravel. 11 Aquifers are naturally recharged as surface water
percolates down through the soil and flows into the aquifer. 12
Thus, the amount of water in an aquifer will naturally vary based
on seasonal climate patterns, and the water table in an aquifer will
naturally rise and fall. 13
Human activities, however, also affect groundwater levels. 14
When groundwater is pumped from a well, “water levels in the
aquifer are drawn down, and a cone-shaped depression is formed
on the water-level surface of the aquifer.” 15 If groundwater
withdrawals in an area exceed the amount of water that is naturally
recharged, water levels will inevitably decline. The decline in
groundwater levels may be so significant that shallower wells
suffer from a loss of well productivity, or even dry up entirely. 16
When the operator of a shallow well sees his production go down
due to aquifer decline, he is faced with two unpleasant options: 1)
increase the depth of his own well, thereby incurring significant

9. Id.
10. Id. at 6. Several large and important aquifer systems in Louisiana have
experienced declines in groundwater levels of 1ft/yr or more in recent years.
11. Mark
McGinley,
Aquifer,
The
Encyclopedia
of
Earth,
http://www.eoearth.org/article/Aquifer (last updated Nov. 11, 2011).
12. Id.
13. Tomazewski et al., Water Resources Technical Report No. 68, supra
note 7 at 6.
14. Id. at 6. Seasonal patterns in agriculture and industry, as well as longterm changes in pumping patterns may affect groundwater levels.
15. Id. at 6. The so-called cone of depression may be very localized, or it
may extend for many miles in an area where several high capacity wells are
operating.
16. Id. at 6. “When water levels continuously decline, a level may be
reached that affects well use; shallower wells in the area can go dry or, more
likely, the water level drops below the pump inlet. When this happens, even
though the situation may be temporary, concern about the use, allocation, and
availability of ground-water resources dramatically increases.”
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expense and further contributing to the overall problem of aquifer
decline, or 2) do nothing and watch his well slowly dry up.
Recognizing the importance of maintaining the health and
productivity of Louisiana’s aquifers, the legislature in 2001 gave
the Department of Natural Resources (“DNR”), through the Office
of Conservation (“Office”), authority to regulate groundwater use
on a statewide-basis. 17 The Office’s activities to date concerning
groundwater conservation have focused on identifying “Areas of
Ground Water Concern.” 18 The Office has also begun to develop a
statewide “ground water resources management program” with an
emphasis on “alternative supplies and technologies”. 19
Statewide regulations issued by the Office allow someone who
is negatively affected by groundwater pumping in his area to file
an application with the Commissioner of Conservation to declare
an area of groundwater concern. 20 Upon reviewing the application,
other available data, and after the opportunity for a public hearing,
if the Commissioner determines that “unacceptable environmental,
economic, social, or health impacts” have been caused by water
level decline, he has the authority to designate an area of
groundwater concern. 21 If the Commissioner chooses to do so, he
will then issue a “recommended plan to preserve and manage the
ground water resources” of the designated area. 22 To date, only
certain areas of the Sparta Aquifer in north Louisiana have been
recognized as areas of groundwater concern. 23
17. Office of Conservation, Louisiana Department of Natural Resources,
Areas of Ground Water Concerns, http://dnr.louisiana.gov/index.cfm?md=
pagebuilder&tmp=home&pid=473.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, §301. “Any owner of a well that is
significantly and adversely affected as a result of the movement of salt water
front, water level decline, or subsidence in or from the aquifer drawn on by such
well shall have the right to file an application to request the commissioner to
declare that an area underlain by such aquifer(s) is a an area of ground water
concern.”
21. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, §307, 309.
22. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, §505.
23. Areas of Ground Water Concerns, supra note 17.
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This regulatory regime does not sufficiently protect the state’s
groundwater. State regulatory agencies like the DNR have limited
financial resources with which to handle numerous responsibilities.
As a result, protection of the state’s aquifers is not always given
top priority. This problem is illustrated by the fact that only the
Sparta Aquifer has so far been declared an area of groundwater
concern, while significant decline in groundwater levels has
continued to be a problem in many other parts of the state. 24 The
problem of limited governmental resources can be addressed in
part by shifting some of the responsibility for groundwater
protection to private parties. Moreover, while the DNR has the
ability to declare an area of groundwater concern, this remedy is
unlikely to apply to those landowners who find themselves in a
very localized area of groundwater decline. Even if a landowner is
able to successfully petition the DNR to declare an area of concern,
it remains to be seen whether the management strategies employed
by the department in such an area will adequately protect all
interests involved.
Recognizing a cause of action in tort to enjoin a neighbor’s
excessive use of groundwater would allow private parties to play a
more active role in protecting the public interest while
simultaneously pursuing their own interests in conserving
groundwater resources. Furthermore, the potential for tort liability
may prove to be a more effective deterrent to excessive use of
groundwater than the current regulatory regime. 25
II. LEGAL RIGHTS IN GROUNDWATER
Groundwater is a valuable resource for municipal, agricultural,
industrial, and domestic uses. 26 Encouraging the sustainable use of
24. See Tomazewski et al., Water Resources Technical Report No. 68,
supra note 7 at 13.
25. Although beyond the scope of this essay, improvements in the
regulatory regime that go hand-in-hand with tort law could go far in solving the
groundwater problem.
26. See discussion supra part I.
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this resource is good policy. With this in mind, it is important to
emphasize the distinction between two separate legal issues: the
question of who owns groundwater in Louisiana, and the question
of who has the right to pump for groundwater in Louisiana. These
two inquiries do not result in identical answers. As will be shown,
one need not own groundwater located in an aquifer in order to
have a right to pump for it. On the contrary, the right to pump for
groundwater creates the potential to eventually become the owner
of groundwater by reducing it to one’s possession.
A. Ownership of Groundwater in Louisiana: The Rule of Capture
Louisiana is a state where the ownership of groundwater is
determined by the “rule of capture”. 27 The rule of capture is
defined as a principle of water law whereby a surface landowner
can extract and appropriate all the groundwater beneath the land,
even if doing so drains away groundwater to the point of drying up
springs and wells from which other landowners benefit. 28 Under
the rule of capture, a landowner has no claim of ownership over
the groundwater underlying his land until he pumps the water or
otherwise reduces it to his possession. In this regard the legal
regime governing ownership of groundwater differs from the
doctrine of riparian rights which governs ownership of running
surface water. In Louisiana, all running surface water is owned by
the state, 29 and riparian land owners are only given a right to the
reasonable use of that water. 30 When a landowner appropriates
surface water that runs through or adjacent to his land, he does not
thereby become the owner and is required to return the water to its
channel after its use has been served. 31 A landowner who acquires
27. James M. Klebba, Water Rights and Water Policy in Louisiana: Laissez
Faire Riparianism, Market Based Approaches, or a New Managerialism?, 53
LA. L. REV. 1779, 1824 (1993).
28. Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2010).
29. LA. CIV. CODE art. 450.
30. Klebba, supra note 27 at 1798-1800.
31. See, e.g, Klebba, supra note 27 at 1793; LA. CIV. CODE art. 657-58.
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ownership over groundwater by extracting it owes no
corresponding duty to return the used water to the aquifer for the
benefit of neighboring landowners.
The rule of capture has its origins in the common law where it
is often referred to as the “English Rule,” although it has been
adopted by Louisiana courts dating at least as far back as the
Second Circuit’s decision in Adams v. Grigsby. 32 In Adams,
plaintiff landowners complained of damage resulting from reduced
access to groundwater because of the neighboring defendant’s
heavy pumping, but were denied injunctive relief and damages
because the court determined they had no claim of ownership over
the water while it remained in the ground. 33 As one scholar has
already pointed out, the Adams court did not satisfactorily explain
the legal basis for adopting this common law rule in Louisiana. 34
Nevertheless, for the time being it appears that Louisiana courts
are willing to treat groundwater as a “fugitive mineral,” which is
not owned until it is reduced to one’s possession. 35 Thus,
groundwater in Louisiana is best classified as a res nullius
susceptible of occupation. In effect, the rule of capture gives rise to
the “Rule of the Biggest Pump,” whereby one’s ability to establish
a claim of ownership over groundwater is limited only by one’s
ability to pump it, without regard to the use to which the water is
being put or the rights of neighboring landowners.
B. The Right to Explore and Produce Groundwater From Beneath
One’s Land
Adams was decided before the adoption of the Louisiana
Mineral Code in 1976. The Mineral Code codified the rule
announced in Adams that treated groundwater as a “fugitive
32. Adams v. Grigsby, 152 So. 2d 619, 622-23 (La. Ct. App. 1963) writ
refused, 153 So. 2d 880 (La. 1963).
33. Adams, 152 So. 2d 619.
34. Klebba, supra note 27, at 1826 n.225.
35. Figgie International, Inc. v. Bailey, 25 F.3d 1267, 1271 n.1 (5th Cir.
1994).
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mineral” or a res nullius, the ownership of which is subject to the
rule of capture. 36 However, the Mineral Code does more than just
define when fugitive minerals become privately owned; it protects
a landowner’s right to explore and produce liquid and gaseous
minerals from beneath his land, and also provides that landowners
with rights in a common reservoir have correlative rights and
duties with respect to one another. 37
The right to explore and develop fugitive minerals (including
groundwater) from beneath one’s land is clearly established by the
Mineral Code. 38 A situation in which neighboring landowners have
rights in a common reservoir would arise whenever such a
reservoir extends across those neighbors’ boundary lines. The
official comment to the relevant Mineral Code articles indicates
that one purpose of the correlative rights and duties established by
the Mineral Code is to assure landowners “the opportunity to
produce a fair share of the common reservoir.” 39 Thus, while no
one owns groundwater as long as it remains in the aquifer, surface
landowners nonetheless have rights in that water which are
recognized by the Mineral Code. It is unclear to what extent, if
any, the Mineral Code’s reference to correlative rights can be
36. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:4 (2005), “The provisions of this [Mineral]
Code are applicable to . . . rights to explore for or mine or remove from land the
soil itself, gravel, shells, subterranean water, or other substances occurring
naturally in or as a part of the soil or geological formations on or underlying the
land.”(emphasis added); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:8 (2005), “A landowner may
use and enjoy his property in the most unlimited manner for the purpose of
discovering and producing minerals . . . . He may reduce to possession and
ownership all of the minerals occurring naturally in a liquid or gaseous state that
can be obtained by operations on or beneath his land even though his operations
may cause their migration from beneath the land of another.”
37. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:9 (2005), “Landowners and others with rights
in a common reservoir or deposit of minerals have correlative rights and duties
with respect to one another in the development and production of the common
source of minerals.”; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:10 (2005), “A person with rights
in a common reservoir or deposit of minerals may not make works, operate, or
otherwise use his rights so as to deprive another intentionally or negligently of
the liberty of enjoying his rights, or that may intentionally or negligently cause
damage to him. . . .”
38. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:4 (2005).
39. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:9 (2005).
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squared with the rule of capture as it pertains to groundwater in
Louisiana. The most likely explanation for this apparent
discrepancy is that the Mineral Code merely codified the rule of
capture as articulated in Adams and left the further development of
the correlative rights doctrine to the courts. 40 Accordingly, the
problems associated with the common law rule of capture as it
pertains to groundwater are not adequately addressed by
application of the Mineral Code alone.
It is clear that the right to explore and produce groundwater
from beneath one’s land is not dependent on ownership. In this
respect, Louisiana’s groundwater regime more closely resembles
the riparian rights doctrine in that landowners who cannot claim to
be owners of the water in question nonetheless have legallyprotected rights in that water. The right to explore and pump for
groundwater beneath one’s land, like the right to use surface water
that runs through or adjacent to one’s land, is vested automatically
by operation of law and is distinct from the question of who owns
the water.
C. Inadequacy of the Current Legal Regime Governing Groundwater in Louisiana
The right to explore and produce groundwater from beneath
one’s land is clearly established by the Mineral Code and deserves
legal protection. The Adams holding, which denied relief to the
plaintiffs because they did not own the groundwater located in the
aquifer, overlooks the fact that landowners have rights in
groundwater other than outright ownership. 41 Landowners must be
given a realistic opportunity to actually explore and produce
groundwater from beneath their land if that right is to have any
40. See Comment to LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:8 (2005), “. . . Article 8
does not attempt . . . a full definition of the rules governing the landowner’s
freedom to operate and his liability for abuse of his property rights.”
41. Considering that the right to explore and produce groundwater was
established by the mineral code after the decision in Adams, this oversight only
exists in retrospect.
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significance. However, the right to explore and produce
groundwater will soon become meaningless if the current rate of
aquifer decline in Louisiana continues unchecked. The rule of
capture, standing alone, does not provide any incentive for the
conservation of groundwater nor does it provide any deterrent to its
unsustainable or irresponsible use. Louisiana courts should
entertain claims which seek to restrict the unsustainable use of
groundwater if the right of every landowner to explore and produce
this resource is taken seriously.
1. Uncertainties regarding rights of landowners
Under the current regime, landowners cannot be certain that the
right to explore and pump for groundwater under their land will
receive any legal protection. If a neighboring landowner is able to
install a larger, deeper, or more powerful pump, then it is entirely
possible that the groundwater reservoir will be drawn down or
depleted to the point where his neighbors are no longer able to
access that reservoir. This system creates incentives for
landowners to pump more water than they might legitimately need.
The doctrine of riparian rights addresses this problem in the
surface water context by limiting landowners to a reasonable use of
the disputed water resource. 42 A similar “reasonable use”
limitation would be well-advised in the context of disputed
groundwater rights as a means of protecting all interests involved.
The current system also creates an incentive for neighboring
landowners to engage in a “race to the bottom,” without regard for
the long-term health of the aquifer. Usually, large commercial
operations will be able to win this “race” against individual
landowners for use of a shared groundwater reservoir, with
devastating effects to those individual landowners who rely on that
groundwater for their livelihoods. The right of every landowner in
Louisiana to explore and pump for groundwater under their land
42. Klebba, supra note 27 at 1798-1800.
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provides justification for the courts to prevent the inequity of
allowing large users to trample the rights of smaller users.
2. Law and economics—the efficient allocation of natural
resources
From a macro-economic perspective, the best way to manage a
natural resource is to provide for the most efficient allocation of
the resource among competing uses. This involves a balancing
between the scarcity of the resource on the one hand, and the
enforcement costs of protecting rights in that resource on the
other. 43 This means that if the market value of a natural resource is
less than the cost of enforcing rights in that resource, these rights
should not be protected because it is more efficient for consumers
to acquire the resource through the market. 44 If, however, the
market value of a natural resource is greater than the cost of
enforcing rights in that resource, these rights should receive legal
protection because it is more efficient for consumers to maintain
control over the resource through legal means. 45 In other words,
the greater the scarcity of a natural resource, the larger the
enforcement costs society is willing to tolerate.
Applying these principles to Louisiana’s groundwater situation,
it is clear that the more groundwater levels are depleted, the scarcer
this resource becomes. As groundwater becomes scarcer, we
should become more willing to accept stricter legal protections on
rights in groundwater. 46 Assuming the costs of prosecuting a tort
action in Louisiana remain relatively constant, the more that
groundwater levels are depleted, the more efficient tort suits will
be as a means of allocating groundwater to beneficial uses.
43. Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics Movement in LAW AND
ECONOMICS: A READER 40, 45-6 (Alain Marciano ed., 2009).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. For an argument that increased restrictions on groundwater use may
produce greater economic benefits, see J. David Aiken, Ground Water Mining
Law and Policy, 53 U. COLO. L. R. 505, 507 n.16 (1982).

2012]

EXCESSIVE PUMPING OF GROUNDWATER

215

III. THE LEGAL BASIS FOR RESTRICTING THE PUMPING OF
GROUNDWATER: LIMITATIONS ON THE USE OF PROPERTY UNDER
THE CIVIL LAW
The long-term solution to the problem of unsustainable use of
groundwater is probably a more comprehensive regulatory regime
than that currently employed by the DNR. To be effective, this
regulatory regime would require sufficient financial backing so
that DNR is able to carry out the more extensive regulatory duties
likely to be required under such a system. This system might
resemble the process of pooling and unitization, which the
Commissioner of Conservation already uses to regulate the
production of other subsurface minerals. 47 Until this is realized,
however, the courts of Louisiana should play a more active role in
upholding the constitutionally declared policy of natural resource
conservation. 48 In upholding this constitutional mandate, courts
should apply well-established legal principles regarding use of
property in order to determine the circumstances under which the
pumping of groundwater should be restricted. The civil law of
Louisiana contains several guiding principles for when certain uses
of property can be restricted, principles that may be readily
adapted to this purpose.
A. Limitations on the Use of Property Generally: Sic Utere
As the Latin maxim sic utere indicates, the freedom to use
one’s property in any manner one pleases is usually not absolute.
Rather, one should use one’s property in such a manner so as not to
injure that of another. This Roman law precept has been
recognized in many civil law systems as well as in the Louisiana
Civil Code.49 The various limitations on property use may be
organized into three broad categories, each discussed below.
47. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:9 (2005).
48. LA. CONST. art. IX, §1.
49. A. N. Yiannopoulos, Civil Responsibility in the Framework of Vicinage:
Articles 667-69 and 2315 of the Civil Code, 48 TUL. L. REV. 195 (1974).
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Generally, one may not use his property in such a manner as might
constitute 1) an illicit use of property; 2) an abuse of rights; or 3) a
nuisance.
1. Illicit use of property
The first general limitation on the use of property is so obvious
it need not be discussed in great detail. One may not use his
property in a manner that is contrary to law. Thus, while one has
the right to drive his car on a public road, one may not drive his car
in a negligent manner which causes injury to another. 50 Such an
illicit use of property may give rise to an obligation to pay
damages or even criminal liability.
2. Abuse of rights
The concept of absolute rights has seen a gradual decline in
most Western systems of law over the past few centuries. 51 As
even the staunchest supporters of absolute rights concede, in
certain circumstances, such as disagreements between neighbors, a
regime of absolute rights may result in unfavorable outcomes. 52
The doctrine of abuse of rights has developed in both common law
and civil law jurisdictions, although oftentimes implicitly and
unsystematically, as a response to situations where the rigidity of
absolute rights would dictate unjust or inequitable outcomes. 53 At
least two kinds of abusive actions are condemned by the doctrine
of abuse of rights: a) the predominant motive for the action is to
cause harm; b) the exercise is totally unreasonable given the lack
of any legitimate interest in the exercise of the right, and its
exercise harms another. 54

50. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (2005).
51. Joseph M. Perillo, Abuse of Rights: A Pervasive Legal Concept, 27 PAC.
L.J. 37, 48-49 (1995).
52. Id. at 49.
53. Id. at 40-44.
54. Id. at 47.
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a) Predominant motive for the use of the right is to cause
harm
The first embodiment of the abuse of rights doctrine is
sometimes described as a use of a right which is motivated by a
malicious desire to cause damage to another. 55 Examples of this
type of abuse of right include the erection of fences or buildings
out of spite for one’s neighbor. A French case from the mid-1800s
recognized that in such a situation, even though no law or
regulation may bar a landowner from making such a construction,
nevertheless a malevolent exercise of a right should be
prohibited. 56 Louisiana courts have also explicitly recognized this
limitation in the context of mineral rights. 57 The principle that a
landowner may not exercise his rights for the sole purpose of
maliciously causing harm to his neighbor was incorporated into the
Louisiana Mineral Code. 58
A “malicious use” limitation on the use of property is
dependent on the defendant’s subjective mental state; a defendant’s
subjective motivations are crucial to determining when he is
abusing his right as opposed to exercising his right legitimately.
This leads to situations in which a plaintiff must be forced to suffer
harm because the defendant did not have the requisite mental state.
For example, in the case of McCoy v. Arkansas Natural Gas Co.,
the court held that a defendant who negligently allowed large
quantities of natural gas to escape from his well was not liable to
his neighbors because the loss was the result of “a mere exercise of
bad judgment on the part of the [defendant] in drilling on his own
land.” 59 While it makes sense to provide harsher punishments to
55. See Julio Cueto-Rua, Abuse of Rights, 35 LA. L. REV. 965, 978-82
(1975).
56. Perillo, supra note 51 at 44.
57. Higgins Oil & Fuel Co. v. Guaranty Oil Co., 82 So. 206 (La. 1919) (a
defendant may be prevented from leaving a well uncapped where the purpose
was to decrease the pumping efficiency of a neighbor’s well).
58. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:9 (2005); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
31:10(2005), and comments.
59. McCoy v. Arkansas Natural Gas Co., 143 So. 383, 386 (La. 1932).
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those who have more culpable mental states, it does not necessarily
make sense to deny any and all recovery to innocent plaintiffs who
suffer injury just because the defendant was acting negligently
rather than maliciously.
b) Use of right without legitimate interest whose exercise
causes harm
The second embodiment of the abuse of rights doctrine is
stated as a prohibition against a use of a right which is not
motivated by a serious and legitimate interest. Examples of this
type of abuse of right include wasteful extraction of groundwater
or other minerals beyond that which the landowner is able to
legitimately use. 60 Once again, a French case from the mid-1800s
is illustrative: the owner of a spring installed a powerful pump that
extracted far more water than the owner could market or use; it
was determined to be an abuse of right. 61
The Adams court also recognized this limitation as being
applicable in the context of groundwater extraction when it
postulated that the defendant might be liable “if he simply opened
his own well and allowed it to pour out the water as waste without
benefit to himself.” 62 The principal that an abuse of right occurs
when a right is exercised without a legitimate interest is necessary
because in not all situations will it be possible to show a malicious
intent on the part of one who is abusing a right. As the Supreme
Court of Louisiana held in Morse v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., “the
exercise of a right [...] without legitimate and serious interest, even
where there is neither alleged nor proved an intent to harm,
constitutes an abuse of right which courts should not
countenance.” 63

60. Perillo, supra note 51 at 43-44.
61. Id.
62. Adams, 152 So. 2d at 624.
63. 344 So. 2d 1353 (La. 1977). See also Michael Byers, Abuse of Rights:
An Old Principle, A New Age, 47 MCGILL L.J. 389 (2002).
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c) Nuisance
The last category of limitations on the use of property is of
more recent vintage. 64 Certain uses of property, even if they are
conducted with due diligence and in accordance with other rules of
law, may nonetheless cause damage to others situated nearby. 65
Since the onset of the industrial revolution, the magnitude of this
problem has increased. 66 This type of property use may be
restricted or give rise to an obligation to pay damages not because
it is illicit or abusive, but because it is “excessive” in the sense that
the use is not “normal” or “regular” according to the
circumstances. 67 Determining when a use of property is excessive
by reason of circumstances or surroundings is obviously a factually
dependent inquiry.
B. Louisiana Civil Code Articles 667-669
Louisiana Civil Code articles 667-669 are the primary source
of law in Louisiana regarding general limitations on the use of
property. 68 They provide:
Art. 667. Limitations on use of property:
Although a proprietor may do with his estate whatever he
pleases, still he cannot make any work on it, which may
deprive his neighbor of the liberty of enjoying his own, or
which may be the cause of any damage to him. However, if
the work he makes on his estate deprives his neighbor of
enjoyment or causes damage to him, he is answerable for
damages only upon a showing that he knew or, in the
64. See Yiannopoulos, supra note 49, at 200. In France, the law of nuisance
is referred to as Trouble du Voisinage. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Cueto-Rua, supra note 55, at 977. Common law jurisdictions have also
developed their own body of nuisance law. Although modern Louisiana courts
may be unwilling to analogize to the common law of nuisance, the concepts
embodied therein have been utilized by Louisiana courts in the past, especially
when interpreting Civil Code articles 667-669. See, e.g., Robichaux v.
Huppenbauer, 245 So. 2d 385 (La. 1971).
68. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1-3. Legislation and custom are the sources of
law in Louisiana. When the two conflict, custom may not abrogate legislation.
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exercise of reasonable care, should have known that his
works would cause damage, that the damage could have
been prevented by the exercise of reasonable care, and that
he failed to exercise such reasonable care. Nothing in this
Article shall preclude the court from the application of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in an appropriate case.
Nonetheless, the proprietor is answerable for damages
without regard to his knowledge or his exercise of
reasonable care, if the damage is caused by an
ultrahazardous activity. An ultrahazardous activity as used
in this Article is strictly limited to pile driving or blasting
with explosives.69
Art. 668. Inconvenience to neighbor
Although one be not at liberty to make any work by which
his neighbor's buildings may be damaged, yet every one
has the liberty of doing on his own ground whatsoever he
pleases, although it should occasion some inconvenience to
his neighbor.
Thus he who is not subject to any servitude originating
from a particular agreement in that respect, may raise his
house as high as he pleases, although by such elevation he
should darken the lights of his neighbors's [neighbor's]
house, because this act occasions only an inconvenience,
but not a real damage. 70
Art. 669. Regulation of inconvenience
If the works or materials for any manufactory or other
operation, cause an inconvenience to those in the same or
in the neighboring houses, by diffusing smoke or nauseous
smell, and there be no servitude established by which they
are regulated, their sufferance must be determined by the
rules of the police, or the customs of the place. 71
These three articles have been a part of Louisiana law since the
Code of 1808. 72 Because these three articles derive from a
common source and govern the basic limitations on the use of
69. LA. CIV. CODE art. 667.
70. LA. CIV. CODE art. 668.
71. LA. CIV. CODE art. 669.
72. Dean v. Hercules, Inc., 328 So. 2d 69 (La. 1976). These articles have no
counterpart in the French CODE CIVIL, but appear to be taken from the text of
Domat. Rodolfo Batiza, The Louisiana Civil Code of 1808: Its Actual Sources
and Present Relevance, 46 TUL. L. REV. 4, 69 (1971).
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property in Louisiana, they are often discussed and interpreted in
conjunction with each other. 73 Generally, article 667 prohibits uses
of property which cause damage or deprive neighbors of the
enjoyment of their property, while article 668 allows uses of
property that only cause “some inconvenience” to neighbors. 74
Article 669 provides that certain inconveniences which must be
allowed under article 668 “may be [either] tolerated or suppressed,
depending on police regulations and local customs.” 75 Essentially,
these three code articles establish the following legal regime. First,
one may not use property so as to cause actual damage or
substantial interference with the enjoyment of another’s property.
Second, most other types of interferences are considered to be
lesser inconveniences which must be tolerated. 76 Third, certain
specific types of lesser inconveniences (i.e., the diffusion of smoke
or odors from “manufactory or other operations”) may be
prohibited by local regulations or customs. 77
The broad language of these articles has often created
confusion as to which uses of property are prohibited and which
are allowed, but the scope of these articles is sufficiently broad to
encompass all three types of general limitations on the use of
property discussed above. 78 These articles have been applied by
Louisiana courts to restrict or impose liability on illicit uses of
property, 79 abusive uses of property, 80 and nuisances. 81
73. See, e.g., Yiannopoulos, supra note 49, at 204. “Articles 667-69 form a
unit in the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, and, for a proper understanding, they
must be read together.”
74. Id. at 204-05.
75. LA. CIV. CODE art. 669.
76. Yiannopoulos, supra note 49, at 205.
77. Yiannopoulos, supra note 49, at 205; LA. CIV. CODE art. 669.
78. Cueto-Rua, supra note 55, at 1012-13. See also Yiannopoulos, supra
note 49, at 203. “Articles 667-69 of the Louisiana Civil Code were apparently
conceived as an application of the sic utere doctrine.”
79. Langlois v. Allied Chemical Corporation, 249 So. 2d 133 (La. 1971)
(holding defendant chemical plant liable for personal injuries sustained by a
firefighter as a result of exposure to gas that escaped from the plant). In
imposing liability, the court looked in part to the duty imposed by Civil Code
articles 667 and 669. The court held, “The defendant has injured this plaintiff by
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In 1996, the Louisiana Legislature undertook broad-based
revision of the Civil Code articles relating to delicts and quasidelicts, including article 667. The purpose of these amendments
was to change from a strict liability standard to one of
negligence. 82 Thus, it is clear that a defendant will not be liable
under article 667 based on a theory of strict liability, except for
specific ultrahazardous activities. 83 Although the current standard
of care imposed on proprietors by article 667 is to act reasonably
(i.e., to avoid acting negligently), there is no reason to doubt that
this article along with articles 668 and 669 still embody the
concept of sic utere in Louisiana law. In other words, while a
plaintiff seeking to invoke liability under article 667 now must
prove the defendant’s negligence, the types of activities from

its fault as analogized from the conduct required under Civil Code Article 669
and others . . .”
80. Higgins Oil, 82 So. 206 (La. 1919) (a defendant may be prevented from
leaving a well uncapped where the purpose was to decrease the pumping
efficiency of a neighbor’s well).
81. Salter v. B.W.S. Corporation, Inc., 290 So. 2d 821 (La. 1974)
(defendant corporation was enjoined from disposing industrial waste on its
property in a manner which would cause harm to neighbors, even though the
corporation was granted a disposal permit from the state department of health to
carry on its disposal operations at the site); Robichaux, 245 So. 2d 385 (La.
1971) (owner of horse stable was enjoined from operating the stable in such a
manner as to cause harm to neighbors, even though the stable did not violate the
city’s ordinances or regulations); Devoke v. Yazoo & Mississippi Valley
Railroad Company, 30 So. 2d 816 (La. 1947) (railroad company may not cause
injury to those residing in the vicinity, even though it was engaged in the pursuit
of a lawful trade, and was held liable for damages).
82. The language added to article 667 in 1996 includes the following: “. . .
if the work [the proprietor] makes on his estate deprives his neighbor of
enjoyment or causes damage to him, [the proprietor] is answerable for damages
only upon a showing that he knew or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should
have known that his works would cause damage, that the damage could have
been prevented by the exercise of reasonable care, and that he failed to exercise
such reasonable care. Nothing in this Article shall preclude the court from the
application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in an appropriate case.” LA. CIV.
CODE art. 667.
83. An ultrahazardous activity in the context of article 667 is “strictly
limited to pile driving or blasting with explosives.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 667. This
essay is not concerned with strict liability for ultrahazardous activities, and the
ultrahazardous activity exception to article 667 will be disregarded as
inapplicable.
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which the plaintiff may seek redress remain unchanged from prior
law.
If articles 667-669 are to be applied to restrict the pumping of
groundwater, then this activity must be classified as either an illicit
act, an abusive act, or a nuisance. Otherwise, pumping of
groundwater would not properly fall within the ambit of these
articles. Pumping groundwater is not by itself illegal; the right to
explore and produce groundwater from underneath one’s land is
clearly established by the Mineral Code. 84 Therefore, a proprietor
cannot be limited from pumping groundwater on his land on the
basis that this would constitute an illicit act. Neither does pumping
groundwater in most circumstances constitute an abuse of property
rights. Most proprietors who pump groundwater have a legitimate
reason for doing so and are not acting maliciously to cause harm to
others. Therefore, a proprietor usually cannot be limited from
pumping groundwater on his land on the basis that this would
constitute an abuse of rights. However, it is possible that a
proprietor may be held liable for nuisance under the current
version of these articles for negligently causing damage or a loss of
enjoyment to his neighbors through excessive pumping of
groundwater.
IV. APPLICABILITY OF LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE ARTICLES 667-669
TO EXCESSIVE PUMPING OF GROUNDWATER
A thorough analysis of the language of Louisiana Civil Code
articles 667-669, along with the jurisprudence interpreting these
articles, reveals that they are fully applicable to a tort claim for
excessive pumping of groundwater.

84. See discussion supra part III.B; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:4 (2005); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:8 (2005).
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A. Codal Source of Liability
The first step in applying articles 667-669 to a claim for
excessive pumping of groundwater is to determine which article is
the source of liability. Some scholars have sought to draw a
distinction between articles 667 and 668 on the one hand and
article 669 on the other. 85 According to this understanding, articles
667 and 668 establish reciprocal duties that neighboring
landowners owe each other, while article 669 specifically governs
those inconveniences that correspond to the law of nuisance. 86 This
approach suggests that excessive uses of property—those that are
neither illicit nor abusive but nevertheless go beyond what is
normal according to the circumstances—can only be restricted or
regulated under article 669. However, Louisiana courts have
apparently declined to adopt this interpretation. This is probably
because the types of excessive inconveniences which are subject to
potential regulation under article 669 are very limited and have
been interpreted as exclusive rather than illustrative. 87 The original
version of article 669 which appeared in the Code of 1808
contained a reference to “other different inconveniences,” but this
language is absent from the current article. 88 As a result, the
restrictions placed on excessive uses of property are very limited
under the current version of article 669. The courts have responded
to this problem by allowing excessive use of property claims to be
brought under article 667. 89 Article 669, in turn, has been
85. Yiannopoulos, supra note 49, at 206.
86. Id.
87. Robichaux, 245 So. 2d 385 (La. 1971) (Article 669 speaks only of
“smoke” and “nauseous smell”.)
88. Robichaux, 245 So. 2d 385 (La. 1971); The Editor’s note to the 2011
edition of the Louisiana Civil Code article 669 states that “[t]he English text of
CC 1808 is a more complete and preferable translation of the French text that
the present English text.”
89. Robichaux, 245 So. 2d 385 (La. 1971). “Despite the apparent failure of
these articles to deal explicitly with the standards to be followed in operations
which may cause inconvenience to neighboring property or the failure of these
articles to more comprehensively enumerate the ‘other inconveniences’, they
have nevertheless been employed by this Court together with the common-law
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interpreted as establishing the legal restrictions which can be
placed on those types of “mere inconveniences” which are not
regulated under articles 667 and 668. 90 Considering the limited
scope of article 669, a claim for excessive pumping of groundwater
probably can’t be brought under this article. In light of the broad
application that article 667 has been given by the courts, such a
claim is best brought under this article instead.
B. Preliminary Concerns
Before determining when a claim for excessive pumping of
groundwater can be brought under article 667, it is necessary to
define some key terms as they are used in the article. First, the
jurisprudence is clear that the use of the word “work” in article 667
applies to activities as well as structures. 91 It cannot therefore be
argued that drilling a well and pumping groundwater is not a
“work” within the meaning of this code article. Also, damage need
not be caused by actual physical invasion of property in order to be
compensable under article 667. 92 For example, it has been held that
the presence of a hazardous high pressure gas pipeline adjacent to
a plaintiff’s property gave rise to damages caused by the proximity
of the pipeline, which impaired the market value and the full use of

theory of nuisance to grant relief where a use of property causes inconvenience
to a neighbor.”; See also Dean, 328 So. 2d 69 (La. 1976) (allowing a claim for
damages allegedly suffered as a result of chemical emissions to be brought
under article 667 although there were no allegations that the defendant acted
either illegally or maliciously towards his neighbors).
90. See Rodrigue v. Copeland 475 So. 2d 1071, 1075 (La. 1985) (“a mere
inconvenience [is] subject to regulation by the ‘rules of the police’ [under] C.C.
669.”)
91. Yokum v. 615 Bourbon St., L.L.C., 977 So. 2d 859, 875 (La. 2008)
(“the ‘work’ to which Article 667 refers includes not only constructions but also
activities that may cause damage.”)
92. Hero Lands Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 310 So. 2d 93, 98 (La. 1975) (“. . .
damage may well be intrinsic in nature, a combination of facts and conditions
which, taken together, do not involve a physical invasion but which, under the
circumstances, are nevertheless by their nature the very refinement of injury and
damage.”)
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the estate. 93 Thus, defendants cannot avoid liability on the basis
that no physical intrusion onto the plaintiff’s land occurred.
Although the text of article 667 refers to proprietors, Louisiana
jurisprudence has interpreted the article to apply to a broader
category of persons than just landowners. 94 The article has been
applied to lessees, including holders of mineral leases. 95
C. Distinguishing Between Excessive and Non-Excessive Uses of
Property
In applying article 667 to complaints against excessive uses of
property, Louisiana courts have drawn an analogy to the common
law theory of nuisance. 96 Generally, there are two types of
nuisances–nuisances at law and nuisances in fact. 97 A nuisance at
law is “an act, occupation, or structure which is a nuisance at all
times and under any circumstances, regardless of location or
surroundings.” 98 Pumping groundwater is not a nuisance at law,
because the right to explore and produce groundwater from one’s
own land is clearly established by the Mineral Code. 99 A nuisance
in fact is an act, occupation, or structure which becomes a nuisance
by reason of circumstances or surroundings. 100 Pumping
groundwater can only be considered excessive by reference to the
circumstances under which it is being withdrawn. If, according to
the circumstances, groundwater pumping went beyond what is
normal and became excessive, this would be considered a nuisance
in fact under article 667. Determining what is normal and what is
93. Id.
94. Butler v. Baber, 529 So. 2d 374 (La. 1988); See also Yokum, 977 So. 2d
859, 874-75 (La. 2008).
95. Id. While the proper definition of the term “proprietor” under article 667
may be open to debate, it should be understood that this essay’s use of that term
is not limited to landowners.
96. Robichaux, 245 So. 2d 385 (La. 1971).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 389, n.4-5.
99. See discussion supra part III.B; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:4 (2005); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:8 (2005).
100. Robichaux, 245 So. 2d 385 (La. 1971).
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excessive is a highly fact-sensitive inquiry, so it is difficult to make
generalizations about this distinction. The best principle that can be
extracted from the jurisprudence is a test of “reasonability.”101
When applying a reasonability test to a claim for excessive
pumping of groundwater, reference could be made to the relative
size of the cone of depression caused by the pumping at issue. If
this cone of depression is much larger or more extensive than those
created by pre-existing water wells in the area, the pumping might
be unreasonable, i.e., excessive under the circumstances. However,
even if a use of property is determined to be unreasonable or
excessive under the circumstances, this does not automatically
entitle the plaintiff to relief under article 667. 102 Rather, the
threshold for relief under article 667 is whether one has suffered
actual compensable injury in the form of either damage or loss of
enjoyment.
D. Distinguishing Between Compensable and Non-Compensable
Injuries
To state a claim under article 667, a plaintiff must demonstrate
that the conduct in question causes actual damage or deprivation of
the liberty to enjoy one’s own property. 103 Conduct which merely
occasions some inconvenience is not compensable. 104 The
distinction that must be drawn between real injury and mere
inconvenience appears at first glance to correspond closely to the
distinction between a use of property that is excessive and a use of
property that must be tolerated because it is normal according to
the circumstances. Upon closer inspection of the codal language,
however, it appears that not all excessive uses of property give rise
101. Id. at 389 (“Thus the principle is enunciated . . . that within reasonable
limits the individual citizen has to submit to some annoyance and inconvenience
from the legal exercise of the rights of others.”).
102. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 668. “. . . everyone has the liberty of doing on
his own ground whatsoever he pleases, although it should occasion some
inconvenience to his neighbor.” (emphasis added).
103. LA. CIV. CODE art. 667.
104. LA. CIV. CODE art. 668.
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to compensable injury. After all, articles 667 and 668 do not state
that only normal uses of property are allowed. To the contrary,
article 668 states that one may do “on his own ground whatsoever
he pleases, although it should occasion some inconvenience to his
neighbor.” 105 This provision would seem to indicate that even
abnormal or excessive uses of property must be tolerated under
some circumstances. The focus of articles 667 and 668 is on the
effect which certain uses of property have on neighbors. 106 Simply
determining that a certain use of property is excessive according to
the circumstances is not enough. Rather, the crucial inquiry is
whether the plaintiff has been deprived of the enjoyment of his
own property or has suffered damage. If the plaintiff has only been
exposed to “some inconvenience,” he has not suffered a
compensable injury.
Distinguishing between real injury and mere inconvenience
proves difficult in real-world situations. The Code articles
themselves do not provide much guidance on where to draw the
line. As a result, it is not surprising that Louisiana courts have
treated this determination as a factual inquiry. 107 In making this
factual determination, courts have considered the nature and
degree of the intrusion on plaintiff’s property, the character of the
neighborhood, and the extent or degree of the damage including
the effect on the health and safety of the plaintiffs. 108
Applying these factors to an excessive pumping of
groundwater claim, a plaintiff must be able to show more than just
105. Id.
106. The focus of articles 667 and 668 on the effect of certain uses of
property in order to determine when a neighbor is entitled to legal protection is
entirely consistent with civilian doctrine. See AUBREY ET RAU, PROPERTY § 194
et seq. “Although in principle it is not prohibited to cause nuisances to a
neighbor. . . such a damage becomes illegal when the source exceeds certain
intensity.. . . for one cannot expect to live in a group without causing some
inconvenience to neighbors.”
107. Barrett v. T.L. James, 671 So. 2d 1186 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (“When the
actions or work cease to be inconveniences and become damaging is a question
of fact.”).
108. Barrett, 671 So. 2d 1186.
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mere inconvenience. First, it must be recognized that when
proprietor A pumps groundwater and thereby reduces proprietor
B’s access to that same groundwater reservoir, this constitutes a de
minimus (or even non-existent) intrusion on proprietor B’s
property. Proprietor A has not interacted with proprietor B’s
property except to cause the migration of groundwater from
underneath B’s land. For this reason, this factor weighs against a
finding that excessive withdrawal of groundwater constitutes a
compensable injury. However, actual physical intrusion is not
required under article 667, and the lack of physical intrusion could
be outweighed by other factors under certain circumstances. 109 For
example, the character of the neighborhood might be such that all
proprietors have historically made moderate withdrawals from a
common groundwater reservoir for domestic uses or for raising
livestock. If a proprietor in this neighborhood withdraws
significantly greater amounts of water from that reservoir for use in
industrial or mining operations, such a use would not be in line
with the character of the neighborhood. To the extent that the other
proprietors are prevented or restricted from making use of the
groundwater in the manner to which they are accustomed, this
would weigh in favor of a finding of compensable injury rather
than mere inconvenience.
Additionally, the greater the effect on the plaintiff’s health,
safety, and welfare occasioned by the excessive withdrawal, the
greater the chance that a court will find that a compensable injury
has occurred. This might be shown by proof of a negative effect on
the plaintiff’s livelihood, such as when the plaintiff’s access to
groundwater has been reduced to such an extent that the plaintiff’s
agricultural or ranching operations have become impractical or
prohibitively expensive. Also, if the plaintiff is able to show that
109. Hero Lands Co., 310 So. 2d 93, 98 (La. 1975) (“. . . damage may well
be intrinsic in nature, a combination of facts and conditions which, taken
together, do not involve a physical invasion but which, under the circumstances,
are nevertheless by their nature the very refinement of injury and damage.”)
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his neighbor’s excessive withdrawal of groundwater has reduced
the plaintiff’s ability to obtain safe drinking water and thus
exposed his family to greater health risks, this would weigh in
favor of a finding that a compensable injury has occurred.
The factors used by the courts to determine whether a
particular use of property creates a compensable injury essentially
guide the courts in an assessment of the severity of the disturbance
suffered by neighbors. 110 The more severe the disturbance created
by a particular use of property, the more likely a court is to find
that a real injury has occurred.
E. Additional Elements of Negligence as Applied to a Tort Claim
under Article 667 for Excessive Pumping of Groundwater
After the court makes the preliminary determination that a
compensable injury has occurred, the plaintiff still must prove
three distinct elements to impose liability on the defendant under
article 667: 1) the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge
that his works would cause damage; 2) the damage could have
been prevented through the exercise of reasonable care; and 3) the
defendant failed to exercise reasonable care. These elements were
added to article 667 in 1996 in order to change the law from strict
liability to a negligence standard. 111
1. Actual or constructive knowledge
A defendant “is answerable for damages only upon a showing
that he knew or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have
known that his works would cause damage.” 112 The knowledge
element might serve to immunize some proprietors who are
ignorant of the possibility that their excessive groundwater
110. See AUBREY ET RAU, PROPERTY § 194 et seq. “Although in principle it
is not prohibited to cause nuisances to a neighbor. . . such a damage becomes
illegal when the source exceeds certain intensity.”
111. See discussion supra part III.B.
112. LA. CIV. CODE art. 667.
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pumping would cause damage to their neighbors if the possibility
of this damage was not discoverable or predictable through the
exercise of reasonable care. However, given the sophisticated
nature of the science of hydrogeology, the ignorance defense may
be a “tough sell.” This is especially true if the defendant is a large
firm conducting mining or secondary recovery operations and has
significant scientific knowledge and resources at its disposal. Such
a large and sophisticated firm should probably know, through the
exercise of reasonable care, the effects of its groundwater pumping
operations on the underlying aquifer and the resultant harms which
might be suffered by neighbors. Furthermore, because Louisiana
state regulations require that new water wells be installed by a
licensed contractor, the level of knowledge imputed to those who
install large capacity wells should be considerable. 113 Thus, the
knowledge which a court would expect a groundwater withdrawer
to obtain through the exercise of reasonable care may depend in
large part on the size of the well and the expected amount of water
to be pumped. 114
2. Damage could have been prevented through exercise of
reasonable care
For a defendant to be liable under article 667, a plaintiff must
show that “the damage could have been prevented by the exercise
of reasonable care.” 115 This may be the most difficult element for a
plaintiff to prove in a case of excessive withdrawal of
groundwater. Clearly, any amount of withdrawal is going to draw

113. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, §701.
114. Steven J. Levine, Ground Water: Louisiana’s Quasi-Fictional and Truly
Fugatious Mineral, 44 LA. L. REV. 1123, 1145 (1983-1984). “Wells that a
reasonable person would not install without first making hydrologic tests would
be defined as high-capacity wells, and owners of such wells would be charged
with knowledge revealed by the tests and could be liable for unreasonable
injurious consequences. Small wells would be defined as those which a
reasonable person would install without expensive testing. Owners of small
wells would be charged only with knowledge reasonably available to them.”
115. LA. CIV. CODE art. 667.
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down the groundwater reservoir to some extent, so the question
becomes how a proprietor might prevent damage to a neighbor
through the exercise of reasonable care. At the very least, a
proprietor can prevent damage to neighbors by not withdrawing
more groundwater than he is able to put to a productive use. If a
proprietor withdraws more groundwater than he is able to
productively use, then it can be presumed that this waste could
have been prevented through the exercise of reasonable care and
any damage which results from this waste would be imputable to
the excessive withdrawer.
Furthermore, a proprietor could prevent damage to a neighbor
by making use of other reasonably available alternative sources of
water. This argument could cut both ways, however, because if
there are alternative sources of water reasonably available to the
defendant, those alternative sources might also be available to the
plaintiff, in which case it would be harder for the plaintiff to show
that he has suffered real damage. 116 Still, it is conceivable that a
large industrial user of groundwater has a greater ability to obtain
alternate sources of water due to its greater financial resources and
larger economies of scale than an individual user. If a large
groundwater user has reasonably-available alternative sources of
water that it can use to avoid severely limiting a smaller neighbor’s
access to a common groundwater resource, then it can be fairly
claimed that the damage suffered by the smaller user could have
been prevented through the use of reasonable care on the part of
the larger user. In the context of industrial or mining operations
where the quality of the water is of little importance, it might also
be reasonable to expect this operation not to deprive its neighbors
of access to a pristine source of groundwater that is being used for
human consumption, animal consumption, or agricultural
purposes. In such a situation it would be reasonable to expect such
an industrial or mining operation to make use of reasonably116. See discussion supra part IV.D.
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available alternative sources of water, such as untreated surface
water, that are not suitable for its neighbors’ more sensitive uses.
The requirement that proprietors can only be liable when the
damages could have been prevented through the exercise of
reasonable care is closely related to the causation element required
in all tort actions. Clearly, if the damage suffered by a neighbor is
not caused by the actions of the defendant in pumping
groundwater, then this damage could not have been prevented by
the exercise of reasonable care on the part of the defendant and the
defendant would not be liable for those damages. The causation
element allows a defendant to argue that the damage suffered by
his neighbors was either caused by the neighbors’ own actions, by
the actions of a third party, or by some “act of God.” 117
3. Failure to exercise reasonable care
Failure to exercise reasonable care refers to a breach of the
duty which one proprietor owes to another under article 667. This
duty, as discussed above, consists of a requirement that all
proprietors must exercise reasonable care in determining if their
works might cause damage to a neighbor and to exercise
reasonable care in preventing such damage. After a court weighs
all the facts and determines that a duty exists on the part of the
groundwater withdrawer to protect his neighbors from damage that
could result from the withdrawal, the inquiry turns to whether the
groundwater withdrawer breached this duty. While the delineation
of the duty to avoid excessive pumping of groundwater that may
cause damage to neighbors is the province of the court, the
question of whether a groundwater withdrawer breached this duty
is a question of fact. 118 In other words, once the court has
identified the specific duty owed by a proprietor and articulated the
reasonable care with which it is expected to exercise when
117. See Loescher v. Parr, 324 So. 2d 441 (La. 1975).
118. See Pinsonneault v. Merchants & Farmers Bank & Trust Company, 816
So. 2d 270 (La. 2002).
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pumping groundwater, the question of whether the proprietor has
failed to exercise reasonable care becomes a simple yes or no
question submitted to the factfinder.
F. Available Remedies under Louisiana Civil Code Article 667 for
Excessive Pumping of Groundwater
If a plaintiff establishes liability under article 667, a court must
then determine the appropriate remedy: injunctive relief, monetary
damages, or both. The remedy of injunctive relief will be sought
by plaintiffs who are seeking to prevent future injury caused by
excessive groundwater pumping. In many cases the plaintiff may
also seek monetary damages as compensation for past injury which
they have already sustained as a result of excessive groundwater
pumping.
1. Injunctive relief
Injunctive relief is generally only available when the plaintiff is
faced with “irreparable injury, loss, or damage.” 119 The Louisiana
Supreme court held in Salter v. B.W.S. Corp., Inc. that this
limitation on the availability of injunctive relief is applicable in in
an action predicated on Louisiana Civil Code article 667.120
However, the Salter holding is arguably at odds with the general
civil law principle that property rights (i.e., real rights) are per se
entitled to injunctive protection and a showing of irreparable injury
is usually not required. 121 Notwithstanding this apparent conflict,
as long as the Salter rule remains in effect, a plaintiff must show
that he has suffered or will suffer an irreparable injury to obtain
injunctive relief in a claim involving excessive pumping of
groundwater. An injury is irreparable when it “cannot be
adequately measured or compensated by money.” 122
119.
120.
121.
122.

LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 3601 (2005).
Salter, 290 So. 2d 821, 825 (La. 1974).
See Cosby v. Holcomb Trucking, Inc., 942 So. 2d 471, 475 (La. 2006).
Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2010).
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Louisiana Civil Code article 667 prevents a proprietor from
making any work on his land which “deprive[s] his neighbor of the
liberty of enjoying his own, or which may be the cause of any
damage to him.” 123 Thus, article 667 contemplates two distinct
categories of injuries: 1) loss of enjoyment, and 2) damage. The
nebulous notion of a loss of enjoyment, especially when contrasted
with the more traditional notion of damage, might qualify as a type
of injury which cannot be adequately measured or compensated.
Accordingly, a plaintiff who is able to show that his reduced access
to groundwater has deprived him of the liberty of enjoying his
property may be entitled to enjoin his neighbor from making
excessive use of the shared groundwater reservoir. This situation
might arise when a plaintiff who relies solely on groundwater for
his domestic use is deprived of the ability to enjoy his property
when a neighbor’s excessive pumping of groundwater makes this
use impossible or impracticable. On the other hand, a plaintiff who
suffers some monetary damage but is not prevented from using or
enjoying his own land may not be entitled to enjoin his neighbor’s
excessive pumping. This situation might arise when a plaintiff has
lost the use of a groundwater well but has other sources of water
available to him such that he is not completely prevented from
using or enjoying his property. The increased costs of obtaining
these other sources of water would be readily quantifiable in the
form of damages. While the circumstances surrounding such a
situation must still weigh in favor of a finding that the plaintiff has
suffered some compensable injury, 124 the appropriate remedy
would be the awarding of monetary damages rather than injunctive
relief. Interestingly, it is unclear whether the new elements of
negligence that were added to article 667 in 1996 apply when a
plaintiff is requesting only injunctive relief. The relevant codal
language reads, “if the work he makes on his estate deprives his
neighbor of enjoyment or causes damage to him, he is answerable
123. LA. CIV. CODE art. 667.
124. See discussion supra part IV.D.
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for damages only upon a showing that [the new elements of
negligence have been met].” (emphasis added). A literal reading of
the article suggests that a plaintiff may be entitled to injunctive
relief regardless of whether the defendant has acted negligently.
Thus, a plaintiff may be able to enjoin a neighbor from making
excessive use of groundwater even if the neighbor could not have
discovered that injury would result from the excessive use and
even if the neighbor otherwise exercised reasonable care.
2. Monetary damages
In cases where there is no showing of irreparable injury, a
plaintiff may be limited to recovering monetary damages. 125
Article 667 has been successfully used as a legal basis for
imposing on defendants an obligation to pay damages. 126 In theory,
there is no reason to doubt that damages sustained by a plaintiff as
a result of a defendant’s excessive pumping of groundwater might
give rise to an obligation to pay damages under article 667. For
example, if a plaintiff temporarily lost access to water as a result of
a neighboring proprietor’s excessive pumping and the plaintiff’s
cattle subsequently died as a result, the excessive pumper might be
held liable to pay to the plaintiff the value of the cattle, assuming
all other elements of liability are met.
V. CONCLUSION
The growing use of water in Louisiana has the very real
potential to negatively affect groundwater reservoirs throughout
the state. As groundwater pumping increases, groundwater levels
will continue to decline. This creates significant problems for
operators of smaller wells and raises concerns for the long-term
sustainability of Louisiana’s groundwater resources.
125. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 3601 (2005).
126. See Butler, 529 So. 2d 374 (La. 1988) (holding defendants liable under
article 667 to pay damages to plaintiffs as a result of damages sustained by
plaintiff’s oyster leases).
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Present law is inadequate to address these problems. The rule
of capture, which does not place any limits on how much
groundwater a proprietor is able to withdraw from a reservoir
underlying his land, does not provide incentives for conservation
or encourage responsible use of groundwater. The Louisiana
Department of Natural Resources has not yet demonstrated that its
ground water resources management program has been able to
address the problems of aquifer decline throughout the state.
The availability of a tort remedy against those who withdraw
excessive amounts of groundwater to the detriment of their
neighbors would provide a much needed supplement to
Louisiana’s stated goal of conservation of groundwater resources.
This tort remedy is available as provided by Louisiana Civil Code
article 667 which embodies the civil law maxim that no one may
use his property so as to injure another. In order to prevail on such
a tort claim, a plaintiff will have to prove that he has suffered
actual injury as opposed to mere inconvenience. The determination
that a plaintiff has suffered actual injury will depend on the
circumstances surrounding the claim, including the nature and
degree of the intrusion on plaintiff’s property, the character of the
neighborhood, and the extent or degree of the damage, including
the effect on the health and safety of the plaintiff. The additional
elements of negligence which were added to article 667 in 1996
will also have to be proven by the plaintiff.

CIVIL LAW IN LOUISIANA
THE CONTINUING DEBATE OF CONTINUING TORT: THE
LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT’S TREATMENT OF THE
CONTINUING TORT DOCTRINE IN HOGG V. CHEVRON
USA, INC.
Mark Assad *
On July 6, 2010, the Louisiana Supreme Court decided an
important installment in the debate surrounding the proper
application of the continuing tort doctrine. 1 The court held that,
under Louisiana law, the continuing tort doctrine suspends
prescription if the operating cause, defined by the majority as the
initial tortious act of the defendant rather than the subsequent
effects, is continuing in nature.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs brought suit against neighboring property owners,
Chevron USA, Inc., and the operator of the service station located
thereon, alleging property damage resulting from leaking gasoline
tanks located beneath the service station. 2 On discovering the leaks
in 1997, defendant replaced the tanks. In 2001 and 2002, plaintiffs
received two letters from the Louisiana Department of
Environmental Quality (LDEQ) apprising them of the gasoline
contamination in the area surrounding the service station and
informing the plaintiffs that LDEQ may ask permission to perform
environmental tests on their property in the future. On September

* Candidate, J.D. and Diploma in Comparative Law (2013), Paul M.
Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University.
1. Hogg v. Chevron USA, Inc., 09-2632 (La. 2010), 45 So. 3d 991.
2. Id.
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12, 2006, the plaintiffs were contacted concerning access to their
property for the purpose of conducting remediation.
On September 6, 2007, the plaintiffs filed suit against the
defendants under the tort theory of trespass “seeking damages for
diminution of the value of their property, the stigma of owning
contaminated property, loss of enjoyment of use of the property,
and exemplary damages.” 3 The plaintiffs argued that the presence
of the gasoline, the defendants’ failure to remove it, and the ill
effects sustained resulted in a viable claim in trespass under
Louisiana tort law. Defendants subsequently filed motions for
summary judgment asserting plaintiff’s action was barred by the
one-year liberative prescription pursuant to Louisiana Civil Code
articles 3492 and 3493. Defendants argued that plaintiffs were
aware of the damage from the letters received in 2001 and 2002,
and therefore prescription began to run upon receipt of those
letters. 4 Plaintiffs argued the letters were subject to more than one
reasonable interpretation and summary judgment was inappropriate
because the reasonableness of their interpretation was an issue of
material fact to be decided at trial. 5 The district court agreed with
the plaintiffs and denied the defendant’s motions for summary
judgment. 6 The Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, declined the
defendant’s application for supervisory writ; however, the
Supreme Court of Louisiana subsequently granted writs to review
the district court’s denial of summary judgment. 7
II. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
The Supreme Court of Louisiana addressed two primary issues
in its decision. First, the Court had to decide whether or not the
LDEQ letters sent to plaintiffs were sufficient to give them actual
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Id.
Id. at 996.
Id.
Id.
Hogg v. Chevron USA, Inc., 28 So. 3d 263 (La. 2010).
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or constructive knowledge of the contamination such that
prescription began to run upon the plaintiffs’ receipt of the letters.
Second, the Court addressed the continuing tort doctrine and
whether or not it was applicable to the facts before the Court.
Regarding the first issue, the Court noted that “there is no
question as to what the plaintiffs knew and when [they knew it]”
because the “[p]laintiffs’ knowledge is contained in the letters.” 8 A
plain reading of the letters, according to the Court, clearly
indicated that there was soil and groundwater contamination in the
area surrounding the service station; therefore, there was no issue
of material fact regarding whether or not this amounted to actual or
constructive knowledge. 9 Instead, the Court framed the issue as
whether or not the plaintiffs’ knowledge from the letters
constitutes actual or constructive knowledge such that prescription
began to run upon their receipt. 10 Because the dispute concerns
whether or not the letters amount to actual or constructive
knowledge and not what the substance of the letters contained, the
Court found that summary judgment was appropriate. 11
In addressing whether the doctrine of continuing tort would
suspend prescription for the plaintiffs’ claim, the Court first
addressed plaintiffs’ assertion that the presence of the gasoline on
their property was a trespass, and its continued presence was, in
fact, continuing tortious activity by the defendants. 12 The Court
also distinguished continuous and discontinuous operating causes,
relying on Crump v. Sabine River Authority, where the Louisiana
Supreme Court stated, “[a] continuing tort is occasioned by
[continual] unlawful acts, not the continuation of the ill effects of
an original, wrongful act.” 13 Applying this standard to the present
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
728.

Hogg, 45 So. 3d at 999.
Id. at 1000.
Id. at 999.
Id.
Id. at 1002.
Crump v. Sabine River Authority, 98-2326 (La. 1999), 737 So. 2d 720,
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case, the Court held that the operating cause of the injury was the
leaking of the gasoline out of the tanks, which was abated in 1997,
rather than the continued presence of the gasoline on the
property. 14 Therefore, the tortious activity alleged by plaintiffs
ceased in 1997 and the continuing ill effects of that conduct does
not suspend the running of prescription under the doctrine of
continuing tort. However, prescription did not begin to run until
years later because plaintiffs were not made aware of the injury
until the letters were received in 2001 and 2002. 15 Nevertheless,
plaintiffs’ suit, filed in 2007, was not within the one-year
prescriptive period for tort actions. 16
III. COMMENTARY
First, the procedural posture of the case is worth noting. The
appeal was from a motion for summary judgment that was denied
at the trial court, thus the question was whether or not there was a
genuine issue of material fact in existence such that judgment
could not be rendered as a matter of law. 17 Overturning the trial
court’s ruling, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that, because
there was no issue of material fact regarding when the plaintiffs
acquired actual or constructive knowledge, summary judgment was
appropriate. 18 The only question left after this factual
determination was whether or not the defendant was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law, which the court found it was through
14. Hogg, 45 So.3d at 1006.
15. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3493 provides: “[w]hen damage is caused to
immovable property, the one year prescription commences to run from the day
the owner of the immovable acquired, or should have acquired, knowledge of
the damage.”
16. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3492 provides in pertinent part that “[d]elictual
actions are subject to a liberative prescription of one year.” In the context of this
case, the provisions of Louisiana Civil Code art. 3493, id. note 15, apply as to
when the one-year liberative prescription commences.
17. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 966(B) (2011). The article provides that
summary judgment should be granted if “there is no genuine issue as to material
fact, and … [the] mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
18. Hogg, 45 So. 3d at 1006.
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the correct interpretation of the continuing tort doctrine. For the
purposes of this note, the court’s treatment of the continuing tort
doctrine is the central issue to be considered.
The plaintiffs argued for the application of the continuing tort
doctrine in order to circumvent prescription. 19 The plaintiffs
characterized the presence of the gasoline as a trespass and
asserted, consequently, that the trespass continued as long as the
gasoline remained on the property. The Court acknowledged this
argument and summarily dismissed it for two reasons. First, the
Court questioned whether the leaking of the gasoline was a
trespass at all because there was little evidence that the defendants
intended the gasoline to enter plaintiffs’ land. 20 The Court only
briefly questioned whether or not the gasoline’s presence was a
trespass at all because a final determination on that issue was not
necessary to address the continuing tort doctrine and prescription.
As the Court noted, the issue of whether or not an underground
leak falls within trespass, nuisance, neither, or both, is more
appropriate for another discussion.
Second, the Court stated that defining the presence of the
gasoline as continuing tortious activity in the form of a trespass
would render trespass “an imprescriptible species of tort, an
argument at odds with the plain language of Louisiana Civil Code
arts. 3492 and 3493, which makes no exception of trespass….” 21
The majority’s position on this issue is well grounded in light of
the plain meaning of the prescription articles, which make no
indication that an expansive reading is appropriate. In fact, the
Official Revision Comment (b) to Louisiana Civil Code art. 3492

19. The applicable liberative prescription period in delictual actions is
generally one year pursuant to LA. CIV. CODE art. 3492. See supra note 16.
20. Hogg, 45 So.3d at 1002 (the Court specifically states in n.11 that “civil
trespass is generally considered to be an intentional tort, requiring proof that the
defendant took some intentional action that resulted in harm to the plaintiff.”).
21. Id. at 1002, n.12.
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states that the one-year prescription applies to all delictual
actions. 22
The decision turns on how to define the operating cause of the
damage, and the majority opinion is consistent with jurisprudence
regarding the continuing tort doctrine. 23 The Louisiana Civil Code
offers no guidance regarding the continuing tort doctrine, which
has developed primarily through jurisprudence. In Crump, 24 the
Louisiana Supreme Court defined the operating cause of the injury
in order to determine the applicability of the continuing tort
doctrine. In that case, the defendants created a canal on land
adjacent to the plaintiff’s, which caused continued flooding on the
plaintiff’s land. The Court held that the operating cause was
digging the canal - not the water that was spilled onto plaintiff’s
land. 25 Instead, the Court characterized the water that remained on
plaintiff’s land as the “continuing ill effects arising from a single
tortuous act.” 26 The initial act of digging the canal was the
operating cause of the injury suffered, not the continued presence
of the water on the plaintiff’s property. The Supreme Court
presented the issue as a problem of determining where the line
between cause and effect was drawn, and essentially held that only
the initial act should be considered the operating cause of the
injury suffered within the context of the continuing tort doctrine.
Justice Knoll’s dissent argues in favor of considering the
presence of the gasoline a continuing tort that would suspend
prescription, which differs from the majority position that views
the “operating cause” of the tortious effects as only the initial act
of the defendants. Justice Weimer, writing for the majority, defines
22. Id.
23. See Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 09-2368 (La. 10/19/10), 48 So. 3d 234
(reaffirming the holding in Hogg, supra note 1); Crump v. Sabine River
Authority, 98-2326 (La. 1999), 737 So. 2d 720; South Central Bell Telephone
Company v. Texaco, Inc., 418 So. 2d 531 (La. 1982); Mouton v. State of
Louisiana, 525 So. 2d 1136 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1988), writ denied, 526 So. 2d 1112
(La. 1988).
24. Crump, 737 So. 2d at 728.
25. Id. at 731.
26. Id. at 728.
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the operating cause of the injury as the actual leaking of the
gasoline from the tanks. In contrast, Justice Knoll’s position is that
the continued presence of the gasoline is causing the harmful
effects to plaintiffs and therefore the presence should be
considered the cause of the injury suffered. The fundamental
question of where to draw the line for cause and effect 27 is
apparently still contentious among current Justices of the Louisiana
Supreme Court. The majority’s holding, aligned with Louisiana
Supreme Court jurisprudence, considers the leak from the tanks the
initial, operating cause of the injury, and therefore it alone is the
tortious activity in the present case. Consequently, the
contamination of plaintiffs’ land itself is the injury, or the effect, of
the operating cause along with any additional effects that may arise
as a result of the leak.
In light of the Louisiana Supreme Court’s past rulings
regarding the doctrine of continuing tort and the holding in this
case, there is a clear indication that the Court is unwilling to
expand the prescriptive period beyond the initial act (or acts)
constituting the operating cause of the injury. The prescriptive
period in such cases begins to run as soon as the defendant’s
tortious conduct ceases and the plaintiff knows or should know of
the damage caused by the act.
However, it is worth noting that Louisiana is not alone in its
confusion over the appropriate circumstances for the continuing
tort doctrine’s application. For example, in Nieman v. NLO, Inc., 28
the federal Sixth Circuit ruled that Ohio’s continuing trespass
doctrine requires no showing of continuing conduct, but rather
27. The question of whether the continuing conduct (cause) or the
continuing damage (effect) is the proper method of defining a continuing tort is
recognized in national sources as an area that is generally unsettled. See 54
C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 223 (2012) (“Under the continuing tort doctrine,
where a tort involves a continuing or repeated injury, the limitations period does
not begin to run until the date of the last injury or the date the tortious acts
cease…”) (emphasis added). The use of the “or” demonstrates the rift in
jurisdictions’ analysis for defining a continuing tort.
28. 108 F.3d 1546 (6th Cir. 1997).
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only a showing of continuing damage. Interestingly, Judge
Krupansky’s dissent mirror’s the Louisiana Supreme Court
majority’s reasoning in Hogg, noting that “[o]ngoing conduct is the
key to a continuing tort. Where no continuing action by the
defendant is necessary to effect the damage in controversy—that
is, where the tort is an accomplished fact, such as when intangible
pollutants have impacted the plaintiff's property…—the tort is
permanent” and thus prescribed.

COLUMBIA GULF TRANSMISSION CO. V. BRIDGES: AN
EXAMPLE OF DIFFERING DEFINITIONS OF SALES UNDER
LOUISIANA LAW
Brian Flanagan *
This case compares the definition of a sale for sales tax
purposes with sale as defined by the Louisiana Civil Code.
I. BACKGROUND
Columbia Gulf Transmission Co. (Columbia) is a natural gas
transmission company seeking to recoup sales tax and use tax paid
under protest to the Louisiana Department of Revenue. 1 Columbia
transports natural gas through a series of pressurized underground
pipelines. During transportation, the natural gas loses pressure and
must be recompressed at compression stations along the way. 2
Some of the gas Columbia transfers is diverted to these
compression stations and used to power the compressors in order
to maintain the gas pressure in the pipeline. Pursuant to the gas
tariff (effective rate schedule) that Columbia was operating under,
Columbia was not charged for the use of this gas. 3
The Louisiana Department of Revenue asserted that the gas
belonged to Columbia’s customers, and Columbia’s use of the gas
to power the compressors constituted a sale in the form of a
barter. 4 Therefore, the Department of Revenue asserted the sale
was subject to Louisiana state sales tax and use tax.
* J.D./D.C.L. Candidate (May, 2013) Paul M. Hebert Law Center,
Louisiana State University. Special Thanks to Prof. Alain Levasseur for his
research suggestions, proofreading and editing; to Prof. Olivier Moreteau for
support and editing, and to Ms. Jennifer Lane for proofreading and editing.
1. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co. v. Bridges, 08-1006 (La.App Ct. 1st
Cir. 6/25/09) 28 So. 3d 1032.
2. Id.
3. The gas tariff is regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC).
4. Columbia, 28 So. 3d at 1035.
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Columbia paid the taxes under protest while asserting there had
been no sale. Further, Columbia argued that the Louisiana
Department of Revenue calculated the use tax based on “spot
[market] prices,” in violation of the definition of “cost price” set
forth in Louisiana Revised Statute 47:301.5 Columbia argued that
it did not pay any price for the fuel, in that it was “tendered to
Columbia Gulf by its shippers without cost,” thus its taxable “cost
price” should be zero. 6 Therefore, Columbia argued it did not owe
any sales or use tax on the gas.
II. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
The Court of Appeal reversed the summary judgment that had
been granted in favor of Columbia by the trial court. In doing so,
the court of appeal distinguished a sale as defined by Louisiana
Civil Code Article 2439 from a sale defined in the LA. REV. STAT.
47:301 for sales tax purposes. 7 Using the definition in LA. REV.
STAT. 47:301, the court held when Columbia diverted some of the
natural gas from the pipeline to power the compressors, such
action constituted “transfer of title of possession of the gas for a
consideration.” 8 Even though no price in money was paid for the
gas, LA. REV. STAT. 47:301 allows the price to be paid in money or
otherwise. Therefore the fact that Columbia did not pay any money
5. LA. REV. STAT. 47:301 defines cost price: “‘Cost price’ means the
actual cost of the articles of tangible personal property without any deductions
therefrom on account of the cost of materials used, labor, or service cost, except
those service costs for installing the articles of tangible personal property if such
cost is separately billed to the customer at the time of installation, transportation
charges, or any other expenses whatsoever, or the reasonable market value of the
tangible personal property at the time it becomes susceptible to the use tax,
whichever is less.”
6. Columbia, 28 So. 3d at 1034.
7. Id. at 1043. While Article 2439 states that Sale is a contract whereby a
person transfers ownership of a thing to another for a price in money, LA. REV.
STAT. 47:301(13)(a) defines “Sales price” as the total amount for which tangible
personal property is sold, less the market value of any article traded in including
any services, except services for financing, that are a part of the sale valued in
money, whether paid in money or otherwise. (emphasis added)
8. Although the Civil Code articles do not use the term “consideration,”
LA. REV. STAT. 47:301 uses the term for sales tax purposes.
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for the gas did not preclude it being categorized as a sale for sales
tax purposes. Finally, the court added that consideration could be
inferred because “nothing in the record supports a finding that this
transfer of gas was gratuitous,” and moreover, “businesses do not
generally give away their assets.” 9 The court of appeal then
remanded to the trial court to determine the correct amount of sales
tax owed by Columbia. 10
III. COMMENTARY
This case illustrates the principle in Louisiana law that courts
will give contracts their proper legal characterization, focusing on
its component parts rather than form or wording. Thus, when the
name or title fails to properly identify the nature of the contract,
courts will apply the proper characterization according to the
component parts of the contract. 11 In this case, Columbia had an
agreement with its customers that allowed it to use the gas free of
charge to power the necessary compression stations, but despite the
wording of the contract, the court of appeal categorized this as a
taxable sale under LA. REV. STAT. 47:301. 12
Next, it is important to note that the court recognized that “laws
regulating the collection of taxes are sui generis, and constitute a
system to which the general provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code
have little, if any, application.” 13 Therefore the statute on sales tax
should be considered separately from the Civil Code. Finally, this
statute is lex specialis in that it deals specifically with sales tax,
and should not impact the definition of a sale in the lex generalis. 14
One may not infer from this case that under Article 2439, a price
9. Id. at 1042.
10. Id. at 1044.
11. LA. CIV .CODE art. 2053.
12. Additionally, Judge Parro states, “the fact the terms of Columbia’s
contracts with its customers were mandated by the FERC regulations does not
render the sales tax law of this state inapplicable once the taxing jurisdiction of
Louisiana was invoked.”
13. Columbia, 28 So. 3d at 1041.
14. The lex generalis in this case is LA. CIV .CODE art. 2439.
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may be money or otherwise. If paid in kind, the contract is not a
sale but an exchange. 15
Interestingly, the definition of sale in LA. REV. STAT. 47:301 is
consistent with the common law definition of sale found in
Uniform Commercial Code 2-304, 16 in that both statutes allow that
the price may be in money or otherwise. Likewise, in the law of
lease, LA. CIV .CODE art. 2675 now allows the payment of rent to
be in money or “otherwise,” specifically commodities, fruits,
services or other performances specific to support an onerous
contract. While this may suggest a pattern in the legislation, 17 there
does not appear to be any need to broaden the definition of a sale
under Civil Code article 2439. The category of exchange already
exists for these situations. Moreover, there is also a possibility of
categorizing the contract as an innominate contract to categorize
transactions where the price is not in money, but otherwise. 18

15. ALAIN LEVASSEUR & DAVID GRUNNING, LOUISIANA LAW OF SALE AND
LEASE 29 ( 2nd ed., 2011).
16. U.C.C. §2-304(1) states, “The price can be made payable in money or
otherwise. If it is payable in whole or in part in goods each party is a seller of
the goods which he is to transfer.”
17. In the international realm, the United Nations Convention on Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) makes no reference to price being
paid in money or otherwise. (emphasis added)
18. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2664 provides that, with several exceptions, the
contract of exchange is governed by the rules of the contract of sale. Innominate
Contracts are defined in art. 1914, in the general obligations portion of the Civil
Code.

NEEB V. LASTRAPES, AND THE CONFUSING STATE OF THE
ANCIENT DOCTRINE OF DELIVERY IN LOUISIANA
William Gaskins *
Is there a sale when the owner’s husband negotiates the deal,
the price is never agreed upon, neither the buyer nor the real owner
signs the document of sale, and the buyer moves into the house
only to be replaced by the old owner after a month? These are the
issues faced in the tangled 2011 Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeal case Neeb v. Lastrapes. 1 This comment will recount that
odd case, and then will briefly determine its place (and that of the
Louisiana law underlying it) in relation to Roman and French civil
law.
I. BACKGROUND AND THE DECISION OF THE COURT
In September of 2005, shortly after the Hurricane Katrina
disaster, John Lastrapes contacted Anne Neeb via email about
purchasing her house in Metairie, just outside of New Orleans.
Mrs. Neeb responded that she planned to sell her house for
$415,000; fifteen days later, Mr. Lastrapes sent her a $10,000
“deposit,” which Mrs. Neeb accepted into her bank account. Then,
Mr. Neeb (who did not share in his wife’s ownership) faxed an
“agreement to sell real estate” to Mr. Lastrapes. The document
proposed the price of $415,000 for the sale of the property, and
was signed by Mr. Neeb, purportedly as a proxy for his wife; yet
neither Mr. Lastrapes nor Mrs. Neeb ever signed the contract.
Despite this, the Neebs removed some, but not all, of their
possessions from the home, and vacated the home themselves. The
Lastrapes then moved in, changed the locks, erected a fence, and

* Candidate, J.D. and D.C.L. at Louisiana State University Law Center
(2013). He thanks Professor Olivier Moréteau for his assistance.
1. Neeb v. Lastrapes, 64 So. 3d 278 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2011).
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removed all of the yard’s existing landscape plants except the
grass.
After inhabiting the house for one month, Mr. Lastrapes called
Mrs. Neeb and told her he would not be purchasing the property.
He promptly quit the home, and the Neebs moved back in, all of
this in such short time that the Neebs were able to host their family
meal there on Thanksgiving Day (November 25, 2005). In the
three years that followed before the trial began, Mrs. Neeb claimed
a “homestead exemption” on the home and paid its property taxes,
specifically admitting that she was the owner of the house in
August, September, October, and November of 2005. Mrs. Neeb
filed suit against Lastrapes in April of 2006, eventually alleging
that the Lastrapes reneged on a valid obligation to buy the house.
Despite the complicated nature of the matter, the Fifth Circuit
made quick work of it on appeal. The Fifth Circuit overturned the
trial court decision and declared that no sale occurred because the
seller’s delivery and the buyer’s subsequent possession were too
transitory to be valid. 2 To be sure, the facts of the case are
peculiar; but given how far the parties went in transferring the
house, might not one argue that even the murkily-wrought delivery
between the Neebs and the Lastrapes was more than sufficient to
result in a valid sale?
II. COMMENTARY
A. The Louisiana Law, and Its Relation to French and Roman Law
The court’s decision is based on Louisiana Civil Code art.
1839, which states in pertinent part that, “A transfer of immovable
property must be made by authentic act or by act under private
signature.” 3 As an exception to that rule the Civil Code states,
2. Id. at 282. As a secondary line of reasoning seemingly based on the
same assumptions as those above, the court noted that a valid sale requires
ascertainment of thing, price, and consent, and those factors were not fulfilled in
this case. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2439.
3. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1839.
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“Nevertheless, an oral transfer is valid between the parties when
the property has been actually delivered and the transferor
recognizes the transfer when interrogated under oath.” 4 In other
words, oral transfers of immovables are valid when 1) there is
actual delivery and 2) the seller admits to the transfer. There is no
definition of “delivery” for immovables in Louisiana law except
that in Civil Code art. 2477, which only treats immovables
transferred by writing; 5 the question thus arises, how should a
court determine whether a delivery of immovables without a
writing has taken place?
In Roman law, the earliest way to make a sale was by delivery
of the thing (in French, tradition réelle). 6 From the requirement of
actual delivery, there arose formalistic doctrines which integrated
various degrees of fiction to take the place of delivery. In tradition
symbolique, delivery of the entire thing was replaced with delivery
of a smaller thing that represented or came from the bigger one.
Another method was delivery by long hand (longa manu), which
allowed the seller to merely show the thing to the buyer to effect a
sale. Another method of effecting a sale, and one useful when the
buyer had already possessed the thing, was delivery by short hand
(brevi manu), in which the seller merely declared the buyer to be
the owner. In such situations of pre-sale possession by the buyer,
the parties might instead effect delivery by adding an additional
element to the underlying contract, such as a usufruct, in order to
make the contract valid (tradition feinte). 7 Through all of these
institutions, delivery remained the element necessary to effect a
sale; only the degree of fiction allowed in the delivery changed.
Later, Old French law came up with nothing new, and used the
4. Id.
5. Concerning immovables, “Delivery of an immovable is deemed to take
place upon execution of the writing that transfers its ownership.”
6. ROBERT POTHIER, TRAITÉ DU DROIT DOMAINE DE PROPRIÉTÉ 126-32
(M. Hutteau fils, 2006); MARCEL PLANIOL, 1 TREATISE ON THE CIVIL LAW 52932 (Louisiana State Law Institute trans., William S. Hein & Co., 2005)
7. Id.
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Roman methods of delivery and fictitious delivery to satisfy the
continued requirement of delivery for the validation of a sale. 8
Notwithstanding the reverence of the French for Roman law,
the 1804 Code civil made a complete break from the past on the
subject of consecration of a sale. Whereas the necessity of
delivery, either real or fictitious, had always been the rule in civil
law before, the drafters of the Code civil declared consent to be the
new means of sale. Article 1589, in both the 1804 Code civil and
that of today, reads: “La promesse du vente vaut vente, lorsqu’il y
a consentement réciproque des deux parties sur la chose et sur le
prix.” 9 Furthermore, in article 1583, “[La vente] est parfaite entre
les parties, et la propriété est acquise de droit à l’acheteur à l’égard
du vendeur, dès qu’on est convenu de la chose et du prix, quoique
la chose n’ait pas encore été livrée ni le prix payé.” 10 In other
words, the French Code civil has held since its conception that
consent is what consecrates a sale. Planiol argues that the effect of
the new rule is the same as that of the old because Roman delivery
was often fictitious, and might as well have not occurred; 11 yet the
fundamental theory underlying sale was certainly changed in 1804.
Even where the Code civil requires writing to prove a sale, consent
is nonetheless the real modern method for achieving the sale, and
writing is merely proof of the consent. 12
Louisiana law states that, “[a] party who demands performance
of an obligation must prove the existence of the obligation;”13
likewise the French Code civil says, “[c]elui qui réclame
8. PLANIOL, supra note 6, at 532.
9. “The promise of sale becomes validly a sale when there is reciprocal
consent of the two parties on the thing and the price.” CODE CIVIL art. 1589 (fr.)
(years 1804 and 2005). Note that the modern-day article adds a stipulation for
land that is to be divided into allotments.
10. “[The sale] is perfect between the parties, and the property is acquired
by law by the buyer with regard to the vendor, when there is agreement on the
thing and the price, although the thing has not yet been delivered, nor the price
paid.” CODE CIVIL art. 1583 (fr.) (years 1804 and 2005).
11. PLANIOL, supra note 6, at 533-34.
12. PLANIOL, supra note 6, at vol. II, 564.
13. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1831.
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l’exécution d’une obligation doit la prouver.” 14 Doubtless this idea
is the reason for the requirement that a sale be validated by a
writing in authentic form. Perhaps the allowance for sale by
delivery in Louisiana Civil Code art. 1839 serves the same
purpose: not as a way around the requirement of proof of a
transfer, but simply as another, more ancient method of proof.
Whatever the reason for the delivery provision, its effect is exactly
that: although modern civil law doctrine has otherwise abandoned
its old method of consecrating a sale of an immovable, one
Louisiana Civil Code article keeps alive the tradition of
consecration by delivery.
B. Interpreting the Louisiana Rule and Neeb in Light of Legal
History
In Neeb v. Lastrapes, the court declared that Mrs. Neeb did not
meet the Louisiana Civil Code art. 1839 requirement that property
be “actually delivered,” despite the facts that the Neebs moved out
of their house, that they removed most of their possessions, that the
Lastrapes moved into the house and lived there for a month, and
that the Lastrapes changed the locks, dug up all of the plants, and
erected a fence around the property. It seems that under ancient
Roman and Old French law such actions would have constituted
not just fictional but real delivery of the immovable into the hands
of the sellers. Thus, the court’s decision that the actions do not
satisfy the delivery provision under Louisiana Civil Code art. 1839
departs from, not only the ancient law of delivery, but also the
words themselves in the modern allowance for valid sale when 1)
“the property has been actually delivered” and 2) “the transferor
recognizes the transfer.” 15
Present-day law of sale in both France and Louisiana is based
upon consent, rather than the ancient doctrine of sale by delivery.
14. “He who claims the execution of an obligation must prove it.” CODE
1315 (fr.) (1804 and 2005).
15. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1839.
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Yet one article of the Louisiana Civil Code—article 1839—pays
tribute to the ancient Roman and Old French delivery law.
Unfortunately, the short explanation of the court in Neeb leaves
readers to wonder why the lengthy and multi-faceted delivery to
and possession by the Lastrapes was not sufficient for the property
to have been “actually delivered” and thus to result in a valid sale.
Perhaps a future case will explain this questionable departure from
both the written and the historical law; but if to have our
explanation we must wait for another case with facts as odd as
those in Neeb, we may have to wait a long time.

UDOMEH V. JOSEPH: WHEN ACKNOWLEDGING
PATERNITY IS NOT ENOUGH
Taylor Gay*
I. BACKGROUND
The case of Udomeh v. Joseph involves a Plaintiff named Fidel
Udomeh who filed suit for the wrongful death of his son. 1 Mr.
Udomeh claimed that he and Sandra Joseph were the biological
parents of a child named S.U., who was born on June 16, 1997.
Although Mr. Udomeh and Ms. Joseph were never married, Mr.
Udomeh alleged that he played an active role in S.U.’s life.
In February of 2006, Mr. Udomeh discovered that Ms. Joseph
attempted to commit suicide while she was in the presence of S.U.
Ms. Joseph subsequently committed herself for psychiatric
treatment, and was released a few days later. Following this, Mr.
Udomeh lodged a formal complaint against Ms. Joseph with the
Louisiana Department of Social Services (LDSS). The LDSS, who
employed Ms. Joseph, responded to his complaint by sending a
form letter stating that they were “unable to investigate the
situation because it does not meet the legal and policy definition of
child abuse or neglect.”
A few years later, in January of 2009, Ms. Joseph experienced
a psychotic episode at a restaurant while S.U. was with her. The
Lafayette City Police sent her to the University Medical Center
(UMC) for treatment, and Ms. Joseph was eventually released with
S.U in her custody. Later that month, Ms. Joseph began acting
strangely and erratically at work, and her coworkers at the LDSS
consequently filed complaints about Joseph, voicing concern for
S.U.’s safety.
* Candidate, J.D. & Graduate Diploma in Comparative Law, LSU Law
Center (2013). Special thanks to Prof. John Randall Trahan for his guidance and
to Ms. Jennifer Lane and Prof. Olivier Moréteau for proofreading and editing.
1. Udomeh v. Joseph, 75 So. 3d 523 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2011).
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Finally, on February 21, 2009, Ms. Joseph drove S.U. to Grand
Coteau, Louisiana, and ordered him out of the car. She then used
her car to intentionally and repeatedly run over S.U. until he died.
Mr. Udomeh accordingly filed a wrongful death action against
Ms. Joseph, UMC, and the LDSS. UMC and the LDSS filed
exceptions of no right of action and/or lack of procedural capacity.
Because Mr. Udomeh failed to institute a Petition for Judgment of
Filiation under Louisiana Civil Code article 198, the trial court
sustained their exceptions and dismissed Mr. Udomeh’s case
against UMC and LDSS with prejudice.
Mr. Udomeh thereafter appealed the trial court’s decision,
alleging that the trial court erred in granting the exception because:
“(1) Louisiana Civil Code article 198 does not require that a father
establish paternity before having a right of action for wrongful
death, (2) Such a finding leads to inequitable, unjust, and otherwise
absurd consequence, and (3) The court should have considered the
dilatory exceptions of lack of procedural capacity instead.”
II. JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEAL OF
LOUISIANA
A majority of the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s
finding that Mr. Udomeh lacked a right of action. 2 The court relied
on First Circuit case Thomas v. Ardenwood Props. & Scottsdale
Ins. Co., 3 which addressed the question of whether a biological
father could institute a wrongful death action on behalf of his child
born out-of-wedlock. 4 The First Circuit suggested that such a
father would have a right to bring this action, but only if he first
complied with the requisite procedural formalities. The procedural
formalities contemplated by the First Circuit include a judgment of
filiation under Louisiana Civil Code article 198—action to obtain
2. Id. at 524.
3. See Thomas v. Ardenwood Props. & Scottsdale Ins. Co., 43 So. 3d 213
(La. App. 1 Cir. 2010).
4. Udomeh, 75 So. 3d at 525.
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which must be instituted within a peremptive period of one year
from the day of the child’s death.
In Udomeh v. Joseph, although Mr. Udomeh alleged that he
was S.U.’s biological father in his wrongful death petition, Mr.
Udomeh never instituted a Petition for Judgment of Filiation to
establish his filiation to S.U. within the one-year peremptive
period. Thus, because Mr. Udomeh failed to timely institute an
action to establish filiation, the appellate court decided that he is no
longer within the class of persons entitled to bring a wrongful
death action on S.U.’s behalf.
III. DISSENT BY JUDGE COOKS
Judge Cooks dissented from the majority’s opinion. According
to Judge Cooks, Louisiana Civil Code article 198 does not compel
a father to institute an action to establish paternity before pursuing
a wrongful death or survival action found in Louisiana Civil Code
articles 2315.1 and 2315.2. 5 Judge Cooks suggested that Louisiana
Civil Code article 198 is not mandatory. Her proposition is based
on the seemingly permissive language found in the statute, which
states that a “man may institute an action to establish his
paternity.” Judge Cooks argued that the majority should not have
allowed the permissive language found in Louisiana Civil Code
article 198 to “thwart the right of action provided to biological
fathers to bring actions under our tort laws.”
Judge Cooks went on to suggest that statutes found in the
family law section of the Louisiana Civil Code should not override
statutes found in the obligations section of the Code. She also
noted that the majority should not have granted the Defendants’
motion to strike references to and copies of the documents attached
to Udomeh’s brief, because these references and copies contained
evidence that Udomeh was the biological father of S.U. 6
5. Id. at 526
6. Id. at 528. These stricken documents and records show that Mr.
Udomeh is listed as the father of S.U. on S.U.’s birth certificate and that Mr.

260

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 5

IV. COMMENTARY
This case provides a stern warning for Louisiana lawyers
wishing to avoid malpractice claims: if representing an unfiliated
parent of a decedent child, you should institute a Petition for
Judgment of Filiation contemporaneously with any wrongful death
and survival actions or, at least, institute such an action within the
one year peremptive period. 7
In the author’s opinion, the court’s holding is severely unjust
because the court allowed Mr. Udomeh’s failure to comply with a
vague procedural requirement, i.e. the requirement to file a Petition
for Judgment of Filiation, to preclude his opportunity to recover
damages for the loss of his son. Mr. Udomeh obviously cared for
S.U. He provided child support to S.U., was declared to be S.U.’s
biological father in a court proceeding, and was listed as S.U.’s
father on S.U.’s birth certificate. 8 Furthermore, Mr. Udomeh
attempted to protect S.U. from the unstable behavior of Ms.
Joseph, but his efforts were quashed by LDSS, who employed Ms.
Joseph.

Udomeh always held himself out to the community as S.U.’s father. The trial
judge also stated that he had “no doubt” that Mr. Udomeh was S.U.’s biological
father. Further, Udomeh voluntarily paid child support until Ms. Joseph filed for
state mandated child support in 2001. After Ms. Joseph’s filing for mandated
child support, there were court proceedings in which it was determined that Mr.
Udomeh was indeed S.U.’s biological father, and the court ordered him to pay
monthly child support to S.U. on that basis.
7. This warning is equally applicable to cases, like Udomeh, where the
plaintiff has filiated himself to the child by means of a formal acknowledgment
under Louisiana Civil Code article 196. Article 196 provides that a man may
formally acknowledge a child not filiated to another man. Formal
acknowledgment may be accomplished by either authentic act or signing the
child’s birth certificate. This acknowledgement creates a presumption that the
man who acknowledges the child is the father. Nevertheless, this presumption
can only be invoked on behalf of the child. In the Udomeh matter, Mr. Udomeh
was presumed to be S.U.’s father under Louisiana Civil Code article 196
because he formally acknowledged S.U. by signing his birth certificate. Mr.
Udomeh’s presumption of paternity, however, could have only been invoked by
S.U. Thus, Mr. Udomeh could not use this presumption of paternity in his
wrongful death and survival action because the effects of this article flow only
in the child’s favor. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 196 (2009).
8. Udomeh, 75 So. 3d at 527.
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As Judge Cooks’ dissent correctly points out, Louisiana Civil
Code article 198 does not require a father to file a Petition for
Judgment of Filiation. 9 The author thus prays that the Louisiana
Supreme Court will take notice of this article’s words and reverse
the lower court’s decision so as to avoid inequitable judgments like
the one found in Udomeh v. Joseph.

9. Id. at 527.

A TALE OF TWO FATHERS: STATE OF LOUISIANA,
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES EX REL. P.B. V.
MICHAEL REED
Sarena Gaylor *
I. BACKGROUND
A child, P.B., was conceived in May 2000 while his mother,
B.B., was married and simultaneously involved in a sexual
relationship with her brother-in-law, Michael Reed. Because
B.B.’s husband had undergone a vasectomy, she believed Reed
was the biological father of P.B. On September 10, 2007, the
Department of Social Services (DOSS) filed suit against Reed to
Prove Paternity and Obtain Child Support.1 DOSS offered genetic
evidence, which reflected Reed’s probability of being P.B.’s
biological father as 99.999%.
On November 10, 2008, the juvenile court judge determined it
was in P.B.’s best interest for Reed to be established as P.B.’s
biological father. Following this ruling, a hearing took place to set
child support. Using two paycheck stubs from the mother, an
unauthenticated list of bank deposits for the biological father, two
different Louisiana Automated Support Enforcement System
(LASES) worksheets, and a 1099 form for the biological father, the
judge ordered Reed to pay B.B. $365.00 per month for P.B.’s
support.
The State appealed the award arguing that the juvenile court
judge erred, as a matter of law, in the methodology used to
calculate the child support obligation of a biological father. The
trial judge did not have the adequate evidence necessary under
* Candidate, J.D. & Graduate Diploma in Comparative Law, LSU Law
Center (2013). Special thanks to Prof. Randall Trahan and Prof. Katherine Spaht
for their assistance with research; and to Prof. Olivier Moreteau, Ms. Jennifer
Lane, Ms. Taylor Gay, and Ms. Chelsea Gomez for proofreading and editing.
1. 52 So. 3d 145 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2010).
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Louisiana Revised Statute 9:315, et seq. to determine Reed’s
financial obligation to the child.
II. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal reversed and
remanded the case. The trial court’s discretion in setting child
support is structured and limited 2 by the Guidelines for
Determination of Child Support which are set forth in Louisiana
Revised Statute 9:315 et seq. 3 Louisiana Revised Statute 9:315.2
requires “each party to provide a verified income statement
showing gross income and adjusted gross income with
documentation of current and past earnings…The documentation
shall include a copy of the party’s most recent Federal Tax
Return.” It was uncertain as to what exhibits of those transmitted to
the Fifth Circuit were actually introduced into evidence at the
hearing. Additionally, no copy of the parties’ most recent federal
tax return was provided. Moreover, it was unclear to the Fifth
Circuit how the trial judge came upon the amount of income
imputed to the legal father or the biological father with the
evidence provided. In cases where the record contains inadequate
information and documentation upon which to make a child
support determination under the guidelines, a remand to the to the
trial court is necessary. 4 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit concluded
the trial court judge abused her limited discretion in calculating the
child support award, and the court consequently vacated the award
and remanded the case to the lower court for a hearing to set child
support in compliance with the guidelines, including, but not
limited to Louisiana Revised Statute 9:315.2(A).

2. Id. at 147, citing State of Louisiana, Department of Social Services ex
rel. D.F. v. L.T., Jr., 934 So. 2d 687, 690 (La. 2006).
3. Reed, 52 So. 3d at 147.
4. Id.
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III. COMMENTARY
Unlike the rest of the United States, Louisiana has long
recognized the possibility of a child having two fathers: a
biological father and a legal presumptive father. 5 This concept,
referred to as “dual paternity,” is now legislatively provided for in
Louisiana Civil Code articles 197 and 198. 6 Dual paternity allows
a child to seek support from his or her biological father, though the
child is presumed to be the child of a marriage between the mother
and another man (legal father). 7
In Smith v. Cole, 8 the court stated “the biological father does
not escape his support obligations merely because others may
share with him the responsibility,” establishing that in
circumstances where a child already has a legal father to support
him or her, the biological father’s duty to the child is not
extinguished. Furthermore, biological fathers are civilly obligated
to support their offspring. 9 Whether the biological father has or has
not played a role in the child’s life has no material effect on the
obligations he has assumed. 10
The aforementioned duty the fathers owe to the child is, of
course, expressed by way of child support. Louisiana Revised
Statute 9:315.2 provides a rigid guideline as to the calculation of
basic child support. The statute requires parties to provide verified
income statements showing gross and adjusted income,
documentation of current and past earnings, a copy of the party’s
most recent federal tax return, and any documents related to the
5. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 197 (2011); see also art. 197 comments. (a),
(b); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 198 (2011); State of Louisiana ex rel. C.W. v.
Wilson, 855 So. 2d 913, 914 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/24/03).
6. LA. CIV. CODE art. 197 allows a child to establish paternity though he is
presumed to be a child of another. LA. CIV. CODE Art. 198 allows a man to
establish paternity of a child who is presumed to be that of another.
7. Wilson, 855 So. 2d at 914, citing State, Dep’t of Soc. Serv., Office of
Family Support ex rel. Munson v. Washington, 747 So. 2d 1245 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 12/08/99).
8. Smith v. Cole, 553 So. 2d 847, 854 (La. 1989).
9. Id.
10. Wilson, 855 So. 2d at 915.
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ownership interest in a business. 11 Using the information provided,
the parties combine the amounts of their adjusted gross incomes
and then determine (by percentage) his or her proportionate share
of the combined adjusted gross income. 12 The court then
determines the basic child support obligation amount from the
schedule provided for under Louisiana Revised Statute 9:315.19
using the combined adjusted monthly gross income of the parties
and the number of children for whom support is sought. 13 The
amount which each party is obligated to pay is divided in
proportion to each parents’ percentage share of the combined
adjusted gross income. 14 While seemingly fair and equitable to the
parties involved, the statute contemplates that there are two – and
only two—parents, one mother and one father.
Although dual paternity has long been a part of Louisiana law,
there has yet to be either legislation or jurisprudence constante
developed to establish guidelines to determine the legal and
biological fathers’ financial obligations to the child in terms of
child support. The court in State ex rel. C.W. v. Wilson attempted
to resolve this issue by combining the adjusted gross incomes of
the biological and legal father with that of the mother. 15 Utilizing
the schedule within Louisiana’s current child support guidelines,
Louisiana Revised Statute 9:315.19, the paternal support obligation
was established. 16 The court then compared the two fathers’ shares
of income and the mother’s income and determined that the
fathers, together, were responsible for 67.4 percent ($519.88) of
the child’s total support obligation; the mother was responsible for
the remaining 32.6 percent ($251.48). 17 Of the $519.88, the legal
father was responsible for 65 percent ($339) of the paternal
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §315.2(A) (2011).
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §315.2(C) (2011).
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §315.2(D) (2011).
Supra note 12.
Wilson, 855 So. 2d at 913-914 (2003).
Id.
Id. at 915 n.5.
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obligation, and the biological father was responsible for 35 percent
($180.88) of the paternal obligation. 18 The Second Circuit Court of
Appeal affirmed the lower court’s judgment finding that the
calculation was done “in the spirit of the guidelines [of LA. REV.
STAT. §9:315.2],” because child support was allocated in
proportion to the needs of the child and the ability of the parents to
provide such support. 19 The Fifth Circuit in Reed, noting the
formula accepted by the Second Circuit, described this
methodology as “interesting” and remanded the question to the
lower court to determine a proper child support payment in
compliance with Louisiana Revised Statute 9:315. 20 Again, this is,
strictly speaking, impossible because Louisiana Revised Statute
9:315 does not provide a formula for multiple fathers.
Though the Wilson resolution allows a child to receive the
necessary support, are we inadvertently rewarding a woman for
committing adultery? Including an extra parent in the child support
calculation will only reduce the obligation of the mother. Further,
accepting adultery is inconsistent with Louisiana’s strong public
policy that considers the sanctity of marriage and familial values
top priority.
On the other hand, if courts do not follow the procedure set
forth in Wilson, where does the legal father stand in a dual
paternity situation? Should the legal father be required to support
the child at all? If so, are the two fathers bound solidarily on the
obligation to the support the child? If the legal father is forced to
pay, can he seek indemnity from the biological father? Or, if he
cannot obtain indemnity, can he at least obtain contribution? If he
can, then in what amount?
These are the questions facing Katherine Spaht, Professor
Emeritus at LSU Law Center, chairman and reporter of the
Marriage and Persons Committee of the Louisiana State Law
18. Id. at 915-16.
19. Id. at 916.
20. Reed, 52 So. 3d 145, 148 n.2.
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Institute and member of the Child Support Committee. The
Marriage and Persons Committee has been given the task by the
Louisiana Legislature to identify all areas of law, which are
effected by “dual paternity”; one of these areas, naturally, is child
support. 21 On behalf of the Marriage and Persons Committee, Prof.
Spaht drafted the proposed resolution regarding child support in a
dual paternity situation. 22 The proposal acknowledges that the
guidelines used in Wilson were proper: considering the income of
all three parents and proportioning the responsibility of each parent
gave the most satisfactory resolution. 23 Prof. Spaht’s proposal will
likely be introduced at the next Child Support Review Committee
guidelines meeting, which meets every four years (the next
meeting to be held in 2016). 24 Until then, courts have freedom to
determine dual paternity child support in any manner that strikes
them as consistent with the current Child Support Guidelines.

21. Dual Paternity: Hearing on Child Support Before the Marriage & Pers.
Comm., 2012 Sess. 20 (prepared by Katherine S. Spaht, Reporter, Marriage &
Pers. Comm.).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §315.16 (A) (2011).

SS EX REL. K.B.D. V. DREW: THE FAILURE TO ALIGN
BIOLOGICAL AND LEGAL PATERNITY—WHEN CLEAR
AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE ISN’T ENOUGH
Chelsea Gomez ∗
I. BACKGROUND
The case of State of Louisiana, Department of Social Services
ex rel. K.B.D. v. Drew 1 required the Louisiana Second Circuit
Court of Appeal to determine whether a presumed father, under
Louisiana Civil Code article 185, could successfully file a petition
to disavow paternity more than five years after the birth of his
presumed child by providing clear and convincing evidence that he
was not the biological father of the child. 2 Particularly, the court
was asked to determine whether a presumed father could
successfully disavow paternity when he had no reason to question
paternity until four years after the child’s birth.
After becoming pregnant out of wedlock, the mother of K.B.D.
married her boyfriend, Marion Drew, Jr., in December 2003. Six
months later, on June 14, 2004, the child was born of the marriage,
and the husband signed the certificate of live birth. The husband
filed for divorce more than four years later. At this point, he never
questioned the biological paternity of the child. After the state filed
a rule to establish support on behalf of the minor child in April
2008, 3 the husband acquired knowledge that the mother might
∗ Candidate, J.D./D.C.L., 2013, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana
State University. The author would like to thank Professors John Randall Trahan
and Olivier Moréteau for their guidance throughout the writing of this Case
Note.
1. 46,337, (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/29/11); 70 So. 3d 1011.
2. Id. at 1012.
3. Id. at 1011, n.1 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 651 and 608) “. . .recipients of
AFDC under Title IV D of the Social Security Act assign their child support
rights to the state and are required to cooperate (unless good cause for refusing
to do so is determined to exist) in whatever legal action the state undertakes. By
assigning their child support rights in return for AFDC aid, they give the states
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have slept with another man around the time of conception. In June
2008, the presumed father requested DNA testing, which
ultimately determined that he was not the biological father. In July
2009, he filed a petition to annul his acknowledgment and in
October 2009 amended his petition to disavow paternity. This suit
was brought more than four years after the birth and more than a
year after questioning filiation.
II. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
A divided court 4 upheld the legal presumption of paternity and
dismissed the father’s disavowal action as prescribed, with a
concurring opinion advocating for the application of contra non
valentem when a father, such as the presumptive father in the
instant case, was not informed of the possibility that the baby could
have been fathered by another man. 5 In its legal analysis, the
majority quickly disposed of the petition in which the presumed
father attempted to annul his acknowledgement of paternity. 6 He
alleged that Louisiana Revised Statute 9:392(A)(7)(b) allowed him
to annul his acknowledgment because he was able to prove, by
clear and convincing evidence, that he was not the biological
father. 7 The court, however, recognized that the acknowledgment
referred to is not that which can be accomplished by the signing of
the birth certificate at the time of birth, but rather that which can be
accomplished by the execution of an authentic act of
acknowledgment or by the subsequent signing of the birth
certificate. 8 As the court correctly noted, the presumed father in
this case had not made such an acknowledgment. In addition, the

the opportunity to recoup the financial drain imposed by the welfare system on
the state and federal treasuries.”
4. Id. at 1016 (Judge Stewart concurring in a separate opinion).
5. Id. at 1015, 1016.
6. Id. at 1014.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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court noted, even if the father had made such an acknowledgment
and even if it were to have been annulled, the outcome of the case
would not have been changed: the child was born of the marriage;
therefore, the presumption of paternity created by Civil Code
article 185 was valid without any acknowledgment required. 9
The court relied on Louisiana Civil Code articles 185 and 189
in deciding this dispute.10 Article 185 states, “The husband of the
mother is presumed to be the father of a child born during the
marriage or within three hundred days from the date of the
termination of the marriage.” 11The husband and presumed father
may rebut this presumption by bringing a “disavowal action.”12
This action is further governed by the one year liberative
prescription period of Louisiana Civil Code Article 189, which
provides that prescription commences from the day the husband
learns of, or should have learned of the birth of the child. 13 The
only exception provided is if the husband and mother continuously
lived separate and apart during the three hundred days preceding
the birth. 14 In that case, prescription does not begin to run until the
husband is notified in writing that someone has asserted he is the
child’s father. 15
The court recognized that the presumed father’s testimony, the
mother’s testimony, and the DNA results successfully proved, by
clear and convincing evidence, that he was not the biological
father, thus, meeting the requirements of Louisiana Civil Code
article 187 for a successful disavowal action. 16 Regardless of such
proof, the language of article 189 is clear and unambiguous—
prescription should start on the date the presumed father learned or

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id.
Id. at 1012-1013.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 185 (2011).
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 187 (2011).
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 189 (2011).
Id.
Id.
Drew, 70 So. 3d at 1013; LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 187 (2011).
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should have learned of the birth. 17 Though the prescriptive period
may be subject to the doctrine of contra non valentem, 18 the court
recognized that the presumed father, under these circumstances,
clearly knew that the child was born on the date of birth, which
disallowed interruption or suspension of the prescriptive period. 19
Therefore, by the time the complaint was filed in the instant
matter, the cause of action had prescribed. Under this analysis, the
majority of the Second Circuit seems willing to apply the doctrine
of contra non valentem only if the father has no reason to know
about the actual birth, not in cases where he had no reason to
question the biological paternity until a later date. Though this
reasoning is consistent with the public policy to “protect innocent
children, born during the marriage,” the doctrine would be
unnecessary in such circumstances. 20 If the husband has no reason
to know of the birth of the child, article 189 already provides for
interruption of prescription until he should have learned of the
birth. 21 Although the court states that contra non valentem could
be applied to this prescriptive period, its reasoning rejecting its
application seemingly bars the doctrine from use in disavowal
suits.
The Second Circuit recognized that the changes made in 2005
to the law of filiation liberalize the strict nature of the
presumptions, more closely aligning biological and legal
17. LA. CIV. CODE Ann. art. 189 (2011).
18. See Corsey v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Corrections, 375 So. 2d 1319, 132122 (recognizing that “Louisiana jurisprudence has recognized a limited
exception [to the running of prescription] where in fact and for good cause a
plaintiff is unable to exercise his cause of action when it accrues” The Court also
recognizes that this “principle is often denoted by the maxim Contra non
valentem agere nulla currit praescriptio” and is “especially applicable in the
present instance, where the plaintiff's inability to act is due to the defendant's
willful or negligent conduct.”); Benjamin West Janke and François-Xavier
Licari, Contra Non Valentem in France and Louisiana: Revealing the
Parenthood, Breaking a Myth, 71 LA. L. REV. 503 (explaining the relationship
between the Louisiana and French courts’ treatment of the extra-codal principle
of contra non valentem in prescription law).
19. Drew, 70 So. 3d at 1014.
20. Id. at 1015.
21. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 189 (2011).
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paternity. 22 These changes make the presumption more easily
rebuttable, including changing the period to disavow from
peremptive to prescriptive and extending an action of contestation
to the mother of the child. 23 However, the court states that the
unambiguous prescription period must govern, and prescription
was deemed to have run. Therefore, the Second Circuit affirmed
the grant of the state’s exception of prescription. 24 This reasoning
is in stark contrast with the concurring opinion. Judge Stewart’s
separate concurring opinion advocates for the application of contra
non valentem, a doctrine standing for the “proposition that
prescription does not run against those who cannot act.” 25
Louisiana courts allow contra non valentem to apply and prevent
the running of liberative prescription when the “cause of action is
not known or reasonably knowable by the plaintiff.” 26 Judge
Stewart states that this doctrine should be applicable “in matters
like this one, where the mother withheld information” and
“prevented him from availing himself of the disavowal action.” 27
In particular, the mother never informed the presumed father that
she was still sexually involved with her ex-boyfriend at the time of
conception. 28 Whereas the majority seemingly would never apply
contra non valentem to a disavowal action, Judge Stewart
recommends this doctrine be applied when the mother withholds
information necessary for the presumed father to avail himself to
his cause of action.
III. COMMENTARY
The Second Circuit majority decision in SS ex rel. K.B.D. v.
Drew reinforces the notion that the presumption of paternity found
22. Drew, 70 So. 3d at 1013-1015.
23. Id. at 1014.
24. Id. at 1013-1015.
25. Id. at 1017.
26. Id. (citing Corsey v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Corrections, 375 So. 2d
13139, 1321-22 (La. 1979)).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1016.
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in Louisiana Civil Code article 185 is one of the strongest
presumptions in Louisiana law. 29 Regardless of the ability to
determine biological paternity with practical certainty (i.e. using
advances in technology and science such as DNA testing), the
decision strictly enforces the prescriptive period set forth in article
189. The court explained its holding by recognizing the Louisiana
Supreme Court’s explanation of the purpose of the presumption
stating, “The action to disavow is to protect innocent children, born
during marriage, against scandalous attacks upon their paternity by
the husband;” because of this important purpose, the presumption
should be zealously guarded and enforced. 30 However, under the
facts provided in the case, it was clear, through testimony, that the
mother knew the identity of the other man she engaged in sexual
intercourse with, making it possible to find and impose liability on
the biological father for the support of his child.
The policy questions raised by Judge Stewart’s concurring
opinion are especially noteworthy. Particularly, he recognizes that
this decision requires a man to support a non-biological child while
the known, although absent biological father “escapes financial
responsibility.” 31 The majority does say that contra non valentem
could be applied to disavowal actions, but its discussion of the
doctrine would likely lead to confusion in lower courts when
applying this doctrine to similar disputes. The court merely
recognizes its potential application, recognizes that the Plaintiff
clearly knew of the child’s birth and believed at this time that it
was his biological child, and that there was no question of filiation
until almost four years later. 32 There is no further explanation as to
exactly why the doctrine should not apply. The court’s explanation
seemingly hinges on the fact that the presumed father clearly knew
29. See, e.g., Tannehill v. Tannehill, 261 So. 2d 619 (La. 1972); Williams v.
Williams, 87 So. 2d 707 (La. 1956).
30. Drew, 70 So. 3d at 1015 (citing Gallo v. Gallo, 03-0794 (La. 12/3/03);
861 So. 2d 168).
31. Id. at 1016.
32. Id. at 1014.
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of the birth, and that the prescription period is unambiguous.
However, Judge Stewart’s recommendation to remedy this
situation seems reasonable—to apply contra non valentem in
matters, such as the present case, where the mother withheld
information, thereby making it impossible for the father to
“reasonably know” of his possible cause of action. 33 Today, this
seems especially reasonable with the availability of DNA
technology, allowing for biological and legal paternity to be more
closely aligned without violating the strong public policy in favor
of providing child support. Until there is clarification in the Second
Circuit’s application of contra non valentem, the prescriptive
period for disavowal actions will likely be strictly enforced to
protect children born of a marriage.
Another potential remedy for this apparent inequity would be
to extend the policy embedded in the Louisiana Civil Code
provisions on the designation of “dual paternity” 34 to
circumstances similar to those in the instant case—when a legal
father is deceived by the mother and there is a known biological
father. Civil Code article 198 would seemingly be the most
relevant statement of law, capable of application through analogy
to the instant situation.35 This article allows a biological father to
establish paternity even if the child has a presumed father. 36 The
action to designate a biological father when a presumed father
exists is typically limited by a one-year peremptive period,
commencing at the time of birth of the child. However, the
33. Id. at 1017.
34. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 197, 198 (2011).
35. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 198 (2011); “A man may institute an action to
establish his paternity of a child at any time except as provided in this Article.
The action is strictly personal. If the child is presumed to be the child of another
man, the action shall be instituted within one year from the day of the birth of
the child. Nevertheless, if the mother in bad faith deceived the father of the child
regarding his paternity, the action shall be instituted within one year from the
day the father knew or should have known of his paternity, or within ten years
from the day of the birth of the child, whichever first occurs. In all cases, the
action shall be instituted no later than one year from the day of the death of the
child. The time periods in this Article are peremptive.”
36. Id.
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legislature provides a limited application of contra non valentem in
circumstances of the mother’s deception of the biological father. 37
Specifically, the action may be instituted within one year from
when the biological father knew or should have known of his
paternity, but at the latest, within ten years of the child’s birth.
Applying a similar contra non valentem period for the presumed
father would not defy the policy in favor of child support as long
as appropriate safeguards are followed—as long as a known
biological father exists and may be held liable for support. Since
dual paternity is already recognized in Louisiana, the legislature
could at least allow courts to designate dual paternity in these
narrow instances of deception of the presumed father. In these
cases, courts could then adopt the process already recognized for
setting child support in dual paternity cases designated under Civil
Code articles 197 and 198. 38 Doing so would not only ensure
support for the child, but would also coincide with the policy
argument recognized in the Reed case. In particular, the court
stated, “the biological father does not escape his support
obligations merely because others may share with him the
responsibility. Biological fathers are civilly obligated for the
support of the offspring.” 39 In sum, with the proper legislative
safeguards, there is no reason to continue requiring presumed
fathers to be solely liable to support a child with a known
biological father when the mother intentionally deceived the
presumed father about the conception of the child. Especially with
modern DNA testing, there should be action taken to better align
legal and biological paternity.
37. Id.
38. See State of Louisiana, Department of Social Services ex rel. P.B. v.
Reed, 10-410 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/26/10); 52 So. 3d 145 (requiring both the
presumed and biological father to provide support to the child because it was
found to be within the child’s best interest; and also requiring the child support
guidelines to be followed, with each party providing to the court a verified
income statement showing gross income and adjusted gross income, together
with documentation of current and past earnings).
39. Id. at 147.

“TRESPASS” TO MOVABLES? SAY NO MORE.
MCI COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES, INC. V. HAGAN
AND LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE ARTICLE 2315
Bill Hudson *
Answering a certified question from the U.S. Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals, the Louisiana Supreme Court recently refused to
recognize the tort of trespass to chattels, declaring instead that the
claim at issue was governed by the general delictual liability
provision of Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.
I. BACKGROUND
MCI Communications maintained claims of trespass and
negligence against co-defendants Hagan and Joubert in federal
court. 1 The suit arose after an MCI fiber optic cable, a portion of
which ran underground Hagan’s property, was cut, allegedly by
Joubert while operating a backhoe on Hagan’s land. 2 At trial, MCI
attempted to demonstrate the defendants’ negligence by claiming
noncompliance with the Louisiana Damage Prevention Act. 3

* J.D. & Graduate Diploma in Civil Law, LSU Law Center (2012).
Special thanks to Prof. William Crawford for his research suggestions,
proofreading, and editing; to Prof. Olivier Moreteau for loans of books and
editing; and to Ms. Jennifer Lane and Mr. Mark Assad for proofreading and
editing.
1. Verizon Business Global initially brought the action, and MCI was
substituted when its ownership of the damaged movable was established. MCI
Communications Services, Inc. v. Hagan, 641 F. 3d 112, 114 (5th Cir. 2011).
2. MCI Communications Service, 641 F. 3d at 114.
3. MCI Communications Services, Inc. v. Hagan, 74 So. 3d 1148, 1149,
1151 (La. 10/25/11). The Louisiana Underground Utilities and Facilities
Damage Prevention Law, or “Damage Prevention Act” as used by the court, LA.
REV. STAT. § 49:1749.11 et seq., provides among other things that “no person
shall excavate… near the location of an underground facility or utility… without
having first ascertained, in the manner prescribed in Subsection B of this
Section, the specific location as provided in R.S. 40:1749.14(D) of all
underground facilities or utilities in the area which would be affected by the
proposed excavation or demolition.” LA. REV. STAT. § 49:1749.13(A).
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The trial court found that MCI had only a contractual right for
its cable to run through Hagan’s property according to the sale
terms when Hagan purchased the land, and not a servitude. A jury
found the co-defendants had not acted negligently. 4 Based on these
findings, the trial judge declined, over MCI’s objection, to instruct
the jury, in essence: “A Defendant may be held liable for an
inadvertent trespass resulting from an intentional act.” 5
Reviewing the case on MCI’s appeal, the U.S. Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals reasoned that, without a servitude in MCI’s
favor, no trespass to land could have occurred. Although, finding
enough evidence to establish Joubert had severed the cable while
intentionally operating the backhoe, the Fifth Circuit believed
“MCI may [have been] entitled to have the jury instructed on the
claim of trespass to chattels.” 6 Having been presented with no
Louisiana Supreme Court decision on the requisite intent for
“trespass to chattels” (or in regard to the very existence of that tort
in Louisiana), 7 the Court of Appeals certified to the State Supreme
Court the question:
Is the proposed jury instruction in this case, which states
that “[a] Defendant may be held liable for an inadvertent
trespass resulting from an intentional act,” a correct
statement of Louisiana law when the trespass at issue is the
severing of an underground cable located on property
owned by one of the alleged trespassors [sic], and the
property is not subject to a servitude by the owners of the
underground cable but only to the contractual right to keep
it, as an existing cable, underneath the property? 8

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

MCI Communications Services, 74 So. 3d at 1151.
Id.
MCI Communications Services, 641 F. 3d at 115.
MCI Communications Services, 74 So. 3d at 1152.
MCI Communications Services, 641 F. 3d at 116.
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II. LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT DECISION
To reply to the Fifth Circuit, the Louisiana Supreme Court
framed the issue as “whether Louisiana law recognizes a distinct
tort of ‘trespass to chattels’ and, if so, can a ‘trespass to chattels’
be committed inadvertently if it results from an otherwise
intentional act.” 9 The court first noted an important distinction
between trespass to chattels and the facts of the Hagan case:
relying on Black’s Law Dictionary, legal scholars, and The
Restatement (Second) of Torts, 10 the court concluded that “the
common law claim of trespass to chattels appears to require intent
to interfere with another’s interest in movable property before an
action for trespass to chattels may lie.” 11
The court then concluded that, regardless of the presence or
absence of intent, an owner of movable property damaged by
another “has an adequate remedy under the law of tort without
recourse to the common law trespass to chattels” under the
broadly-phrased Louisiana Civil Code article 2315(A)—“[e]very
act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges him by
whose fault it happened to repair it.” 12 A remedy under article
2315 does not preclude evidence of a defendant’s noncompliance
with the Damage Prevention Act, since, even though “a violation
of the statute does not result in either strict civil liability or
negligence per se,” ignoring the duty to locate “an underground
utility as required by statute subjects the excavator to delictual
liability under the theory of negligence, and any statutory violation
is considered in the traditional duty-risk analysis.” 13 MCI’s
proposed jury instruction was thus “not a correct statement of
Louisiana law.” 14

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id. at 1153.
Id. at 1153-1154 & n.8-10.
Id. at 1154.
Id. at 1155 (quoting LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315(A)).
Id. at 1155.
Id.
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III. COMMENTARY
Hagan is a key illustration of the basic difference in how
the common law and the civil law remedy damages. The decision
underlines, and will doubtlessly help to preserve, Louisiana’s civil
law tradition.
The question certified by the Fifth Circuit appears to have
resulted from MCI’s ignoring Louisiana’s encompassing codal
framework for remedying damages, and needlessly pinning its case
to a “trespass” theory. Presented with the issue of trespass, the
Fifth Circuit wondered whether a certain type of trespass theory—
trespass to chattels—was applicable to the claim.
At common law, a claim for damage to movable property
would involve a more particularized claim centered on one or more
specific theories of recovery, since common law tort suits,
traceable to old writs, 15 are maintained under theories of recovery
connected to specific sets of facts. 16 The task of fitting the right
theory with its corresponding elements to an injury-causing
occurrence can become highly technical: regarding cases of
damage to buried utility lines, Prosser and Keeton note that the
intent element alone produces contention in the fact-specific
inquiries surrounding trespass to chattels claims. 17 By contrast,
Louisiana Civil Code article 2315 gives legal effect to a general
principle, as is characteristic of codal law, 18 that there may be a
remedy for any act which causes damage, thus removing the

15. 1 DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., PRACTITIONER TREATISE SERIES: THE LAW OF
TORTS 127, 162 (2d ed. 2011) (brief background of writs for trespasses to land
and personal property).
16. H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD 211 (2000);
(Common law “could not, and did not, subsequently modernize itself, in terms
of overall expression…. [T]here is still a law of torts (the plural is important)
since there were no general principles of liability in England, only given
wrongs…”) Id. at 217.
17. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 86 (W. Page
Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984).
18. GLENN, supra note 16 at 126; see generally, Alain Levasseur, On the
Structure of a Civil Code, 44 TUL. L. REV. 693 (1970).
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complexity of defining and recognizing specific torts claim-byclaim and fact-by-fact.
In Hagan, the State Supreme Court applied article 2315
literally, in accordance with the Code’s rule of interpretation:
“When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not
lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written
and no further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of
the legislature.” 19 The court recognized article 2315’s capacity to
remedy damage, and it prevented the adoption of a common law
theory which, given its historical application, could have become
the basis for tort liability for trespass alone, even when trespass
does not produce damages. 20
In his treatise on Louisiana tort law, Professor William E.
Crawford states, “The fact of trespass in itself is not an actionable
civil wrong, contrary to the common law. All actions for trespass
under Louisiana law have involved damage done by the trespasser
after or in the course of the trespass.” 21 Indeed, under the
reasoning of cases like Dickie's Sportsman's Centers, Inc. v.
Department of Transp. & Dev., an action in trespass without
damages would be absurd in Louisiana:
In the assessment of damages arising out of trespass, the
trial court has much discretion. The damage, however, must
be certain, and the discretion exercised only to the extent of
the damage and ascertained from all the facts and
circumstances. 22
Without damage, there can be no recovery; therefore, there is
no “tort” in the sense of “[a] civil wrong, other than breach of
contract, for which a remedy may be obtained.” 23 The simple
19. LA. CIV. CODE art. 9.
20. KEETON ET AL., supra note 17 at 67.
21. WILLIAM E. CRAWFORD, 12 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE: TORT
LAW 242 (2d ed. 2009).
22. Dickie's Sportsman's Centers, Inc. v. Dept. of Transp. and Dev., 477 So.
2d 744, 751 (La. Ct. App. 1 Cir. 1985) (citations in original omitted).
23. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1626 (9th ed. 2009).
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solution in Hagan is a consistent application of these concepts: a
claim for trespass to movable property cannot stand alone and
apart from a claim for damages; thus Civil Code article 2315
governs actions where there is damage resulting from trespass.
Trespass as recognized in Louisiana appears to be a tort
almost completely anticipated by the broad wording of article
2315. It would seem that filing a suit “for trespass” should be
effectively unnecessary in Louisiana, since a “suit for damages
pursuant to La. Civ. Code art. 2315” would likely be a more
accurate description. Even trespass accompanied by the conversion
of trees on another’s property, the distinctive instance where
interference with private property gives rise to enhanced damages
in Louisiana, is governed by statute, and not fact-specific common
law theory. 24 Where trespass is concerned, the language of the
Civil Code, while broad, does not seem to need court-created
factors “borrowed from the common law of torts” to substantially
clarify how liability is to be proven, as opposed to concepts like
“assault, battery, false imprisonment…[, and] negligence,” in
regards to which the common law has been readily enlisted to
define essential elements. 25 Rather, a plaintiff in a trespass action
succeeds by proving what the Code plainly and simply requires:
damage caused by another’s act.
Yet how valuable is Hagan in “predict[ing] the path of
Louisiana tort law” 26 generally, or the direction of state law in its
entirety? The opinion seems at first glance a sweeping defense of
civilian methodology, insisting on reliance upon the Civil Code’s
language despite a common law theory which might more closely
fit the facts alleged, and reconciling a claim for damages to
24. LA. REV. STAT. § 3:4278.1; CRAWFORD, supra note 21.
25. Harriet Spiller Dagget et al., A Reappraisal Appraised: A Brief for the
Civil Law of Louisiana, 12 TUL. L. REV. 12, 32 (1937). See also, CRAWFORD,
supra note 21, at 22 (“The codal texts governing délit are so spare and general
that the court must as a practical matter write most of the tort law with its own
pen, though it is done in the name of interpretation.”).
26. CRAWFORD, supra note 21, at 24.
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movable property with statutory text. But the Louisiana trespass
claim might be rather unique even in Louisiana tort law for the
ease with which it can be understood and maintained. Proving
liability for other delicts in the state appears to require more
attention to the factors of specific wrongs, as evidenced by the
importation of common law elements to define many other torts. 27
Another indication of plain application of statutory language
being a less-than-universal principle is the wide discretion
exercised by Louisiana appellate courts in tort cases. Prof.
Crawford has identified forty-five key cases spanning twenty-four
years which represent the state judiciary’s independent
modifications of rules on such matters as strict liability,
prescription, and damages for mental and emotional suffering. 28
The old notion that “[t]here is no liability in this State for damages
sounding in tort except where such liability is expressly or
impliedly authorized by the codal articles and statutes of the
state” 29 seems unlikely to remain absolute when one reads a long
list of Louisiana appellate decisions illustrating “[l]iberalization of
tort liability by the Louisiana appellate courts.” 30
In Louisiana jurisprudence on other matters of law as well,
strict adherence to civil law principles has counterparts. While one
can identify close adherence to elementary civil law principles in a
number of court opinions, 31 there are others in which common law
doctrine seems about to summarily supplant existing statutory
principles. For instance, in the 2004 Louisiana Supreme Court
decision in Avenal v. State, the majority 32 and concurring 33
27. Dagget et al., supra note 25.
28. Id. at 25-30.
29. Martin v. Brown, 240 La. 674, 680 (La. 1960).
30. CRAWFORD, supra note 21, at 25.
31. See e.g., State ex rel. D.W., 865 So. 2d 45, 46 (La. 2004) (on statutory
construction); Gregor v. Argenot Great Cent. Ins. Co., 851 So. 2d 959, 964 n.6
(La. 2003) ("Legislation is superior to any other source of law and is a solemn
expression of legislative will."); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Sewerage &
Water Bd., 710 So. 2d 290, 292 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1998) (on sources of law).
32. Avenal v. State, 886 So. 2d 1085, 1101-1102, 1108 n.28 (La. 2004);
John J. Costonis, Avenal v. State: Takings and Damagings in Louisiana, 65 LA.
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opinions suggested a common law public trust doctrine could be
applied in Louisiana, despite scholars’ conclusions that Louisiana’s
constitution and legislation might well serve the purposes met by
the public trust doctrine in other states. 34
However, despite any drifting away from the pure civil law
caused by Louisiana judicial decisions, 35 the delict akin to trespass
to chattels as concerned in Hagan seems particularly suited for
straightforward application of the Civil Code’s language, and thus
is unlikely to be complicated by judicial gloss in the future.
“Trespass” claims like that brought by MCI are suits for either
unauthorized intrusion upon another’s property, or damage to
another’s property. 36 Louisiana law does not remedy mere
unauthorized intrusions if no damage has resulted, and plainly
allows recovery when there is injury caused by another. Refusing
to recognize a specific action for trespass to chattels, the Louisiana
Supreme Court refused to complicate the plain meaning of article
2315 and the requirements for maintaining a suit for delictual
damages, and declined to expand unnecessarily state law through
jurisprudence. The court followed its charge from the legislature

L. REV. 1015, 1030 (2005) (“Justice Victory… announced… the public trustbased doctrine acknowledging the ‘right of the state to disperse fresh water…
over saltwater marshes in order to prevent coastal erosion.’”).
33. Avenal, 886 So. 2d 1085, at 1115 n.8 (Weimer, J., concurring).
34. Lee Hargrave, The Public Trust Doctrine: A Plea for Precision, 53 LA.
L. REV. 1535, 1541-1544 (1993); A. N. Yiannopoulos, Five Babes Lost in the
Tide—A Saga of Land Titles in Two States: Philips Petroleum Co. v.
Mississippi, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1357, 1370 (1988).
35. The ultimate question, likely, is whether Louisiana courts have
sometimes looked completely beyond statutory law and proceeded according to
a kind of common law, or have acted within their authority under Civil Code
article 4: “When no rule for a particular situation can be derived from legislation
or custom, the court is bound to proceed according to equity. To decide
equitably, resort is made to justice, reason, and prevailing usages.” This issue
cannot be fully examined here. However, the breadth of article 2315 in
sanctioning remedies for all damage-causing acts, as well as the public trust-like
statutory law of Louisiana, see e.g., LA. CIV. CODE arts. 450-452, 455-456;
Hargrave, supra note 34, call into question the necessity of judicially-created
rules in cases to which this legislation would seem to apply.
36. MCI Communications Services, 74 So. 3d 1151.
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most exactly, applied what the Code clearly provides, and was
thereby true to the law, in principle and in letter.

MALONE V. MALONE: STRICT APPLICATION OF
AUTHENTICITY REQUIREMENT OF FORMALITY OF
DONATIONS IN LOUISIANA
Daniel Lee *
I. BACKGROUND
WEI, a Louisiana corporation, was a family business with
two majority shareholders, Ken and Greg Malone. 1 When their
father died in 2007, they each owned 849 shares, while their father
owned two shares. His surviving spouse, Doris Malone, succeeded
one share as part of her one-half interest in community property.
The other share was succeeded by Ken and Greg in the capacity of
legatees. Based on a judgment rendered in 2009, Ken and Greg
Malone ended up having 849 and half shares each, and Doris had
one share.
Later in 2009, Doris purported to execute a donation of her one
share equally to Ken and Greg so that they would own 850 shares
each. The act of donation was drawn up in the form of a notarial
act but was not dated or notarized. It stated that Doris delivered her
share to Greg and Ken and they accepted the donation by receiving
the property, but it did not indicate whether the certificate of stock
was in fact transferred by actual endorsement and delivery.
Greg was the manager of WEI, and Ken was an employee at
the sales department of WEI. They had dispute about selling the
business of WEI – Ken was for the sale, while Greg was against it.
While considering quitting his employment from WEI, Ken
requested certain documents from WEI’s attorney, including his
mother’s donation of one share to her sons. The attorney warned
* J.D. & Graduate Diploma in Comparative Law, LSU Law Center, 2012.
Special thanks to Prof. Olivier Moreteau for his superb revisions and
suggestions, to Ms. Jennifer Lane for arranging everything smoothly, to Daniel
On, Brian Flanagan and Aster Lee for proofreading and peer editing.
1. 77 So. 3d 1040 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2011).
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him that the donation was not notarized and needed to be redone.
Besides, it seems that Greg already knew the defect of the act of
donation. However, Greg never shared with Ken his knowledge
about the problem with the act of donation, so Ken did not have
such notice.
On November 18, 2010, shortly before the annual shareholders
meeting, Ken filed a derivative action against Greg, in his capacity
as a shareholder of WEI. After the filing of the derivative action
but before the shareholder’s meeting, Doris executed an
“irrevocable” proxy allowing Greg to vote any share held by her.
On December 14, 2010, a shareholders meeting was held. In the
meeting, Greg became the president of WEI and Ken lost his
position as an officer. About a week after the meeting, Ken filed
three actions to restrain the defendants and enjoin them from
making executive decisions, and have the defendants recognize the
donation at issue and administer transfer by the donation. The
Louisiana Fifth Judicial District Court, Franklin Parish, finding for
the defendants, held that the inter vivos donation was invalid. The
Plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second
Circuit, confirmed, on the ground that the purported inter vivos
donation of Doris’ share was not in the form of an authentic act,
and thus the transfer was not completed.
A donation inter vivos is a contract by which the donor divests
himself/herself, at present and irrevocably, of a thing in favor of
the donee who accepts. 2 A donation inter vivos should be made by
authentic act. 3 To be an authentic act under art. 1541, the act of
donation should be notarized.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 1550 states that the donation of an
incorporeal movable of the kind that is evidenced by a certificate
may be made by authentic act or by compliance with the
requirements otherwise applicable to the transfer of that particular
kind of incorporeal movable. In addition, an incorporeal movable
2. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1468.
3. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1541
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that is investment property 4 may also be donated by a writing
signed by the donor with donative intent and with direction of the
transfer of the property to the donee. A share of a stock is an
incorporeal movable in LA. CIV. CODE art. 473, so it may be
subject to the application of art. 1550.
When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous and
its application does not render absurd consequences, no further
interpretation should be made in search the legislative intent. 5 If
the language is susceptible of different meanings, it must be in
conformance with the purpose of the law. 6 Laws on the same
subject matter must be interpreted in reference to each other in
order to accomplish the purpose of the laws. 7
The legislative history of LA. CIV. CODE art. 1550 shows that
the legislature added this article as part of its revision of the Civil
Code in 2008, but did not change the prior law requiring authentic
act for donations incorporeal movables. It rather provided other
means of completion of act of donation for incorporeal movables
evidenced by a certificate. In addition to the legislative history, the
pertinent jurisprudence proves that the formalities of an authentic
act in such donation can be waived as long as the shares of stock
are transferred pursuant to Louisiana’s stock transfer laws. 8 The
Court found that article 1550 codified the jurisprudence.
It is obvious that the donation by Doris was not made by an
authentic act or other ways in compliance with the requirements
under Louisiana Commercial Laws, LA. REV. STAT. 10:8(101) et
seq. In addition, there was no evidence of delivery or endorsement
of the stock as required under LA. REV. STAT. 10:8(301) or

4. Investment property is as defined in Chapter 9 of the Louisiana
Commercial Laws.
5. LA. CIV. CODE art. 9.
6. LA. CIV. CODE art. 10.
7. LA. CIV. CODE art. 13.
8. Primeaux v. Libersat, 322 So. 2d 147 (La. 1975); Champagne v.
Champagne, 992 So. 2d 1071 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2008); Succession of Payne v.
Pigott, 459 So. 2d 1231 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984).
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10:8(304) for the transfer of securities. Therefore, the donation by
Doris was not completed and thus invalid.
Ken argued that the form of the donation instead satisfied the
requirements of the second paragraph of LA. CIV. CODE art. 1550.
However, the Court disagreed: as explained in Comment (b) of the
2008 Revision Comments of article 1550, the words “for his
benefit” are intended “to cover situations when the transfer may
not be directly to the donee’s account, but would be used to pay
something for his benefit such as paying off debt to a bank for a
child.” There was no record indicating that the donation by Doris
was made in such purpose.
Moreover, the transfer still did not follow the formality
requirements as required by LA. CIV. CODE art. 1550, or other
pertinent stock transfer laws. Therefore, no matter how the signed
writing described the transfer, the record showed that there was no
delivery or endorsement as required by pertinent law and the
transfer of one share by Doris was not made in the proper form and
thus invalid.
II. COMMENTARY
This case emphasizes the formal requirement of donation inter
vivos in Louisiana. Several Louisiana Civil Code articles show that
the laws regarding act of donation inter vivos consistently require
the necessity of forms by an authentic act.
Notarization is essential part of authentic act in regulating the
formality of donation inter vivos. Notarization is generally done
only by registered notary. Unless formally notarized as required by
Louisiana Civil Code, an act of donation was invalid due to the
lack of required formality. This is the case even when it satisfies
other requirements such as signature by donor, signature by donee,
and signature by two witnesses. The formality requirements for a
donation must be strictly followed, since it is described explicit
and clear enough in the Civil Code.
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Moreover, even when the property which is being donated is
subject to the rules of other pertinent law (e.g. stocks are subject to
the laws regulating the transactions of stocks), the procedure of the
donation itself must be made and evidenced in accordance with the
formalities requirements of the donation under the Civil Code. In
the instant case, the transfer of the property, one share of stock
which had been owned by Doris Malone, was not evidenced to be
transferred to Ken and Greg Malone. Thus the act of donation was
in conformance neither with requirements under Louisiana Civil
Code Articles nor with the requirements under pertinent part of
Louisiana commercial law.
This case is a good example how the Louisiana’s civil law on
notary public is different from other civil law traditions. In
Louisiana, basically any person can be appointed a notary public if
he or she passes a written examination administered by the
Secretary of the state of Louisiana. 9 The licensed Louisiana
attorneys are exempted from the examination requirement, so any
attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana may notarize any
documents without further requirements. 10
Notaries have broader powers in Louisiana than in other states.
Unlike notaries in the other 49 states in the United States,
Louisiana notaries may perform unique civil law notarial works.
For example, notaries in Louisiana can perform many notarial acts
which usually associate only with attorneys in other states, except
legal representation. 11 However, their “advice” must be limited to
purely notarial ones, since they are not allowed to give any legal
advice to their clients.
A “notary” in a civil law country other than Louisiana is quite
different in the scope of its roles. In a civil law country such as
France, Italy, Spain, Germany, Mexico or South Korea, all notaries
9. LA. REV. STAT. 35:191.
10. Id.
11. Professional
Civil
Law
(http://www.pclna.org/notaryinfo.html).

Notary

Association
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are “public officials” who received educations as thoroughly as
attorneys and judges. 12 Notaries are bound to advise the
contracting parties before them, including diligent inquiries into
the identity and legal capacity of the parties and legal
consequences of their acts. 13 If, either negligently or intentionally,
a notary omits or misrepresents such advice, he or she is subject to
disciplinary proceedings and to civil liability for malpractice. 14
For example, in South Korea, all notaries are appointed,
authorized and employed by the national government. 15 Only
attorneys, prosecutors, or judges may apply for the position of
notary public. The notaries are subject to very intense supervision
of district attorneys. Most importantly, the notaries, who are
already attorneys, are obliged to give legal advice to the full extent
to their clients, even if the clients did not ask for. Since nearly all
business transactions and real property transactions use notarial
services for its authentic authorization, the roles of notaries in
Korea are fairly broad enough to overlap the roles of ordinary legal
practices in those transactions.
If the instant case took place in other civil law countries, the
notary who notarized the donation at issue would have informed
the parties about the deficiency of required formality, or, at least,
advise them the potential consequences the notarized act would
encounter. Otherwise, the notary would be subject to a claim for
malpractice. For these reasons, the troubling defects of form in the
present case would have been prevented or remedied. While it is
true that Louisiana recognizes broader scope of the role of notary
public than other common law states, it is also distinguishable
from other civil law traditions as well, not offering equivalent
quality standards.
12. RUDOLPH SCHLESINGER ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW 144-153, (7th ed.,
Foundation Press, 2009).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Korean Ethnicity and Culture Encyclopedia, Korean Laws and
Administrations: “Notaries and Notarized Acts”, 現代行政法論, 1996.

LOUISIANA PUBLIC RECORDS DOCTRINE AFTER WEDE
V. NICHE MARKETING
Joseph Stanier Manning *
Louisiana’s approach to public records doctrine is muddy and
largely the result of historical accident; the Louisiana State Law
Institute and Louisiana legislature have amended the civil code
intending to reform this body of law, but the courts have not
recognized this reform and interpret the new codal text in ways
that yield no new substantive change in the law. Beginning in
1992, the Louisiana legislature revised the Civil Code, which
created Titles 22 and 22-A. Some commentators interpreted these
revisions as an attempt to change the law of recordation
completely. In 2010, the Wede v. Niche Marketing case made its
way to the Louisiana Supreme Court, and the case was decided in
such a way that the apparent changes in the law made by the
revisions were given no effect. 1 Wede tells us that the law of public
records doctrine has not changed since the addition of Titles 22
and 22-A, but the case also illustrates the problems that arise by
keeping two separate sets of land records – one for mortgages and
one for conveyances. If this arbitrary distinction were removed, it
is likely that the Wede case would have been decided in a way that
would have given effect to the apparent changes in the revisions.

* Candidate, Juris Doctor and Graduate Diploma in Comparative Law,
LSU Paul M. Hebert Law Center (2013); B.A. (hons.), Paul Tulane College,
Tulane University (2008). I send many thanks and much gratitude to the
following people for their support and helpful comments: Professor Olivier
Moréteau, Professor Randy Trahan, Jennifer Lane, and my wife, Annabelle
Pardi Manning.
1. Wede v. Niche Mktg. USA, LLC, No. 51406, 2008 WL 5770634 (La.
Dist. Ct. November 25, 2008), rev’d, 09-146 (La. App. 5. Cir. 12/29/09); 30 So.
3d 145, aff’d, 2010-0243 (La. 11/30/10); 52 So. 3d 60 (2010).

294

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 5

I. BACKGROUND
In Wede, a money judgment was filed in the parish records to
create a judicial mortgage on all immovables that the defendantdebtor owned in that parish. Because the Clerk of Court’s office no
longer kept physical records, the judgment was scanned
electronically. When the document was scanned, the Deputy Clerk
handling the document, instead of electronically marking it “MO”
for mortgage documents, electronically marked it “CO” for
conveyance documents. Because of this mistake, the judgment
would not show up in any mortgage searches made by means of
the computer system.
Before the Clerk’s Office realized and corrected its mistake,
the debtor sold some of his encumbered immovable property. The
judgment creditor then moved to seize that property from the thirdparties who had bought it, insisting that its judicial mortgage was
in evidence in the parish records when the sale took place despite
the Deputy Clerk’s computer errors.
II. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
The district court, applying Louisiana Civil Code article 3347
ruled for the judgment creditor. 2 The article states in full:
The effect of recordation arises when an instrument is filed
with the recorder and is unaffected by subsequent errors or
omissions of the recorder. An instrument is filed with a
recorder when he accepts it for recordation in his office. 3
The court found the mistake to be one of misindexing on the
part of the Clerk's office rather than one of misrecording. Though
the court acknowledged that third-parties should be able to rely on
the public records, the court also pointed out that the indices are
not part of the public records. To the trial court, this meant the

2. Id.
3. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3347 (2012).
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recording was valid and that the clerk's mistake did not have any
adverse effect on the judicial mortgage.
The Fifth Circuit and the Louisiana Supreme Court both
disagreed with the district court that this was an indexing error.
The Louisiana Supreme Court echoed the circuit court’s reasoning
by reading Civil Code article 3347 alongside Civil Code article
3338. 4 The Supreme Court held that, while article 3347 describes
“when” a document must be recorded, it is article 3338 that
addresses “where” a document must be recorded. 5 The Supreme
Court held that because the document was listed as "CO" rather
than "MO," it had been filed in the conveyance records rather than
the mortgage records. And because it was filed in the wrong set of
records, it was not properly recorded and did not affect thirdparties.
III. COMMENTARY
Among the jurisdictions within the United States, there is a
majority and a minority approach regarding how to deal with
public records. “The majority view is that a person who files a
document . . . is protected if the instrument is delivered to the
proper recording official. . . .” 6 Under this approach the filer is
legally protected despite any recording errors later – even if the
instrument is never actually recorded at all. 7 On the other hand, the
minority jurisdictions hold an instrument must be recorded to be
effective. 8 Louisiana has historically fallen within the minority
camp, and this case further cements Louisiana’s position among
those jurisdictions.

4. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3338 (2012).
5. Wede, 52 So. 3d 60, n.9 at 65.
6. ALEJANDRO M. GARRO, LOUISIANA PUBLIC RECORDS DOCTRINE AND
THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 218–219 (Paul M. Hebert Law Center Publications
Institute, Baton Rouge, 1989).
7. Id. at 219.
8. Id.
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For most of Louisiana legal history, the Louisiana law of
recordation has lacked “a unified and coherent legislative
framework.” 9 Indeed, “the statutory provisions specifying . . .
when the act of recordation was deemed to be complete
contradicted one another.” 10 This unruly approach came about
largely through accident. 11 “Louisiana law historically has always
distinguished between filing and recordation.” 12 It also
distinguished and treated separately “the recordation of mortgages
and that of conveyances.” 13 For example, “[c]onveyances were
always deemed effective upon filing, even if not recorded, while
mortgages were effective only upon recordation.” 14 Also, rather
than recording all land documents together like most jurisdictions,
Louisiana record offices keep a distinct set of records for
conveyances and a distinct set of records for mortgages. 15
Over the past century the legislature made several attempts to
remedy these discrepancies. 16 For example, Act 215 of 1910,
codified as Louisiana Revised Statute 9:5141, was passed to make
mortgages effective against third-parties at the time of filing. 17
This would have brought the way mortgages were deemed to be
effective into line with the way conveyances were treated. Even so,
this legislative intent was “not recognized by the jurisprudence.” 18

9. Id. at 246.
10. Id. at 247.
11. Id.
12. Michael H. Rubin & Stephen P. Strohchein, Security Devices, 55 LA. L.
REV. 611, 615 (1995).
13. GARRO, supra note 6, at 245.
14. Rubin & Strohchein, supra note 12, at 615.
15. The Wede case is rooted in the fact that these distinct sets of records are
kept. Although the judgment-creditor’s mortgage did indeed get recorded, the
problem was that it was incorrectly recorded in an arbitrarily defined set of land
records. If nothing else, this case illustrates the folly of keeping separate records
for conveyances and mortgages for no reason other than historical accident.
16. GARRO, supra note 6, at 276–282 (discussing a thoroughly researched
history of these attempts as well as the various outcomes of each attempt).
17. Michael H. Rubin & R. Marshall Grodner, Security Devices, 53 LA. L.
REV. 969, 1002 (1993); Rubin & Strohchein, supra note 12, at 615; GARRO,
supra note 6, at 279.
18. Id., Rubin & Grodner at 1002.
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Instead of ruling that mortgages become effective immediately
upon filing, the courts made mortgage instruments effective
retroactive to the time of filing only if they were actually placed in
the records within a reasonable time after the filing. 19
This was the state of the law until 1992 when the Louisiana
State Law Institute, recognizing the law’s haphazard approach to
registry, decided to fully systematize and integrate the public
records law. This systemization was put into effect by the
Louisiana Legislature through Act 652 of 1991 and Act 169 of
2005, which gave rise to Title 22 and Title 22-A respectively, in
Book III of the Civil Code. Notably, one of the amendments to the
Civil Code that came about through these revisions was article
3347. A plain reading suggested that in all instances a record
would become effective against third parties at the time of filing
without regard to later errors. 20 For these reasons, this article at
first glance appeared to rewrite the recordation law so that
Louisiana would join the majority view described above.
While the earlier rule, as noted above, was that an instrument’s
effectiveness arose retroactive to filing provided that actual
recordation later occurred, this new provision’s language seemed
to put forward rather plainly that any “effect” that comes from
“recordation” arises when an instrument is “filed,” without regard
to any later errors on the part of the recorder. The new article goes
on to specify that an instrument is “filed” when the instrument is
accepted by the recorder.
Of the three courts that rendered judgment in the Wede case
only one – the trial court – adopted this “plain meaning” reading of
the article. The Louisiana Supreme Court, by contrast, specifically
19. Id.; GARRO, supra note 6, at 280 (explaining the now irrelevant
constitutional reasons behind this rule); Rubin & Strohchein, supra note 12, at
615 (citing Kennibrew v. Tri-Con Prod. Corp., 154 So. 2d 433 (La. 1963) and
Opelousas Fin. Co. v. Reddell, 119 So. 770 (La. App. 1929)).
20. Generally this is the tentative rule that was being taught to students by
Louisiana law professors since the legislation was passed and at least up until
the Wede court delivered this decision.
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rejected this reading. According to that court, article 3347, rather
than answering the question “what must be done in the way of
filing and recordation” in its entirety, answers only the “when” part
of the question. Alongside this part of the question, the court
reasoned, there is also a “where” part. According to the court, the
“where” part of the question is answered in article 3338. So, under
article 3347 “recordation” occurs when an instrument is “filed,”
but according to the Louisiana Supreme Court interpretation of
article 3338 any recordation is “without effect . . . unless the
instrument is registered by recording it in the appropriate mortgage
or conveyance records.”
But what effect, if any, did the Supreme Court give to the
language of article 3347 stating that a recording’s effectiveness is
“unaffected by subsequent errors or omissions of the recorder?” In
a footnote, the court explained that it was unnecessary to describe
“what might be included within the complete spectrum” of that
phrase. 21 The court did, however, declare that the error of “placing
an instrument outside of the mortgage records and into the
conveyance records” could not be the kind of error contemplated,
because otherwise the article would conflict with article 3338.22
Justifying this interpretation, the court referred to its
jurisprudential rule not to interpret statutes as in conflict with one
another but rather to reconcile perceived inconsistencies.
Since the revisions to the Civil Code adding Titles 22 and
22-A, Wede has been the only case decided that tells us whether
there was effective legislative reform in this area of law. From
Wede we learn that the change in the Louisiana public records
from the minority view to the majority view that some observers
believed had been accomplished by legislative revision was
illusory. It remains the case that in Louisiana a mortgage
instrument must be actually placed in the correct set of records –
the mortgage records – to be considered “recorded.” Only then is
21. Wede, 52 So. 3d, n.10 at 65.
22. Id.
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this recordation effective against third parties (albeit retroactively
to the original time of filing). This is the same law as Louisiana
had before 1992. In this regard, Wede informs us that no change
has taken place in this crucial element of the Louisiana public
records doctrine. The Louisiana Supreme Court reached its result
by focusing intently on “where” land records are filed – with the
mortgages or conveyances. Louisiana does not need to maintain
two separate sets of records. Removing this arbitrary distinction
between mortgage records and conveyance records will go a long
way toward improving Louisiana public records doctrine.

BOOK REVIEW
LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE SERIES
Reviewed by Phillip Gragg *
The theme of the present issue of the Journal of Civil Law
Studies is the contribution of Louisiana to the world corpus of civil
law. No series better exemplifies that contribution than the
Louisiana Civil Law Treatise Series. While these volumes are
useful for the struggling student, the advanced scholar will
likewise find them to be insightful resources. While a Louisianabased civil law scholar often struggles with the inadequacies of
common law classification and vocabulary so often utilized in
English language civil law publications, this series is written by
civilians for civilians and common law lawyers with interest in the
civil law. While there are efforts currently underway to encapsulate
and define the English-language civil law lexicon, the reader of the
civil law treatise series will instantly recognize the shared lineage
of Louisiana civil law with more traditional civil law jurisdictions.
(The debate about Spanish and French influence on Moreau
Lislet’s original civil code notwithstanding, and a debate which I
will not attempt to engage or comment on here.) 1
The series encompasses a broad range of subjects, including
some that do not traditionally qualify as civil law. However, within
the 23 volumes the researcher will still find pillars of the civil law,
such as matrimonial regimes, torts, successions and donations, and
obligations. Each volume within the series is intelligently designed
* Phillip Gragg is Associate Professor and Director, George R. White
Law Library at Concordia University School of Law in Boise, Idaho, and was
formerly the Associate Director for Public Services and Adjunct Professor at the
Louisiana State University Paul M. Hebert Law Center.
1. See generally ALAIN LEVASSEUR, MOREAU LISLET: THE MAN BEHIND
THE DIGEST OF 1808 (Claitor’s Publishing, Baton Rouge, La., 2008).
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and researched. The volumes contain detailed tables of contents,
each chapter begins with an outline of that area of the law, and
access to material within the book is enhanced by comprehensive
tables of laws and rules, cases and an index sounding in civil law.
Updates to the print material are by way of an annual pocket part.
There is one curious addition to these volumes that upon first
glance would seem a bit odd: the volumes all contains external
references to the West Digest (of cases) System. There are two
factors that make this an interesting addition. The first is a
weakness, the second a strength. The West Digest system was
designed to organize the case law of the United States Federal
government and the 50 states. Naturally, indexing civil law based
on a common law regime leads to some awkwardness. When we
talk about legal resources or the state of the law in the United
States, we often say, “the 49 states,” and intentionally leave
Louisiana out. One example of the awkwardness created by the
digest system (and it is in all other ways brilliant) is that notions
such as movable and immovable property are blown into
unrecognizable fragments and re-categorized into common law
structures. Specifically, if one were to look in the “real estate”
section of the Louisiana Digest, there are few cases listed. The
notion of movable and immovable property is still alive and well in
Louisiana, but categorizing it into a common law system presents
unique challenges. This should not otherwise reflect poorly on the
digest system, but it is a limitation.
So why would we care that a volume on civil law is
interoperable with a common law digest system? Perhaps the best
reason is that by moving from the civil law volume to the digest,
we might be able to find cases that express similar legal notions
within the common law system. If a researcher would like to
compare the dispensation of the civil law in Louisiana with some
of the other 49 states, this technique could be a real time saver. It is
admittedly not a perfect technique, since underlying theory and
structure differ, but it is a start.
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For those of our readers with access to Westlaw, the Louisiana
Civil Law Treatise series is available through that database. For
our readers in foreign countries, these series would be an excellent
addition to a comparative collection. Indeed, if a scholar wants to
look at Louisiana’s take on the civil law, this is a resource not to be
missed. 2

2. The volumes of the LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE SERIES, published
by West, are (titles of volumes pertaining to matters dealt with in the Civil Code
appear in bold) : FRANK L. MARAIST, CIVIL PROCEDURE (VOL. 1, 2d ed., 20082012; 928 pages, $191); FRANK L. MARAIST, CIVIL PROCEDURE—SPECIAL
PROCEEDINGS (VOL. 1A, 2005-2012; 571 pages, $148); A. N. YIANNOPOULOS,
PROPERTY (VOL. 2, 4th ed., 2001-2012; 755 pages, $160); A. N.
YIANNOPOULOS, PERSONAL SERVITUDES (VOL. 3, 5th ed., 2011-2012; 726
pages, $146); A. N. YIANNOPOULOS, PREDIAL SERVITUDES (VOL. 4, 3d ed.,
2004-2012; 819 pages, $170); SAUL LITVINOFF, UPDATED BY RONALD J.
SCALISE, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS (VOLS. 5 AND 6, 2d ed., 1999-2011; 1632
pages, $295); GLENN G. MORRIS & WENDELL H. HOLMES, BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS (VOLS. 7 AND 8, 1999-2012; 1661 pages, $299); SUSAN
KALINKA, UPDATED BY JEFFREY KOONCE, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES AND
PARTNERSHIPS: A GUIDE TO BUSINESS AND TAX PLANNING (VOLS. 9-9A, 3d ed.,
2001-2012; 2299 pages, $282); KATHRYN VENTURATOS LORIO, SUCCESSIONS
AND DONATIONS (VOL. 10, 2d ed., 2009-2011; 714 pages, $152); EDWARD E.
CHASE, TRUSTS (VOL. 11, 2d ed., 2009-2012; 506 pages, $121); WILLIAM E.
CRAWFORD, TORT LAW (VOL. 12, 2d ed., 2009-2011; 1150 pages, $176); H.
ALSTON JOHNSON III, WORKER’S COMPENSATION (VOL. 13-14, 5th ed., 20102011; 1960 pages, $309); W. SHELBY MCKENZIE & H. ALSTON JOHNSON,
INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE (VOL. 15, 3d ed., 2006-2011; 1570 pages,
$152); KATHERINE S. SPAHT & RICHARD MORENO, MATRIMONIAL REGIMES
(VOL. 16, 3d ed., 2006-2012; 1130 pages, $162); CHENEY C. JOSEPH, JR. & P.
RAYMOND LAMONICA, CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND PROCEDURES (VOL.
17, 2d ed., 2003-2011; 738 pages, $192); H. ALSTON JOHNSON III, CIVIL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS (VOL. 18, 3d ed., 2011; 469 pages, $166); FRANK L. MARAIST,
EVIDENCE AND PROOF (VOL. 19, 2d ed., 2007-2012; 710 pages, $162); P.
RAYMOND LAMONICA & JERRY G. JONES, LEGISLATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE
(VOL. 20, 2004-2011; 725 pages, $152); FRANK L. MARAIST, N. GREGORY
SMITH ET AL., LOUISIANA LAWYERING (VOL. 21, 2006-2012; 770 pages, $154);
CATHERINE PALO, LOUISIANA SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND RELATED
TERMINATION MOTIONS (VOL. 22, 2012 ed.; 441 pages, $163); DAVID N. FINLEY
& LISA MCGUIRE, LOUISIANA MOTIONS IN LIMINE (VOL. 23, 2012 ed.; 536
pages, $190).

LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE PRÉCIS SERIES
Reviewed by Susan Gualtier *
Louisiana holds the unique distinction of being the only one of
fifty U.S. states to be governed by a Civil Code rather than a body
of common law. Although jurisprudence may be used to support an
argument or to interpret the language of the Civil Code, it is, as in
any civil law jurisdiction, a non-binding secondary authority. At
the federal level, Louisiana is, of course, bound by the same
common law system as the rest of the United States. In such a
mixed jurisdiction, the opportunity for misinterpretation of the law
is considerable, and it is no wonder that the typical American
common law lawyer or law student, or law students first
encountering the dual system of civil and common law in
Louisiana, may find the differences in concept and language to be
confusing or even overwhelming.
In the LexisNexis Précis series, Alain Levasseur, of the
Louisiana State University Paul M. Hebert Law Center, seeks to
provide a concise and easily understandable guide to Louisiana
civil law for both law students and professionals. These volumes
serve to expand upon the text of the Civil Code and to explain its
meaning, nuance and history. They are a reliable and easily
readable study guide to several major areas of law that are covered
by the Civil Code, and would be a useful resource not only to
students and practitioners working in Louisiana, but to common
law attorneys seeking to understand better the unique nature of
Louisiana law and the Louisiana Civil Code.
Beginning in 2006 with the first volume, Louisiana Law of
Obligations in General: A Précis, Levasseur discusses, treatisestyle, relevant sections of the Civil Code, moving numerically
through the articles in the order that they appear. The first Précis,
* Foreign, Comparative, and International Law Librarian, Louisiana State
University Law Center; M.L.I.S., University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee (2011);
J.D., Georgetown University Law Center (2004).
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which covers articles 1756 to 1905, provides an overview of those
sections of the Civil Code that constitute “Obligations in General,”
a term that to a common law lawyer might best be described as
obligations arising from contract or from the law itself, which
requires certain obligations of an individual, or obligor, toward
other persons, or obligees. Levasseur, with the help of his
colleagues in the academic study of Louisiana law, has followed
his first Précis with five additional volumes: Louisiana Law of
Sale and Lease (2007), by Alain Levasseur and David Gruning;
Louisiana Law of Torts (2010), by Frank Maraist; Louisiana Law
of Conventional Obligations (2010), by Alain Levasseur;
Louisiana Law of Security Devices (2011), by Michael H. Rubin;
and Louisiana Law of Property (2012), by John Randall Trahan. At
the time of publication, at least one more volume of the series is
planned. The series also includes a Louisiana Pocket Civil Code,
updated annually, containing the text of the Civil Code as written,
which serves as a useful companion to the substantive volumes.
The strength of the series lies in the authors’ expertise in
their subject areas, and in their ability to elucidate the briefest
sections of the Civil Code through discussion of theory and
supporting case law, while at the same time keeping the text
concise, focused, and practical. The books are also thoroughly
indexed and include appendices containing tables of relevant cases,
the text of the Civil Code, and other relevant information
depending upon the subject area. Each volume also follows
essentially the same format, enhancing their readability and
allowing the reader to turn to the books as a uniform reference.
If the series wants for anything, it is that few of the
volumes contain much framing information. The series assumes
the understanding that Louisiana is a mixed civil and common law
jurisdiction, as well as an understanding of the purpose of the
series itself. It does not attempt, for the most part, to situate the
Louisiana laws within the greater context of the U.S. common law
legal system, or to draw any parallels between the civil law
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concepts and those at common law. Only the volume on Torts
includes a history of the Louisiana civil code and its relationship to
the common law, while the volume on Security Devices is the only
volume to explain the differences and draw parallels between civil
and common law concepts. Therefore, readers seeking a more
comparative overview may wish to consult additional sources in
conjunction with the Précis series. A general Introduction to the
study of Louisiana law could also be a useful addition to the
collection.
Overall, this series is highly recommended for Louisiana
law students and attorneys, for foreign researchers, and for those
common law students and practitioners seeking a better
understanding of specific provisions of Louisiana’s Civil Code and
of the supporting legal theory and case law. The series has filled a
much-needed gap in the literature on the Louisiana Civil Code, and
is, to this author’s knowledge, one of the only such sources
currently available. 1

1. The volumes in the PRÉCIS series are: ALAIN LEVASSEUR, LOUISIANA
POCKET CIVIL CODE, 2012 EDITION (LexisNexis, 2012; 345 pages, $31.00);
JOHN RANDALL TRAHAN, LOUISIANA LAW OF PROPERTY: A PRÉCIS (LexisNexis,
2012; 568 pages, $37.00); ALAIN LEVASSEUR & DAVID GRUNING, LOUISIANA
LAW OF SALE AND LEASE: A PRÉCIS (LexisNexis 2d ed., 2011; 181 pages,
$37.00); MICHAEL H. RUBIN, LOUISIANA LAW OF SECURITY DEVICES: A PRÉCIS
(LexisNexis, 2011; 280 pages, $35.00); ALAIN LEVASSEUR, LOUISIANA LAW OF
CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS: A PRÉCIS (LexisNexis, 2010; 153 pages,
$35.00); FRANK MARAIST, LOUISIANA LAW OF TORTS: A PRÉCIS (LexisNexis,
2010; 80 pages, $35.00); ALAIN LEVASSEUR, LOUISIANA LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
IN GENERAL: A PRÉCIS (LexisNexis 2d ed., 2009; 208 pages, $37.00).

DEFINING LOUISIANA LAW: LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
DICTIONARY † AND WEST’S LOUISIANA DIGEST ǂ
Reviewed by Phillip Gragg *
The most recent addition to the list of works that provide
access to Louisiana’s Civil Code is the Louisiana Civil Law
Dictionary. It is a tool designed for both the civil and common law
attorney. The authors, Gregory W. Rome, a practicing attorney
from Chalmette, Louisiana and N. Stephen Kinsella, general
counsel for a corporation with ties to Louisiana, have succeeded
admirably in providing an explanation of civil law terms in the
most straightforward manner. The most useful aspect of the
dictionary is that definitions are linked to specific provisions of
Louisiana law (largely, but not exclusively, the Civil Code), as
well as prominent Louisiana-specific secondary sources, cases and
law review articles. In fact, the dictionary began life as an article
published by Kinsella. 1
This work is a great access point to Louisiana law,
particularly for those unfamiliar with the state. It is also a quick
reference that could be used by practitioners. The volume concerns
itself with Louisiana and therefore makes only incidental or
fleeting references to other jurisdictions or languages, and then
only that a word is of French origin, for example. In these
instances there is no provenance or citation to another source to
support the translation. That is not to call into question the
accuracy of the work, but rather to suggest that a comparativist
would find the depth of treatment wanting. However, that is not the
purpose of this particular dictionary, and the authors have
† GREGORY W. ROME & N. STEPHAN KINSELLA, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
DICTIONARY (Quid Pro, LLC 2011).
ǂ WEST’S LOUISIANA DIGEST (West 2d, 1987-2012; 148 vols.).
* Phillip Gragg is Associate Professor and Director, George R. White
Law Library at Concordia University School of Law in Boise, Idaho, and was
formerly the Associate Director for Public Services and Adjunct Professor at the
Louisiana State University Paul M. Hebert Law Center.
1. See N. Stephan Kinsella, A Civil Law to Common Law Dictionary, 54
LA. L. REV. 1265 (1994).
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accomplished what they set out to do admirably. The book is
accessible in paperback and hardbound editions, and for the
technologically-oriented, it can be used with Kindle or iPad (with
the Kindle application, of course).
Now, if the reader will indulge us, we would like to take
the reader one step further. The above resource is a good, quick
reference to civil law terms, but we have in our jurisdiction the
obligation to consider the full weight of the opinions of the
judiciary. Precedence; a dirty word in some circles, but part of
Louisiana’s unique civil law tradition. In the process of drafting
opinions, the court is frequently left to wrestle with the meaning of
a term. With no judicial college 2 and formal internal techniques of
interpretation upon which the judge can rely, they are left to
consult the text of the code provision, its commentary, prior
opinion, dictionaries and general commentary, not necessarily in
that order. 3
The resulting opinions create a record that can be easily and
efficiently tracked, if one knows where to look. The American
Digest System, published by West, contains a set of volumes called
Louisiana Digest, published in two series covering 1809 through
present day material. Within the digest are a smaller set of volumes
called, Words and Phrases. These volumes provide an index of
terms that have been judicially defined, and their corresponding
case citations. This is indeed an unusual concept for our readers in
jurisdictions outside of Louisiana and the United States, but it is
the reality of our jurisprudence. These volumes have a practical
use, but also might serve as a basis for evaluating the impact of our
use of precedence as it relates to the application of the civil code.
2. This meant in the classical sense, the Louisiana Supreme Court does, in
fact, provide continuing legal education for state judges. See
http://www.lasc.org/la_judicial_entities/judicial_college.asp. See also Cheryl
Thomas, Review of Judicial Training and Education in Other Jurisdictions, for
the Judicial Studies Board. Part 7 should be of particular interest:
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/socio-legal/docs/Review_of_Judicial_Train.pdf
3. For the leading work on this issue, see Albert Tate, Jr., Techniques of
Judicial Interpretation, 22 LA. L. REV. 727 (1961).
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To illustrate the point, the term “compromise” can be found in
Words and Phrases, and is defined in a manner consistent with
other civil law jurisdictions. It is interesting to note that the term
“compromise settlement” can also be found. “Settlement,” as a
separate term, has caused some consternation in legal proceedings,
but readers will be happy to note that “settlement” must be equated
with “compromise” for purposes of statute governing “compromise
agreements.” 4
The Words and Phrases volumes of the Louisiana Digest can
serve as a quick access point for the practitioner and comparativist
alike. It provides easy access to materials that might be more
obscure in modern databases. As the saying goes, do not do work
that has already been done for you. The Louisiana Civil Law
Dictionary is also such a resource. As we strive to explore, catalog
and comment on the state of the civil code the world over, one
might ask the question, what additional resources are of value?
While we have focused on Louisiana-specific materials, it is not a
stretch to say that English translations of civil law materials are the
next logical frontier in promulgating and supporting the
dissemination of the civil code around the globe.

4. Townsend v. Square, 643 So. 2d 787 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1994). Also, see
generally LA. CIV. CODE art. 3071, and associated Notes on Decision.

REDISCOVERED TREASURES OF LOUISIANA
LAW
HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF LOUISIANA AND OF THE
CIVIL LAW
Thomas J. Semmes*
INTRODUCTION TO THE NEW PUBLICATION
Thomas Jenkins Semmes (1824-1899) was once described as
“the most distinguished statesman and brilliant lawyer of the
south.” 1 Born in Georgetown, D.C., in a mercantile family of
English and French descent, he graduated from Georgetown
College in 1842 and received a law degree from Harvard in 1845.
He practiced law in Washington, D.C., till 1850, when he moved to
New Orleans. He became a leader of the Democratic Party and was
soon elected a member of the Louisiana House of Representatives.
He later served as a member of the Louisiana Constitutional
Conventions of 1879 and 1898. 2 A U.S. Attorney in New Orleans
and later state Attorney General, he became a strong advocate of
secession. He served in the Confederate Senate from 1862 to 1865
and, after having received presidential pardon, he returned to New
Orleans to practice law. He became a professor of law at the
University of Louisiana, later to become Tulane University. There
* Professor of Law, University of Louisiana (1873-1899). This lecture
was first published by Melvin M. Cohen and Joseph A. Quintero in New
Orleans through Clark and Hofeline, Book Printers, 9 Bank Place, in 1873; it
was republished in 1875 in 3 LA REVUE CRITIQUE DE LEGISLATION ET DE
JURISPRUDENCE DU CANADA 405.
1. JAMES S. EASBY-SMITH, 2 GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY IN THE DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA (1789-1907), ITS FOUNDERS, BENEFACTORS, OFFICERS,
INSTRUCTORS AND ALUMNI 146 (1907). See for more detail, CHARLES ROBSON,
REPRESENTATIVE MEN OF THE SOUTH 529-551 (1880).
2. Georgia Chadwick, Thomas Semmes, 5 DE NOVO, THE NEWSLETTER OF
THE LAW LIBRARY OF LOUISIANA, Issue 3, 7 (2007).
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he taught civil law (1873-1879) and common law (1879-1899), till
the day of his sudden death. 3
The Journal of Civil Law Studies owes to Mr. Louis de la
Vergne the rediscovery of this inaugural lecture, first published as
a book in New Orleans in 1873. Ms. Georgia Chadwick 4 was
instrumental in having the text entirely retyped and edited. The
lecture proves the vast expertise and intimate knowledge Semmes
had of the civil law tradition and its impact in Louisiana, at the
moment he started an academic career, at the age of forty-nine. He
was an accomplished scholar. The first part of the text gives a very
informative and accurate survey of the history of Louisiana law till
the revision of its Civil Code in 1870. The second part explains
how the civil law tradition evolved in Rome, from the Law of the
Twelve Tables to Justinian’s Corpus Juris Civilis, discussing the
main steps of the evolution and their significance.
At a time where many a legal scholar would devote fifty pages
to the discussion of a small problem, it is good to remember old
masters who could cover with clarity and accuracy centuries of
legal history in half this volume. To readers looking for a short but
informative account of the development of the civil law tradition in
Louisiana and its interaction with the common law until the postCivil War years, Semmes gives a most useful and readable answer.
In Louisiana or in other parts of the world, teachers of comparative
law and of legal traditions may safely use this text. If pressed to
cover the development of Roman law in just one class or two, they
will find in the second part of Semmes’ lecture a most useful and
reliable guide.
The short book was retyped from the original at the Louisiana
Law Library, and edited by Ms. Jennifer Lane at the LSU Center of
Civil Law Studies. It is published with minimal edits, aiming at
3. Id.
4. Law Librarian of Louisiana, Executive Director, Supreme Court of
Louisiana Historical Society, and Curator, Supreme Court of Louisiana
Museum.

2012]

HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF LOUISIANA

315

making the text easily readable in the 21st century. Sequentially
numerical footnotes are references by the author, sometimes
complemented by the editors. Additional editorial notes are
announced by an asterisk.
Olivier Moréteau

PREFACE TO THE ORIGINAL EDITION
The following introductory lecture, delivered by the Hon.
Thomas J. Semmes, Professor of Civil Law in the Louisiana
University, at the opening of the Institution, needs no comment.
The reputation of the writer, as a jurist of eminent ability, is as
firmly established, as it is universally conceded. Of his study,
culture, and research, the reader can best judge from a perusal of
the lecture. As elaborate in detail as the limits of a discourse will
sanction, it is as pointed in application, as the scope of the subject
justifies, and doubtless establishes its authenticity, by the citations
it introduces.
We present it to the profession in the conviction of its affording
them satisfaction; and grateful for the favors conferred in their
patronage, hope to offer them other lectures on equally valuable
legal themes.
The Publishers
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Thomas Semmes *

I. AN EPITOME OF THE HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE LAWS OF
LOUISIANA AND OF THE CIVIL LAW
Before I enter upon the consideration of the history and sources
of the civil law, I propose to review the history and sources of the
laws of Louisiana. In Louisiana, the civil law prevails, and it is the
only state in the federal union, carved out of the vast territories
acquired by the United States from France, Spain and Mexico, in
which the civil law has been retained as the basis of jurisprudence.
The common law modified by statute dominates all our sister
states.
The intimate relations and intercourse between the people of
Louisiana and the citizens of other state, have given rise, in our
courts, in consequence of the dissimilarity of the two systems of
* Engraving of Thomas Semmes, from REPRESENTATIVE MEN OF THE
SOUTH (Chas. Robson & Co., Philadelphia, 1880), a volume in the Rare Book
Collection of the Law Library of Louisiana.
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law, to more numerous and intricate questions of conflict of laws
than in the courts of any other state.
Happily for us, many of these questions were considered and
adjudicated while Chief Justice Martin was, by his ability and
learning, the ornament of our supreme judicial tribunal.
You will perceive in Story’s elaborate work on the Conflict of
Laws, 5 numerous and copious references to the decisions of the
Louisiana courts. The conflict of laws is a subject daily considered
by the legal practitioner in Louisiana, and I commend it to your
careful study, as an essential branch of the law, and necessary to fit
you for the intelligent performance of your professional duties.
Louisiana was settled by the French in 1699, and was subject to
the dominion of France until August 1769, when it was taken
possession of by Alejandro O’Reilly for Spain under a secret treaty
concluded in November 1762, but not made public until April 23,
1764. About three months after taking possession, O’Reilly
published in the French language extracts from the whole body of
the Spanish law, with references to the books in which they are
contained, purporting to be intended for elementary instruction to
the inhabitants of the province. This publication, followed by an
uninterrupted observance of the Spanish law, was received as an
introduction into the Louisiana of the Spanish Code in all its parts. 6
The laws of Spain are contained in various codes, the most
complete of which is known under the name of “Las Sieté
Partidas.” The other codes are the Fuero Juzgo, Fuero Viejo and
Fuero Real: to which may be added the laws regulating the
practice of courts, the Royal Ordinances (Ordenancas Reales de
Castilla), and those of Alcala; the Laws of Toro, the Recopilacion
de Castilla, and the Recopilacion de las Indias.

5. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, originally
published by Hilliard, Gray, and Company in 1834.
6. FRANCOIS-XAVIER MARTIN, 4 THE HISTORY OF LOUISIANA: FROM THE
EARLIEST PERIOD 368 (2000), originally published by Lyman and Beardslee,
New Orleans, in 1827.
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The Fuero Juzgo was published about the year 693. It was first
published in Latin under the title of “Forum Judicum” and
afterward translated into Spanish in the 13th century under
Ferdinand III. It was originally called “El Fuero de los Jueces,”
but this name was changed by corruption of words into Fuero
Juzgo, and under that title it was published in the year 1600.
The Fuero Viejo was published in the year 992, and contains
the ancient customs and usages of the Spanish nation.
Alphonso the Wise, desiring to establish a uniform
jurisprudence in all his dominions, published a third code, under
the name of “Fuero Real;” this was the precursor of the Partidas,
which Alphonso had ordered to be compiled, and is to the
Partidas, what the Institutes of Justinian are to the Pandects.
The Partidas is the most perfect system of Spanish laws; they
were compiled in imitation of the Pandects, and as a digest of the
laws of Spain, are worthy of the praise bestowed on them by jurists
of every country.
The work was projected by Ferdinand III, but accomplished by
his son and successor, Alphonso the Wise, who appointed four
jurists to execute it. This task was entered upon in the year 1256,
and finished in seven years. Strange to say, the names of these
enlightened jurists have not been preserved. All those parts of the
new code relating to religious matters, were compiled from the
canonical laws of Spain: those which relate to civil and criminal
matters, are derived principally from the Roman laws, which were
freely translated without acknowledgment of the fact. The Partidas
were not promulgated until 1343, and were not actually put in
operation until 1505, when Ferdinand and Joanna gave them their
sanction at the Cortez held that year in the city of Toro.
The Partidas are divided into seven parts, each part divided
into titles, and each title sub-divided into laws.
The first part details the canons and liturgy of the church. The
second is a summary of the ancient usages of the Spanish nation
and of the rules of its government. The third, fifth and sixth parts
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contain an abridgment of the principles of the Roman laws on
actions, suits, judgments, contracts, successions, testaments,
minority and tutorship. The fourth is a compendium of the laws
relative to marriage and family relations, legitimate and
illegitimate, freedom, slavery and enfranchisement. The seventh
details crimes, offences, and punishments, and, in imitation of the
Pandects, concludes with one title on the signification of words,
and another on the rules of law.
The Partidas contain the fundamental principles of the Spanish
law, expressed with grace, with simplicity and in the purest idiom
of the Spanish language. The elevation of the sentiments of the
Pandects has attracted the admiration of the learned. They contain
these remarkable words, “despotism tears the tree up by the roots;
a wise monarch prunes its branches.”
The Laws of Toro were published at the Cortez held at the city
of Toro, in 1505; they relate principally to wills, successions and
donations.
The Royal Ordinance was published by Ferdinand and Isabella
in 1496; it is divided into eight books and the greatest part of it has
been inserted in the Recopilacion of Castilla, which completes the
system of Spanish legislation. This Recopilacion was published by
Philip II, in the year 1567. The Ordinance of Alcala, the Royal
Ordinance and the Laws of the Toro, are contained in it.
The laws of Spain regulated and governing her immense
dominions in America were collected and digested by order of
Philip IV, and published in the year 1661, in the Recopilacion de
las Indias.
The transfer from France to Spain did not change the system of
law governing the territory; for the civil law, as a system, then was,
and now is, the law of both those nations. Spain, so far as
possession affected our laws, remained in possession until 1803,
when Louisiana was transferred to the United States.
It is true the territory was acquired from France during the
administration of Mr. Jefferson, for by the Treaty of Ildefonso, in
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the year 1800, Spain had retroceded Louisiana to France, but the
actual possession of France lasted only from November 30, 1803
to December 20, 1803. During this brief interval no material
change in the law was made. The French merely re-established the
Code noir of Louis XV, prescribing rules for the government of
slaves, and substituted a mayor and council in the place of the
Cabildo, for the administration of affairs of the city of New
Orleans.
Therefore, so far as our law is concerned, it may be said that it
was French from 1699 to 1769 and Spanish from 1769 to 1803.
But as French and Spanish law both descend from the same parent
source, the changes made during Spanish rule, so far as private
rights are concerned, were not radical, but modifications of the
system founded by the French.
The material changes consisted in the substitution of the
Spanish for the French language in all legal proceedings, the
introduction of Spanish laws respecting public order, and the
disposition of the national domain. It is thus perceived, that at the
time Louisiana came into the possession of the United States, her
law was a system established by the French and modified by the
Spanish, but derived from the civil law that was common to both
peoples.
By the Treaty of Paris, the inhabitants of Louisiana became
citizens of the United States, and were guaranteed the enjoyment
of their liberty, property, and religion.
Congress, in anticipation of the transfer, on the October 31,
1803, provided for the temporary government of the territory by a
statute vesting all the military, civil and judicial powers exercised
by the officers of the existing government, in such person or
persons as the President might appoint, to be exercised in such
manner as the President might direct. By act of Congress approved
March 26, 1804, a territorial government was organized under the
name of the “Territory of Orleans.” The territory described in that
act embraced all the territory of the present state of Louisiana, and
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separated it from the residue of the Louisiana cession, as described
in the Treaty of Paris. For at the time of transfer, Louisiana, as
acquired from France, embraced all of the country from the Gulf of
Mexico to the 49th parallel of latitude, and from the Mississippi
River to the Rocky Mountains.
Although the terms of the territorial act of 1804 embraced the
territory now comprised within the limits of the state of Louisiana,
the part of the state commonly called the “Florida Parishes” was at
that time actually in possession of Spain and was held by her until
the year 1810.
The territorial act of 1804 vested the legislative power in a
governor, appointed by the president, and thirteen persons who
were to be appointed annually by the president. But on March 2,
1805, Congress authorized the president to establish in Louisiana a
government similar to that existing in the “Mississippi Territory.”
That governance had been created by adopting the Ordinance of
1787, relative to territory northwest of the Ohio River, excluding
the portion of the ordinance regulating successions and the last
article prohibiting slavery. It is thus perceived that the celebrated
Ordinance of 1787 regulated the form of government existing in
Louisiana until she was admitted into the Union as an independent
state. The second article of the Ordinance of 1787 guaranteed,
among other fundamental rights, the benefit of writ of habeas
corpus, the right of trial by jury, and judicial proceedings
according to the course of the common law.
The first important and radical change made by the new
government in the laws of the territory was the necessary result of
the change of rulers and of the guarantees contained in the
Ordinance of 1787.
The criminal law and proceedings of the Latin races of Europe,
whose absolute governments ignored the guarantees contained in
our Federal Constitution, were repugnant to the Anglo-Saxon ideas
of individual liberty and constitutional limitations of governmental
power, which predominated in the American mind. The territorial

322

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 5

statute of May 4, 1805, defined what acts should constitute crimes
and offences and provided for the trial and punishment of
offenders. In so doing, the language and terms of the common law
of England were used, and the following provision was embodied
in the act, viz:
All the crimes, offences, and misdemeanors hereinbefore
mentioned, shall be taken, intended and construed
according to, and in conformity with, the common law of
England, and the forms of indictment, (divested, however,
of unnecessary prolixity,) the method of trial, the rules of
evidence, and all other proceedings whatsoever, in the
prosecution of said crimes, offences and misdemeanors,
changing what ought to be changed, shall be (except by this
act otherwise provided for) according to the common law.
This section of the act of 1805 had never been repealed; even
in the Revised Statutes of 1870, it is expressly excepted in the
general repealing clause contained in the last section of the
statutes. The result of this enactment was an entire displacement of
the existing criminal law of the territory, and the substitution of the
provisions of the act in its stead. Hence, no act of man is criminal
in Louisiana unless a statute of the state can be produced stamping
it as a crime or offense. There is no such thing in Louisiana as a
common law offense; all offenses are created by statute. The
common law is resorted to for purpose of interpretation and
construction of the terms of the statutes creating offenses, but
criminality cannot be predicated on an act that the legislature has
not, in express terms, denounced as crime or offense.
An additional result of this statute of 1805 is that the common
law of England, as construed and interpreted in 1805, is the
standard by which we are governed; hence, no change or
modifications of the English laws affect our criminal jurisprudence
in Louisiana, unless adopted by statute. In addition, the English
decisions and the opinions of English commentators since 1805, in
opposition to the decisions and standard works prior to that period,
are not authoritative expositions of our criminal law.
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The next important legislative measure was a codification of
the civil law of the Territory. Prior to this codification, the laws
were in the Spanish language, and the fact that the vast majority of
the people were of French descent and Americans, rendered it
necessary that the new compilation should be published in English
and French. It is generally supposed that the Civil Code of
Louisiana ∗ is but a re-enactment of the Code Napoleon, but such is
not the fact. It is true that French code preceded our Code of 1808
by four years, and a projet of it may have suggested to our
legislators the idea of codification; however, at the time of the
preparation of the Louisiana Code of 1808, the Code Napoleon as
adopted had not reached the territory.
In June 1806, the legislature of the territory appointed two
lawyers of eminence, James Brown and Louis Moreau Lislet, to
prepare the Civil Code. Brown and Moreau Lislet were given
express instructions to make the civil law, by which the territory
was then governed, the ground work of the code.
On March 31, 1808, the code was adopted by the Territorial
Legislature and all ancient laws inconsistent with it were repealed.
The effect of this was that the Spanish laws remained in force, to
the extent to which they were not in conflict with the Code of
1808, and they were quoted and acted on as authoritative until
1828.
On the March 28, 1828, the legislature repealed all the civil
laws of the state in force prior to the Code of 1825, ** except a
portion of title ten of the Code of 1808 treating of the dissolution
of corporations. The state of Louisiana was admitted into the
federal Union under the dominion of the Code of 1808, and the
Spanish laws not in conflict with that code.
∗ The author refers to the Civil Code of Louisiana throughout the article.
The actual name of the enactment is DIGEST OF THE CIVIL LAWS NOW IN FORCE
IN THE TERRITORY OF ORLEANS (1808). The Digest was often called the Old
Code.
** One page further, the author explains how the Digest of 1808 was
replaced by a Civil Code in 1825.
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On the February 20, 1811, Congress passed an act to enable the
people of the Territory of Orleans to form a constitution and state
government, and for the admission of said state into the Union on
an equal footing with the original states. 7
The people in convention assembled, having framed a
constitution and adopted the name of Louisiana as the title of the
new state, Congress, on April 8, 1812, declared Louisiana to be
one of the United States of America and admitted into the Union
on an equal footing with the original states in all respects whatever.
Provided, that it should be taken as a condition upon which the
said state is incorporated into the Union, that the river Mississippi,
and the navigable rivers and waters leading into the same, and into
the Gulf of Mexico, shall be common highways and forever free as
well to the inhabitants of said state as to the inhabitants of other
states and the territories of the United States, without any tax, duty,
impost of toll therefor, imposed by the said state, and that the
above condition, and also all the other conditions and terms,
contained in the third section of the act of 1811, shall be taken and
deemed as fundamental conditions and terms upon which the said
state is incorporated into the Union. 8
It was further declared, that all the laws of the United States
not locally inapplicable were by that act extended to the said state.
At the same time the state was organized into one federal
judicial district, and the appointment of a District Judge of the
United States with circuit court powers, was provided for. While
on this subject of judicial districts, I may as well mention, that on
July 29, 1850, by act of Congress, the state was divided into two
judicial districts, called the Eastern and Western districts, but since

7. Louisiana Enabling Act, Ch. 21, 2 Stat. 641 (February 20, 1811),
available at http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llsl&fileName
=002/llsl002.db&recNum=0678.
8. Admission of the State of Louisiana into the Union, Ch. 50, 2 Stat. 703
(April 8, 1812), available at http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId
=llsl&fileName=002/llsl002.db&recNum=740.
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the war ∗ these two have been merged into one, styled the “District
of Louisiana.”
The Partidas were translated into English at the expense of the
state, by virtue of a law passed March 3, 1819. On the March 14,
1822, a resolution of the Legislature of the state was adopted, by
which Messrs. Livingstone, Derbigny and Moreau Lislet, three
distinguished members of the bar, were appointed to revise the
Civil Code of 1808, by amending it in such a manner as they
should think proper, and adding to it such laws in force as had not
been adopted in that code.
The report of these jurists was adopted by the Legislature on
April 12, 1824 and is denominated the “Civil Code of 1825”
because it was put in operation during that year. Many articles of
the Codes of 1808 and 1825 are identical with articles in the Code
Napoleon; no doubt the compilers appropriated the language of the
Code Napoleon, or its projet, whenever the rule of the law
intended to be established in Louisiana, was the same as that
adopted in France. Many provisions of the Code Napoleon are not
to be found in either of our codes, and, in some instances, the text
of the Code Napoleon was amended to conform to our law and so
adopted; in other instances, the Spanish law was first written in
French and translated into English. The constitution of the state
required the laws to be enacted in the English language, hence, in
cases of difference between the English and French texts of the
Code of 1825, the English text prevailed. But as the Code of 1808
was enacted during the regime of the territorial government, when
laws were passed in both languages, the French text of the code
has been held to be of equal force with the English text and has
been accepted by the courts to avoid the evils of incorrect
translation.
The practice of the state courts of Louisiana in civil cases was
based on the Spanish law and was regulated by the Territorial Act
∗

The author refers to the U.S. Civil War (1861-1865).
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of 1805 and its amendments until the Code of Practice, approved in
April 1824, was put in operation in September 1825.
The Code of Practice, prepared by authority of the Legislative
resolution of 1822, was written in French and many inaccuracies
exist in the English translation.
By the act of 1828, all other rules of proceeding in civil cases,
except those contained in the Code of Practice, were abrogated. In
case the Code of Practice contains any provisions contrary, or
repugnant, to those of the Civil Code, the latter are considered as
repealed or amended by the Code of Practice. 9
The revised Civil Code and Code of Practice adopted in 1870
were prepared under legislative sanction. They are almost identical
with the Codes of 1825, except that all the provisions in relation to
slaves are omitted, and the statutory amendments, enacted from
time to time, are incorporated in the new codes. The Codes of 1870
are written and promulgated in the English language only, in
conformity with the mandate of the constitution of 1868.
The Legislature, in 1855, undertook a revision of the statutes of
the state. This revision was effected by the enactment of many
separate statutes, relating to various and distinct subjects; all
previous statutes relating to a particular subject were grouped
together and incorporated into one statute relative to that subject,
and at the end of each revised statute was annexed a clause,
repealing all laws on the same subject matter, except what was
contained in the Civil Code and Code of Practice. The object of the
Legislature was to facilitate the study of law by confining
investigation, so far as our statutory law was concerned, to the two
codes and the Revised Statutes. The object was not fully
accomplished, because the courts have held that there are statutes
previous to 1855 not repealed by that revision, as the subject of the
un-repealed statutes is entirely omitted from the Revised Statutes
of 1855. The Revised Statutes of 1870 are but a reenactment of the
9. LA. REV. STAT. §§314 & 592 (1825).
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Revised Statutes of 1855, with amendments and additions since
made, omitting, however, all legislation pertaining to the
institution of slavery.
The revising legislation of 1870 was mainly intended to
obliterate from our system of laws every vestige of the institution
of slavery and to accommodate our legislature to the new order of
things, inaugurated by the various amendments of the Federal
Constitution, or resulting from the adoption of the new
Constitution of 1868 and the reconstruction measures of Congress.
A projet of a commercial code was prepared under the
resolution of 1822, but it failed to meet the approval of the
Legislature. Questions of commercial law are, therefore, settled in
Louisiana by reference to approved works on the subject and the
decisions of the enlightened judicial tribunals of the civilized
world. The decisions of the English and American courts are most
generally consulted and accepted as authority.
An attempt was made in 1820 to codify the criminal law of the
state. In 1821, Edward Livingston was appointed by the
Legislature to prepare and submit to its consideration a criminal
code. This distinguished legist made an elaborate and scientific
report, which increased his literary fame, but its philosophic
speculations never received the sanction of law.
Our lawyers, accustomed to the civilian practice, were much
embarrassed as to the method of conducting civil cases in the
courts of the United States. The distinction between “law and
equity” is unknown in Louisiana practice; the courts adjudicate all
civil cases without reference to such distinction, which is peculiar
to countries in which the common law prevails. In Louisiana,
where the distinction, derived from the common law system,
between writ or error and appeal is ignored, the evidence in any
civil case of which the court of final resort has jurisdiction is, at the
request of either party, reduced to writing. The appellate court
reviews the law and the fact, without regard to the circumstance of
whether the case was tried by a jury in the court below.
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All the evidence is transmitted to the appellate court which
disposes of the case on its merits, even though no bills of exception
are taken by either party, to the judgment of the court below on
questions of law. All that is necessary to bring into activity the
revisory power of our Supreme Court is the presentation of all the
evidence, on which the judge below decided the case; on that
evidence, the court will proceed to adjudicate de novo both the law
and fact involved in the cause.
Congress attempted to conform the practice of the courts with
the United States, sitting within this state, to the practice of the
state courts. A special statute for Louisiana was passed by
Congress, May 26, 1824, 10 by which it is enacted that the mode of
proceeding in civil causes in the courts of the United States, that
now are or may hereafter be established in the state of Louisiana,
shall be conformable to the laws directing the mode of practice in
the district courts of said state. Provided, the judge may alter the
times limited or allowed for different proceedings in the state
courts, and make by rule such other provisions, to adapt the said
laws of procedure to the organization of the United States courts,
and to avoid any discrepancy between such state laws and the laws
of the United States.
The object of this act has been almost completely nullified by
the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States.
That court was compelled to admit, that the term “civil
cases,” used in the process act of 1824, would include cases at law
or in equity. But, it held that the acts of Congress in the general
legislation of the country have always distinguished between
remedies at common law and in equity. To effectuate the purpose
of the Legislature, the remedies in the courts of the United States
are to be at common law or in equity—not according to the
practice of the state courts, but according to the principles of
10. Act to Regulate the District Courts of Louisiana, Ch. 181, 4 Stat. 62
(May 26, 1824), available at http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId
=llsl&fileName=004/llsl004.db&recNum=109.
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common law and equity, as distinguished and defined in that
country from which we derive our knowledge of those principles.
Since there are no courts of equity, or state laws in Louisiana
regulating the practice of equity cases, the federal courts in the
state are bound to proceed according to the principles and usages
of courts of equity, and the rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
of the United States.
Louisiana had not then, and has never had, a representative of
her legal system on the bench of the Supreme Court of the United
States. ∗ This decision, which was not given without a vigorous
protest from Mr. Justice McLean, renders it absolutely necessary
for a Louisiana lawyer, who desires to practice in the federal
courts, to study the common law, in order to ascertain what is a
common law case and what is a case in equity. When he finds out
that his case is one in equity, he must become familiar with
chancery practice in order to prosecute it with success. 11
If his case is a common law case, he can adopt the Louisiana
practice of pleading, but he must be careful in the trial of the case
to resort to the common law method of proceeding. The Supreme
Court has held:
First, that if the record contains the evidence, but no bills of
exceptions, and nothing raising any point of law distinct
from the evidence, the Supreme Court cannot revise the
judgment on writ of error. 12
Second, if a case is tried by a jury, even though all the
evidence may be reduced to writing and transmitted to the
Supreme Court, that court cannot revise the judgment of the
facts, as the Supreme Court of Louisiana does. This
decision is based on the Seventh Amendment of the
∗ Since the writing of this article, there has been a U.S. Supreme Court
Justice from Louisiana: Edward Douglass White, who served from 1894-1921,
and was Chief Justice from 1910-1921.
11. Gaines v. Relf, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 9, 14 (1841); Story v. Livingston, 13
Pet. 368, 406 (1839); Ex Parte Story v. Story, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 339 (1838); Ex
Parte Poultney v. City of La Fayette, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 472, 474 (1838);
Livingston v. Story, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 632, 658 (1835).
12. Minor v. Tillotson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 392, 394 (1844), 11 L.Ed. 312.
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Constitution of the United States, which provides “that no
fact once tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examinable in
any court of the United States, than according to the rules
of the common law.” 13
Third, when the judge passes on the law and the fact, if a
jury trial is not claimed, the judge must find the facts, and
the Supreme Court must treat such facts as conclusively
settled and, therefore, cannot revise the case on the facts,
even though the evidence on which the judge based his
findings is transmitted in the record. 14
Fourth, the practice of the courts in Louisiana as to giving
reasons for judgment, which the Louisiana law requires
under penalty of nullity and as to the form and effect of
verdicts of a jury, is governed by the acts of Congress and
the rules of the common law, not by the laws of the state. 15
It is therefore perceived that, so far as practice is concerned, in
the courts of the United States little is left of the state laws with
which these courts are to conform. If the case is an equity case,
there is absolutely no conformity with the state law. If it is a
common law case, the pleadings and rules of evidence are the same
as those in the courts of the state; the method of trial, and preparing
a case for the appellate court, the form of the verdict and judgment,
and the effect of the verdict are totally different. I do not perceive
that the judicial acts of 1872 have made any material changes in
the particulars I have mentioned.
The act of Congress, approved June 8, 1872, departs from the
practice of the state courts as to the number of peremptory
challenges in civil cases; in the state courts, four peremptory
challenges are allowed, while only three are permitted in the
Federal Courts. The same rule applies to criminal cases, except in
trials for treason and felony. The act of Congress approved June 1,
1872, merely requires the practice pleadings and forms of
13. Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 447 (1830), 7 L.Ed 732.
14. United States v. King, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 833, 853–54 (1849), 12 L.Ed.
934.
15. Parks v. Turner, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 39, 44 (1851), 13 L.Ed. 883.
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proceedings, in other than equity and admiralty causes, to conform
to the practice, pleadings and forms of proceeding in the state
courts. This act seems to adopt the views of the Supreme Court of
the United States, in regard to the process act of 1824, as it
expressly excludes “equity causes” from its operation.
II. CIVIL LAW
The Justinian collections called the Corpus Juris Civilis,
constitute the basis of modern civil law so far as private rights are
concerned.
The public law of the Romans, their criminal law, their laws of
practice or procedure, and their laws as to private rights, before
and after Justinian, are not received; though a few of the provisions
and principles derived from these sources have been incorporated
in the modern civil law system.
Even the Justinian collections exercise little or no influence on
modern civil law, except in regard to rights of Roman origin or
growing out of transactions known to the Romans.
The law in regard to bills of exchange and promissory notes,
insurance, stocks, banks, the modern rights of corporations, the
modern laws of trade and commerce, and the laws of community
between the husband and wife are not of Roman origin, or they
have been so radically and thoroughly transformed in the process
of adaptation to the requirements of modern civilization that the
germ of the Roman law can be scarcely traced.
The Roman jurists are distinguished above all others, ancient or
modern, for their classic mode of enunciating principles of law, as
well as for the art of tracing, and the method of applying those
principles. The celebrated metaphysician Leibnitz remarks:
I have often said, that after the writings of the
geometricians, there is nothing extant comparable for force
and subtility with the writings of the Roman jurisconsults;
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so much nerve is there in them, and so much profundity. 16
Again he says:
I admire the digests, or rather the labors of the authors from
whom the Digests are extracted; whether you consider the
acumen of the reasoning, or the vigor of the expression, I
have never seen anything more nearly approach the
precision of mathematics. 17
The law of the Pandects is but a system of general legal
principles. For this reason, the enlightened jurists of the civilized
world resort to it as a magazine of jurisprudence, based on reason
and philosophy, and therefore, in its application and usefulness,
unrestricted by time and place.
It is necessary however, that you should have some idea of the
manner, in which the Roman law was gradually developed, and
molded into the system embodied in the Corpus Juris Civilis, as
well as of the sources of that law. I proceed to give you a rapid,
and therefore imperfect, sketch of the history and development of
the Roman law, preparatory to a discussion of its principles, so far
as they are incorporated into the jurisprudence of Louisiana.
It is well known that in the earliest period the Roman
government was a limited monarchy, the political power being
vested in king, senate and people. The people were separated into
two classes: the patricians, or hereditary nobility, and the
plebeians, or free citizens. At first, the plebeians were excluded
from any participation in the government and from the use of the
public lands.
16. In Latin: “In juris prudential regnat (romani). Dixi saepius post scripta
geometrarum nihil extare quod vic ac subtilitate cum romanorum
jurisconsultorum scriptis comparari possit:tantum nervi inest; tantum
profunditatis.” Gottfried Wilhelm Baron von Leibniz (1646–1716), German
philosopher and mathematician. NINETEENTH CENTURY NATION BUILDING AND
THE LATIN AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL TRADITION 57 (Janet Burke & Ted
Humphrey ed. & trans., 2007).
17. In Latin: “Ego Digestorum opus, vel potius auctorum, unde excerpta
sunt, labores admiror, nec quidquam vidi, sive rationum acumen, sive dicendi
nervos spectes, quod magis accedat ad mathematicorum . . . ” JOHN GEORGE
PHILLIMORE, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY AND HISTORY OF THE ROMAN LAW
233 (William Benning & Co., London 1848).
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The king and senate proposed laws that were submitted for
adoption to the vote of the national assemblies, called the curiae,
composed exclusively of patricians.
In later times, the laws were submitted for adoption to
assemblies, called centuriae, in which the plebeians, to a limited
extent, obtained some share in legislation. The law adopted in
assemblies of the curiae was called lex curiata, and law adopted in
assemblies of the centuriae was called lex centuriata.
When the kings were expelled, a republic was established, and
two consuls, who were patricians, were substituted for the king.
The plebeians, dissatisfied with the insignificant influence
exercised by them in the assemblies of the centuriae, which had
been so constituted as to almost overwhelm their voice by the
weight of rank and wealth, succeeded, after severe contests, in
establishing officers called “tribunes of the people”, to be chosen
from the plebeians, and, for the protection of their rights, vested
with authority to render any law ineffectual by a veto.
Soon, however, the tribunes acquired the right of proposing
laws to assemblies of the plebeians called comitia tribute, and
these laws, when approved, were called plebiscita.
The struggle between the two parties resulted in the adoption of
the celebrated Law of the Twelve Tables. ∗ This law is both a
political constitution and a law in regard to private rights. One of
its objects was to establish the political equality of the plebeians
with the patricians, and to define the limits of judicial power then
in the hands of the consuls. Besides this, it reduced to writing the
laws in regard to private rights, which had previously existed, and
merged the peculiar law of each tribe in one system. This law is
also called lex decemviralis, from the number of persons selected
to compose it.
The decemvirate first appointed was composed solely of
patricians; they reported ten tables. But the year following, a
∗

In 450 BC.
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decemvirate, composed of seven patricians and three plebeians,
added two to the former ten. Those twelve were engraved on
wood, ivory, or brass and exposed on the rostra for public
examination. It is said that an Ephesian exile imparted his
knowledge to the Roman legislators and, in recognition of his
services, a statue was erected in the forum to the memory of
Hermodorus.
The Romans entertained the greatest reverence for the Twelve
Tables and delighted to bestow encomiums on them as the highest
evidence of the wisdom of their ancestors. They vaunted the
superiority of Roman legislation over the jurisprudence of Draco,
Solon and Lycurgus, which Cicero does not hesitate to characterize
as rude and ridiculous while he asserts that the brief composition
of the decemvirs surpasses in genuine value of the libraries of
Grecian philosophy. 18 The Twelve Tables survived the devastation
of the Gauls, and subsisted at the time of Justinian; their
subsequent loss has been imperfectly repaired by fragments,
collected by modern critics, from the commentaries of Gaius
contained in the Pandects, from Ulpian’s fragments, from the
lately discovered Institutes of Gaius, and the Vatican fragments.
After the Twelve Tables, the Romans divided their law into jus
scriptum and jus non scriptum, or law established by custom. The
Institutes of Justinian perpetuated this distinction and defined “the
unwritten law to be that which usage has approved—for daily
customs, established by the consent of those who use them, put on
the character of the law.” 19 The written law consisted of the leges,
the plebiscita and the Senatus Consulta.

18. MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, DE RE PUBLICA DE LEGIBUS 223 (Clinton W.
Keyes trans., 1977); MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, DE ORATORE 123 (E.W. Sutton
trans., Harvard Univ. Press, 1942).
19. In Latin: “Ex non scripto jus venit, quod usus comprobavit: nam diuturni
mores cousensu utentium comprobati legem imitantur.” See THE INSTITUTES OF
JUSTINIAN 85 (Thomas Collett Sandars, trans. & ed., Longmans, Green, and Co.
3d ed., London, 1865).
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The leges were enacted on the proposal of a magistrate
presiding in the Senate and adopted by the Roman people in the
assemblies of the Centuriae, composed of patricians and plebeians.
These related almost entirely to Public Law.
The plebiscite were proposed by the tribune, and adopted by
the plebeians alone in the comitia tribute. For this reason, they
were binding on the plebeians only until, at a subsequent period, it
was decreed that all the Roman people should be bound by the
plebiscita.
The Senatus Consulta were decreed by the Senate, without the
concurrence of the plebeians, who objected to the force of these
decrees as to them; but when the Senate submitted the plebiscite,
the plebeians in turn acquiesced in the authority of the Senatus
Consulta.
The proper administration of justice in civil cases soon
required the establishment of the office of Praetor. He was styled
Praetor urbanus; his jurisdiction, at first, was restricted to cases in
which both parties were citizens of Rome. The increase of business
intercourse with strangers occasioned about a century later the
establishment of another Praetor to decide the suits of strangers
among themselves or with Romans. He was styled Praetor
Perigrinus. The term of office of the Praetor was one year.
The proper Roman law, jus civilis, was never applicable to
strangers. It was intended for Roman citizens only. But when the
Roman power was extended over Italy and other countries, the
necessities arising out of the new relations, and the incessant
intercourse with strangers, led the Romans to acknowledge and
apply a universal natural law in addition to their peculiar jus civile.
The principles of this universal natural law (called by them jus
gentium) were at first applied to strangers, but subsequently they
were extended to Romans also to moderate the rigor and correct
the injustice arising from the strict application of the jus civile.
This change was effected by the edicts of the Praetors, who
annually, on taking possession of office, announced the legal
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principles in accordance with which they would administer justice
during the year. Each successive Praetor adopted such rules of his
predecessor as had been sanctioned by reason and justice, so that
the annual edicts, by continual repetition of the same principles,
soon became in practice a fixed system of law. So fixed, indeed,
had become the principles of the Praetorian edicts, and for such a
long period had they been annually announced, that the annual
edict assumed the name of the “Perpetual Edict.” This praetorian
law was denominated jus honorarium, because, says the Institutes,
“the magistrates who have honors in the state have given their
sanction.” 20
The main principles of law having been thus established by the
Twelve Tables and the Praetor’s edicts, the lawyers began to
develop them more fully by interpretation. The law thus introduced
by jurists was called auctoritas prudentum. These opinions of
lawyers were never regarded as authority until Emperor Augustus
allowed some distinguished jurists to answer in his name. In the
reign of Tiberius, these responsa prudentum grew into
considerable credit. But it was not until the reign of Hadrian that
the responsa prudentum were vested with the authority of the law.
He decreed that the unanimous opinion of the jurists, specially
authorized to respond, should have the force of law. In case the
lawyers disagreed, the judge should follow the opinion which he
himself considered just. At a later period, Constantine determined,
by special ordinance, what writings of the old jurists should have
special authority. A century later, in the year 426, Theodosius II
issued a more extensive ordinance, in which he confirmed, by
name, the writings of Gaius, Ulpian, Paul, Papinian and
Modestinus, and forbade the judges to depart from the opinion of
these lawyers on questions of law. In case they differed in opinion,
the Emperor ordained, the judges should be governed by a
majority; in case of equal division, they should follow those to
20. In Latin: “. . .quod qui bonoremgerunt, id est magistratus, auctoritatem
huic juri dederunt.” Id. at 83.
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whom Papinian adhered. This ordinance was intended for the
Eastern Empire, but it soon obtained force in the Western Empire
as well. From Augustus to Trajan, says Gibbon, “the modest
Caesars were content to promulgate their edicts in the various
characters of a Roman Magistrate; and in the decrees of the Senate,
the epistles and orations of the princes were respectfully
inserted.” 21
The Institutes of Justinian expressly declare that the pleasure of
the emperor has the vigor and effect of law, since the Roman
people, by the royal law, have transferred to their prince the full
extent of their own power and sovereignty. Therefore, whatever
the emperor ordains by rescript, decree or edict is law. Such acts
are called constitutions. 22
In what manner the emperors were invested with legislative
power, is not precisely known. The newly discovered Institutes of
Gaius state that it was in virtue of a law, but it is uncertain,
whether this was a general law passed on the transition of the
government from a republican to the imperial form or a law passed
on the accession of each emperor. At all events, from the time of
Hadrian, the public and private jurisprudence was molded by the
will of the sovereign. The “gloomy and intricate forest of ancient
laws” in the language of Tertullian, “was cleared away by the axe
of royal mandates and constitutions.”23
The period just preceding Augustus surpassed all the others for
the variety and profundity of the productions of its jurists, whose
learning and sagacity advanced the science of law to a high degree
of perfection, but little is preserved of their writings to vindicate
their title of the appellation of “the classical jurists.” It is certain,
21. EDWARD GIBBON, 5 THE HISTORY OF THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE
ROMAN EMPIRE 268 (John Murray, London 1854)
22. In Latin: “Sed et quod principi placuit, legis habet vigorem; cum lege
regia quae de ejusimperio lata est, populus ei et in eum omne imperium suum et
potestatem concessit. Quodcumque ergo imperator per epistolam constituit, vel
cognoscens decrevit, vel edicto praecepit, legem esse constat; hae sunt quae
constitutions appellantur.” Supra note 19, at 82-83.
23. See GIBBON, supra note 21, at 269.
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however, that the jurists of the age, in which Cicero’s voice
resounded in the forum, being thoroughly imbued with Grecian
philosophy and the logic of Aristotle and the stoics, established
law as an art on a certain and general theory, and diffused over its
then-shapeless mass, the light of order and eloquence. The
foremost and most distinguished of these jurists was Servius
Sulpicius.
The period from Augustus to Alexander Severus is illustrated
by the writings of Gaius, Papinian, Ulpian, Paulus and Modestinus,
none of which, save the Institute of Gaius, have been preserved
except such fragments as are contained in the Pandects or in the
Fragmenta Vaticana. The Institutes of Gaius are particularly
interesting to us because they formed the foundation of the
Institutes of Justinian. It was not until the year 1816 that the
genuine Institutes of Gaius were discovered by Neibuhr in a codex
rescriptus in the library of the Cathedral chapter of Verona.
While the Syrian priest of the sun, Heliogabalus, surrounded
his throne with eunuchs, buffoons, and dwarfs, made senators of
coachmen and strollers, and created a senate of women to decide
upon questions of fashion, his successor and cousin, Alexander
Severus, was learning the great art of ruling from the celebrated
Christian doctor Origen who, in the early part of the third century,
was the friend of the future emperor’s mother. Alexander Severus
never became a Christian, but he revered Christianity and its divine
founder. He rendered divine honors to Jesus Christ, whose statue
was placed in his oratory. He even made a proposition to the
Senate to admit to rank among the gods the founder of a religion
whose morals were so pure. But the Senate, having consulted the
Oracles, received a response that if this new apotheosis were to be
celebrated, the temples would soon be abandoned and all of the
world become Christian. Notwithstanding the good will of
Alexander towards Christianity, the Roman legislation was not
changed in its hostile disposition towards the disciples of Jesus
Christ. The legists of the imperial palace, Ulpian and Paulus,
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whose names are as imposing in jurisprudence as they are odious
in the annals of Christianity, took pleasure in compiling the
ordinances which devoted the Christians to death.
The assassination of Alexander Severus at Mayence, in his
28th year, extinguished the hopes of good government, which
seemed so flattering at his accession to the throne.
The Roman law never felt the influence of the gospel until after
the Battle of Actium for Christianity was fought in the year 312.
The famous labarum of Constantine floated from a staff in the
form of a cross; above it sparkled a crown of gold and precious
stones, in the midst of which was the monogram of Christ.
Under this banner, two religions and two worlds met at the
Milvian bridge; two religions were face to face, armed on the
banks of the Tiber, in view of the capitol. Maxentius interrogated
the Sybilline books, sacrificed lions, and opened pregnant women,
to search the bosom of infants torn from their mothers’ wombs, for
it was supposed hearts that had never palpitated could not conceal
imposture. Constantine came by a divine impulse and the greatness
of his genius. These words are engraved on his triumphal arch,
Instinctu divinitatis, mentis magnitudine. 24
Scarcely had the “Successor of the Caesars” entered Rome as
victor when he sought out the representative of the Christian
church, the purple of whose spiritual royalty until now had been
the blood of the martyrs, and presented to him the Lateran palace
as a pontifical residence.
Constantine, born in ancient Maesia, brought up at the court of
Nicomedia, and proclaimed Emperor in Britain, had no sympathy
with Rome. Julius Caesar had once wished to rebuild Troy, the
24. The entirety of the engraving of Constantine’s triumphal arch reads:
To the Emperor Caesar Flavius Constantinus Maximus Pius Felix
Augustus the Senate and the Roman People dedicate this arch as a
memorial to his military triumphs, who by the inspiration of divinity
and his own genius avenged, with righteous arms in one instant, the
Republic against the tyrant and his faction.
The selection of “Instinctu divinitatis, mentis magnitudine” translated from the
Latin is: “to divine inspiration, mental magnitude (genius).”
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fabled cradle of the Roman race, and to make it the seat of Empire.
Constantine took up the idea with modification and fixed his
throne at Byzantium, which he called Constantinople. The rising
city was enriched with the spoils of Greece and Asia; they brought
idols of the now-unworshipped gods and the statues of great men.
The old metropolis also paid its tribute to the youthful rival now
growing at its side; Constantinople clothed itself with the
nakedness of other cities. The families of senatorial and equestrian
rank were brought from the banks of the Tiber to those of the
Bosphorus, here to find palaces equal to those they had forsaken.
From this time, the Christian religion became predominant and the
Latin language was gradually displaced by Greek. The two
principle cities had each an administration of its own, unconnected
with that of the Empire; the former state authorities thereby
became municipal magistrates. The Empire itself was divided into
four praefecturae praetoriae: the praefectus Orientis resided at
Constantinople; the praefectus Illyrici, at Thessalonica; the
praefectus Italiae, at Milan, and the praefectus Galliae, at Treves.
Another political change of considerable importance in the
history of private law was that the natural free development of the
law by the courts and jurists became more and more limited, in
conformity with the spirit of the autocratic government. The
autocracy assumed even the interpretation of the law, and hence
the multitudinous imperial decrees and constitutions.
Before Constantine, most of the Imperial ordinances were
decrees and rescripts. A decree was a decision in a judicial cause,
which had been brought by appeal before the Auditorium principis.
The rescript was the answer or direction of the emperor upon
applications, or questions, in doubtful cases.
The edicts were general ordinances, intended for the whole
people, and called constitutiones generales.
During the reign of Constantine and subsequently, the edicts
became frequent and often introduced extensive changes in the
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constitution of the nation, for the prevalence of Christianity had
changed, or subverted, many ancient opinions and usages.
The imperial constitutions, or edicts, having become very
numerous and complex, led two jurists, about the middle of the 5th
century, to make two compilations; that of Gregorius contained the
constitutions from Hadrian to Constantine, and that of Hermogenes
was a supplement to the former, containing the constitutions of
Diocletian and Maximian.
These were followed by the Theodosian Code (Codex
Theodosianus). Sixteen jurists compiled this code under an
ordinance of the Emperor Theodosius the Younger; it was a
collection of the edicts and many of the rescripts and was
published as a code for the Eastern Empire in the year 438.
Theodosius sent this code to his son-in-law, Valentinian III, who
confirmed it in the same year for the Western Empire. The
Theodosian code consisted in sixteen books, each of which was
subdivided into titles; from the conclusion of the sixth book to the
end of it remains entire. Lately, the first five books and part of the
sixth have been discovered at Turin.
The Fragmenta Vaticana, edited by Angelo Mai in 1823 from
a codex rescriptus of the Vatican Library, contains fragments of
law-writers from the time of Alexander Severus to Justinian, and
of imperial constitutions. They appear to be remains of a large
collection during the time that intervened, between the Codex
Hermogenianus and the Codex Theodosianus.
In the year 500, Theodoric, King of the Ostrogoths, after the
fall of the Roman Empire of the West, issued an edict intended not
only for the Romans, but also for the Ostrogoths. This edict is
entirely derived from the Roman law, especially from the Codex
Theodosianus, the later novels and Pauli sententiae rescriptae.
Alaric II, King of the Visigoths, in the year 506, published a
code affecting only the Romans living in his Empire. This code is a
compilation from the previous codes, the later novels, and the
writings of Gaius, Paulus and Papinian.
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This collection is called the Breviarium Alaricianum and in it
many passages have been preserved which would otherwise have
been lost from the first five books of the Theodosian Code and the
writings of Gaius, Paulus and Papinian.
After the time of Theodosius II, nothing was done in the East
to facilitate the administration and study of the law until Justinian
ascended the imperial throne in the year 527.
Justinian was the first, after Theodosius, who undertook a new
collection of the imperial constitutions, which was intended to
form a substitute for previous collections.
For this purpose, he appointed ten lawyers; among them was
the celebrated Tribonian and at their head was Johannes the Exquaestor of the Sacred Palace.
In fourteen months, the labors of this commission were
completed. This new code consisted of twelve books; it was
confirmed by a special ordinance prohibiting the use of the older
collections of rescripts and edicts. This first code of Justinian is
called the Codex Vetus and is now entirely lost.
After the code was published, Justinian, in the year 530,
ordered Tribonian and sixteen other jurists to select all of the most
valuable passages from the writings of the old jurists, which were
regarded as authoritative, and arrange them according to their
subjects under suitable headings. He gave them extensive powers
and suspended the citation law of Theodosius II, who had
prohibited citation from the writings of any other jurists than those
specified in his ordinance. The Tribonian commission, however,
were not confined to the letter of the passages they might select.
They had the privilege to abridge, to add, and to alter, but were
directed to avoid repetitions, remove contradictions, and omit the
obsolete. The result was that the extracts contained in the Pandects
did not always truly represent the originals, which were often
interpolated, or amended, to conform to the views of the
commission as to the existing law.
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These alterations, additions, or modifications were called
Emblemata Triboniani.
The work was completed in three years; within this time the
commission had extracted from the writings of thirty-nine jurists
all that was considered valuable. It is said the writings inspected
and extracted from consisted of two thousand treatises, containing,
in the aggregate, three million lines, which were reduced to fifty
books containing one hundred and fifty thousand lines. Over every
extract a heading was placed containing the name of the work from
which it was, or should have been, derived.
The whole composition consisting of fifty books was entitled
Digesta sive Pandectae juris enucleate ex omni vetere collecti. The
Pandects were published December 16, 533 A.D., and were put in
force on December 20, 533. In compiling the Pandects, the
commission met with important unsettling controversies.
Justinian, however, settled thirty-four of the controversial
questions before the commencement of the Pandects, and before
its completion these decisions increased to fifty. These decisions
were afterwards embodied in the new code of Justinian called
Codex repetitae praelectionis.
As the Pandects were unsuited to the use of those just
beginning the study of law, Justinian ordered Tribonian, with the
assistance of Theophilius and Dorotheus, to prepare a brief treatise,
which should contain the elements of legal science.
This resulted in the Institutes, published November 21, 533,
which obtained legal force on the same day as the Pandects—
December 30, 533.
This work is but a revised edition of Gaius’ Institutes, in which
the obsolete was omitted and the new constitutions of Justinian
were referred to. After the publication of the Pandects and
Institutes, the code was revised by Tribonian and four other
lawyers. This revision included a great many new constitutions and
the fifty decisions; it was put in operation November 16, 534, and
the old code was abolished.
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During the long reign of Justinian, after the publication of the
new code, many constitutions were issued, by which the laws were
materially changed; the greater part of these new constitutions
were written in Greek and are also called novels: Novellae
Constintutiones.
After the death of Justinian, a collection of 168 novels was
made, 154 of which had been issued by him and the residue by his
successors.
Justinian’s law collections were intended only for the East, but
after he conquered the Ostrogoths, who then ruled Italy, he sent his
compilations there, and, by special edict, ordered them to be
introduced in the court and law schools.
During all the political changes which subsequently took place
in the West, the use of Justinian’s collections continued
uninterruptedly, even in the Empire of the Lombards in France.

